25 March 1998

    From: "Yaman Akdeniz" <lawya@lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk>
    To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk
    Date: Wed, 25 Mar 1998 18:02:57 GMT0BST
    Subject: US official concedes that key recovery is inferior to alternativ

    Members will find the following EPIC press release of interest.

    Yaman

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           U.S. OFFICIAL CONCEDES THAT "KEY RECOVERY" ENCRYPTION
              IS INFERIOR TO ALTERNATIVE PRIVACY TECHNIQUES

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                    CONTACT:
    Wednesday, March 25, 1998                David Sobel/Dave Banisar

                                             (202) 544-9240

    WASHINGTON, DC -- A top U.S. official acknowledged more than a
    year ago that the Internet privacy technique championed by the
    Clinton Administration is "more costly and less efficient" than
    alternative methods that the government seeks to suppress.  The
    concession is contained in a newly-released high-level document on
    encryption policy obtained by the Electronic Privacy Information
    Center (EPIC).

    In a November 1996 memorandum to other government officials,
    William A. Reinsch, the Commerce Department's Under Secretary for
    Export Administration, discussed the Administration's efforts to
    promote "escrowed" or "recoverable" encryption techniques in overseas
    markets.  Such techniques enable government agents to unscramble
    encrypted information and they form the cornerstone of current U.S.
    encryption policy.

    After noting that government regulations permit the export of non-
    escrowed encryption products only to "safe end-users" such as foreign
    police and security agencies, Reinsch recognized the inferiority of
    the Administration's favored technology:

         Police forces are reluctant to use "escrowed" encryption
         products (such as radios in patrol cars). They are more
         costly and less efficient than non-escrowed products.
         There can be long gaps in reception due to the escrow
         features -- sometimes as long as a ten second pause. Our
         own police do not use recoverable encryption products;
         they buy the same non-escrowable products used by their
         counterparts in Europe and Japan.

    Ironically, Reinsch's concession is contained in a memorandum that
    discusses the Administration's strategy to "help the market transition
    from non-recoverable products to recoverable products." According to
    EPIC Legal Counsel David Sobel, the newly released document "suggests
    that the Clinton Administration is trying to sell key recovery
    technology while quietly recognizing its inferiority.  This approach
    will ultimately weaken the global position of the American computer
    industry and hold back the development of the privacy protections so
    badly needed on the Internet."

    EPIC and other critics of current U.S. encryption policy have long
    maintained that "key escrow" and "key recovery" approaches compromise
    the security of private information by providing "backdoor" access to
    encrypted data.

    The Reinsch memo was released in response to a Freedom of
    Information Act request EPIC submitted to the Department of State
    concerning the international activities of former U.S. "crypto czar"
    David Aaron.  That request is the subject of a pending federal lawsuit
    initiated by EPIC last year.

    The memorandum is available at the EPIC website at:

         http://www.epic.org/crypto/key_escrow/reinsch_memo.html

                                 - end

    .....................................................................
    . . David L. Sobel, Legal Counsel                *   +1 202 544 9240
    (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center        *   +1 202 547 5482
    (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 301          *   sobel@epic.org
    Washington, DC 20003   USA                   *   http://www.epic.org .

    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    Yaman Akdeniz <lawya@leeds.ac.uk>
    Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK) at:

    http://www.leeds.ac.uk/law/pgs/yaman/yaman.htm

    Read CR&CL (UK) Report, 'Who Watches the Watchmen'

    http://www.leeds.ac.uk/law/pgs/yaman/watchmen.htm
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~