This is one of five Defense Trade News on this site:

    January and April 1993: http://jya.com/dtn0193.htm
    January 1994:           http://jya.com/dtn0194.htm
    April 1994:             http://jya.com/dtn0494.htm
    July/October, 1994:     http://jya.com/dtn0794.htm
    October 1995:           http://jya.com/dtn1095.htm

Source: gopher://gopher.state.gov

    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
    DEFENSE TRADE NEWS
    VOLUME 5, NUMBER 2, APRIL 1994
    PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

    ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
    Policy
    1.  COCOM: An End and a Beginning -- End of the Cold War Brings Changes
    to Multilateral Export Controls
    2.  Licensing Cyberspac -- Evolving Policies on Encryption Technologies
    3.  Lean Times Ahead for FMF -- U.S. Government Budget for Foreign
    Military Financing Shrinks
    4.  A New Chief for Defense Trade -- An Interview with Deputy Assistant
    Secretary Martha Caldwell Harris

    Operations
    5.  National Disclosure Policy -- A Primer on the Process
    6.  Perestroika at PM-- A Guide to the Restructured Bureau of Political-
    Military Affairs
    7.  ELSA Speeds Staffing -- State's Export License Staffing Analysis
    Network Cuts License Processing Time
    8.  SARP Update -- State Appeals Review Process Gets Underway

    Departments
    9.  Country Policy Briefs
    10  Defense Trade Advisory Group Developments
    11.  U.S. Customs Report
    12.  Suspensions, Debarments, Reinstatements
    13.  Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations
    14.  Feedback and Application Forms

    Editor's Note
    Welcome to the second issue of the revamped Defense Trade News and
    Export Policy Bulletin.  This issue's feature articles  highlight U.S.
    Government initiatives in response to two key trends in the export
    control environment -- the post-Cold War shift in focus from the Soviet
    threat to the dangers of regional arms proliferation, and the rapid
    technological and marketplace evolution in encryption,
    telecommunications, and computing.  The back of the book contains
    practical information for exporters.  Please send in your Feedback form
    to let us know how Defense Trade News and Export Policy Bulletin can
    better serve your needs.

    DTC Has Not Moved...
    ...but it does have a new address.  Due to security upgrades at the
    State Department Annex housing the Office of Defense Trade Controls,
    the public access and courier delivery address has changed from 1701 N.
    Fort Myer Drive to  1700 Lynn Street.  The mailing address is unchanged.
    See the inside rear cover of this issue for a list of addresses and
    phone/fax numbers.

    ARTICLE 1:

    COCOM: An End and a Beginning
    End of the Cold War Brings Changes to Multilateral Export Controls

    On March 30, 1994, the White House released the following statement on
    export control reform.

    Today the President announced another step in U.S. efforts to reform the
    export control system. From the outset, this Administration has been
    committed to combatting the proliferation of dangerous weapons and
    sensitive technologies, while at the same time ensuring that American
    workers and firms remain the most competitive in the world.

    Our policies seek to balance these goals. As global technology advances,
    export controls must be updated, in order to remain focused on those
    items that still make a difference to programs of proliferation concern.
    To promote U.S. economic growth, democratization abroad, and
    international stability, we actively seek expanded trade and technology
    exchange with nations, including former adversaries, that abide by
    global nonproliferation norms.

    Export Liberalization
    As of April 1, 1994, we will liberalize licensing requirements on the
    export of nearly all civilian telecommunications equipment and computers
    that operate up to 1000 MTOPS (million theoretical operations per
    second) to civil end-users in all current COCOM-controlled countries
    except North Korea.

    This action is consistent with our national security requirements,
    because we are retaining individual licensing requirements for high-end
    computers and for transfers to military end-users. We are not changing
    our nonproliferation controls, which require a license for any export
    that would contribute to a program of proliferation concern.

    Last year, the Commerce Department received approximately 25,000 export
    license applications. With these and other changes announced by this
    Administration, it is expected that the number will be cut by nearly
    half. When this Administration came into office, certain basic personal
    computers, such as IBM PCs and Apple Macintoshes, were still being
    controlled. Last September, we took the first step to liberalize
    licensing requirements for over $30 billion worth of computer exports.

    National Security and Nonproliferation
    Today's decision is compatible with our national security and
    nonproliferation objectives. By liberalizing licensing requirements on
    items that routinely are granted licenses, we will concentrate our
    export control efforts on denying technologies that still make a
    difference to the development of dangerous arms. Most of the items
    currently controlled by the United States will remain subject to
    licensing requirements, including dual use goods and technologies
    controlled due to their use in chemical, biological, nuclear, advanced
    conventional weapons and missile delivery systems.

    The members of COCOM have agreed to end the Cold War regime effective
    tomorrow. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet
    Union and the Warsaw Pact led us and our allies to the view that
    COCOM'sstrategic rationale was no longer tenable.

    In its stead, the COCOM members agreed to work together toward a new,
    more broadly-based arrangement designed to enhance transparency and
    restraint in transfers of conventional weapons and sophisticated
    technologies to countries whose behavior is cause for serious concern
    and to regions of potential instability. The new arrangement will thus
    have a completely different purpose than COCOM. It will seek to put in
    place multilateral approaches to controls aimed at the threats we face
    today. We hope that Russia will become a founding member of the new
    regime. We are working to achieve this.

    While the specific procedures of the new regime are still being
    developed, COCOM member governments have agreed to maintain the
    capability after April 1 to control on a national basis, to any
    destination, items previously contained on the COCOM lists (industrial,
    military, and atomic energy) while new control lists and arrangements
    are being finalized.

    As we look ahead, there is much work to be done with other governments.
    We must continue to work to establish a regime to control sensitive
    exports to countries of concern and to regions of potential instability.
    Here at home, we will work with the Congress to pass an Export
    Administration Act that brings the export control system in line with
    the new challenges we face to our national security and economic
    competitiveness.

    (###)

    A Brief History of COCOM
    45 Years of Multilateral Cooperation

    The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) was
    established in 1949 to facilitate multilateral cooperation to control
    strategic goods and technology. Its 17 members were Australia, Belgium,
    Canada,  Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
    Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S.

    COCOM was not based on a treaty or executive agreement; it operated
    instead by informal agreement and according to the rule of unanimity. A
    COCOM secretariat was located in Paris, with member countries
    represented by permanent delegates.

    Members cooperated in publishing national control lists of embargoed
    equipment (dual-use, atomic energy use, and direct military use) and
    enacting effective export control systems; considering proposed exports
    of specific embargoed items from member countries to proscribed
    countries; and harmonizing national licensing practices for strategic
    exports and coordinating export control enforcement activities.

    In June 1992, COCOM members decided to establish a COCOM Cooperation
    Forum on Export Controls and to invite the former Soviet republics to
    participate.  The Forum's first meeting was held in Paris in November
    1992, with representatives from all Eastern European democracies, the
    Baltic states, and all but three of the former Soviet republics
    attending. It was concluded that trade in sensitive goods and
    technologies could be significantly liberalized, as the reforming
    countries introduced and developed adequate export controls.  COCOM
    members undertook to provide technical assistance to help establish
    control systems through both bilateral contacts and multilateral
    meetings.

    Today, Russia and other formerly proscribed countries are viewed not as
    potential adversaries but as potential allies in combatting the
    proliferation of sensitive technology.
    (###)

    ARTICLE 2:

    Licensing Cyberspace
    Evolving Policies on Encryption Technology

    On February 4 Dr. Martha Caldwell Harris, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    State for Export Controls, made the following statement regarding new
    Administration policies on the export licensing of encryption
    technologies:

    The Secretary of State is announcing today measures arising from the
    Administration's decision to reform export control procedures applicable
    to products incorporating encryption technology. These reforms are part
    of the Administration's effort to eliminate unnecessary controls and
    ensure efficient implementation.

    The reforms will simplify encryption product export licensing and speed
    the review of encryption product exports, thus helping U.S.
    manufacturers to compete more effectively in the global market. While
    there will be no changes in the types of equipment controlled by the
    Munitions List, we are announcing measures to expedite licensing.

    Presidential Initiative
    Last year the President announced an initiative to encourage U.S.
    manufacturers and users of encryption to take advantage of a government
    technology (the key-escrow chip) that provides excellent security while
    ensuring that the Government has a means to decode the encryption when
    lawfully authorized, such as when executing a court-authorized warrant
    in connection with a criminal investigation.

    At the time he announced this initiative, the President directed a
    comprehensive review of U.S. policy regarding domestic use and export of
    encryption technology. The reforms we are announcing today result from
    that review.

    The President has determined that vital U.S. national security and law
    enforcement interests compel maintaining appropriate  control of
    encryption. Still, there is much that can be done to reform existing
    controls to ensure that they are efficiently implemented and to maintain
    U.S. leadership in the world market for encryption technology.

    Immediate Action
    Accordingly, the President has asked the Secretary of State to take
    immediate action to implement a number of procedural reforms. The
    reforms are:

    -- License reform.  Under new licensing arrangements, encryption
    manufacturers will be able to ship their products from the United States
    directly to customers within approved regions without obtaining
    individual licenses for each end user. This will improve the ability of
    our manufacturers to provide expedited delivery of products, and to
    reduce shipping and tracking costs. It should also reduce the number of
    individual license requests, especially for small businesses that cannot
    afford international distributors.

    -- Rapid review of export license applications. A significant number of
    encryption export license applications can be reviewed more quickly.
    For such exports, we have set a license turnaround goal of two working
    days.

    -- Personal use exemption. We will no longer require that U. S .
    citizens obtain an export license prior to taking encryption products
    out of the U.S. temporarily for their own personal use. In the past,
    this requirement caused delays and inconvenience for business
    travellers.

    -- Allowing exports of key-escrow encryption: After initial review, key-
    escrow encryption products may now be exported to most end users.
    Additionally, key-escrow products will qualify for special licensing
    arrangements.

    Cooperation with Industry
    These reforms should have the effect of minimizing the impact of export
    controls on U.S. industry.  The Department of State will take all
    appropriate actions to ensure that these reforms are implemented as
    quickly as possible.  The Secretary of State asks that encryption
    product manufacturers evaluate the impact of these reforms over the next
    year and provide feedback both on how the reforms have worked out and on
    recommendations for additional procedural reforms.
    (###)

    ROBB Users -- Remember to Log Off
    Users of DTC's Remote On-Line Bulletin Board (ROBB) should be sure to go
    through the full log-off procedure when done, not just "quit" the
    system.  Users who fail to go through the log-off sequence may be
    exposing some of their licensing data (specifically, case numbers) to
    other ROBB users who log on subsequently.  Questions on log-off
    procedures should be directed to DTC's Computer Support Staff a (703)
    875-6650.

    ARTICLE 3:

    Lean Times Ahead for FMF
    US Government Budget for Foreign Military Financing Shrinks

    Broad Mandate
    The U.S. has long used foreign assistance to promote political
    stability, democratization, and market economy throughout the world. The
    post-Cold War world system continues to provide numerous challenges in
    which foreign assistance can be a vital tool.

    The President has defined six fundamental foreign policy goals against
    which decisions on the allocation of foreign assistance resources are to
    be measured:

    --  Promoting U.S. Prosperity through Trade, Investment, and Employment
    --  Building Democracy
    --  Promoting Sustainable Development
    --  Promoting Peace
    --  Providing Humanitarian Assistance
    --  Advancing Diplomacy

    Shrinking Budgets...
    Budgets for key foreign assistance programs -- Foreign Military
    Financing (FMF), Economic Support Fund (ESF), and International Military
    Education & Training (IMET) -- continue to decrease. The combined budget
    for FMF, ESF, and IMET has shrunk since Fiscal Year '91 by about one
    third, or $2.5 billion.

    FMF in FY 94 sustained a 10% reduction from the previous budget, for a
    cut of nearly $1 billion since FY 91. There is no indication this trend
    will reverse in FY 95. Adding to the crunch is the rescission of nearly
    $550 million of previous years' uncommitted aid, including $91 million
    from FMF.

    Plus Reduced Flexibility...
    The decrease in the overall foreign assistance budget has not been
    matched by a decrease in Congressionally-mandated earmarks, with the
    result that earmarks accounted for 98% of grant FMF in FY 94.

    Increased U.S. commitments to peacekeeping operations have also consumed
    a growing share of assistance funds, with correspondingly less available
    for discretionary spending. After earmarks, commitments, and treaty
    obligations are subtracted, $25 million remains in the budget to fund
    discretionary FMF programs worldwide.

    ...Equals Fewer Programs
    As a result of funding cuts in FY 92-94, 45 country programs spanning
    every geographic region have been dropped.  FMF spending cuts have
    extended to counternarcotics programs, requiring reduction in assistance
    to South American and Caribbean nations cooperating with the U.S.

    The assistance budget cuts are also felt in the U.S. With the exception
    of some funds earmarked by Congress for expenditure in Israel, almost
    all FMF aid is spent in the U.S., to the benefit of American industry.

    New Challenges, New Alternatives
    Budgetary constraints have forced the U.S. to seek alternative and
    innovative ways to continue to assist friendly nations, notably the
    Excess Defense Article (EDA) program, under which U.S. forces' excess
    hardware is provided to allies and friends. Inevitably, however, some
    former recipients of U.S. foreign assistance will reach out to other
    suppliers, government or commercial, to fill the gap.

    (###)

    ARTICLE 4:

    A New Chief for Defense Trade
    An Interview with Deputy Assistant Secretary Martha Caldwell Harris

    Within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the senior official
    responsible for export control is Deputy Assistant Secretary Martha
    Caldwell Harris.  Since taking her Ph.D. in Political Science at the
    University of Wisconsin, Dr. Harris has held a number of academic and
    government positions "at the intersection of national security and
    international competitiveness."  She conducted a number of studies on
    strategic trade issues during more than seven years at the Congressional
    Office of Technology Assessment.  More recently, at the National
    Research Council, her work focused on issues in U.S./Japan trade and
    technology transfer.  Dr. Harris spoke with Defense Trade News and
    Export Policy Bulletin about current trends in the export control
    environment.

    Multi-Front Engagement
    Dr. Harris listed four broad areas in which she is engaged: policy
    development on dual use and defense export controls; licensing and
    compliance issues; industry and public relations; and internal
    management.

    Policy Development
    Dr. Harris assumed her new duties at a time of rapid shifting in the
    export control environment due to the end of the Cold War and the
    imminent dissolution of the COCOM regime.  "Just in the last few months,
    the focus has changed.  Some ask why, with no unified threat, we even
    need export controls.  But we've gone from an East/West confrontation to
    a world with many proliferation threats and many sources of instability.

    "There has been dramatic change in the past year," she added.  "The
    world is a more complicated place.  Information flows rapidly.  Even
    developing countries are increasingly able to afford high technologies
    which could improve their military capabilities."

    In developing U.S. aims for the post-Cold War export control
    environment, Dr. Harris emphasized the need to "develop an international
    security policy framework, then determine where our export control goals
    fit into the framework."

    Licensing and Compliance
    "You'd expect this to be fairly routine, right?"  Actually, noted Dr.
    Harris, while licensing procedures are generally straightforward, a
    small percentage of the 50,000+ cases which State processes each year do
    reach her desk. "The ones I see either present tough choices, or somehow
    push the envelope."

    Does that mean individual cases drive export policy?  "No.  Cases will
    not be emblematic of a whole new approach.  They don't create a policy
    framework.  Cases will, however, highlight the gaps in the policy
    framework" that need to be adjusted to the realities of actual commerce.

    Dr. Harris added that PM is putting increasing effort into compliance
    issues, including investigation of tech transfer violations, but "we
    need better interaction with industry and other governments" to tighten
    enforcement.

    Industry Relations
    "We need to hear what industry has to say" about both policy and
    operational licensing issues, she emphasized.  Dr. Harris noted that she
    frequently hears laudatory comments from "companies on the front line"
    about State's Office of Defense Trade Controls and Office of Export
    Control Policy.  "Over time, a professional and cooperative relationship
    has developed, which I attribute in large part to the professionalism of
    the people at DTC."

    Does that mean State is improving?  "It's difficult to know how good a
    sample you're getting.  There's a lot of positive feedback from big
    companies, but I haven't had as much opportunity to hear from smaller
    companies, and we need to be sensitive to their needs."  Dr. Harris
    emphasized the need for companies to provide feedback on such matters as
    regulatory modifications.  "It has to be a two-way street."

    What of criticism that State has been slow to adjust the export control
    regime to the realities of technological development?  Is State building
    roadblocks on the information superhighway?  "In fact, we've liberalized
    quite a lot lately, particularly on dual use [equipment]," she said,
    referring to the Administration's liberalization of telecommunications
    and computer export standards.

    "We hear broad complaints, but we need to hear specifics so we can
    examine our decisions.  For example, I hear criticism about the
    Commodity Jurisdiction procedure [being too restrictive],  but few
    concrete complaints about CJ rulings."  Moreover, "we have an active
    [interagency] process underway to eliminate some of these restrictions."

    Dr. Harris acknowledged the existence of "irritants" in licensing
    operations and the policy development process.  "Companies are concerned
    not only with processing time, but also with the clarity of policy
    guidelines" they need to  judge whether to devote resources to potential
    export markets.

    Dr. Harris rejected any notion that State is less sensitive to the needs
    of American industry than agencies focused on commercial matters.  While
    the Arms Export Control Act directs that licensing decisions are to be
    made on national security and foreign policy grounds, it does not
    prohibit taking into account economic or commercial interests in a
    reasonable manner.  "Prosperity is a factor in national security, and
    while we cannot allow commercial concerns to overpower the other
    interests we need to balance, neither should we ignore" the well-being
    of U.S. firms.  One sign of State's concern, she added, is the growing
    emphasis on commercial work at our embassies.

    And how does Dr. Harris rate the Defense Trade Advisory Group, the
    Department's official link to the defense industry? "DTAG is very
    active.  I've worked with advisory groups at several other agencies, and
    DTAG is a good example of how the relationship should work.  I would
    like to see more frequent interaction [than the semiannual plenary]  --
    more frequent meetings, to break down big questions into manageable
    problems and come up with solutions.

    "DTAG is also helpful in clarifying to the public that State's not just
    limiting defense exports; we're also working to facilitate legitimate
    sales.  We recognize the importance of arms exports for legitimate
    goals, such as improving interoperability with allied forces and
    supporting regional stability."

    Internal Management
    In keeping with the National Performance Review, State is working to
    make the export control process "more customer-friendly and efficient,"
    Dr. Harris noted. One result has been the reinvention of the former
    Office of Defense Trade Policy as the Office of Export Control Policy,
    which absorbed COCOM staff formerly assigned to the Bureau of Economic
    and Business Affairs.

    "Before, the COCOM staff, working in a dual-use context, had little to
    do with PM.  That might have made sense in the old world; after all, we
    weren't selling arms to COCOM-proscribed countries.  Now we have brought
    together the expertise to work military and dual use issues in a more
    integrated way."

    (###)

    ARTICLE 5:

    National Disclosure Policy
    A Primer on the Process

    Many people have observed that the process surrounding the National
    Disclosure Policy (NDP) and the actions of the National Disclosure
    Policy Committee (NDPC) appear opaque and rather mysterious. This
    article is meant to make both the policy and the process more
    understandable.

    What is the NDP?
    The NDP establishes a framework for approval or denial of proposed
    disclosures of classified information to foreign governments and some
    international organizations. Information controlled under NDP includes
    eight categories of information on subjects as diverse as military
    intelligence, military organization, and training, as well as
    information required for operation and maintenance of  military
    materials and munitions sold to foreign countries.

    The NDP establishes specific criteria and conditions which must be
    satisfied before a decision is made to release classified military
    information to foreign governments.  These criteria and conditions
    satisfy, in part, the security requirements of the Arms Export Control
    Act and Executive Order 12356.  Approval or denial is based on a
    determination of whether these specific criteria and conditions are
    satisfied.

    The Secretaries of the military departments have generally been
    delegated authority to render decisions, with respect to disclosure of
    information controlled by their departments, to the governments of
    countries with which the United States has mutual defense arrangements.
    In cases where authority has not been delegated, an exception to NDP is
    needed.  Requests for exception are considered by the National
    Disclosure Policy Committee.

    What is the NDP Committee?
    The NDPC is chaired by a Defense Department representative and includes
    representatives of each military service, the State Department, and
    other agencies.  A small secretariat is based at the Pentagon.

    The Exception Process
    Often U.S. firms encounter the NDP when an export license application
    dealing with the release of a classified defense article is denied on
    NDP grounds.

    A request for exception to NDP must be sponsored by an NDPC member,
    normally the cognizant military service -- that is, the service which
    operates or "owns" the system. For example, the Air Force would normally
    sponsor the F-16, the Navy the F/A-18, and the Army the Apache
    helicopter. State or other NDPC members may sponsor a request for
    exception, but this is generally impractical as only the cognizant
    service will have the technical expertise to make a credible case. Once
    a member agrees to sponsor a request for exception, the sponsor submits
    the request to the secretariat, which staffs the proposal to the NDPC
    members. Members normally must vote within 10 working days, or justify
    the delay.

    Exception Criteria
    NDPC members determining whether to sponsor or approve an exception
    judge requests according to the following criteria:

    -- The proposed disclosure must support U.S. foreign policy objectives
    toward both the recipient country and the region.

    -- The proposed disclosure must have no unacceptable military security
    implications. The key consideration is the impact a compromise or
    diversion of the system or technology would have on the operational
    capability of U.S. and allied forces. This determination takes into
    account system capability and vulnerability, foreign availability of the
    same or similar systems and technology, and the susceptibility of the
    system to exploitation.

    -- The recipient must have the capability and intent to protect the
    system.  The U.S. Government determines capability through on-site
    security visits, intelligence risk assessments, and other means.  Intent
    is established by the negotiation of detailed security agreements with
    recipient governments. If there is no security agreement, a program-
    specific security arrangement may be negotiated.

    -- The proposed disclosure must result in clearly-defined political,
    military or other national security benefit to the U. S.
    Economic/commercial benefits to the U.S. are not currently exception
    criteria.

    -- The disclosure must be limited to the minimum information necessary
    to satisfy the U.S. Government goals outlined above. Information must
    not be divulged that would  assist the recipient in the design and
    development of an indigenous system -- unless, of course, that is the
    U.S. Government's intention in permitting the disclosure, e.g., to
    enhance an ally's defense industrial base.

    Determination and Appeal
    If NDPC members split on whether to permit a disclosure, the Committee
    chairman renders  a "Chairman's Decision." Dissenting NDPC members can
    appeal this ruling to the Secretary of Defense.

    If the NDPC achieves unanimity -- or if there is a disagreement, but the
    members in the minority choose not to appeal -- the Chairman releases a
    formal "Record of Action" on the determination.  Decisions rendered by
    the Secretary of Defense or his deputy are recorded in the same manner.

    Efforts to Improve the System
    The NDP process is important to the protection of U.S. classified
    material. State and DoD recognize, however, that industry has
    experienced difficulties with this process. All agencies involved are
    working to improve the NDP process.

    Suggestions or questions on National Disclosure Policy should be
    directed to the Office of Export Control Policy.
    (###)

    ARTICLE 6:

    Perestroika at PM
    A Guide to the Restructured Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

    This snapshot guide to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM, in
    State Departmentese) is aimed at business people and others who work
    with PM offices but may not be familiar with the Bureau's overall
    structure and responsibilities.

    The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs recently underwent a
    reorganization aimed at improving policy and operational efficiency,
    absorbing some elements previously attached to other State bureaus.

    Some PM offices were given modified responsibilities, and most were
    given new names reflective of these evolving missions.  For example, the
    former Office of Defense Trade Policy became the Office of Export
    Control Policy, following augmentation with officers transferred from
    the Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs.

    Mission
    The Bureau furthers U.S. national security objectives by stabilizing
    regional military balances through negotiation and security assistance;
    negotiating reductions in global inventories of weapons of mass
    destruction and curbing their proliferation; maintaining global access
    for U.S. military forces; inhibiting adversaries' access to militarily
    significant technologies; and promoting responsible U.S. defense trade.

    Organization
    PM's 270 Foreign Service, Civil Service, and  military personnel are
    supervised by four Deputy Assistant Secretaries, who -- together with
    several Ambassadors-at-Large -- report to Assistant Secretary of State
    for Political-Military Affairs Robert L. Gallucci. The Bureau's work is
    divided into four functions:

         Arms Control
    The Ambassador for Safe and Secure Dismantlement leads the State
    Department effort  in negotiating and implementing agreements for
    assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan for the safe and
    secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons.

    The Office of Strategic Policy and Negotiations supports the development
    of U.S. policy on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations; safe and
    secure dismantlement; strategic arms negotiations; ballistic missile
    defense policy; arms control and security negotiations in Europe; and
    multilateral arms control.

    The Office of Arms Control Implementation provides political-military
    technical expertise related to compliance with and implementation of
    arms control agreements.

    The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) operates 24-hour government-to-
    government communications links ("hotlines") in support of arms control
    and security agreements with former Soviet republics and member states
    of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

         Export Controls
    The Office of Defense Trade Controls, the Bureau's largest element,
    issues export licenses to U.S. firms and enforces compliance  with the
    Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms
    Regulations.

    The Office of Export Control Policy sets policy guidelines for
    commercial defense trade and high technology exports, and provides
    guidance to embassies on assistance to U.S. defense industry marketing
    efforts overseas.

         Nonproliferation
    The U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency serves
    as Ambassador to this multilateral organization, tasked with
    strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and
    advancing peaceful nuclear cooperation.

    The Office of the  Senior Coordinator directs the development of U.S.
    policies and activities in two areas -- establishing centers in the
    former Soviet Union to engage scientists and engineers in peaceful
    science and technology activities, and coordinating U.S. Government
    technical assistance to former Soviet, Eastern European, and Central
    European countries to improve the safety of nuclear power reactors.

    The dual mission of the Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs is to
    strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, while
    advancing peaceful nuclear cooperation with those states which have
    accepted binding international commitments to nuclear nonproliferation.

    The Office of Regional Nonproliferation works to prevent and reverse the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
    delivery.  Among its activities, the office provides operational and
    intelligence support to the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq and the
    International Atomic Energy Agency.

    The mission of the Office of Chemical, Biological, and Missile
    Nonproliferation is to fight the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction and the systems capable of delivering them.  It leads U.S.
    efforts in such multilateral fora as the Missile Technology Control
    Regime, and works with the Office of Defense Trade Controls to regulate
    trade in missile technology.

         Regional Security
    The Ambassador-at-Large for Burdensharing works to ensure a more
    balanced sharing of defense costs by U.S. allies.

    The Office of Defense Relations and Security Assistance manages
    bilateral political-military relations and negotiates agreements on
    access, prepositioning, and basing of U.S. forces overseas.  The office
    also manages State's statutory responsibilities for security assistance
    programs and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) arms transfers.

    The Office of International Security and Peacekeeping Operations serves
    as State's primary operational point of liaison with the Defense
    Department, the National Security Council, and U.S. embassies during
    crises, military exercises, and operations abroad.  The office provides
    coordination and support for a growing number of humanitarian assistance
    programs, such as airdrops to Bosnia.

    The Office of Policy and Plans conducts long-range policy planning with
    an emphasis on the scope of our future security commitments, prepares
    crisis response options, and supports development of the policy
    framework for peacekeeping, regional arms control, and confidence-
    building initiatives.

    Administration, Liaison, Detachments
    The Bureau includes an administrative unit known as the Office of the
    Executive Director and a small Congressional/Public Affairs staff. Also
    carried on the Bureau's rolls are State officers serving rotational
    tours outside the Department -- as State-Defense Exchange Officers at
    the Pentagon, and Political Advisors on the staffs of senior U.S.
    military commanders.

    (###)

    ARTICLE 7:

    ELSA Speeds Staffing
    State's Export License Staffing Analysis Network Cuts License Processing
    Time

    In recent years the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) has developed
    several automated systems to speed license processing and provide more
    timely information to the public. These include the in-house information
    management system known as DETAS, the automated telephone inquiry system
    ALISS, the electronic bulletin board ROBB, and the new electronic
    licensing application system ELLIE.

    March 1994 saw the introduction of State's latest export licensing
    support system -- ELSA, the Export License Staffing Analysisnetwork.
    ELSA is a PC-based net which links DTC to the State Department regional
    bureaus and functional bureaus which review many license applications on
    foreign policy grounds.

    Before ELSA, DTC staffed applications to other State offices by
    forwarding hard copies of applications via inter-office mail.  With
    quick electronic communication via ELSA, the Department hopes to achieve
    quicker turnaround on staffed cases while reducing instances of strayed
    documents and human processing error.

    Unlike ALISS, ROBB, and ELLIE, ELSA won't  communicate directly with
    U.S. industry.  But she will be serving it.

    (###)

    ARTICLE 8:

    SARP Update
    State Appeals Review Process Gets Underway

    The Office of Defense Trade Controls has  begun the State Appeals Review
    Process (SARP) described in the January 1994 issue of Defense Trade
    News.  Procedures and guidelines are being fine-tuned as we proceed.

    No Detour Around the Day-in-Court
    Applications for which the Department of Defense has recommended denial
    based on national security concerns will not be eligible for the SARP if
    an applicant has been offered, and has declined, a DoD Day-in-Court
    hearing.  An applicant who has made his case at a Day-in-Court without
    obtaining a reversal of the DoD position may request a SARP hearing, but
    only if the applicant has substantial new information to introduce.  In
    such cases, DTC will invite DoD to participate.

    Questions and suggestions on the State Appeals Review Process should be
    directed to the Licensing Division of the Office of Defense Trade
    Controls.

    (###)

    ARTICLE 9:

    Country Policy Briefs

    Central and Eastern Europe
    On January 5, 1994, President Clinton announced his finding that the
    furnishing of defense articles and services to the governments of the
    Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic will strengthen the security of
    the U.S. and promote world peace.  On March 22, the President announced
    the same finding regarding the governments of Albania,  Bulgaria,
    Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania.  The State Department will
    henceforth consider applications for the export of U.S. Munitions List
    articles and services to these governments on a case-by-case basis.

    Vietnam
    On February 4, 1994, President Clinton announced that the trade embargo
    imposed with respect to Vietnam in 1975 is being removed.  This action,
    however, did not extend to trade in U.S. Munitions List articles.  The
    State Department continues to return without action all applications for
    licences to export USML hardware, technical data, or services to
    Vietnam.

    Former Yugoslavia
    On July 11, 1991, the United States declared an embargo on exports of
    U.S. Munitions List articles and services to the former Yugoslavia,
    suspending all existing licenses.  This embargo remains in force,
    applying to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of
    Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro, and Slovenia.

    (###)

    Subsidiaries --
    Don't Forget Your Parents
    Subsidiaries sometimes submit applications to the Office of Defense
    Trade Controls (DTC) using a parent company's registration code but not
    the parent company's name. This delays processing while DTC verifies the
    subsidiary's status. To avoid this problem, subsidiaries should identify
    the parent company in the Applicant box of applications, e.g.:

    ABC Company
    A Subsidiary of XYZ, Inc.
    1234 Elm Street
    Anytown, CA 99999
    (###)

    ARTICLE 10:

    DTAG Developments

    The Defense Trade Advisory Group (DTAG) convened its semi-annual plenary
    session on March 17, 1994  at the Department of State.  Highlights from
    the session:

    The Policy Framework
    In his opening address, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military
    Affairs Robert L. Gallucci outlined the broad foreign policy context for
    U.S. export controls:

    --  Supporting reform in Russia is a top U.S. priority.

    --The success of the Middle East peace process will determine whether
    the region will be stable and whether certain nations will be a threat
    to their neighbors and to the U.S.

    -- North Korea's attempts to acquire nuclear capability threaten the
    entire Pacific region.

    -- While China is potentially a lucrative market, it is also a major
    arms supplier and presents human rights concerns.

    -- The Partnership for Peace provides flexibility to meet Europe's long-
    term security needs, preserving the traditional U.S.-NATO military
    alliances while allowing us to broaden security ties with other European
    countries.

    Presidential Directives
    Mr. Gallucci described four Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs)
    shaping policy on arms transfers and export controls. PDD-8 calls for
    strengthening nonproliferation regimes. PDD-23 announces a liberalized
    remote sensing satellite policy.  PDD-27 maintains State's role in
    controlling encryption exports to safeguard national security, while
    streamlining encryption licensing. Finally, the Administration is
    preparing PDD-41 on U.S. conventional arms transfer policy. Goals
    include enhancing transparency, encouraging restraint in conventional
    arms sales, and supporting defense conversion.

    Balancing Exports & Nonproliferation
    Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Controls Martha Harris opened her
    keynote address by saying the President has placed the nonproliferation
    of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons on the
    international security agenda. The Administration is striving to reduce
    the supply of these arms to countries of concern  such as North Korea,
    Iran, Iraq, and Libya.

    Dr. Harris reiterated State's commitment to support U.S. firms facing
    hardship in the shrinking global defense market, stating that  State
    will take economic considerations into account in licensing decisions.
    She described PM initiatives to better assist industry, including the
    centralization of dual-use and defense export control policy management
    in the Office of Export Control Policy; the implementation by the Office
    of Defense Trade Controls of expedited license review, electronic
    license application, and the State Appeals Review Process;  and the
    continuing revision of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

    Country Policies
    Dr. Harris noted continuing concern over China's commitment to human
    rights and non-proliferation.  Taking questions, she said that proposed
    recipients' human rights records are factored into licensing decisions;
    that the U.S. is working to limit the spread of weapons of mass
    destruction in South Asia; and that the U.S. hoped that free and fair
    elections  in South Africa would allow the U.N. embargo to be lifted.

    Working Group Reports
    DTAG officers outlined their accomplishments since the October 1993
    plenary and their projects for 1994. In 1993 the Policy Working Group
    submitted recommendations on U.S. conventional arms transfer policy and
    U.S. arms transfer policy towards Taiwan, and proposed  State/DOD
    collaboration on preparation of a comprehensive foreign availability
    database and identification of technological means to mitigate the
    consequences of unauthorized transfers.

    New issues for the Policy Working Group include U.S. arms transfer
    policy towards Latin America  and South Africa; consideration of
    cooperative theater missile defense development, production, and
    deployment as a policy instrument; amendment of unfair tax treatment of
    defense exports; participation by U.S. firms in Soviet bloc equipment
    upgrades; and clarification of U.S. policies on arms transfers to
    multilateral entities.

    The Regulatory Working Group has submitted recommendations on the State
    Appeals Review Process, Commodity Jurisdiction issues, and third country
    transfers.  It has task forces devoted to the Missile Technology Control
    Regime, licensing automation, review of the International Traffic in
    Arms Regulations, and compliance issues. The Technical Working Group
    continues to focus on jet engine hot sections, satellites, and
    encryption policy.

    Background Briefings
    Clifford Bond, Deputy Director for Regional Economic Assistance, Office
    of Independent States and Commonwealth Affairs, discussed the Russian
    economy.  State planning and centralization have been abolished, trade
    liberalized, and foreign investment encouraged. The defense sector no
    longer controls resource allocation. To bring about a full market
    economy, the government must diffuse economic power to the provinces,
    create a social safety net, and become more involved in building up
    selected industrial sectors. Elsewhere, Ukraine is suffering
    economically. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova also face financial
    hardships, but are proceeding with economic reforms.

    Ed Malloy, Director of State's Office of Science, Technology, and
    Health, described the rapid development of U.S./Russian space
    cooperation. Although some in the Russian government feel Russia is
    sacrificing too much Soviet technology, many more favor increased
    cooperation. The U.S. and Russia are cooperating on missile
    nonproliferation, a technical safeguard agreement for INMARSAT, and the
    space station partnership.  Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine want
    to broaden space collaboration with the United States.

    Andrew Church of the Office of Export Control Policy outlined U.S.
    efforts to help Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states establish
    effective export controls. State is in the process of amending the ITAR
    list of proscribed destinations to reflect progress by various states.

    In the case of the former Soviet states, the U.S. is most likely to
    approve sales of non-lethal civilian end-use items.  Albania, Bulgaria,
    Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania have made progress toward
    becoming free-market democracies; while they remain proscribed, State is
    approving some transfers in support of legitimate defense needs.  The
    Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia were removed from the
    proscribed list in 1991.  They have the region's most effective export
    control systems, and are likely to be the most active Partnership for
    Peace participants.  These countries are eligible for FMS transfers, and
    State is likely to approve commercial sales which fulfill these
    countries' legitimate defense needs.

    Dean Rogers of the Office of Export Control Policy and Daniel Cook of
    the Office of Defense Trade Controls discussed developments on
    reconnaissance satellite and encryption policy.

    Under Secretary's Overview
    Finally, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs
    Lynn E. Davis took questions on prospects for U.S. participation in the
    upgrade of Soviet systems, human rights as a factor in licensing
    decisions for countries such as China, the Conventional Arms Transfer
    policy review, defense export financing, and the COCOM successor regime.

    DTAG-related questions can be directed to Linda Lum of the DTAG
    Secretariat at  (202) 647-4231.

    (###)

    ARTICLE 11:

    U.S. CUSTOMS REPORT

    Customs and the Revised ITAR

    Most of the revisions to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
    (ITAR) which took effect July 22, 1993, had minimal effect on the import
    and export procedures of the U.S. Customs Service. The new ITAR
    exemptions from licensing requirements do change some of the
    documentation required by Customs for exports and temporary imports.

    Certify Exemptions
    Exporters are cautioned that they must claim an exemption from licensing
    requirements for defense articles by certifying on the Shippers Export
    Declaration (SED) the ITAR citation under which the exemption is
    allowed. The certification is a declaration that all the conditions of
    the exemption are met.

    Customs regulations allow for filing most SEDs with the complete
    manifest up to four days after outbound clearance of a vessel. Most
    general cargo carriers take advantage of this procedure. SEDs for all
    defense articles listed in the ITAR must be filed with Customs before
    the shipment is exported. This includes SEDs for exports fitting within
    the new ITAR exemption provisions.

    File Documents On Time
    The exporter must assure timely delivery of SEDs to Customs. Delivery of
    documentation by the exporter to an agent or forwarder is not
    sufficient. The exporter is still in violation if a SED is not received
    by Customs prior to export.

    A certification for exemption from the requirement for a temporary
    import license for defense articles must be listed on Customs entry
    documents at the time of import. The entry number on which the exemption
    was claimed and the regulatory citation for the exemption are required
    on the SED when the merchandise is exported. The annotated SED must be
    provided to Customs prior to the actual export.

    Maintain Records
    The exporter needs to maintain a complete record of the Customs import
    entry numbers and documentation to assure the export requirements can be
    met. Many Customs brokers do not routinely include the entry number in
    documentation returned to the importer. The importer/exporter may need
    to take extra steps to assure the information is available at the time
    of export.

    The best advice Customs can offer to avoid a delay in shipments of
    defense articles is to get documentation to Customs early to provide
    adequate time for review and verification. The exporter/importer is the
    party responsible for providing accurate and complete information. A
    deficiency caused by an agent or freight forwarder acting for the
    company does not alleviate the liability of the exporter or importer.

    Any Questions?
    U.S. Customs has a policy of promoting informed compliance with all laws
    and regulations within Customs  jurisdiction. If you have questions
    about import and export procedures and requirements, please call your
    local Customs office.

    (###)

    ARTICLE 12:

    Suspensions, Debarments, Reinstatements

    Japan Aviation Electronics Industry, Ltd., Japan (JAE)
    Effective March 25, 1994, Japan Aviation Electronics Industry, Ltd.,
    Japan (JAE)  had export/retransfer privileges reinstated pursuant to
    Section 38(g)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and Section
    127.11 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).  JAE may
    once again participate in the export or retransfer of defense articles
    or defense services subject to Section 38 of the AECA and the ITAR.

    Notice of this reinstatement was published in the Federal Register
    (April 7, 1994, No. 67, Page 16681-2, Public Notice 1980).

    Rexon Technology Corporation
    Gary D. Kauf
    Jerome S. Shafir
    James A. Bittel
    Ronald L. Laib
    Ordnance Technologies Ltd. (ORDTEC)
    John Paul Grecian
    Bryan Mason

    On February 24, 1994, Assistant Secretary Robert L. Gallucci, Bureau of
    Political-Military Affairs, suspended all existing licenses and other
    approvals (including all activities under manufacturing license and
    technical assistance agreements) granted pursuant to Section 38 of the
    AECA that authorized the export or transfer of defense articles or
    services by, for, or to Rexon Technology Corporation, New Jersey; Gary
    D. Kauf (president of Rexon); Jerome S. Shafir (employee of Rexon);
    James A. Bittel (employee of Rexon); Ronald L. Laib (former employee of
    Rexon); Ordnance Technologies Ltd., a.k.a. ORDTEC, United Kingdom; John
    Paul Grecian and Bryan Mason, United Kingdom; and any of their
    subsidiaries, associated companies or successor entities.

    In addition, it shall be the policy of the Department of State to deny
    all export license applications and other requests for approval
    involving, directly or indirectly, Rexon Technology Corporation; Gary D.
    Kauf; Jerome S. Shafir; James A. Bittel; Ronald L. Laib; Ordnance
    Technologies Ltd., a.k.a. ORDTEC; John Paul Grecian; Bryan Mason, and
    any of their subsidiaries, associated companies or successor entities.
    Also, these persons are precluded from using any exemptions from license
    or other approval included in the ITAR.

    Notice of this suspension was published in the Federal Register (April
    7, 1994, Vol. 59, No. 67, Page 16682-3, Public Notice 1981).

    Armour of America
    On December 31, 1992, pursuant to Section 38 of the AECA, the Department
    of State in Public Notice 1753 suspended all existing licenses and other
    approvals that authorized export or transfer of defense articles or
    services by, for, or to Armour of America, Inc. (Armour) and any of its
    subsidiaries or associated companies, and Arthur G. Schreiber, President
    of Armour.  (See 58 Federal Register 4450, January 14, 1993.)

    On September 20, 1993, Ms. Glenda Joyce Tucker, a former employee of
    Armour, pled guilty to the illegal export of defense articles in
    violation of Section 38 of the AECA and the ITAR, and aiding and
    abetting in violation 18 U.S.C. $ 2(b); making false statements within
    the jurisdiction of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. $1001;
    and bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. $1344. Ms. Tucker is currently
    statutorily debarred pursuant to 22 C.F.R. $127.7(c) of the ITAR. (See
    59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994.)

    As a result of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement between Armour and the
    Departments of Justice and State, and an Order by the Assistant
    Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, the Department of
    State's suspension notice of December 31, 1992 was rescinded for Armour
    and its subsidiaries and associated companies and Arthur G. Schreiber,
    effective December 29, 1993. Therefore, those persons holding existing
    licenses or other approvals that were affected by the Armour and Arthur
    G. Schreiber suspension may resume exporting defense articles or defense
    services.

    Notice of this recision action was published in the Federal Register
    (Vol 59, January 26, 1994, p. 3746, Public Notice No. 1934).

    Public Notices of Debarred Persons
    The following persons have previously been debarred for a period of
    three years following their conviction for violating or conspiring to
    violate the AECA.  Key -- name; offense; conviction date & court;
    Federal Register citation.

    Aero Systems, Inc.
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778) and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    May 12, 1993, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1868, 58 Federal Register
    50382, September 27, 1993)

    Aero Systems, Inc. -- 2nd Statutory Debarment
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778) and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    July 5, 1993, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1944, 59 Federal Register 5664, February 7, 1994)

    Aero Systems Aviation Corp.
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violat 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    May 12, 1993, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1868, 58 Federal Register 50382, September 27, 1993)

    Aero Systems Aviation Corp. --  2nd Statutory Debarment
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778) and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    July 5, 1993, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1944, 59 Federal Register 5664, February 7, 1994)

    Aero Systems Pte. Ltd.
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    May 12, 1993, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1868, 58 Federal Register 50382, September 27, 1993)

    Aero Systems Pte. Ltd. -- 2nd Statutory Debarment
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    July 5, 1993, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1944, 59 Federal Register 5664, February 7, 1994)

    Luis Fernando Arcila-Giraldo
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    April 30, 1991, Middle District of Florida
    (Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

    Symone Morris Behrmann
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    May 10, 1990, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

    John L. Broussard
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    June 26, 1992, Western District of Louisiana
    (Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

    Maryanne E. Callaghan
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    July 20, 1990, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

    Fu Chin Chung, a.k.a. Alfred Chung
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    May 20, 1990, Northern District of Georgia
    (Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

    B.V. Delft Electronische Producten (DEP),
    Netherlands [DEP defense-related activities]
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

    Delft Instruments, N.V., Netherlands
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

    Delft Instruments Defense B.V., Netherlands
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

    Delft Instruments Electro-Optics B.V.  (DIEO), Netherlands
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

    Colin J. Devellerez
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    September 14, 1993, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

    Dilligas Trading Co., Inc.
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    December 13, 1991,  Eastern Dist. of Virginia
    (Public Notice #1674, 57 Federal Register 37184, August 18, 1992; Public
    Notice #1699, 57
    Federal Register 43768, September 22, 1992,
    Department of State Correction Notice)

    Brian Joseph Fleming, a.k.a. Brian Joseph  McSulla
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    July 3, 1990, Middle District of Alabama
    (Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

    Franke Systemtechnik GmbH, Germany
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

    Louis Haneef
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    December 30, 1991, Southern Dist. of Florida
    (Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

    Edouard Michel Heldewier
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    June 3, 1991, Eastern District of Michigan
    (Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

    Hierax Co. Ltd.
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    May 12, 1993, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1868, 58 Federal Register 50382, September 27, 1993)

    Hierax Co. Ltd. -- 2nd Statutory Debarment
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    July 5, 1993,  District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1944, 59 Federal Register 5664, February 7, 1994)

    Ronald J. Hoffman
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    April 20, 1992, Central District of California
    (Public Notice #1895, 58 Federal Register 58586, November 2, 1993)

    Herbert J. Hoffmann
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    December 11, 1990, District of Maryland
    (Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

    Tsotomu Ida
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    December 17, 1992, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1895, 58 Federal Register 58586, November 2, 1993)

    Instrubel N.V., Belgium
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

    John Jarema
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    August 30, 1990, Eastern District of Michigan
    (Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

    Franciso Ernesto Jerez
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    January 29, 1992, Central District of California
    (Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

    Jetborne, Inc.
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    December 3, 1992, Southern District of Florida
    (Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

    Hilton Langley
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    June 26, 1992, Western District of Louisiana
    (Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

    Joseph McColgan
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    June 7, 1991, Southern District of Florida
    (Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

    Charles Farrell Malone
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    June 20, 1990, Middle District of Alabama
    (Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

    Miles Andrew Maynard
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    June 3, 1991,  Eastern District of Michigan
    (Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

    George R. Mitchell
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    January 17, 1992, District of Maryland
    (Public Notice #1674, 57 Federal Register 37184, August 18,1992; Public
    Notice #1699,
    57 Federal Register 43768, September 22, 1992, Department of State
    Correction Notice)

    Seamus Moley
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    June 7, 1991, Southern District of Florida
    (Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

    Toshiyuki Murakoshi
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    December 17, 1992, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1895, 58 Federal Register 58586, November 2,1993)

    Novacom, Inc.
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    December 13, 1991, Eastern Dist. of Virginia
    (Public Notice #1674, 57 Federal Register 37184, August 18,1992; Public
    Notice #1699,
    57 Federal Register 43768, September 22, 1992, Department of State
    Correction Notice)

    OIP N.V., Belgium
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

    Oldelft Electronic Instruments Srl, Italy
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

    Francisco Salvador Martin Panameno
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    January 29, 1992, Central District of California
    (Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register  6835, February 2, 1993)

    Pan Aviation, Inc.
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    January 23, 1992, Southern District of Florida
    (Public Notice #1674, 57 Federal Register 37184, August 18, 1992; Public
    Notice #1699,
    57 Federal Register 43768, September 22, 1992, Department of State
    Correction Notice)

    Ricardo Benitez Perez
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    January 21, 1992, Southern District of Texas
    (Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

    Alfredo Antonio Ramos-Tinoco
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    April 4, 1991, Middle District of Florida
    (Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

    Frank J. Randazzo
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    May 10, 1990, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

    David R. Rosen
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778) and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    June 26, 1990, Eastern Dist. of Pennsylvania
    (Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

    Sarkis G. Soghanalian
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    January 29, 1992, Southern District of Florida
    (Public Notice #1674, 57 Federal Register 37184, August 18, 1992, Public
    Notice #1699; 57
    Federal Register 43768, September 22, 1992, Department of State
    Correction Notice)

    Hironobu Takahashi
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    December 17, 1992, District of Columbia
    (Public Notice #1895, 58 Federal Register 58586, November 2, 1993)

    Rudy Yujen Tsai
    18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
        and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    March 4, 1991, Eastern Dist. of Pennsylvania
    (Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

    Glenda Joyce Tucker
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    September 20, 1993, Central Dist. of California
    (Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

    Phyllis Ware
    22 U.S.C. $ 2778
    June 3, 1991, Eastern District of Michigan
    (Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

    Anyone needing additional information to determine whether a person has
    been debarred or reinstated should contact the Compliance Division of
    the Office of Defense Trade Controls.
    (###)

    ARTICLES 13 AND 14 ARE NOT LISTED.  PLEASE REFER TO THE PAPER COPY OF
    THIS DOCUMENT.

    [END OF DTN, VOL. 5, NO. 2]