29 May 1999.
Source: Betrayal, Bill Gertz, Washington, D.C., 1999. ISBN 0-89526-317-3. Thanks to Bill Gertz.

See Betrayal excerpts: http://www.washtimes.com/investiga/gertz1.html. See other secret documents in the book:

> http://cryptome.org/jya/tsdocs-gertz.htm

> http://cryptome.org/jya/bmddocs-gertz.htm

> http://cryptome.org/jya/cndocs-gertz.htm

> http://cryptome.org/jya/rudocs-gertz.htm

From an Appendix of 59 images of classified government documents, pp. 219-84.

Original in capitalized text.

[pp. 255-64]

These text excerpts from a 1998 cable from the US. embassy in South Korea reveal a looming crisis: North Korea is gradually disintegrating as a nation, and the Clinton administration's attempts at diplomacy have failed to adequately prepare the U.S. for the growing threat of North Korean collapse. (10 pages)

SECRET

R 070810Z AUG 98
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2727
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEBASSY TOKYO
AMEBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL SENYANG
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEBASSY LONDON
AMEBASSY PARIS
AMEBASSY BONN
AIT TAIPEI 5359
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA//
CJCS WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//J5//
USCINCUND SEOUL LOR//UNCMAC/SA//

SECRET
EXDIS
SPECAT
E.O. 12958:DECL: (AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION)
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, ECON, KN

SUBJECT: THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: REFLECTIONS ON NORTH KOREA

REF: SEOUL 3724
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR BOSWORTH. REASONS: 1.5 (B), (D)

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1. (C) THIS IS AN END-OF-TOUR ESSAY BY POL/EXT CHIEF LARRY ROBINSON, WHO HAS BEEN THE EMBASSY'S NORTH KOREAN WATCHER FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS. IT IS IN SOME SENSE A COMPANION PIECE TO REFTEL, WHICH ANALYZED PRESIDENT KIM DAE-JUNG'S "SUNSHINE POLICY" TOWARD NORTH KOREA AND WHY THE NORTH WAS LIKELY TO VIEW IT AS MORE OF A THREAT THAN AN OPPORTUNITY.

2. (S) THIS ESSAY FOCUSES ON NORTH KOREA'S INTERNAL SITUATION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE. U.S. IT CONCLUDES THAT:

-- KIM JONG-IL IS A WEAK LEADER WHOSE SAVING GRACE IS HIS AWARENESS OF HIS OWN INADEQUACIES. HE KNOWS WHAT IS WRONG IN THE DPRK, BUT LACKS THE VISION, THE STRENGTH OF CHARACTER, AND THE LEGITIMACY TO CHANGE POLICY. ACCORDINGLY, HE APPEARS ALSO TO LACK THE ABILITY TO THINK SYSTEMATICALLY, TREATING EACH OF THE ISSUES THAT COMES ACROSS HIS DESK IN ISOLATION. AT 56, HE CANNOT REALISTICALLY BE EXPECTED TO CHANGE PERSONALITY.

-- OF KIM JONG-IL'S THREE MAIN POWER BASES -- THE KOREAN WORKERS PARTY (KWP) APPARATUS, THE SOCIALIST YOUTH LEAGUE AND THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY (KPA) -- ONLY LATTER IS FUNCTIONING NORMALLY. HIS CONTROL OVER THE KPA LOOKS SOLID, BUT THIS MAY BE DECEPTIVE; KIM HIMSELF DOES NOT APPEAR TO BELIEVE HE HAS A FIRM GRIP ON MILITARY LOYALTY.

-- THE REST OF THE DPRK GOVERNMENT HAS LARGELY CEASED TO FUNCTION. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY OF THE MAJOR ORGANS OF STATE POWER HAS MET SINCE 1994. MINISTRIES GO THROUGH THE MOTIONS WITH NO CENTRAL COORDINATION . THE KWP HAS BEEN REDUCED TO THE ROLE OF CHEERLEADER AND HAGIOGRAPHER. A TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM CANNOT FUNCTION WITHOUT A PLAN, AND NORTH KOREA HAS NEITHER A PLAN NOR EVEN A BUDGET. A BYZANTINE FORM OF BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS IS PLAYED, THOUGH NOT ALONG THE SIMPLE MFA VS KPA SPLIT THAT DPRK DIPLOMATS CLAIM.

-- WITH NO SYSTEMATIC ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES, THE DPRK'S FORMAL ECONOMY IS EFFECTIVELY DEFUNCT. PER CAPITA GNP MAY BE AS LOW AS THE $239 THAT PYONGYANG REPORTED TO THE UN LAST YEAR. FOOD SHORTAGES ARE JUST THE MOST VISIBLE SYMPTOM OF THIS UNPRECEDENTED COLLAPSE. IN ORDER TO ENABLE PEOPLE TO SURVIVE, NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES HAVE GRUDGINGLY ALLOWED THE EMERGENCE OF AN INFORMAL ECONOMY BASED LARGELY ON CORRUPTION. THE UNTRAMMELED WORKINGS OF THIS PROTO-CAPITALIST ECONOMY HAVE HAD A DEVASTATING IMPACT ON SOCIAL ORDER AND STABILITY AND MAY HAVE REINFORCED NORTH KOREANS' AVERSION TO GENUINE MARKET REFORMS.

-- NORTH KOREAN ELITES HAVE TO COPE WITH AN EXTRAORDINARY DEGREE OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: ALL THE INFORMATION THAT REACHES THEM ABOUT THE STATE OF THEIR COUNTRY AND THE REST OF THE WORLD IS IN FUNDAMENTAL CONFLICT WITH WHAT THEY ARE REQUIRED TO BELIEVE. AN APPARENTLY LARGE AND GROWING NUMBER OF THEM HAVE LOST THEIR FAITH IN THE OFFICIAL IDEOLOGY. SOME ARE BEGINNING TO RISK DISCUSSING THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS WITH RELATIVES AND CLOSE FRIENDS. WITH THE SECURITY SERVICES INCREAS-INGLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO CORRUPTION, THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE LIKELY TO SPREAD AND INCREASE POLITICAL VOLATILITY.

-- DESPITE ITS AVOWED POLICY OF "JUCHE," OR SELF-RELIANCE, NORTH KOREA HAS ALWAYS DEPENDED ON THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS. KIM IL-SUNG WAS A MASTER AT MANIPULATING COLD WAR AND SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS TO KEEP THE SUBSIDIES FLOWING. KIM JONG-IL HAS LOST THE LEVERAGE TO DO THIS, AS THE VIEWS OF ALL THE MAJOR OUTSIDE POWERS HAVE CONVERGED. BUT INSTEAD OF TAKING THE ADVICE THAT ALL THESE OUTSIDERS PRESS UPON HIM KIM IS STILL LOOKING FOR A NEW, UNDEMANDING PATRON. AT HIS FATHER'S DIRECTION, HE HAS TRIED TO CAST THE U.S. IN THIS ROLE. THE UN AND THE SOUTH KOREAN CHAEBOL MAY BE THE NEXT TARGETS.

-- PREDICTING THE TIMING AND NATURE OF A DPRK POLITICAL COLLAPSE IS IMPOSSIBLE. GENUINE REFORM IS CONCEIVABLE, IF UNLIKELY, AS IS AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF MUDDLING THROUGH, AND A DECISION TO GO TO WAR CANNOT BE RULED OUT. OF THE NUMEROUS OTHER SCENARIOS, MOST INVOLVE SOME KIND OF COUP AT SOME STAGE. WE DO NOT WANT THAT OUTCOME, AND SHOULD SEEK TO AVERT IT; BUT ASSUMING THAT OUR POLICIES WILL PREVENT IT IS A DANGEROUS TRAP.

-- THERE IS NO "MAGIC BULLET" THAT WILL BRING ABOUT A MAJOR BREAK-THROUGH IN U.S.-DPRK RELATIONS. NEW INITIATIVES ARE LIKELY TO CONFUSE DPRK LEADERS AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO HOLD OUT FOR MORE. THE OFFERS WE HAVE ON THE TABLE ARE GOOD ONES. IF THE DPRK MAKES A FUNDAMENTAL DECI-SION TO COOPERATE THE CURRENT OFFERS WILL BE MORE THAN ADEQUATE TO TRANSFORM THE RELATIONSHIP: ABSENT SUCH A DECISION, NOTHING IS GOING TO WORK. WE SHOULD BE FIRM, PATIENT AND PREDICTABLE IN PURSUING OUR CUR-RENT INITIATIVES AND WE SHOULD DO A BETTER JOB OF FOLLOWING THROUGH ON OUR COMMITMENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, WE NEED TO SUPPLEMENT PURSUIT OF OUR POSITIVE GOALS WITH PREPARATIONS FOR COLLAPSE -- JUST AS OUR MILITARY PREPARATIONS FOR WAR SUPPLEMENT DETERRENCE.

END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

THE INADEQUATE LEADER

3. (S) KIM JONG-IL REMAINS ONE OF THE MOST ENIGMATIC OF NATIONAL LEADERS. LIKE THE WIZARD OF OZ, HE HIDES BEHIND A SCREEN AND ISSUES PRONOUNCEMENTS THROUGH A MEGAPHONE ENOUGH ANECDOTAL INFORMATION HAS SEEPED OUT OF NORTH KOREA THROUGH DEFECTORS AND VISITORS. HOWEVER, THAT WE CAN PIECE TOGETHER A REASONABLY COHERENT PICTURE OF THE MAN. WE KNOW, FOR INSTANCE, THAT HE HAS BEEN LIVING A LIE THROUGH MOST OF HIS LIFETIME: HIS "BIRTHPLACE'' ON MT PAEKTU HAS BEEN RELOCATED AND REBUILT TO GIVE IT GREATER SYMBOLIC WEIGHT. BUT THE OLD GUARD AND MANY OF KIM'S INNER CIRCLE KNOW THAT HE WAS REALLY BORN IN KHABAROVSK, WHERE HIS FATHER WAS BUSY LIBERATING KOREA FROM JAPANESE RULE AS A MAJOR IN THE RED ARMY, WE KNOW THAT KIM JONG-IL HAD AN UNHAPPY CHILDHOOD, LOSING HIS ADORED MOTHER, AND YOUNGER BROTHER AS A BOY AND HATING HIS STEPMOTHER. HIS CAMPAIGN IN LATER 1997 TO DEIFY HIS MOTHER, AND HIS PERSISTENT EFFORTS TO MARGINALIZE HIS STEPMOTHER AND SIBLINGS INDICATE THAT THIS ENMITY PERSISTS. HIS SISTER, KIM KYUNG-HEE, HAS PROBABLY BEEN HIS CLOSEST CONFIDANTE, THOUGH A REPORT IN FEBRUARY CLAIMED EVEN SHE HAD BEEN PURGED.

4. (C) IT IS ALSO REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT KIM JONG-IL IDOLIZED HIS FATHER, WHO ENJOYED THE GENUINE ADULATION OF VIRTUALLY ALL NORTH KOREANS (AND THE GRUDGING ADMIRATION OF MANY IN THE SOUTH) IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THIS RESPECT WAS RECIPROCATED: THERE ARE NUMEROUS STORIES OF PUT-DOWNS BY FATHER TO SON, INCLUDING KIM JONG-IL'S OWN CURIOUS ADMISSION IN HIS SPEECH AT KIM IL-SUNG UNIVERSITY IN DECEMBER 1996 THAT HIS FATHER ALWAYS TOLD HIM TO LEAVE ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING TO OTHERS, AND ACCORDING TO THE FORMER PLAYMATE OF KIM JONG-IL'S OLDEST SON, WHO LIVED IN HIS HOUSE FOR SEVERAL YEARS, KIM IL-SUNG NEVER ONCE CAME TO VISIT.

5. (S) KIM IL-SUNG WAS EVERYTHING HIS SON WAS NOT -- PHYSICALLY IMPOSING, AN ELOQUENT PUBLIC SPEAKER, A CHARISMATIC LEADER, A COMMANDER WHO LED FROM THE FRONT WITH GENUINE (IF EXAGGERATED) MILITARY CREDENTIALS. KIM JONG-IL, BY CONTRAST, IS SO UNPREPOSSESSING THAT RUSSIAN AND CHINESE DIPLOMATS TELL US THEIR LEADERS HAVE MET HIM FREQUENTLY IN COMPANY WITH HIS FATHER, BUT NONE CAN REMEMBER HAVING DONE SO. WHILE SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO HAVE MET THE YOUNGER KIM IN PRIVATE DESCRIBE HIM AS AN INTELLIGEN[T] AND ARTICULATE INTERLOCUTOR, THE FACT THAT HE HAS NEVER ATTEMPTED MORE THAN ONE SENTENCE IN A PUBLIC VENUE LENDS CREDENCE TO THE PERSISTENT RUMORS THAT HE STUTTERS UNDER PRESSURE. HE IS CLEARLY A VERY SHY PERSON, SKIPPING MOST PUBLIC CEREMONIES (EVEN FOR HIS OWN BIRTHDAY) AND SOCIALIZING ONLY WITH A TINY COHORT OF FRIENDS. HIS SON'S PLAYMATE SAID HE ALMOST INVARIABLY TOOK BOTH LUNCH AND SUPPER AT HOME, AND HER BROTHER SAID KIM WORKED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY AT NIGHT WITH SHIFTS OF TYPISTS TO TRANSCRIBE AND DISTRIBUTE HIS ORDERS.

6. (S) ACCORDING TO HWANG JANG-YOP, KIM IL-SUNG AND KIM JONG-IL WERE ACUTELY AWARE OF THE LATTER'S LIMITATIONS, AND SPENT TWO DECADES CONSTRUCTING A GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE THAT HE -- AND ONLY HE -- COULD CONTROL. KIM JONG-IL RULES MOSTLY BY TELEPHONE AND FAX, SELDOM SEEING EVEN SENIOR PARTY OFFICIALS. HIS PUBLIC APPEARANCES ARE CAREFULLY SCRIPTED SET-PIECES, MORE LIKE THOSE OF THE BRITISH ROYAL FAMILY THAN HIS FATHER'S "ON THE SPOT GUIDANCE."

7. (C) DESPITE HIS SECLUSION, KIM JONG-IL APPEARS TO HAVE A REASONABLY GOOD GRASP OF NORTH KOREA'S PROBLEMS, AS EVIDENCED BY HIS DECEMBER 1996 SPEECH. HE REPORTEDLY DISTRUSTS OFFICIAL REPORTS (WITH GOOD REASON), AND MAINTAINS SEPARATE INFORMAL CHANNELS THROUGH CLOSE AIDES. NUMEROUS REPORTS INDICATE HE ALSO FOLLOWS WORLD EVENTS AVIDLY THROUGH TRANSLATED TRANSCRIPTS OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTS AND PRINT MEDIA. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH KIDNAPPED SOUTH KOREAN FILM DIRECTOR SIN SANG-OK IN THE MID-1980'S, KIM ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE LACK OF MATERIAL INCENTIVES UNDER SOCIALISM GUARANTEED POOR ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL PERFORMANCE, AND NORTH KOREA COULD SUCCEED ONLY BY OPENING UP TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD.

8. (C) BUT WHILE KIM'S ANALYSIS CAN BE PERCEPTIVE, HE SELDOM FOLLOWS HIS OWN LOGIC IN PRESCRIBING SOLUTIONS. IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH SIN, HE PROPOSED REINVIGORATING DPRK FILM-MAKING NOT BY INTRODUCING MATERIAL INCENTIVES, BUT BY KIDNAPPING MORE SOUTH KOREAN ARTISTS. THE PRESCRIPTIVE PART OF HIS DECEMBER 1996 SPEECH FOLLOWED THE SAME PATTERN: INTENSIFICATION OF THE POLICIES THAT HAD ALREADY FAILED. WHETHER THIS DISCONNECT FLOWS FROM A LACK OF IMAGINATION, WEAKNESS OF CHARACTER A PERCEPTION THAT HIS LEGITIMACY IS TOO WEAK TO CHALLENGE HIS FATHER'S LEGACY, OR SOME COMBINATION OF THESE REMAINS AN OPEN QUESTION.

9. (S) ONE OF THE MOST STRIKING INSIGHTS PROVIDED BY HWANG JANG-YOP -- AND CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES -- IS THAT KIM JONG-IL HANDLES EACH OF THE MYRIAD ISSUES FOR DECISION THAT CROSS HIS DESK IN ISOLATION, WITH LITTLE OR NO THOUGHT TO THEIR IMPACT ON EACH OTHER. TOLD OF A PARTICULAR PROBLEM IN ONE FACTORY OR CITY, HE ISSUES INSTRUCTIONS TO GIVE TOP PRIOR ITY TO SOLVING IT-THEN PROCEEDS TO GIVE TOP PRIORITY TO OTHER PROBLEMS THAT DEMAND THE SAME RESOURCES. THIS IS REFLECTED IN OFFICIAL POLICY STATEMENTS OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS THAT GIVE TOP PRIORITY TO OTHER PROBLEMS THAT DEMAND THE SAME RESOURCES. THIS IS REFLECTED IN OFFICIAL POLICY STATEMENTS OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS THAT GIVE TOP PRIORITY TO AGRICULTURE, LIGHT INDUSTRY AND EXPORTS, BUT CONTINUE TO GIVE THE SAME TOP PRIORITY TO MINERAL EXTRACTION AND HEAVY INDUSTRY. THE RESULT IS A CHAOTIC SITUATION IN WHICH PRIORITIES ARE CONSTANTLY SHIFTING AND NO PROBLEM RECEIVES SUSTAINED ATTENTION.

10. (C) SIMILARLY, KIM APPEARS TO PRACTICE TO A DEBILITATING DEGREE. THE CLASSIC POLITICIAN'S PRACTICE OF TELLING EACH AUDIENCE WHAT IT WANTS TO HEAR. WE HAVE HEARD SEVERAL SECOND-HAND ACCOUNTS OF HIS ASSURANCES TO REFORM-MINDED INTELLECTUALS THAT HE PLANS TO CONDUCT CHINESE-STYLE REFORM AND OPENING AS SOON AS THE TIME IS RIGHT. YET EVERY MAJOR OFFICIAL POLICY STATEMENT SINCE HIS FATHER'S DEATH ECHOES HIS PLEDGE AFTER THE FUNERAL: "DON'T EXPECT ANY CHANGES FROM ME." THIS MAY HELP EXPLAIN TWO COINCIDENCES THAT DESTROYED REFORM INITIATIVES: THE 1996 SUBMARINE INCURSION JUST AS THE RAJIN-SONBONG INVESTMENT FORUM CLOSED, AND THE 1998 INCURSIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER HYUNDAI CHAIRMAN CHUNG JU-YONG'S VISIT.

11. (S) EVEN IF THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF KIM IS ACCURATE. THERE REMAINS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HE CAN CWANGE AS HE MATURES IN OFFICE AND CONSOLIDATES HIS POWER. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE OF SUCH CHANGE. SOME REPORTING INDICATES HE HAS CUT BACK ON HIS PREVIOUSLY HEAVY DRINKING SINCE HIS FATHER'S DEATH, AND THAT HE PARTICIPATES LESS IN WILD PARTIES. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HIS PREVIOUS REPUTATION FOR IMPETUOUSNESS HAS BEEN BELIED BY THE CAUTIOUS, RISK-AVERSE APPROACH HE HAS TAKEN TO MAJOR DECISIONS SINCE HIS FATHER'S DEATH. BEYOND THIS, HOWEVER, IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT FUNDAMENTAL PERSONALITY SHIFTS FROM A 56-YEAR-OLD MAN WHO HAS BEEN RUNNING HIS COUNTRY ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS FOR TWO DECADES.

SHAKY POWER RASES

...
[12 and 13 not in Gertz original]

14. (C) KIM'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY OLD GUARD OF HIS FATHER'S GENERATION APPEAR TO BE SOMEWHAT UNEASY, GIVEN THE EXTENSIVE PURGES HE AND HIS FATHER CONDUCTED OF ALL THOSE WHO OPPOSED HIS DYNASTIC SUCCESSION. HE HAS STRESSED THE NEED TO RESPECT ELDERS, BUT IN PRACTICE HE APPEARS TO BYPASS THEM ALMOST ENTIRELY, WORKING INSTEAD THROUGH THE SECRETARIAT AND LOWER RANKING OFFICIALS MORE NEARLY HIS OWN AGE.

15 (C) THAT LEAVES THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY, THE MOST POWERFUL, MOST FAVORED AND PROBABLY MOST EFFECTIVE ORGAN OF STATE POWER. KIM BECAME SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KPA AND CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COMMISSION IN THE EARLY 1990'S, AND HAS BEEN ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE KWP MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE SINCE HIS FATHER'S DEATH. SINCE, 1994 HE HAS RULES PRIMARILY THROUGH THE MILITARY, USING IT INCREASINGLY TO MAN AGE OR SUPERVISE NORMALLY CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS SUCH AS INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND AGRICULTURE. MOST OF HIS PERSONAL APPEARANCES HAVE BEEN AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, EVEN AFTER HIS ACCESSION TO GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE KWP IN OCTOBER 1997. DPRK USES THE TITLE OF "RESPECTED AND BELOVED GENERAL" FOR KIM ALMOST AS OFTEN AS THE MORE EXALTED "GREAT LEADER," AND IN RECENT YEARS HAS INTRODUCED A NEW FORMULATION EQUATING THE ARMY WITH THE PEOPLE, THE STATE AND THE PARTY. SEVERAL SOUTH KOREAN ANALYSTS HAVE ASSESSED THAT HE WAS CONVERTING THE DPRK INTO A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP.

16. (S) THE KPA WOULD THUS APPEAR TO BE THE MAIN BULWARK OF KIM JONG-IL'S RULE. HWANG HAS CONFIRMED THIS, CLAIMING THAT THE ARMY FOLLOWS HIS ORDERS BLINDLY AND WITHOUT QUESTION, AND EVEN SOME KPA DEFECTORS INSIST THAT KIM IS A BRILLIANT MILITARY COMMANDER. BUT THESE APPEAR-ANCES MAY BE DECEPTIVE. THERE IS EXTENSIVE EVIDENCE OF A MAJOR COUP ATTEMPT BY ELEMENTS OF THE VI CORPS IN 1995, WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CRUSHED ONLY WITH SOME DIFFICULTY. THERE HAVE BEEN RUMORS OF OTHER LESS SERIOUS MILITARY UPRISINGS AND ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. AND WHILE THE KPA HAS FIRST CALL ON ALL THE NATION'S RESOURCES, IT TOO HAS SUFFERED FROM THE FOOD SHORTAGES AND ECONOMIC COLLAPSE. RECENT DEFECTORS CONSISTENTLY ASSERT THAT MILITARY DISCIPLINE HAS ERODED, AND THAT GANGS OF SOLDIERS ROUTINELY PREY ON CIVILIANS.

17. (C) MORE SPECULATIVELY, ONE HAS TO WONDER ABOUT THE REACTION OF ANY MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT TO A SUPREME COMMANDER WHO (UNLIKE MOST OF THE MALE POPULATION) NEVER SPENT A DAY IN UNIFORM UNTIL HIS APPOINTMENT AS MARSHAL, WHO HAS A SPECTACULAR LACK OF MILITARY BEARING, WHO HAS NEVER OBSERVED A MILITARY EXERCISE, AND WHO DEVOTES MOST OF HIS TIME WITH THEM TO WATCHING SONG AND DANCE PERFORMANCES. TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE ARE GENUINELY PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS IN THE UPPER REACHES OF THE KPA (AS OPPOSED TO PARTY HACKS IN UNIFORM), THEY MUST BE CONCERNED ABOUT HIS LACK OF EXPERIENCE AND QUESTIONABLE JUDGEMENT. MOST TELLINGLY, KIM HIMSELF DOES NOT ACT IN THE WAY ONE WOULD EXPECT OF A CONFIDENT COMMANDER. THE FACTS THAT HE HAS PROMOTED 922 OFFICERS TO MAJOR GENERAL OR ABOVE SINCE 1992 (A PERIOD DURING WHICH SENIOR LEVEL PROMOTIONS IN THE CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY HAVE BEEN ESSENTIALLY FROZEN), AND THAT HE HAS LAVISHED CARS AND OTHER EXPENSIVE PRESENTS ON FIELD COMMANDERS, MAY INDICATE MERELY HIS FASCINATION WITH THINGS MIL-ITARY, BUT THEY CAN ALSO BE INTERPRETED AS AN ATTEMPT TO BUY OFF AN ESTABLISHMENT WHOSE LOYALTY IS VITAL TO REGIME SURVIVAL, BUT OF WHICH HE IS NOT CONFIDENT.

AD HOC GOVERNANCE

18. (C) APART FROM THE KPA IT IS DIFFICULT TO FIND MUCH EVIDENCE THAT THE DPRK GOVERNMENT IS FUNCTIONING. ...

[19 AND 20 not in Gertz original]

21 (C) THE MOST STRIKING FEATURE OF NORTH KOREA'S GOVERNANCE IS THAT IT IS A PLANNED ECONOMY WITHOUT A PLAN. IN THIS, IT IS UNIQUE IN THE HISTORY OF LENINIST STATES (WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF CHINA DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

[22 AND 23 not in Gertz original]

24. (C) WITH NO PLAN OR BUDGET, AND WITH PRIORITIES CONSTANTLY SHIFTING AT THE WHIM OF KIM JONG-IL, NORTH KOREA'S OFFICIAL CIVILIAN ECONOMY HAS EFFECTIVELY GROUND TO A HALT. ...

[25 not in Gertz original]

26 (C) INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION TO THE DPRK ECONOMY HAS FOCUSED MAINLY ON ITS FOOD SHORTAGES. WHILE MOST CURRENT ANECDOTAL REPORTING INDI-CATES A SOMEWHAT BETTER SITUATION THIS SUMMER THAN IN THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS, THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE SHORTAGE REMAINS SEVERE, AND THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS MAY ULTIMATELY PROVE TO BE ONE OF THE MOST LETHAL FAMINES OF THE CENTURY NO GOOD STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE (THE NORTH KOREANS LIE EGREGIOUSLY IN SEVERAL DIRECTIONS AT THE SAME TIME), BUT SEVERAL INDEPENDENT SOURCES -- HWANG JANG-YOP, ANOTHER DEFECTOR FROM THE DPRK'S MISSION TO THE FAO, A SURVEY OF REFUGEES IN CHINA BY THE KOREAN BUDDHIST SHARING MOVEMENT, AND MOST RECENTLY A CHINESE ANALYSIS OF VOTER ROLLS FOR THE UPCOMING SPA ELECTIONS -- ALL INDICATE A TOTAL PREMATURE MORTALITY COUNT SINCE 1995 IN THE 2-3 MILLION RANGE, SOME 10-15 PERCENT OF THE POPU-LATION. THAT WOULD BE TWICE AS BAD, ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS AS THE HOR- RENDOUS CHINESE FAMINE OF 1959-62.

[27, 28 AND 29 not in Gertz original]

30. (C) ... WHILE THERE IS LITTLE MONEY IN THE ECONOMY, THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MASSIVE TRANSFER OF WEALTH, ALONG THREE DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS. MONEY AND GOODS HAVE FLOWED FROM PREVIOUSLY FAVORED INDUSTRIAL WORKERS TO THE PEASANTS, AS TOWNSPEOPLE SELL OR BARTER WHATEVER THEY HAVE TO GET FOOD. WEALTH HAS FLOWED FROM NORTH KOREA INTO CHINA, AGAIN IN EXCHANGE FOR FOOD, AND THE MOST RUTHLESS AND CORRUPT TRADERS AND OFFICIALS MILK THE REST OF THE POPULATION, PRODUCING GREATER DISPARITIES IN LIVING STANDARDS THAN THE DPRK HAS EVEN SEEN. DEFECTOR REPORTS INDICATE THAT THESE FLOWS ARE BITTERLY RESENTED BY THE LOSERS, ACCELERATING THE BREAKDOWN OF SOCIAL ORDER AND RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY. IN ADDITION TO THE OBVIOUS PROBLEMS THIS POSES FOR REGIME STABILITY, THERE IS ALSO A RISK THAT NORTH KOREANS WILL EQUATE MARKETIZATION WITH MISERY, BUTTRESSING IDEOLOGICAL RESISTANCE TO GENUINE REFORMS....

[31 AND 32 not in Gertz original]

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE

33. (S) THERE IS A GROWING BODY OF REPORTING THAT INDICATES PEOPLE IN NORTH KOREA ARE LOSING FAITH IN KIM JONG-IL AND MUCH OF THE BELIEF STRUCTURE OF WHICH HE IS THE LINCHPIN. MOST OF THESE ACCOUNTS COME FROM DEFECTORS, AND HENCE HAVE TO BE DISCOUNTED SOMEWHAT. BUT THE INCREASING FLOW OF DEFECTORS ITSELF (AND FROM INCREASINGLY ELITE BACKGROUNDS) INDICATES THAT THE PROCESS IS UNDERWAY RECENT DEFECTORS TALK OF WIDESPREAD MUTTERING THAT KIM JONG-IL'S REIGN HAS BEEN A DISASTER, THAT KWP CADRES ARE UNIVERSALLY CORRUPT, AND THAT EVEN A LOSING WAR WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO THE CURRENT SITUATION. EVEN HWANG JANG YOP, WHO DISMISSES MOST NORTH KOREANS AS MINDLESS SLAVES, CLAIMS THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS WHO WANT REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE. EVIDENCE FROM WITHIN NORTH KOREA IS UNDERSTANDABLY SCANTY, BUT IT DOES EXIST. IN ONE CASE A SENIOR AGRICULTURAL OFFICIAL TOLD AN AMERICAN VISITOR THAT ALL GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS WERE LIES. ANOTHER OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA WAS NONSENSE, BUT MAINTAINED IT WAS NECESSARY TO KEEP THE MASSES QUIET.

[34 not in Gertz original]

35. (S) IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ASCERTAIN AT THIS POINT HOW FAR THE LOSS OF FAITH HAS SPREAD OR THE EXTENT TO WHICH PEOPLE ARE BEGINNING TO RISK SHARING THEIR DOUBTS WITH OTHERS. UNTIL RECENTLY, THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONCEIVABLE, GIVEN NORTH KOREA'S HUGE AND OVERLAPPING SECURITY APPARATUS. BUT WE KNOW THAT SOME DISCUSSIONS ARE TAKING PLACE HWANG WAS PART OF ONE CONSPIRACY, OTHER DEFECTORS HAVE MENTIONED CONVERSATIONS WITH RELATIVES AND FRIENDS. THERE IS GROWING EVIDENCE OF THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF POLICE AND STATE SECURITY OFFICIALS TO CORRUPTION. AT SOME POINT IF CHINA'S EXAMPLE IS A GUIDE. IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO BRIBE OR OTHERWISE PERSUADE THEM TO LOOK THE OTHER WAY WHEN THAT HAPPENS, THE LOSS OF FAITH IS LIKELY TO SPREAD VERY RAPIDLY. THE DPRK HAS A HIGHLY DEVELOPED, RIGID AND COMPREHENSIVE IDEOLOGY, AND A BELIEF STRUCTURE OF THAT SORT MIGHT TEND TO SHATTER RATHER THAN EVOLVE. WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THE DISAFFECTED ELITES WILL DO ABOUT THEIR LOSS OF FAITH IS HARD TO SAY, BUT IT WILL CERTAINLY CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO POLITICAL VOLATILITY.

LOOKING FOR MR. GOODBAR

[36 not in Gertz original]

...

37. (C) AT SOME POINT IN THE EARLY 1990'S, KIM IL-SUNG APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT HIS FORMER FRIENDS WERE NO LONGER WILLING OR ABLE TO HELP AND HE BEGAN CASTING ABOUT FOR A NEW PATRON. THIS DECISION PROBABLY EXPLAINS MUCH OF THE FLURRY OF DPRK DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE DECADE, INCLUDING THE NORTH-SOUTH BASIC AGREEMENT, NORMALIZATION TALKS WITH JAPAN AND THE DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. THAT PRO-DUCED THE AGREED FRAMEWORK. AT THE TIME OF KIM IL-SUNG'S DEATH, ALL THREE INITIATIVES LOOKED LIKELY TO PROVIDE LARGE-SCALE BENEFITS. KIM JONG-IL HAS BEEN FAR LESS ADEPT AT MANIPULATING EXTERNAL POWERS. LIKE HIS FATHER, HE TRIED TO USE BOTH CARROTS AND STICKS, BUT THEY HAVE TENDED TO CANCEL OUT RATHER THAN REINFORCE EACH OTHER. HE HAS ALSO BEEN STYMIED BY THE GROWING CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ABOUT THE KOREAN PENINSULA BY ALL THE MAJOR POWERS., FROM CHINA, RUSSIA, SOUTH KOREA, THE U.S., JAPAN, AND THE EU, HE NOW GETS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME MESSAGE -- WE'LL PROVIDE MODEST HUMANITARIAN AIDE, AND ARE WILLING TO GIVE MUCH MORE, BUT ONLY IF YOU REFORM.

[38 and 39 not in Gertz original.]

PROSPECTS

40. (S) PREDICTING REGIME COLLAPSE IN NORTH KOREA HAS PROVEN AN EMBARRASSMENT TO A VARIETY OF OFFICIALS AND ACADEMICS FROM THE ROK, THE U.S. AND ELSEWHERE. FORMER ROK PRESIDENT KIM YOUNG-SAM EXPECTED THE COLLAPSE DURING HIS ADMINISTRATION AND ACCORDING TO SOME REPORTS LAUNCHED COVERT ACTIONS TO FACILITATE IT. FORMER USFK CINC GENERAL LUCK TOLD CONGRESS TWO YEARS AGO THAT A COLLAPSE WAS LIKELY WITHIN A YEAR OR TWO. MANY OTHER SUCH PREDICTIONS HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY REFUTED BY EVENTS. THERE ARE SIMPLY TOO MANY UNKNOWN VARIABLES -- THE RESILIENCE OF THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE, THE COERCIVE POWER OF THE REGIME, THE LEVEL OF OUTSIDE AID -- TO MAKE FORECASTS OF NORTH KOREA'S FUTURE ANYTHING BUT A GAME FOR FOOLS. IT IS STILL CONCEIVABLE (THOUGH HIGHLY UNLIKELY) THAT KIM WILL LEAD THE DPRK TOWARD GENUINE REFORM AND OPENNESS, AND SUCCEED AS CHINA AND VIETNAM HAVE DONE. WITH LESS FAR-REACHING REFORMS, THE DPRK COULD PROBABLY MUDDLE THROUGH FOR A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF YEARS, AND IT IS DANGEROUS TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A QUIXOTIC INVASION OF THE SOUTH, SHOULD KIM CONCLUDE THAT THE ODDS AGAINST MILITARY SUCCESS ARE NO LONGER THAN THOSE FOR OTHER ALTERNATIVES.

41. (S) WHILE ALL THESE ARE POSSIBILITIES, AND THERE IS NO SINGLE OUTCOME THAT APPROACHES A 50-50 PROBABILITY, THE LARGEST SINGLE SET OF FORESEE ABLE SCENARIOS INVOLVE SOME FORM OF INTERNAL SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION THROUGH A COMBINATION OF COLLAPSE AND REVOLUTION. THERE IS A WIDE RANGE OF PATHS THIS PROCESS COULD TAKE, INCLUDING ANARCHY, FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND REGIONAL WARLORDISM. ALL OF THESE SCENARIOS, HOWEVER INVOLVE A CHANGE OF TOP LEADERSHIP AT SOME POINT. IF KIM JONG-IL FAILS TO LEAD NORTH KOREA IN A NEW DIRECTION, IT IS NEARLY INEVITABLE THAT HE WILL BE REPLACED BY SOMEONE WHO WILL. GIVEN THE FACT THAT HIS LEGITIMACY AS LEADER IS SO CLOSELY TIED UP WITH KIM IL-SUNG'S LEGACY, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE KIM CLAN CAN TAKE OVER; NONE OF THEM HAS ANY MORE PERFORMANCE LEGITIMACY THAN HE, AND NONE WAS KIM IL-SUNG'S CHOICE. THE ORIENTATION OF A SUCCESSOR REGIME CANNOT BE PREDICTED, BUT IT WOULD QUITE LIKELY HAVE TO INCLUDE A LARGE MILITARY COMPONENT.

42. (S) A NORTH KOREAN COLLAPSE INTO REVOLUTION WOULD BE A HUMANITARIAN DISASTER AT BEST, A GRAVE SECURITY THREAT TO THE REGION AT WORST. THERE IS NOT QUESTION THAT IT SHOULD RANK VERY LOW IN EVERY OTHER GOVERNMENT'S HIERARCHY OF PREFERRED OUTCOMES, AND THAT ALL OF US SHOULD DEVOTE OUR EFFORTS TO AVERT IT, AS THE KIM DAE-JUNG GOVERNMENT HAS PLEDGED TO DO. BUT IT IS A DANGEROUS TRAP FOR ANY OF US TO ASSUME THAT COLLAPSE WILL NOT HAPPEN BECAUSE NO ONE WANTS IT TO. AS LONG AS NO OUTSIDE POWER IS PREPARED TO TAKE ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROPPING UP THE KIM REGIME REGARDLESS OF ITS ACTIONS, COLLAPSE WILL REMAIN A DEFINITE POSSIBILITY AT SOME POLNT IN THE INDEFINITE FUTURE.

U.S. RESPONSE

43. (S) IF THE EXPERIENCE OF OUTSIDE POWERS IN DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA HAS TAUGHT US ANYTHING, IT IS THAT THERE IS NO "MAGIC BULLET" THAT WILL TRANSFORM OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DPRK INTO A GENUINELY COOPERATIVE ONE. IT IS IN THE NATURE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY TO SEEK SUCH A BREAKTHROUGH, BUT NOTHING WE KNOW ABOUT THE DPRK OFFERS ANY REASON FOR OPTIMISM THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE ONE. A MAJOR STUDY BY THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS RECENTLY PROPOSED A GREATLY EXPANDED "PACKAGE DEAL" THAT WOULD TRADE COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS EASING AND LARGE-SCALE AID FOR DRAMATIC DPRK STEPS TO STOP THREATENING ITS NEIGHBORS. ONE OF THE STUDY'S AUTHORS TOLD US THE CFR GROUP TOOK THE AGREED FRAMEWORK'S NEGOTIATIONS AS A MODEL, AND PARTICULARLY FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER'S DRAMATIC VISIT TO PYONGYANG WHERE THE ELEMENTS OF THE DEAL WERE AGREED. BUT THIS COMPARISON IS FALLACIOUS. IT IGNORES THE FACT THAT WE ARE NOW DEALING WITH A MUCH WEAKER DPRK LEADER, AND THAT THE AGREED FRAMEWORK ALREADY STRETCHED THE LIMITS OF WHAT IS POLITICALLY DOABLE IN THE U.S. ROK AND JAPAN. IT ALSO IGNORES THE FACT THAT NOTHING IN THE KIM-CARTER AGREEMENT WAS NEW -- ALL OF THE ELE-MENTS HAD BEEN UNDER NEGOTIATION FOR A YEAR, AND THE ONE CENTRAL ELE-MENT (THE LIGHT WATER REACTOR) WAS A DPRK PROPOSAL. THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT A FULLY-FLEDGED INITIATIVE PROPOSED BY THE USG WOULD MEET WITH ANYTHING BUT PROFOUND SUSPICION, PARTICULARLY IF IT REQUIRED PYONGYANG TO GIVE UP THE ONLY THING THAT MAKES IT OF INTEREST TO THE REST OF THE WORLD -- ITS ABILITY TO CAUSE TROUBLE.

44. (S) WHILE NORTH KOREA IS CLEARLY IN DIRE STRAITS, ITS LEADERS DO NOT AT THIS POINT APPEAR DESPERATE ENOUGH TO ACCEPT THE RISKS TO REGIME STABILITY THAT WOULD BE INHERENT IN A DECISION TO MOVE TO A FUNDAMENTALLY COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. OR ROK. IF THEY MAKE THAT DECISION, WE ALREADY HAVE AMPLE MECHANISMS IN PLACE TO MOVE FORWARD ON ALL FRONTS AT WHATEVER SPEED THE DPRK CAN ACCOMMODATE. UNTIL AND UNLESS THAT DECISION IS MADE, NO INITIATIVE ON OUR PART IS GOING TO PRODUCE SATISFACTORY RESULTS.

45. (C) RECOGNIZING THE RISK-AVERSE NATURE OF THE DPRK'S CURRENT LEADERSHIP, WE SHOULD STRIVE TO BE AS PREDICTABLE AS POSSIBLE. FIRMNESS AND PATIENCE IN PURSUING REASONABLE DEMANDS FOR RECIPROCITY ARE MORE LIKELY THAN ANY OTHER APPROACH TO CONVINCE KIM JONG-IL THAT HE CANNOT HOPE TO REPLICATE HIS FATHER'S ONE-SIDED PATRONAGE DEALS. SIMILARLY. THE BEST WAY TO BUILD TRUST WITH THE DPRK IS TO DO A BETTER JOB OF FULFILLING OUR OWN OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AGREED FRAMEWORK. FAR-REACHING NEW INlTIATIVES AT THIS POINT WOULD ONLY CONFUSE THE DPRK, AND WOULD PROBABLY ENCOURAGE IT TO REMAIN INTRANSIGENT IN THE EXPECTATION THAT WE WILL EVENTUALLY PROPOSE SOMETHING TO ITS LIKING.

46. (S) OUR CURRENT STRATEGY OF ACTIVE AND POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE DPRK, WITH THE GOAL OF MAXIMIZING THE PROSPECTS FOR DPRK REFORM, OPENING AND RECONCILIATION WITH THE ROK, IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE BEST APPROACH. IF IT SUCCEEDS, WE WILL ACHIEVE THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE OUTCOMES FOR EVERY CONCERNED GOVERNMENT. AS AND WE SAID OF KIM DAE-JUNG'S "SUNSHINE POLICY," EVEN IF IT DOES NOT SUCCEED IN THOSE TERMS, THE ANCILLARY EFFECTS OF EXPANDED CONTACTS WITH NORTH KOREANS WILL FOSTER DEMANDS FOR AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE KIND OF CHANGES WE SEEK.

47. (S) BUT A POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY ALONE IS INCOMPLETE. OUR MILITARY POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA RELIES ON BOTH A POSITIVE GOAL OF DETERRENCE AND A CONTINGENCY PREPAREDNESS TO WAGE WAR; WITHOUT THE LATTER, THE FORMER CANNOT BE EFFECTIVE. IN THE SAME WAY, WE NEED TO BE PREPARED TO COPE WITH OUTCOMES OTHER THAN THE ONE WE WANT. THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE KIM DAE-JUNG ADMINISTRATION'S EXPECTATION THAT THE DPRK WILL NOT COLLAPSE SOON HAS LED TO A LOSS OF MOMENTUM IN PLANNING TO DEAL WITH TERMINAL INSTABILITY. WE SHOULD NOT MAKE THE SAME MISTAKE, AND INDEED SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE ROKG TO CONTINUE QUIET BUT INTENSIVE COLLAPSE PLANNING EVEN AS WE WORK TOGETHER TO AVERT THAT OUTCOME.

BOSWORTH

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