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24 December 1997: Link to The New York Times report

17 December 1997
Thanks to Steve Bellovin

See related CESG paper on the history of PK crypto: http://jya.com/ellisdoc.htm

    To: cryptography@c2.net
    cc: Matt Blaze <mab@crypto.com>
    Subject: Re: secret history of the development of PK crypto
    Date: Wed, 17 Dec 1997 14:13:34 -0500
    From: Steven Bellovin <smb@research.att.com>

    There is, I think, a lot more that is to be learned about the development
    of public key crypto inside of assorted agencies.  Diffie notes that in
    the 1986 Encyclopedia Britannica (I haven't checked later editions), the
    director of NSA claimed (without substantiation) that NSA had had public
    key crypto a decade earlier than Diffie and Hellman.

    Let me add what little I can.  At the Fairfax conference a few years ago,
    Whit Diffie organized a Festcolloquium in honor of Gus Simmons, who
    was retiring.  Gus told of how he learned of public key crypto -- the same
    way many of us did, by reading Martin Gardner's column in Scientific
    American.  Simmons was on his way to Australia to give a talk; he said he
    was immediately struck by the implications of this technique for nuclear
    weapons command and control -- his field -- so he tore up his talk and
    made up a new one on the plane.  It seemed clear, at that point, that he
    had not known of the technique.  (An alternative explanation, of course,
    is that he knew of it but couldn't speak about it until it was
    rediscovered.  I did not get that impression at the time.)

    The next speaker was someone who had recently retired from the upper
    echelons of NSA.  (His name escapes me; Matt, do you remember who it was?)
    He spoke of National Security Action Memorandum 160 (from June 6, 1962),
    entitled "Permissive Links for Nuclear Weapons in NATO".  The claim was
    that this memo -- signed by President Kennedy and endorsing a memo from
    his science advisor, Jerome Weisner -- was the basis for the invention
    of public key cryptography by NSA.  Simmons nodded in vigorous agreement.

    When the conference was over, Matt Blaze called up the Kennedy Library in
    Cambridge, MA, and asked about getting a copy of the memo.  It was
    classified -- but the person to whom he spoke initiated a declassification
    review.  Fairly promptly, he received a sanitized copy.

    This version has been sitting around here for four years.  I've finally
    gotten around to scanning them in and putting them up on the Web.  I'll
    make up some fancier pages later; for now, they're sitting in
    http://www.research.att.com/~smb/nsam-160/pg?.gif, where ? ranges from
    1 through 7.  (N.B.  The files may not be there this instant, until the
    staging daemon runs; they will be within a few hours.)

    -----

    [End Bellovin message]

    http://www.research.att.com/~smb/nsam-160/pg1.gif through pg7.gif

    Seven images mirrored on this site:

    http://jya.com/nsam160-pg1.gif (20.5K)
    http://jya.com/nsam160-pg2.gif (8.7K)
    http://jya.com/nsam160-pg3.gif (23.9K)
    http://jya.com/nsam160-pg4.gif (28.4K)
    http://jya.com/nsam160-pg5.gif (26.1K)
    http://jya.com/nsam160-pg6.gif (29.7K)
    http://jya.com/nsam160-pg7.gif (27.5K)

    Images transcribed below.

                           THE WHITE HOUSE
                              WASHINGTON

                             June 6, 1962

    SECRET
    RESTRICTED DATA

    NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 160

    TO:        The Secretary of State
               The Secretary of Defense
               The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
               The Director, Bureau of the Budget

    SUBJECT:   Permissive Links for Nuclear Weapons in NATO

         1.  After an examination of the problem of installing per-
    missive links in nuclear weapons dispersed in NATO commands,
    I have decided we should now make the commitment to procure
    appropriate devices for all nuclear weapons, now dispersed and
    to be dispersed to NATO commands, for both non-U. S. and U. S.
    forces.  (See attached memorandum to me from Dr. Weisner
    dated May 29. This decision corresponds to Alternative 5
    of that memorandum.)

         2.  This will require a supplementary appropriation for
    the Atomic Energy Commission budget.  The Secretary of Defense,
    the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director,
    Bureau of the Budget will work out the details of the budget pre-
    sentation.

         3.  At the earliest feasible time, the Secretary of Defense
    will submit for my approval a schedule for the installation of these
    devices in NATO weapons.  In making this schedule, the Secretary
    should consult with the Secretary of State on the political problems
    arising from the existence of weapons assigned to U. S. Forces and
    weapons assigned to our allies.

                                                 SECRET
                                                 RESTRICTED DATA

                                                 [Stamp]
                                                 DECLASSIFIED
                                                 E.O. 12356 Sec 3.4
                                                 NLK-94-5
                                                 By SKF NARA 11/22/93

    SECRET
    RESTRICTED DATA

                               - 2 -

         4.  The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, in con-
    sultation with the secretary of Defense, will carry on a research
    program on an urgent basis directed toward an examination of the
    feasibility and desireablity of more advanced permissive link
    devices with a wider range of capabilities.

                                             [Signature]

                                        cc:  Dr. Weisner
                                             General Taylor
                                             Mrs. Lincoln
                                             Mr. Bundy (3)
                                             Mr. C. E. Johnson
                                             Mr. Kaysen (2)
                                             White House Files
                                             NSC Files

                                             SECRET
                                             RESTRICTED DATA

    [Fax header following pages]
    DEC 15 '93  05:16PM ATT 908 949 0399                     P. 6 through 10

    [Stamp following pages]
    This document contains restricted data as defined
    in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its transmittal
    or the disclosure of its contents in any manner to
    an unauthorized person is prohibited.

    SANITIZED COPY

                           THE WHITE HOUSE
                              WASHINGTON

    SECRET
                             May 29, 1962

    MEMORANDUM FOR

         THE PRESIDENT

    At your request I have reviewed, in consultation with the AEC
    and the DOD, the technical and cost aspects of equipping nuclear
    weapons dispersed overseas with permissive link hardware.  The
    object of this review was to establish the program options that
    were technically available to implement such a program as rapidly
    as possible, and to determine the amount of supplemental funds
    that would have to be requested in the AEC FY '63 budget to ac-
    complish these options.

    A decision on this problem involves the following basic policy
    issues which, while not technical in themselves, are affected by
    the availability of equipment and the program timing and cost:

                   (1) Should a permissive link be incorporated at this time
    in all dispersed nuclear weapons or just in those critical weapon
    systems with quick reaction, high yield, and long range (e.g.,
    Jupiter missiles and quick reaction aircraft)?

                   (2) Should a permissive link be incorporated at this
    time in all weapons dispersed to NATO (U.S. as well as non-U.S.)
    or just non-U.S. weapons?

                   (3) Should a permissive link be incorporated at this time
    in weapons committed to NATO but based in the U.K. as well as weapons
    based on the European Continent?

    These policy issues raise the more basic question as to what ob-
    jective one is attempting to accomplish by incorporating permis-

                                                         SECRET

                                                         [Stamp]

                                                         SANITIZED
                                                         E.O. 12356 Sec 3.4
                                                         NLK-94-5
                                                         By SKF NARA 11/22/93

                               - 2 -

    sive link.  A permissive link can attempt to meet any of the follow-
    ing objectives, each of which imposes increasingly difficult tech-
    nical problems.

              (1) Safeguarding weapons against actions by an individual
    psychotic;

              (2) Meeting the legal and political requirements of
    U.S. control;

              (3) Maintaining control against the unauthorized use of
    weapons by our own or allied military forces under conditions of
    high tension or actual military combat;

              (4) Assuring that weapons could not be use, if forceably
    seized by an organized group of individuals or by a foreign power.

    The first of these objectives (safeguarding against a psychotic) has
    already at least in part been met and the last objective (assuring
    weapons could not be used if seized) cannot be fully achieved without
    further development which would assure the self-destruction of the
    weapons if efforts were made to by-pass the permissive link. For
    the purpose of this review, I have not attempted to meet a specific
    objective but rather have analyzed the operational value of the best
    available equipment and attempted to determine how rapidly it could
    be incorporated in dispersed nuclear weapons.

    While the permissive link equipment presently recommended by the
    AEC leaves something to be desired and can clearly be much im-
    proved with time, I believe that this equipment can be used as the
    basis for a crash program since development quality hardware exists
    and initial production and installation could begin in the immediate
    future.

    Specifically, the AEC recommends that, if a permissive link program
    is undertaken on a crash basis, bombs for aircraft and warheads for
    longer range missiles be equipped with an electro-mechanical lock
    which would have to receive a preset numerical code in order to make
    the weapon operable. In the case of certain bombs which cannot be
    easily retrofitted with this equipment, as an interim measure pending
    the development of improved compatible permissive link hardware,

                                                                 SECRET

                             - 3 -

    mechanical combination locks would be installed to cover a socket
    into which an arming plug must be inserted. In the case of these
    bombs as well as short range missiles, such as Honest John and
    Nike Hercules, and teh 8-inch shell, the arming plugs would be
    stored in self-destruct safes. The proposed program does not
    include a specific hardware for the Davy Crockett missile which
    presents a particularly difficult problem because of its small size
    and possible forward deployment.

    The numbers which would operate both the electro-mechanical and
    the combination lock could be held at any echelon of command. If
    circumstances required, the combination could be held by the U.S.
    custodial officer himself. This procedure could therefore give the
    weapons the same state of readiness that they now possess.

    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ...............................Despite the limitations of this
    equipment, I believe it would give further (and probably decisive
    protection against individual psychotics and would certainly deter
    unauthorized use by military forces holding the weapons during
    periods of high tension or military combat. ......................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    .... The question of the legal and political requirements of control
    were beyond the scope of my review.

    The question has been raised whether the installation of this develop-
    ment quality hardware on a crash basis might reduce th reliability
    of the nuclear weapons. However, in view of the simple nature of

                                                                 SECRET

                             - 4 -

    of this equipment and the method of installation, I believe that it is
    now generally agreed that it would not reduce the inherent reliability
    of the weapons. The weapons would, of course, not be operable if the
    combination number were not received from a higher headquarters.
    This is a communication and management problem, which can be very
    simple or complex, depending on the level of command at which
    the combination number is held and the degree of control maintained
    through coding procedures or the use of different combination number
    for different weapons. In its simplest form, it should be possible to
    handle this procedure wherever a "go code" can be transmitted which
    is presumably a requirement if any control is to exist. In any event, I
    wish to emphasize that, if circumstances demand, a decision can be
    made to release the combination number to the U.S. custodian with the
    field unit and thereby revert to the state of readiness and control that
    exists today.

    At my request, the AEC has estimated the cost and time for completion
    of the following five alternative programs, which I believe represent the
    full range of possible application of th permissive link on a crash basis
    to nuclear weapons dispersed to the European Theater:

    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................
    ..................................................................

            Alternative II - All nuclear weapons assigned to non-U.S.
    NATO forces exclusive  of those assigned to U.K. delivery systems based
    in the U.K.

            Alternative III - All NATO weapons assigned to non-U.S.
    NATO forces including of those assigned to U.K. delivery systems based
    in the U.K.

            Alternative IV - All nuclear weapons assigned to non-U.S. NATO
    forces and all U.S. weapons committed to and dispersed to NATO exclusive
    of U.S. weapons on U.S. delivery systems based in the U.K.

            Alternative V - All nuclear weapons assigned to non-U.S. NATO
    forces and all U.S. weapons committed to and dispersed to NATO including
    those based in the U.K. and assigned to the naval attack aircraft on carriers
    based in European waters.

    The estimated completion date, total cost, and FY '63 cost

                                                                 SECRET

                             - 5 -

    for each of these programs is as follows:

                  Estimated Date            Total Cost    FY'63 Cost
    Alternative   Completed Installation    ($ Millions)  ($ Millions)
    __________________________________________________________________

    I             June 1963                    2.9            2.9
    II            Oct. 1963                    8.1            7.8
    III           Dec. 1963                   10.2            8.7
    IV            Mar. 1964                   15.2           10.7
    V             Aug. 1964                   23.4           10.7
    __________________________________________________________________

    A supplemental to the AEC FY '63 Budget would call for obligation of
    the total cost of the program but expenditure of on the FY '63 cost
    of the program.

    On the basis of this review, I have concluded that it is technically pos-
    sible to equip on a crash basis all nuclear weapons dispersed to the
    European Theater with reasonably effective permissive link equip-
    ment at a relatively small cost. Therefore, the decision as to the ex-
    tent to which permissive link equipment should in fact be incorporated
    in dispersed weapons can be made solely in terms of broad policy con-
    siderations as to the desired objective.

    Whatever decision is made on the crash program to install permissive
    link equipment on dispersed nuclear weapons equipment, I would recom-
    mend that a vigorous program be undertaken to develop an improved
    electronic lock which would be incorporated directly in the electronic
    package associated with all future weapons so that the option of a per-
    missive link would always exist. This program should also include
    work to develop improved devices to retrofit the bombs and short
    range missiles which were equipped with combination locks only as
    an interim measure in the above crash program. I would also recom-
    mend that there be an aggressive research program to develop more
    advanced concepts of the permissive link including mechanisms to
    assure the self-destruction of a weapon if efforts were made to by-pass
    the permissive link. It is my understanding that the AEC has funds
    available to cover the R&D necessary for these advanced programs.

                                          [Signature]

                                          Jerome N. Weisner

                                                                SECRET

    [End]