21 June 1997
See related documents: http://jya.com/whpfiles.htm

------------------------------------------------------------------

4 March 1997

I spoke this morning with William H. Payne in NM (505-292-7037), 
who confirmed that this NSA suit is authentic.

------------------------------------------------------------------

3 March 1997
Source: Anonymous

------------------------------------------------------------------

                  UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

					    )
William H. Payne        	   	    )
Arthur R. Morales                           )
                                            )
                Plaintiffs,                 )
                                            )
v                                           )	Civ No: 97 2266 SC
			                    )   FILED 97 FEB 28
Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF )   AM 10:51
Director, National Security Agency	    )
National Security Agency		    )
9800 Savage Road			    )
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000	    )
                                            )
                Defendant                   )
____________________________________________)


                 COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF


1  	This is an action under the Freedom of Information Act 

[FOIA], 5 USC Article 552, for injunctive and other appropriate 

relief and seeking the disclosure and release of agency 

records improperly withheld from plaintiff William Payne 

[Payne] by defendant Kenneth Minihan of the National Security 

Agency [NSA].


Jurisdiction and Venue

2  	This court has both subject matter jurisdiction over this

action and personal jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to 

5 USC Article 552(a)(4)(B).  This court also has jurisdiction 

over this action pursuant to 28 USC Article 1331.  Venue lies 

in this district under 5 U.S.C. Article 552(a)(4)(B).


The Parties
	
3  	Plaintiff Payne was employed by Sandia National 

Laboratories [Sandia] between 1980 and 1992.  Payne was 

project leader for the Missile Secure Cryptographic Unit 

[MSCU] at Sandia between about 1982 and 1986.  The MSCU was 

funded by NSA.  Payne designed and built the hardware/software 

data authenticator for the US/USSR Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty for Sandia between 1986 and 1992.  Payne held SECRET 

clearance when Payne worked for the Navy, DOE Q clearance, 

crypto and SCI access while at Sandia.


Payne is author of, Machine, Assembly, and System Programming 

for the IBM 360, New York: Harper & Row, 1969;  Programacion 

en Lenguaje de Maquina, Asemblador,y de Sistemas con el IBM 

360, Harper & Row, 197;  Implementing BASICs: How BASICs Work, 

Reston/Prentice-Hall, 1982, with Patricia Payne;  and Embedded 

controller Forth for the 8031 family, Academic Press, 1990.  

Payne is author of about 38 technical articles in the areas of 

pseudorandom number generation, machine combinatorics, and 

human factors.  Payne Discovered the Generalized Feedback 

Shift Register (GFSR) pseudorandom number generator.  The GFSR 

documented in Knuth, D.  The Art of Computer Programming, 

Semi-numerical Algorithms, Vol 2, 2nd edition.  


Payne's PhD students include:   T. G. Lewis, Computer Science.  

Currently employed as department chairman, Navy Postgraduate 

School, Monterey, CA, two term Editor-in-Chief of IEEE 

Software, now Editor-in-Chief IEEE Computer and J. S. 

Sobolewski, Computer Science.  Currently employed as Associate 

Vice President of Computer Information and Resource Technology 

and Professor of Electrical Engineering, University of New 

Mexico.  Sobolewski is one of the Maui supercomputer center 

directors.  


Payne's work experience includes:  National Academy of 

Sciences - National Research Council, Postdoctoral Research 

Fellow at the Navy Electronics Laboratory, San Diego, CA;  

Computer Science and Psychology professor at Washington State 

University, Pullman, WA;  Visiting Research Associate 

Professor of Computer Science, Department of Computer Science, 

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL.


Plaintiff Arthur R. Morales, joining as a concerned citizen, is 

employed as an electrical engineer by Sandia National 

Laboratories.  Morales started and lead a class action lawsuit 

against Sandia National Labs on behalf of Hispanics.  Settlement of 

this lawsuit in October 1993 resulted in compensation for hundreds 

of minorities and women for employment mistreatment.


4  	Defendant Kenneth Minihan of the NSA is an establishment 

within the Department of Defense.  NSA is an agency within the 

meaning of 5 USC Article 552(e).  NSA has primary responsibility 

for government cryptography and electronic espionage.


The Documents at Issue and Plaintiff Payne's FOIA Requests

5  	April 5, 1986 the West Berlin La Belle discotheque, which 

was a popular hangout of American serviceman, was bombed.  Two 

American soldiers and a Turkish woman were killed.  More than 

200 people, including 50 Americans, were injured.


     	Washington charged that the bombing was directed by 
	diplomats in the Libyan mission in East Berlin.  Nine 
	days later, U.S. warplanes retaliated by swooping down 
	on "terrorist centers"and military bases in Libya.

    	[SPY MASTER, The real-life Karla, his moles, and the East      
    	German secret police, Leslie Colitt, Addison-Wesley, 1995]


Former president Ronald Reagan announced on TV the the US was 

justified on the attack on Libya because the US was reading 

Libyan communications.  This initiated in an international 

effort by those involved in espionage to discover the technical

details.

NSA employee Tom White was Payne's NSA liaison contact for the 

US/USSR seismic data authenticator.  White told Payne in 1986 

that NSA regarded Ronald Reagan as America's greatest 

traitor.  For the reason Reagan announced to the world that 

the US was reading supposedly-secret communications.


7   	In 1992 Sandia supervisor James Gosler told Sandia 

employees about Gosler's work for NSA on the "covert Channel" 

in meetings attended by Payne.  Payne also arranged a software 

course for Gosler's employees.  NSA Sandia visitor Donald 

Simard taught portions of the course.  Simard and Gosler's 

employee told Payne about the work they were doing for NSA at 

Sandia.  Writing computer software viruses.


8  	In 1992 Sandia transferred Payne to break electronic 

lock for the Federal Bureau of Investigation/ Engineering 

Research Facility.  Gosler attempted to transfer Payne to work 

on an NSA project.  Payne refused.


9  	Gosler told Payne he violated the agreement,

                    WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN
                  SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES
                               AND
                  THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

     	     CONCERNING RESEARCH IN CRYPTOGRAPHY AT 
	          SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES

  	Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the National 	         
                              
	Security Agency (NSA) have established a working 
	relationship which has grown substantially over the last 
	decade.  Currently, there exist several joint project 
	areas of mutual interest.

    	Different policies and administrative procedure exist at 
	SNL and NSA which govern the handling of sensitive and 
	classified material, and the documentation and 
	dissemination of such work.  It is the purpose of the 
	Agreement to specify the general guidelines under which 
	work will be administered in the area of cryptography 
	research at SNL.

    	First, SNL, in its role as systems integrator, requires 
	and indigenous cryptographic capability to support its 
	Department of Energy mission in the design and development 
	of safe and secure nuclear weapons and in treaty 
	verification.  SNL and NSA agree to a cooperative effort 
	to support SNL's needs in a manner consistent with the 
	role of such work to national security.

     	Second, NSA, in its role as the U.S. Government approval      
	authority for cryptographic systems developed for and 	 
 	used in national security applications, recognizes its 
	responsibility to provide support and guidance to SNL's 
	activities in applying cryptography.

     	Third, SNL will regard cryptographic research work as      
	classified when it is initiated or created, i.e., will      
	protect such work as "created classified", and will 	 
	consult with NSA prior to handling such work as 	 	 
	unclassified.      		
	
	Periodic technical and managerial discussions between SNL 
	and NSA will be held to increase the awareness of the 	 
	security concerns of both organizations and to develop 
	and maintain an SNL cryptographic classification guide 
	which will protect the national security interests of 	 
	both organizations.

     	This working agreement shall be effective on the date of 
	the last signature and will be reviewed annually by SNL 
	and NSA. It will be valid until terminated by mutual 	 
	agreement.

     	AGREED:

     	ALBERT NARATH			RADM JAMES S. MCFARLAND 	
					(USN)
     	President			Plans and Policy
     	TITLE				TITLE
     	SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES	NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
     	June 10, 1991			22 July 1991
     	DATE				DATE

Payne denied this.


10  	Payne was fired from Sandia National Laboratories on July 

27, 1992.  

     	This is to advise you that effective July 27, 1992, 
	you will be terminated from Sandia National 			
	Laboratories.  This action is the results of your 	
	flagrant attack on a valued Sandia customer and 	
	repeated insensitivity to security/classification 	
	requirements.  These acts violate Sandia National 	
	Laboratories Code of Conduct, specifically      	
	the Personal Conduct section,, and the Safeguarding      
	Information and Records Section." ...


11  	Payne sued but Sandia was given summary judgment.  

Payne eventually filed a criminal complaint affidavit on judge 

John Conway.

     	CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT:  JOHN E. CONWAY

     	New Mexico judge John E. Conway (The Court) assumed      
	control from magistrate judge, William Deaton, before 
	trial in a federal lawsuit brought by complainant 	
	William H. Payne, case CIV 92 1452 JC/WWD.

     	On May 10, 1993 The Court halted Plaintiff-			
	Appellant's Discovery pending Defendants' motion and 
	ruling on Summary Judgment.  

     	July 6, 1993  The Defendants' finally submit MOTION 
	by defendants for summary judgment. Docket sheet 	
	entry 93.

     	September 23, 1994 The Court accepts ex parte 	
	affidavits in open court regarding classification 	
	from Defendant Gosler. Docket sheet entry 134.  	
	Excerpt from the transcript reads: 

        	MR. FRIEDMAN ... I think that Mr. Gosler will be 
		able to describe the type of items that are in 
		each these pleadings that, in fact, have been 
		deemed classified, or to use a phrase, 			
		classifiable, meaning that an official has not 
		yet had the opportunity to put a stamp           
		on it.

        	THE COURT:  Is this all in the affidavit?

        	MR. FRIEDMAN:  Yes, sir.  And I believe if Your 
		Honor asks for independent corroboration of 	
		what's in his affidavit, he is prepared to 	
		present that also.

        	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, VOLUME I,          
 
		September 23, 1993, beginning page 5, line 21, ending    
       
		page 6, line 3.

        The Court concludes the proceedings with:
     
        	THE COURT:  All right.  I'll read that affidavit         
  
		Monday morning at 9:00.  We'll be in recess.
        	(Proceedings concluded.) (Page 12 line 10-12)"

     	On information and belief NO transcript of Monday was 
	apparently made.  Next entry on the Court docket 	
	sheet is 10/6/93.

     	October 18, 1993 The Court blanket seals all 		
	documents including documents The Court has, or 	
	should not have, in its possession. Docket sheet 	
	entry 139.

     	Conway, on information and belief,any documents he 
	ordered sealed evaluated for proper classification by 
	the DOE Office of Declassification pursuant to 	
	U.S.C., Title 3 - The President, EO 12356, National 
	Security Information, Section 3.4, Mandatory Review 
	for Declassification using DOE classification 	
	guidelines [EO 12356, Sec. 2.2 states, Classification 
	Guidelines]

     	August 10, 1994  Plaintiff's lawyer Stephen D. Aarons 
	finally files MOTION to reconsider protective order.  
	
	Aarons writes:

     	1  Whether by inadvertence, the press of federal 	
	caseloads, or design, the court suggested at a             
	pretrial conference in May 1993, that both parties             
	suspend further discovery until it ruled on             
	defendants' summary judgment motion.  Discovery has             
	ceased ever since.

     	2  Nearly one year ago, on August 19, 1993, the 	
	court issued its amended protective order, 			
	effectively sealing all substantive pleadings in 	
	this case.

     	3  Before issuing that order, the court considered      
	plaintiff's written response against sealing.  Judge 
	Conway informed all counsel in open court that James             
	R. Gosler would be permitted to deliver unknown             
	documents to Judge Conway at time and place certain.

     	4  Judge Conway apparently reviewed those documents 
	in camera without counsel for plaintiff.

     	5  The communication with Gosler constitutes an 	
	improper, ex parte communication with the one 	
	defendant who has been charged in plaintiff's 	
	amended complaint with the most outrageous and 	
	culpable acts.

     	6  Given the nature of this lawsuit, where 			
	defendants allege some sort of security infraction 
	by plaintiff as justification for his firing, such 
	communication under the guise of national security 
	violated plaintiff's due process rights.  Plaintiff 
	has been prejudiced by this improper communication 
	coupled with protracted delays. ...

     	WHEREFORE Plaintiff William H. Payne requests that:

     	A   Judge Conway recuse himself from further 	
	participation in these proceeding, based on improper 
	communication with defendant Gosler,

	B   The newly designated judge reconsider the 	
	standing protective order without recourse to ex 	
	parte communications with a named defendant, or in 
	the alternative, allow counsel for plaintiff to 	
	review and respond to such communications, and,

     	C   The court deny defendants' long-standing motion 
	for summary judgment, set new discovery deadlines 
	under the circumstances, and grant such further 	
	relief as justice requires.

                         Aarons Law Firm
                         Counsel for Plaintiff ...


12	Swiss national Crypto AG salesman Hans Buehler was 

arrested for espionage in Tehran in March 1992.  Buehler 

spends 9.5 months in an Iranian prison before he is released 

for $1,000,000 US.


13  	Buehler phones Payne on December 31, 1994.  Payne and 

Buehler exchange information regarding "spiking" of crypto 

units.


14   	Baltimore Sun reporter phoned Payne on June 22, 1995. 

Payne provides the Sun,

     	A   Documents and an audio cassette of a Swiss radio 

	international tape of broadcasts of May 15 and July 

	18, 1994 telling of the case of Hans Buehler.


     	B   A name and phone number of someone who Payne guesses

	will talk.


15  	The Baltimore Sun publishes a sixteen page six-part 

series between December 3-15,

                         No Such Agency
                   AMERICA'S FORTRESS OF SPIES
                  by Scott Shane and Tom Bowman

                            Part Four

                        RIGGING THE GAME

     	o  Spy sting:  Few at the Swiss factory knew the
           mysterious visitors were pulling off a stunning
           intelligence coup - perhaps the most audacious in 
	   the National Security Agency's long war on foreign 
	   codes.


tells of the case of Swiss Crypto AG communications engineer, Hans 

Buehler and the spiked crypto units.

Shane and Bowman write in Part Four of their series,

     	Engineers 'turning white'

     	IF CRYPTO AG WAS OFFERED a deal by NSA in return for
     	rigging its products, it would not be alone.  The 	
	approach to American firms usually come during 	
	discussions with NSA's export licensing office.
       	"It is not unheard of for NSA to offer preferential 
	export treatment to a company if it built a back door 
	into its equipment," says one person with experience 
	in the field.
     	  "I've seen it.  I have been in the room."
       	NSA's pitch varies.  "Generally with high-level 	
	executive it's an appeal to patriotism - how 		
	important it is for us to listen to the world," this 
	source says.  "With the midlevel commercial types, 
	it's 'Do this and we'll give you preferential export 
	treatment.'  To the real technical people, it's 'why 
	don't you do this?'  And you don't realize what's 	
	being suggested until you see the engineers are
     	turning white."
       	  In addition to the carrot of export approval, NSA 
	also can  brandish a stick, this source says.  	
	"There's the threat"  You'll never get another export 
	approval if you don't start to play ball."

NSA employee Nora Mackabee was linked to Crypto AG by the Sun.

Journalist Loring Wirbel in the January 22, 1996 issue of 

Electronic Engineering Times wrote,

     	Next in my in-basket was a set of reprints from the
     	Baltimore Sun from the paper's NSA series, which ran 
	in early December.  The series reveals the setup by 
	the NSA and CIA of a new covert collection agency, 
	the Special Collection Service, and details the case 
	of Hans Buehler, an employee of Crypto A.G. who was 
	thrown into an Iranian Prison after getting snared in 
	Crypto/NSA string against that country.


15   	Swiss, Germans, Americans put the story together.  

Cryptographic units were "spiked" so that the crypto key was 

transmitted ['covert channel'] with the cipher text.  The 

method of reading Libya's secret messages referenced by former 

President Reagan was finally explained.

16  	Payne shares this information with a Japanese 

colleague.
        
	======================================================
         BBS: The Albuquerque ROS
        Date: 03-23-95 (01:59)             Number: 5152121
        From: INTERNET: FUSHIMI@MISOJIR    Refer#: NONE
          To: BILL PAYNE                    Recvd: YES (PVT)
        Subj: Tape                           Conf: (0) E-mail
        ------------------------------------------------------
        Dear Bill,

        I have received a cassette tape and other information.          
	Thanks.

        Your Japanese writing is fine, and I can understand 
	it.

        Best regards.

        Masanori Fushimi


Postcard from Tallinn, Estonia received Monday March 11, 1996 

indicates that recipient received similar materials which were

forwarded from Cumberland, MD.


17  	Payne does not use Internet for one year beginning 

September 1995.  Friday January 12, 1996 Payne is informed 

that Sandia's Gosler, Childers, and Hagengruber along with NSA 

employee Simard were personally involved in "spiking" work has 

been put on the Internet in three forums.  Phone message left 

on Payne's recorder stated that messages were read in Tehran 

5.5 hours later.


 18  	July 16, 1996 Payne forwards certified criminal 

complaint affidavits to DC chief judge Harry Edwards naming 

Gosler, Childers, and others involved in "spiking" work for 

violating Payne's civil rights.  


19  	John R. MacArthur author of Second Front: Censorship 

and Propaganda in the Gulf War, 1992 puts together what happened 

to the Iranians.
 
                            Chapter 2
	     	          Selling Babies

     For to say the press does things conceals the fundamental
     truth that the press, strictly speaking, can scarcely be
     said to do anything.  It does not act, it is acted upon.
		        - WALTER KARP	
                   "All the Congressmen's Men"
	           Harper's Magazine, July 1989

    	MUZZLING THE MEDIA during wartime was one thing.  Using 
	the media to start a war was quite another, though just as      
	important to the White House.  While one public relations      
	specialist, the Pentagon's Pete Williams, was lulling the      
	bureau chiefs to sleep, a host of others work tirelessly 
	to awaken the docile journalist to a previously little 
	know danger named Saddam Hussein.  This was no easy task.  
	The Canadian military analyst Gwynne Dyer was largely 
	correct when he remarked that in the fall of 1990 was 
	"Saddam Hussein was not a problem that kept anybody awake 
	in July."  Before his seizure of Kuwait, the Iraqi 
	dictator was regarded by many	politicians and journalists 
	as merely another unpleasant Third World strongman for 
	whom the U.S. foreign-policy establishment had a necessary 
	affinity.  From 1980 to 1988, Hussein had shouldered the 
	burden of killing about 150,000 Iranians, * in addition to 
	at least thirteen thousand of his own citizens, including 
	several thousand unarmed Kurdish civilians, and in the 
	process won the admiration and support of elements 
	of three successive U.S. Administrations.  While it might 
	overstate the case to 

	*  	This number is an Iranian government estimate.  
		In his book, The Longest Day, author Dilip Hiro 
		cites conservative Western estimates of 260,000 
		Iranian dead.

    	suggest that in 1980 the Carter Administration encouraged      
	Hussein to attack Khomeini's Shiite legions, one can 
	safely say that no one in the Carter camp seemed to object 
	very loudly.  In those days (and through most of the 
	eighties), Khomeini's Islamic revolution was regarded by 
	the U.S. as the greatest threat to peace in the Middle 
	East and to a steady supply of cheap oil.  The semisecular 
	Hussein, cognizant of his own restive Shiite majority, 
	viewed Khomeini with equal unease, and he hungered after 
	Iranian oil and ports.  This happy confluence of 
	interests, coming on the heels of the Iranian kidnaping of 
	the U.S. embassy staff in Tehran, guaranteed at the 
	very least official U.S. neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. 
      	  
	  In this case, however, neutrality rapidly metamorphosed      
	into quiet backing for Iraq, which eventually led to 
	military support.  At first, practical dealings and the 
	hostage crisis were thought to require military aid for 
	Iran as well, but by 1984 the Reagan Administration 
	"tilted" toward Iraq and against Iran.  Better the 
	mustachioed Saddam, with whom one could deal, the thinking 
	went, than the bearded Khomeini, who actually meant 
	what he said when he called America the "Great Satan."  As 
	Germaine Greer put it in London's The Independent 
	Magazine, the West "saw Iraq as sort of a repulsive friend 
	in that it was slaughtering the sons of a worse enemy."
	  
       	  Outside the Washington establishment, there was genuine      
	concern about Hussein's penchant for killing people 
	without due process.  Human rights groups were well aware 
	of the Iraqi President's violent behavior and had 
	carefully documented his crimes.  In March 1990, for 
	example, the Committee to Protect Journalists expressed 
	its alarm when Hussein hanged Farzad Bazoft, an Iranian 
	journalist who was arrested after taking soil samples 
	from the grounds of an Iraqi weapons plant in full view of 
	Iraqi soldiers. Bazoft was said to be investigating a 
	massive explosion at the facility for the Observer on 
	London.
	
       	  Hussein also periodically made threats to annihilate 
	Israel, but this sort of rhetoric hardly distinguished him 
	from most of his fellow Arab leaders.  At such behavior 
	official Washington yawned. Human rights groups were 
	always yowling about this or that Middle Eastern despot; 
	whether it was Hafez Assad of Syria or Khomeini or Hussein 
	or the Emir of Kuwait or King Fahd of Saudi Arabia made 
	little difference to the realpoliticians.  What mattered 
	was "What have you done for me lately?" and lately Iraq 
	had done a lot to check Iran. ...

       	  The willingness to give Hussein the benefit of the 
	doubt extended into the high echelons of the Bush 
	Administration, which often seemed devoted to cleaning up 
	his bad-boy image.  Sometimes the Administration offered 
	direct advice of its vilified client.  In her famous 
	meeting with Hussein on July 25, 1990, U.S. Ambassador 
	April Glaspie tried her best to help out with the 
	dictator's questionable character.  After consoling 
	Hussein over a "cheap and unjust" profile by ABC's Diane 
	Sawyer, Glaspie wished out loud of an "appearance in the 
	media, even for five minutes," by the Iraqi President that 
	"would help [the Administration] explain Iraq to the 
	American people."  She also noted wistfully that if George  
	Bush "had control of the media, his job would be much 
	easier." ...
  
       	  Another example of Administration PR support for 
	Hussein concerned Iraqi use of chemical weapons.  As 
	recently as May 1990, he had been portrayed by the 
	Pentagon as rather ordinary Middle Eastern dictator who 
	happened to kill political opponents with poison gas.  
	Just four months later he was cast by the Administration 
	as the uniquely evil equivalent of Adolph Hitler; 
	suddenly the Iraqi President relished the use of gas on 
	ethnic minorities, particularly Kurds and - if he could get 
	away with it - Israeli Jews.
       	  
	  Among those who actually cared about such things, 
	Hussein was, in fact, infamous for his use of chemical 
	weapons against Iraqi Kurds who exploited the Iran-Iraq 
	war to further their dream (doomed as always) of 
	independence.  The most notorious of these Iraqi massacres 
	occurred at Halabja, in March 1988.  There, according to 
	human rights monitors, about four thousand Kurdish 
	civilians, including women, children, and the elderly, 
	were killed in a chemical attack allegedly order by Iraqi 
	forces to punish the Kurds for helping Iran.  But in 
	spring 1990, Pentagon leaders appeared eager to convey 
	another perspective:  they said the victims of Halabja 
	were killed in a crossfire of Iraqi and Iranian gas.  The 
	new version of events suggested you could flip a coin when 
	it came to atrocities by the two combatants. Such are 
	the rules of realpolitik  ...       

	  Later, in the summer, the Bush Administration would 
	cynically beat back attempts by members of Congress, 
	disturbed by Hussein's violent conduct and belligerence 
	toward Israel, to place stricter controls on U.S trade 
	with Iraq.  And in the meeting between Ambassador Glaspie 
	and Hussein, the U.S. strongly suggested it would not 
	intervene in a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait.
                       
			2. Selling Babies

      	  The Reagan Administration tilt toward Iraq - both 
	military and diplomatic - was as cynical a display of 
	realpolitik as one can find in recent U.S. history.  It 
	began in March 1982, when the United States removed Iraq 
	from the State Department's list of nations that support 
	international terrorism, and twenty-two months later added 
	Iran to it terrorist blacklist.  This permitted the 
	Administration to guarantee U.S. Bank loans to Iraq 
	for the purchase of American grain and opened to door to 
	future sales of military technology at the same time that 
	the Administration's Operation Staunch was attempting to 
	slow worldwide arms sale (not withstanding Oliver North's 
	future efforts) to Iran.

      	  Following a meeting between Reagan and Iraqi foreign      
	minister Tariq Aziz in November 1984, according to Dilip      
	Hiro's The Longest War, the U.S. set up direct links 
	between the CIA and the American embassy in Bagdad to aid 
	the Iraqi war effort; thus, the intelligence shared with 
	the Bagdad government helped defeat the Iranian offensive 
	of March 1985. Collaboration between Washington and Bagdad 
	increased to the point where, by early 1987, U.S. Navy 
	ships were guiding Iragi missiles to their Iranian 
	targets, according to BBC correspondent John Simpson.  In 
	his book From the House of War, Simpson reports for the 
	first time that the USS Stark was hit by two Iraqi Exocet 
	missiles on May 17, 1987, because the Iraqi pilot "homed 
	in accidentally on the radio beam from the Stark which was 
	directing the pilot to his [Iranian] target."  The 
	incident killed thirty-seven American crewmen and, 
	Simpson writes, the White House "did not even ask Iraq for 
	compensation..."  On May 29, Hiro says, Assistant 
	Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage stated publicly, "We 
	can't stand to see Iraq defeated."


In The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict by Dilip 

Hiro states on the cover text,

    	How was Iraq - at a 3 to 1 disadvantage in population -
    	able to sustain an eight year war and arm one-tenth of 
	its entire population? ...

    	It had been a bloody and expensive conflict.  Conservative  
    	Western estimate put the total number of war dead at 
	367,000 - Iran accounting for 262,00 and Iraq 105,000.  
	With more than 70,000 injured, the total casualties were 
	put at over million.  The official figures, given a month 
	later by minister of Islamic guidance in a radio 
	interview, put the Iranian dead at 123,220 combatants, and 
	another 60,711 missing in action.  In addition 11,000 
	civilians had lost their lives.  Tehran's total of nearly 
	200,000 troops and civilians killed was in stark contrast 
	to Bagdad's estimate of 800,000 Iranian dead."  page 250. 


And we get an idea of magnitude of the effect of the US spy stings.  

CNN, War in the Gulf, 1991, tells of the losses by the Iranians,

      	While the Iragis were building their army, the Iranians
    	were proclaiming the mobilization of 200,000 more men for 
    	an offensive that would end the war by January 21, 1987 -
    	the Iranian New year.  "The last campaign," as it was 
	billed, began on December 24, 1986, when a large Iranian 
	force tried to take the small island of Umm Rassas in the 
	Shatt al-Arab.  The Iranians planed to use the island as a 
	staging area for an assault of Basra.  The loss of Basra 
	would mean the loss of southern Iraq and, most inevitably, 
	the loss of the war.
      	  
	  The Iraqis defended Basra in a series of battles that 
    	demonstrated a new flair for maneuvering large forces.  It      
	was as if the Iraqis were fighting a World War II-style      
	battle of armor and movement, while the Iranians were      
	fighting a World War I-style engagement of frontal 
	assaults and slaughter.  The Iraqis methodically trapping 
	and annihilating isolated units, killed as many as 70,000      
	Iranians while suffering about 10,000 killed or wounded.


and of Iranian resolve,   


    	  In November 1981, at the town of Bostan, the Iranians 
	shocked even the battle-hardened Iraqis with an incredibly 
	brutal human-wave attack.  First came hundreds of youths, 
	some of them children only 12 years old.  They ran trough 
	a mine field blowing themselves to pieces to clear a path 
	for the Basij, who hurled themselves against the barbed-
	wire of the next line of defense.  Most of the Basij were 
	mowed down by the Iragi fire, but wounded and dying 	 
	Basij crawled to the entanglements and cut through them.  
	Over the corpses of the Basij came thousands of Pasdaran 
	in waves.  The Iraqis retreated at the sight of such 
	fanaticism.

20  	June 10, 1996 Payne issues a FOIA to NSA administrator 

Bruce Bottomly, ...  I request access to, 
 
     	3  all NSA intercepted Iranian messages and 	
	   translations between January 1, 1980 and June 
	   10, 1996,

     	4  all NSA intercepted Libyan messages and 		
	   translations between January 1, 1980 and June 
	   10, 1996.

     	5 USC 552(b) permits withholding only properly 	
	classified documents from a Freedom on Information 
	Act (FOIA) request. ...

     	Therefore, I ask NSA to perform the mandatory      
	declassification review ordered by EO 12356 if NSA 
	feels that  any of the documents are properly 	
	classified under its required published 			
	classification guidelines which I cannot find. ...

	It appears that NSA/US government was giving Iranian 
	tactical war messages to Iraq during the Iran/Iraq 
	war.  ...  


Payne does not receive a response.


21  	Sandia issues technical report SAND91-2201 Data 

Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System 

authored by Payne in which Payne alerts NSA to generic 

deficiencies in NSA's crypto algorithms.

                           APPENDIX T
               Benincasa's Algorithm Deficiencies

               This draft memorandum was circulated at 
               NSA.  No final copy was required.  Sandia
               Labs received one new algorithm.

	       OFFICIAL USE ONLY     	                   181

	
[ ] is used to indicate penciled changes in the typed text.  

Appendix T reads,

                              DRAFT

    	June 21, 1989

    	Dr James J. Hearn
    	Deputy Director of Information Security
    	National Security Agency
    	Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

    	Dear Dr. Hearn:

    	  The National Security Agency provided an approved data      
	authentication algorithm for the SALT II seismic 
	verification program in the middle 1970's.  It is called 
	the National Seismic Station - unmanned [U] Seismic 
	Observatory data authentication algorithm and [ .It] is 
	authored by Ronald Benincasa.

    	  The algorithm is currently being used for the Deployable      
	Seismic Verification System. Data rates increased so the 
	NSS-USO algorithm implementation technology is upgraded. 
	The algorithm continues to serve well [well is crossed 	
	out] for this particular program.

    	  We considered using this approved algorithm for other 
	treaty verification programs but is has several major 
	[major is crossed out] deficiencies which make it awkward 
	to apply.

	These deficiencies are: [include is penciled above 'are']

    	1.  The algorithm is bit oriented as opposed to bye, 16 
	    bit word, 32 bit double word or 64 bit quad word 	
	    oriented.

    	2.  The algorithm required stepping two of its internal         
	    registers at a rate many times the data rate.  This         
	    limits the maximum rate at which data can be         
	    authenticated.

    	3.  The algorithm, because of deficiency 2, is only 	
	    suitable for implementation in hardware.

    	4.  The hardware implementation requires too much 	
	    hardware using low technology chips releasable to 	
	    treaty participants.  The device is too big and 	
	    expensive.

    	5.  The original algorithm specification was amended by 
	    NSA to handle resynchronization in event of data 	
	    transmission errors.  It requires additional 		
	    information to be added to a data frame to preserve 
	    adequate security.

			     DRAFT
      
     	182				OFFICIAL USE ONLY

			     DRAFT

    	6.  The algorithm is currently classified SECRET although 
	    its declassification to a level so its details can be 
	    given to the Soviet Union has been promised.

    	7.  We expect to have data authentication applications 
	    with bilateral and multilateral treaties.
     
    	We feel it is [is is crossed out] advisable to use 
	different algorithms for different treaties.

    	We need a number of unclassified data authentication      
	algorithms which apply to different data widths and 
	speeds.  The algorithms should permit inexpensive 
	implementation in small packages.

    	I ask that NSA assist us by providing us these 
	algorithms.

    	Sincerely,

	TBD by DOE
				DRAFT

    	To: Mark and Ed, R
    	From Bill 	FAX 505-846-6652 phone 505 -292 [292 is 
	crossed out. 884 is penciled above] -6847

    	Tom read and approved this.  We wait for you comments.  
	When we all agree we'll forward this to Doug at DOE.

     	cc Amy Johnston  [ in pencil]

Appendix T was apparently interpreted as "flagrant attack on a 

valued Sandia customer" which, of course, is NSA.


22 	Payne revealed to the public the value 31. "The algorithm 

required stepping two of its internal registers at a rate many 

times the data rate."  


NSA believes that 31 is classified.  Payne believes that this is 

classification abuse.


Therefore, Payne issued a FOIA to NSA crypto-mathematician Brian 

Snow also on June 10, 1996.

     	I found no evidence that NSA possesses any special 
	crypto skills, and apparently hides its deficiencies 
	behind the veil of classification abuse.  

     	To the contrary, I discovered generic deficient 	
	crypto work. 

     	We brought this to the attention of NSA.  Sandia even      
	offered to help NSA fix its deficient crypto work.  
	And NSA attempted to correct its deficient crypto 	
	work.

     	Therefore, under 5 USC 522b I request access all 	
	technical documentation on, 

     	1    Benincasa's original NSS/USO algorithm,

     	2    Benincasa's revision of 1,

     	3    The Unkenholtz - Judy GRANITE algorithm,

     	4    Your MSCU algorithm,

     	5    the clipper algorithm,

     	6    the STU III algorithms.       

     	I feel that published analyses of the above 6 	
	algorithms will show the Clinton administration, 	
	congress, and the public that NSA possess no superior 
	knowledge of crypto matters. 

Payne received no response from NSA.


23   	October 24, 1996 Payne appeals the non-response FOIA 

denial to NSA's director Minihan.  31 December 1996 NSA 

FOIA/PA Appeals Authority, William P. Crowell, writes,  

     	Because the process of your request has not 			
	progressed to a point where there have been any 	
	initial, substantive Agency determination of the 	
	release or withholding of responsive records, I can 	
	offer you no administrative remedy.


24  	To date, defendant Minihan of NSA has not released 

any information responsive to plaintiff's requests.


25  	Plaintiff Payne has exhausted the applicable 

administrative remedies.


26  	Defendant Minihan of NSA has wrongfully withheld the 

requested records from plaintiff.


Requested Relief

	WHEREFORE, plaintiffs prays that this Court:
	
	A  order defendant Minihan of NSA to disclose the requested 

	   records in their entirety in machine-readable form 

	   and make copies available to plaintiffs;
	
	B  provide for expeditious proceedings in this action;
	
	C  award plaintiffs its costs and reasonable fees            

	   incurred in this action; and

	D  grant such other relief as the Court may deem just 

	   and proper.




		











                    Respectfully submitted,



                    _________________________
                    William H. Payne             	   	    
                    13015 Calle de Sandias NE          	    
                    Albuquerque, NM 87111              	    
	            505-292-7037		



                    _________________________				
                    Arthur R. Morales                           
                    1024 Los Arboles NW                        
                    Albuquerque, NM 87107                       
		    505-348-1381

                    Pro se litigants

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[End]
