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8 October 2006. This document has been superceded by:

> "CNSS 7000 TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities (U) May 04 C//REL"

> See: http://www.cnss.gov/Assets/pdf/CNSS-INDEX.pdf

2 January 2000: Annex C revised to show additional recovered text. Contributions/corrections welcomed for the TEMPEST country threat list; send to cryptome[at]earthlink.net -- anonymous if preferred.

1 January 2001
Source: Hardcopy from the National Security Agency in response to an appeal of an earlier FOIA request for TEMPEST-related documents. This is one of three full and five partial documents received under the appeal. See NSA letter and list of documents: http://cryptome.org/0001/nsa-foia-app2.htm

For comprehensive TEMPEST information see: http://eskimo.com/~joelm/tempest.html

xxxxxxxx indicates redactions. Red text was recovered by close examination of crayoned redactions through which some text could be seen, enhanced by lightening of the crayon overwrite by xerography to reveal the darker text.

[19 pages.]

                                    CONFIDENTIAL

                                                     NSTISSI No. 7000

                                                     29 November 1993

    NSTISS

    NATIONAL
    SECURITY
    TELECOMMUNICATIONS
    AND
    INFORMATION
    SYSTEMS
    SECURITY

                              TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES

                                        FOR

                                     FACILITIES

                                SECRET ATTACHED [by hand]

                           CLASSIFIED BY DIRNSA (NATIONAL MANAGER, NSTISS)
                           DECLASSIFY ON: ORIGINATING AGENCY'S
                                           DETERMINATION REQUIRED

                         NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

                                   CONFIDENTIAL

                               CONFIDENTIAL

    NSTISS                 CHAIRMAN
    NATIONAL SECURITY
    TELECOMMUNICATIONS                               November 29, 1993
    AND
    INFORMATION SYSTEMS
    SECURITY COMMITTEE

                                FOREWORD

         1.  (U) National Security Telecommunications and
    Information System Security Instruction (NSTISSI) No. 7000,
    "TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities," establishes guidelines
    and procedures that shall be used by departments and agencies to
    determine the applicable TEMPEST countermeasures for national
    security systems. This document supersedes National
    Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Instruction
    (NTISSI) 7000, TEMPEST Countermeasures and Facilities," dated
    17 October 1988.

         2.  (U) Representatives of the National Security
    Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee
    may obtain additional copies of this directive from:

             Executive Secretariat
             National Security Telecommunications and
    	   Information Systems Security Committee
             National Security Agency
             Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

         3.  (U) U.S. Government contractors should contact their
    Contract Officer's Representative regarding distribution of this
    document.

         4.  (U) This document is not releasable to the Defense
    Technical Information Center.

                               [Signature]
                               EMMETT PAIGE, JR.

                     NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                                                    NSTISSI No. 7000

                   TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURES FOR FACILITIES

    	                                            SECTION

    Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I

    Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II

    Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III

    Threat Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . .	. . . IV

    Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V

    Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI

                         SECTION I - BACKGROUND

         1.  (U) Electronic and electromechanical information-
    processing equipment can produce unintentional intelligence-bearing
    emanations, commonly known as TEMPEST. If intercepted and
    analyzed, these emanations may disclose information transmitted,
    received, handled, or otherwise processed by the equipment.

         2.  (C) Axxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx demonstrate xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx product exploitation xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx factors as political risks and the xxxxxxxx
    intelligence capabilities within the targeted country.

                      SECTION II - PURPOSE AND SCOPE

         3.  (U) This instruction establishes guidelines and
    procedures for determining the applicable countermeasures for
    nationalt security systems. This instruction applies to all federal
    departments and agencies and their agents, which include, but are
    not limited to, contractors, consultants, and licensees.

                     NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                                                    NSTISSI No. 7000

                        SECTION III - DEFINITIONS

         4. (U) Definitions contained in NCSC-3 (TEMPEST Glossary),
    and NSTISSI No. 4009 (National INFOSEC Glossary) apply. For the
    purpose of this instruction the following definitions also apply.

            a.  (U)	Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) - An
    experienced, technically qualified U.S. government employee who has
    met established certification requirements in accordance with
    NSTISSC-approved criteria and has been appointed by a U.S
    Government Department or Agency to fulfill CTTA responsibl-lities.

            b.  (U) Inspectable Space - The three-dimensional space
    surrounding equipment that process classified and/or sensiltfve
    information within which TEMPEST exploitation is not considered
    practical or where legal authority to identify and/or remove a
    potential TEMPEST exploitation exists.

            c.  (C) Special Category information - For the purposes
    of this document, consists of information related to
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx(SCI)xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxSIOP)

                     SECTION IV THREAT ENVIRONMENTS

         5. (C) Outside the United States, the TEMPEST threat varies,
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx interests xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

            a.  (C)  A High Threat Environment is one in which the
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx equipment and the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    United States that would otherwise be characterized xxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

                     NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                                                    NSTISSI No. 7000

                b.  (C)  A Medium Threat Environment is one in which the
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    risks if a xxxxxxxxxxx exploitation were discovered.

                c.  (C)  A Low Threat Environment is one in which a close
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    risks if a xxxxxxxxxxx exploitation were discovered.

           6.  (C)  Within the United States, its trust territories and
    possessions, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    discovery of a technical opexxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

           7.  (U)  Annex A provides tne National Manager's annual
    assessment of the TEMPEST threat.

                          SECTION V - REQUIREMENTS

           8.  (U)  This instruction establishes the requirement to
    review the Tempest posture of certain facILITIES where national
    security information is processed. A CTTA must conduct or validate
    all TEMPEST countermeasure reviews required by this instruction.
    However, the requirement for the CTTA to conduct or validate such
    review does not necessarily imply the need to implement TEMPEST
    countermeasures.  When the CTTA identifies the need to implement
    TEMPEST countermeasures at a specific facility, the CTTA will
    recommend the most cost effective countermeasure which will contain
    compromising emanations within the inspectable space to the
    decision authority designated by the department/agency head.

           9.  (U)  Outside the United States:

                a.  (C)  Facilities located in a High Threat Environment
    require the highest security protection levels of TEMPEST
    countermeasures.  Equipment processing information at levels of
    UNCLASSIFIED through TOP SECRET will be reviewed.

                b.  (C)  Facilities located in a Medium Threat
    Environment that process xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

                     NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                                                    NSTISSI No. 7000

    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

                        (1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

                        (2) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx federal department/agency of
    xxxxxxxxxxxx.

          TEMPEST countermeasures will not be applied to facilities
    processing only UNCLASSIFIED.

              C.  (C)  Facilities located in a Low Threat Environment
    that process TOP SECRET information will be reviewed xxxxxxxxxxxx
    that process SECRET information will be reviewed if:

                        (1) they are located within 200 meters of a
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx a country on the xxxxx NSTL, or

                        (2) they process xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx an entity other than a federal department/agency
    xxxxxxxxxxx

           xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

         10.  (C)  Within the United States, its trust territories and
    possessions, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx will not xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

              a.  (U)  TOP SECRET (Special Category and non-Special
    Catergory) information is processed, or

              b.  (C)  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

                    (1)  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

                    (2)  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx other than a federal department/agency or its
    agents.

         11.  (U)  Where a TEMPEST countermeasure review indicates the
    need to use equipment meeting national standards contained in
    NSTISSAIM TEMPEST/1-92 every effort shall be made to use equipment
    listed in the Information Systems Security Products and Services
    Catalog or the NATO Recommended Products List (NRPL).

                     NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                                                    NSTISSI No. 7000

         12.  (U)  A CTTA must meet the following certification
    requirements:

               a.  Completion of three continuous years of TEMPEST
    technical experience, including at least one year's experience in
    evaluating TEMPEST vulnerabilities of operational facilities and
    making recommendations on TEMPEST countermeasures.

               b.  Completion of mandatory NSTISSC-approved training on
    the technical threat and the CTTA TE14PEST Countermeasures
    Application Course.

               c.  Completion of NSTISSC-approved technical training.
    Technical training requirements may be waived by department or
    agency heads, in consultation with the National Manager.

         13.  (U)  The CTTA shall determine the Inspectable Space for a
    facility.

         14.  (U)  The CTTA shall maintain a record of all TEMPEST
    countermeasure reviews conducted, recommendations provided and
    estimated cost of implementation.

                         SECTION VI COUNTERMEASURES

         15.  (C)  TEMPEST countermeasures consist of xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

         16.  (U) The TEMPEST countermeasure reviews required by this
    document shall be conducted considering, as a minimum, the
    factors identified in Annex B.

                     NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                                  ANNEX B

                       TEMPEST COUNTERMEASURE REVIEW

         (U)  In conducting TEMPEST countermeasure reviews, the CTTA
    shall, as a minimum, evaluate the following factors.

             1.  (C)  Location - xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxx systems and the proximity to the establishments
    xxxxxxx of countries on the National Security Threat List (NSTL)
    and other countries that could pose a technical threat to the
    information being processed.

             2.  (U)  Volume of Information Processed - Consider the
    percentage and volume of information processed at the UNCLASSIFIED,
    SENSITIVE, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET level.  Determine
    the number of pages, messages, screens, etc. for each of the above
    classification levels.

             3.  (U)  Sensitivity of Information Processed - Consider
    the sensitivity of the information being processed by the equipment
    and facility (e.g., DOE - Restricted Data; DCI - Sensitive
    Compartmented Information (SCI); Joint Staff - SIOP).  This will
    be useful in determining the likelihood that an adversary may
    target the facility.

             4.  (U)  Perishability of Information Processed - Consider
    if the information being processed is of long term value (e.g.
    strategic) or short term value (e.g. tactical).

             5.  (U)  Physical Control - Consider the physical/access
    control over the facility and areas containing the system under
    review.  This includes guards (number, hours of posting, patrols,
    etc.); badging; control over access to facility; alarms; procedures
    to monitor/control uncleared or unauthcrized personnel including
    char force, vending personnel, and telephone/power
    maintainers/installers.  Determine the level of authority which
    exists for the inspection or removal of personnel who could
    potentially exploit TEMPEST vulnerabilities.  Examine the posting
    of warning signs and the implementation of procedures in effect to
    exercise control over parking and other areas adjacent to or in
    close proximity to the facility/system under review.

             6.  (U) TEMPEST Profile of Equipment - Consider generic
    or actual TEMPEST profile information for each equipment/system
    used to process classified information at the facility.  Consider
    existing on-site TEMPEST test results for the facility.

                     NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                                                AS OF: 22 NOVEMBER 1993

          DISTRIBUTION:
    	NSA
    	NSC
    	OMB (Intel Branch NSD)
    	OASD (C31/TS) (2)
    	ODASD (CI & SCM)
    	DODSI
    	DA (SAIS-SDC) (15)
    	CNO, (C652C) (3)
    	CMC (CC) (5)
    	COMJSOC (J62)
    	The Joint Staff P6K) (2)
    	The Joint Staff (DIRM/SCD/ISOB)
    	USCINCLANT (J6) (2)
    	USCINCCENT (CCJ6) (4)
    	USCINCEUR (ECJ6-CSS) (2)
    	CINCFOR (FCJ6)  (2)
    	USCINCPAC (J6)  (2)
    	USCINCSO (SCJ6) (2)
    	USCINCSPACE (J4-J6) (2)
    	USCINCSOC (SOJ6) (2)
    	USSTRATCOM (2)
    	USCINCTRANS (TCJ6) (2)
    	A.FC4A/DSS (3)
    	HO USAF (SCXX) (3)
    	EQ USAF (SCS) (3)
    	HQ AFC4A/DSSC (5)
    	COMUSFJAPAN (J6) (2)
    	C014USFKOREA (J6) (2)
    	Defense Courier Service (2)
    	DIA (DSE-2B) (10)
    	DIR JITC
    	DIS (V0432) (5)
    	DIS (VO060)
    	DLA (DLA-CAASA) (2)
    	DNA (ISIS)
    	CDR JIEO
    	COMDT COGARD (G-TTS-4) (3)
    	COMCOGARDLANTAREA
    	COMCOGARDPACAREA
    	COMCOGARDONE
    	COMCOGARDTWO
    	COMCOGARDFIVE
    	COMCOGARDSEVEN
    	COMCOGARDEIGHT
    	COMCOGARDNINE
    	COMCOGARDELEVEN

                                FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

    	COMCOGARDTHIRTEEN
    	COMCOGARDFOURTEEN
    	COMCOGARDSEVENTEEN
    	COMSPAWARSYSCOM (PMW 151) (3)
    	DCMS (TD) (2)
    	CG MCDEC (DEVCEN C3) (2)
    	Dept. of Agriculture (MSD/FAS) (2)
    	Dept. of Commerce (OIRM/TMD) (2)
    	Dept. of Energy (AD241.1) (2)
    	Dept. of Health & Human Services (IG) (2)
    	Dept. of Interior (PPS-S NS5040 MIB) (2)
    	Dept. of Justice (JMD/SEPS) (2)
    	Dept. of State (DS/CMI/ISS) (5)
    	Dept. of State (SA-341 DTS-PO)
    	Dept. of State (A/IM/SO/TO/SI (2)
    	Dept. of Transportation (OIS M-70) (2)
    	Dept. of Treasury (MST) (10)
    	CIA (OC-CSD) (2)
    	CIA (DIR OIT) (2)
    	CIA (C/PAG/OS) (2)
    	CIA (Chief, TEMPEST Division, (OS) (2)
    	CIA (Chief INFOSEC OIT)
    	CIA (Reference Library)
    	DIR, CCISCMO (2)
    	DIR, CCISCMO (Planning Office) (2)
    	DISA (Code DIPP) (5)
    	DISA (Code TG)
    	DISA (Code TGE)
    	DMA (TSC)
    	DMA (IS)
    	Drug Enforcement Administration (OSTC) (2)
    	FAA (ACO-300) (6)
    	FBI (TSD) (5)
    	FCC (OMD) (2)
    	FEMA (NP-IR) (3)
    	GSA (KVI) (6)
    	NASA (JLS)
    	NASA (OS) (2)
    	NASA (JT)
    	NCS (MGR) (2)
    	NESSEC (1)
    	NRC (8203-MNBB) (3)
    	USDELMC (INFOSEC REP)
    	U.S. Customs Service (65)
    	WHCA

                              FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY

                                   SECRET

    NSTISS              NATIONAL MANAGER
    NATIONAL SECURITY
    TELECOMMUNICATIONS                                13 March 1995
    AND                                              NSTISSC-007-95
    INFORMATION SYSTEMS
    SECURITY COMMITTEE

    MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

    SUBJECT: Annex A to NSTISSI No. 7000, "TEMPEST Countermeasures
    for Facilities," dated 29 November 1993 - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

         1.  NSTISSI No. 7000 established guidelines and procedures
    that shall be used by departments and agencies to determine the
    applicable TEMPEST countermeasures for national security systems.
    Enclosed is Annex A to this instruction which provides TEMPEST
    threat categorizations to be used in determining and applying
    appropriate TEMPEST countermeasures.

         2.  A previous version of this annex dated 3 June 1991 and
    updated on 17 September 1991 should be destroyed. Please append
    the attached version of Annex A to your copy of NSTISSI No. 7000.

                             [Signature]
                             J. M. McCONNELL
                             Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

    Encl:
      a/s

    DISTRIBUTION:
      Attached

    Declassify Upon Removal of the Enclosure.

                               NOFORN
                              SECRET

                              SECRET

                               Annex A

                   THE TEMPEST THREAT TO FACILITIES

                         SECTION I - PURPOSE

         1.  (C)  The purpose of this annex is to provide
    Certified TEMPEST Technical Authorities and others who have a
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx  The mandate for this information is set
    forth NSTISSP No. 300, "National Policy on Control of
    Compromising Emanations," dated 29 November 1993, and NSTISS
    No. 7000, TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities," dated
    29 November 1993.

                         SECTION II - SCOPE

         2.  (C)  This annex identifies the	high, medium, and low
    TEMPEST threat environments xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx the TEMPEST threat is low.

         3.  TEMPEST threat levels were established by
    considering various factors, to include, but not limited to:

         -  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and
            xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx intelligence
            services to target the xxxx presence.

         -  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
            xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
            xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
            neglect xxxxx target xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx considered.

         -  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
            xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
            vulnerabilities and exploitation potential.

         -  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
            xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
            xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
            xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx not necessarily conclusive.

                                                      x

                                           Annex A to
                                           NSTISSI No. 7000
                                           dated 29 November 1993

                     NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

                              SECRET

                              SECRET

         4.  (C)  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

                                           Annex A to
                                           NSTISSI No. 7000
                                 2         dated 29 November 1993

                     NOTE RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

                              SECRET

       7    PAGE(S) WITHHELD FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):

        X   (b)(1) of the FOIA

    	_____ subparagraph 1.5(b) of E.O. 12958
    	  X   subparagraph 1.5(c) of E.O. 12958
    	_____ subparagraph 1.5(d) of E.O. 12958
    	  X   subparagraph 1.5(g) of E.O. 12958

        X   (b)(3) of the FOIA

    	_____ 18 U.S.C. § 798
    	_____ 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(c)(6)
    	  X   50 U.S.C. § 402 note (Public Law 86-36)

            (b)(4) of the FOIA

            (b)(5) of the FOIA

            (b)(6) of the FOIA

            Not reasonably segregable for release

            Not Responsive to the request

                               CONFIDENTIAL

    NSTISS                  MANAGER
    NATIONAL SECURITY      EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
    TELECOMMUNICATIONS
    AND
    INFORMATION SYSTEMS
    SECURITY COMMITTEE

                                                       STS/SISS-018-95
                                                       19 September 1995

    MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

    SUBJECT: Annex C to NSTISSI No. 7000 - ACTION MEMORANDUM

          1. During the development of NSTISSI No. 7000, TEMPEST Countermea-
    sures for Facilities, dated 29 November 1993, the TEMPEST Advisory Group
    (TAG) agreed that the reference to the FBI's National Security Threat List [see below]
    (NSTL) should be replaced with a list based specifically on the ability and
    motivation of a foreign government to conduct a TEMPEST attack against the
    U.S. Government. The FBI's NSTL was the best source at that time, but was
    developed without consideration of a country's TEMPEST capabilities. Since
    the ratification of the national policy, the NSA INFOSEC Threat Office has
    researched the TEMPEST threat posed by foreign governments and developed a
    list of countries that have demonstrated hostile intentions toward U.S.
    interests and are known to exploit compromising emanations.

          2. In accordance with the National Manager's responsibilities under
    NSTISSP No. 300 to publish an annual assessment of the domestic and foreign
    TEMPEST threat, the TAG has prepared the enclosed annex, enumerating those
    countries, to be issued to all holders of NSTISSI No. 7000 as a replacement
    for all references to the FBI's NSTL. Also enclosed are the pen and ink changes
    required in NSTISSI No. 7000 to implement the new annex.

          3. If additional information or assistance is required, the Secretariat
    point of contact for this action is Pat Griffith, who can be reached at
    (410) 859-6805.

                                 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
                                 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
                                 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

    Encls.
    a/s

    	                   National Security Agency
    	               ATTN: V503, Executive Secretariat
    	              Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
                        (410) 859-6805 - UFAX: (410) 859-6814
                                 SFAX (410) 859-6805

    Declassify Upon Removal of Enclosure         Classified By: NSA/CSSM 123-2
    		                             Declassify On: OADR

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                               CONFIDENTIAL

    To all holders of NSTISSI No. 7000, please make the following changes to
    your document.

    Section IV - Threat Environments, paragraph 5., a. fifth line. Cross out the
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx TEMPEST
    capabilities.

    Section IV - Threat Environments, paragraph 5., a. sixth line. Cross out
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxx

    Section V - Requirements, paragraph 9.b., (1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

    Section V - Requirements, paragraph 9.c., (1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

    Section V - Requirements, paragraph 10.b., (1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

    Annex B - paragraph 1., third line. Cross out xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

                                                         NSTISSI No. 7000
                                                         Change 1
                                                         19 September 1995

                                               Classified By: NSA/CSSM 123-
                                               Declassify On: OADR

                               CONFIDENTIAL

    [Annex C revised 2 January 2000 to show additional recovered text.]

                               CONFIDENTIAL

                                  ANNEX C

                   THE TEMPEST THREAT TO FACILITIES

    (C) This annex provides Certified TEMPEST Technical Authorities and
    others, who have a responsibility determining TEMPEST capabilities
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
    which have the capabilities to use TEMPEST xxxxxx against the U.S.
    Government.

    xxxxxxxxxxx
    Bulgaria [?]
    Czech Republic [?]
    Hungary
    Poland [?]
    xxxxxxxxxxx
    Cuba [?]
    xxxxxxxxxxx
    France
    Germany
    xxxxxxxxxxx
    Israel
    xxxxxxxxxxx
    Japan
    Netherlands
    Norway [?]
    People's Republic of China
    South Africa
    Taiwan
    xxxxxxxxxxx
    Sxxxxxxxxxx
    Slovakia [?]
    xxxxxxxxxxx

    *Known to have xxxxxxxxx TEMPEST xxxxxxxxxx against U.S. interests.

                                                         NSTISSI No. 7000
                                                         Annex C
                                                         19 September 1995

                                                Classified By: NSA/CSSM 12
                                                Declassify On: OADR

                               CONFIDENTIAL

       2    PAGE(S) WITHHELD FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):

        X   (b)(1) of the FOIA

    	_____ subparagraph 1.5(b) of E.O. 12958
    	  X   subparagraph 1.5(c) of E.O. 12958
    	_____ subparagraph 1.5(d) of E.O. 12958
    	  X   subparagraph 1.5(g) of E.O. 12958

        X   (b)(3) of the FOIA

    	_____ 18 U.S.C. § 798
    	_____ 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(c)(6)
    	  X   50 U.S.C. § 402 note (Public Law 86-36)

            (b)(4) of the FOIA

            (b)(5) of the FOIA

            (b)(6) of the FOIA

            Not reasonably segregable for release

            Not Responsive to the request

                              SECRET

                           [Blank sheet]

                              SECRET

    Transcription and HTML by
    Cryptome.

    For comparison with the TEMPEST country threat list here
    is the FBI's classified National Security List for 1999-2000:
    Source:
    http://www.ai-tv.com/freeh.htm
    From a FBI Director Louis Freeh letter to Congress:
    FBI National Security List / NTSL Country Threat List 1999/2000
    Cuba
      Iraq
      Iran
      Libya
      North Korea (People's Democratic Republic of Korea)
      People's Republic of China (PRC)
      Russian Federation
      Sudan
      Syria
      Taiwan
      Vietnam (Socialist Republic of Vietnam)
      Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
      Republika Srpska (the Serb-controlled region of Bosnia under the Dayton Accords)

    Note that US allies and friends are not on the NSTL as they are on the TEMPEST
    list. Russia has TEMPEST capabilities though not it is not discernible on
    the TEMPEST list.