Source: http://www.isf.rl.af.mil:8001/IRD/isisjitf/isis/amhs/isad/amhs3.html

# Information Systems Accreditation Document

### Volume 3 of 4

## System Security Requirements

### for the

## Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS)

## Automated Message Handling System (AMHS) V2.x

Approved by:
S. Hersch, MDA AMHS Program Mgr

Approved by:
LtCol J. Schepley
Electronics Systems Center
AMHS Program Manager

Approved by:
H. Williams, MDA AMHS QA Mgr

Approved by:
G. Gies, MDA AMHS Chief Engineer

Prepared by:
J. Evans, AMHS Development Mgr.

###### Submitted by:
McDonnell Douglas Aerospace (MDA)
8201 Greensboro Drive, McLean, VA, 22102

###### Developed for:
Electronic Systems Center (ESC)
Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC)

Table of Contents

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2. BACKGROUND

3. PURPOSE

4. SAFEGUARDS AND ANALYSIS

4.a Planned Safeguards to Fulfill the Administrative, Environmentalm and Technical Security Requirements for an AIS Mode of Operation
4.b Planned Safeguards to Fulfill the Administrative, Environmental, and Technical Security Requirements for a Seperately Accredited Network Mode of OPeration
4.c Safeguards to Satisfy Security Requirements Due to Other Network Connections
4.d Safeguards to Satisfy Security Requirements Required by Data Originators
4.e Safeguards to Satisfy Security Requirements from the Accediting Authority
4.f Safeguards to Reduce the Rish Exposure for Significant Risks Identified During a Threat Assesment

5. REVISED EXCEPTIONS TO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

6. VULNERABILITIES AND LEVELS OF RISK

1. Executive Summary

[AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THIS DOCUMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE ACCREDITATION OF AN AIS OR NETWORK.]

The DoDIIS AMHS provides automated message handling capabilities for the military intelligence community. It includes four basic message handling capabilities:

- Incoming Message Processing
- User Services
- Outgoing Message Processing
- System Administration.

The AMHS is intended as a hardware and software add-on to existing environments that include user workstations and application servers connected via a LAN. It is anticipated that these environments will have been previously accredited at System High. The AMHS software is distributed, residing on both AMHS servers and user workstations.

The System Security Analysis is the third in a sequence of documents supporting system accreditation of AMHS 2.x, namely:

- System Concept of Operations
- System Security Requirements
- System Security Analysis
- System Security Test Plan
- System Security Test Procedures.

Collectively, these documents satisfy the Director of Central Intelligence requirements for a "Security Plan".

The System Security Analysis Document provides the analysis that shows how AMHS 2.x meets technical and non-technical requirements for processing US intelligence information in the System High Mode of operation.

This analysis shows that safeguards for the AMHS are provided in large part by the OSF/1 C2 Enhanced Security technology on the AMHS servers.

2. Background

The AMHS design uses the features inherent in OSF/1 to provide the necessary safeguards for the server side of the AMHS.

In addition, the AMHS includes software residing on user workstations. Portions of this software will be trusted to provide necessary AMHS safeguards.

TOPIC, a COTS product that provides the AMHS with a text search capability, includes a system profiling mechanism. TOPIC system profiles are applied as safeguards to enforce site discretionary access control policies for both message distribution and retrospective search.

3. Purpose

This System Security Analysis document provides a vehicle for recording the minimum technical and non-technical requirements for AISs or networks processing US intelligence, and for recommending and analyzing appropriate safeguards to fulfill the security requirements. The document is an amplification of requirements set forth in the DIA supplement to DIA regulation 50-11/DIAR 50-23/DIA manual 50-5, Vol II (referred to as the "Systems Security Handbook").

4. Safeguards and Analysis

4.a Planned Safeguards to Fulfill the Administrative, Environmental, and Technical Security Requirements for an AIS Mode of Operation.

| Security Req't | Safeguards, Vulnerabilities, and Analysis
--- | --- | ---
4. | Access by Foreign Nationals | Site Specific: [The site must describe the conditions under which foreign nationals will be granted access to the AMHS.]
5. | Accreditation / Reaccreditation | The DoDIIS AMHS will operate in System High Mode of operation.
6. | Joint Accreditations | Site Specific: [The AMHS System Specification does not specify any sharing of the AMHS by multiple government activities]
7. | Interim Approval to Operate | Site Specific: [Handbook Guidance: Pending accreditation, an Accrediting Authority may grant interim approval to operate provided 3 conditions are met: a. A security survey has been completed. b. The system security plan has been developed. c. A schedule describing steps to advance to accreditation exists. (Classified Handbook Guidance).]
8. | Security Briefings | Site Specific: [All AMHS users will be briefed on the need for exercising sound security practices in protecting the intelligence information processed and/or stored in the AMHS, including marking and reviewing all input and output.]
9. | Automated Guard Processors and Filters | Site Specific: [The AMHS System Specification does not specify any automated guard processes or security filters.]
10. | Protection of High Density/ Transportable Storage Devices | Site Specific: [Containers of all media will be marked with the highest classification level and handling procedures of the information which can be stored on the media until execution of approved destruction or sanitization proc edures.] [The approved release procedure for the media of the AMHS will be stated in the System Security Plan.]
11. | Memory Remanence | Site Specific: [Magnetic storage media will be physically controlled and safeguarded in the manner prescribed for the highest classification of data ever recorded thereon until approved destruction of the media or execution of approved sanitization procedures.] [The approved release procedure for the media of the AMHS will be stated in the System Security Plan.]
12. | Protected Software and Hardware | Site Specific: [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
13. | Shipment of Equip. to High-Risk Area | Government transportation of major equipment will be utilized for OCONUS sites. Equipment will be shipped from CONUS Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE). Site Specific: [Currently, no sites are located in high-risk areas.]
14. | Marking Storage Media | Site Specific: [Removable information storage media will bear external labels indicating the security classification of the information and applicable associated security markings.] [DCID 3/14, Annex B, specifies the use of standard labels for identifying security classification of removable ADP media, including SCI labels.]
15. | Marking Printed Output | The AMHS relies upon the Client Server Environment (CSE) to provide print services including the proper bannering of printed output. The AMHS provides CSE with the target file and CSE determines bannering and printer selection.
16. | Manual Review of Human Readable Output | Site Specific: [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
17. | System Disposal Plan | Site Specific: [Handbook Guidance: The site must develop and maintain a plan for the disposal of hardware and software components of the AMHS. It must specify the release, reutilization, or destruction conditions for each AMHS component.]
18. | COMSEC | Site Specific: [Handbook Guidance: The communications links connecting the components of the AMHS, associated data communications, and networks must be protected with COMSEC policies and procedures applicable to the sensitivity level of intelligence data being transmitted over such links.]
19. | Use of Dial-Up Lines | Site Specific: [(Classified Handbook Guidance). The AMHS does not support dial-up lines for system connection.]
20. | TEMPEST | Site Specific: [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
21. | Physical Security | Site Specific: [The AMHS and all central and remote equipment will reside in a Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facility (SCIF).] [Handbook Guidance: The AMHS and all central and remote facilities housing attached equipment must comply with DIAM 50-3, Physical Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facilities (SCIFs).]
22. | Personnel Security | Site Specific: [Users will be granted access to the AMHS only after: a. Favorable adjudication of clearance for access to SCI b. Favorable administration determination of need-to-know c. Verification of indoctrination by the SSO.]
23. | Commercial Vendor Maintenance | Site Specific: [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
24. | Tech. Req'ts for Dedicated Mode | Not Applicable
a. | (2.1.1.1) Discretionary Access Control
b. | (2.1.2.1) Identification and Authentication
c. | (2.1.3.1.1) System Architecture
d. | (2.1.3.1.2) System Integrity
e. | (2.1.3.2.1) Security Testing
f. | (2.1.4.1) Security Features User's Guide
g. | (2.1.4.2) Trusted Facility Manual
h. | (2.1.4.3) Test Documentation
i. | (2.1.4.4) Design Documentation
25. | Tech. Req'ts for System High Mode | The Technical Requirements for System High Mode operation are satisfied through a number of mechanisms. Principal among these are the AMHS server hardware (DEC 2100) and operating system (OSF/1).
a. | (2.2.1.1) Discretionary Access Control | OSF/1 has the usual self/group/public controls. These are used appropriately within the AMHS software to enforce discretionary controls. Additionally, the AMHS uses system profiles (internal to TOPIC) to enforce a profile-based discretionary access control policy for message distribution and retrospective searches.
b. | (2.2.1.2) Object Reuse | The AMHS does not store named objects locally on workstations. All AMHS named objects are stored on AMHS servers using OSF/1 that automatically provides for object reuse. (Objects [i.e., messages] stored to user owned storage devices [non-AMHS] are not considered AMHS objects.)
c. | (2.2.2.1) Identification and Authentication | When logging the user on to the AMHS server, AMHS applications use the user identity that has been authenticated and provided by the workstation. Site Specific: [The AMHS System Specification explicitly assumes that the user workstations on which AMHS software must run will authenticate the user's identity and will be able to make that identity known to an AMHS application upon request.]
d. | (2.2.2.2) Audit | The AMHS servers, through OSF/1, provides audit information to the CSE that satisfies enhanced C2 requirements. Additionally, AMHS software collects application level events and provides the audit information to the CSE. The storage, maintenance, reduction, reporting, and managements of audit information is the responsibility of the CSE. The AMHS provides all necessary audit information to the CSE in support of the CSE's audit requirements.
e. | (2.2.3.1.1) System Architecture | OSF/1 provides a system architecture that: a. Protects AMHS servers from external interference or tampering, and b. Isolates AMHS resources to be protected so that they are subject to access control and auditing requirements. Key to meeting the system architecture requirement is the AMHS design approach which uses storage objects (i.e., files) to individually store AMHS storage objects (i.e., messages) and to indirectly store AMHS storage objects through TOPIC (i.e., profiles and Message Queues). Site Specific: [The system architecture provisions for the user workstations must be described.]
f. | (2.2.3.1.2) System Integrity | OSF/1 provides hardware and software features that can be used periodically to validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware and firmware elements of the AMHS servers. Site Specific: [The system integrity provisions for the user workstations must be described.]
g. | (2.2.3.2.1) Security Testing | OSF/1 meets the enhanced C2 security testing requirement. This is supplemented by AMHS accreditation tests which show that the AMHS security mechanisms work as claimed, and that the OSF/1 security mechanisms have been correctly incorporated within the AMHS design. Site Specific: [The security testing provisions for the user workstations must be described.]
h. | (2.2.4.1) Security Features User's Guide | OSF/1 meets the C2 Security Features User's Guide requirement. Additionally, the various positional handbooks (System Administrator, ISSO, Profile Administrator, Generic User, Message Administrator) meet the Security Features User's Guide requirement for the individual positions.
i. | (2.2.4.2) Trusted Facility Manual | OSF/1 meets the C2 Trusted Facility Manual requirement. AMHS "User Positional Handbooks" for the system administrator, profile administrator, and ISSO address AMHS-level trusted facility manual requirements.
j. | (2.2.4.3) Test Documentation | OSF/1 meets the enhanced C2 test documentation requirement. This is supplemented by the AMHS accreditation test plans, test procedures, and test reports. Site Specific: [The test documentation provisions for the user workstations must be described.]
k. | (2.2.4.4) Design Documentation | OSF/1 meets the C2 design documentation requirement. The AMHS Informal Model of Security Policy describes the security policy enforced by the AMHS and shows how this approach is translated into OSF/1, TOPIC, and contractor developed software. Site Specific: [The design documentation provisions for the user workstations must be described.]
The following are additional requirements mandated by DCID 1/16, and described in the Handbook:
l. | Identification of User Terminals | Site Specific [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
m. | Configuration Management | OSF/1 meets the configuration management requirement. AMHS software and documentation development is controlled in accordance with DOD-STD-2167A, as tailored, and the CUBIC Configuration Management Plan. Site Specific [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
n. | Trusted Distribution | [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
The following are additional requirements mandated by the DoDIIS AMHS System Specification and described there:
o. | System Profiles | The AMHS provides an additional form of access control, known as AMHS DAC, through System Profiles. The profile administrator specifies an access control policy for each user or group of users, and codifies this policy in a System Profile. The AMHS enforces the restrictions codified in the System Profiles for: (1) All profile-based distribution of incoming messages, locally distributed outgoing messages, and submitted text; and (2) All retrospective queries of the Message Data Base.
26. | Tech. Req'ts for Compartmented Mode | Not Applicable.
27. | Tech. Req'ts for Multilevel Mode | Not Applicable.
28. | AUTODIN Connectivity | Site Specific [The site connects to AUTODIN via the Communications Support Processor (CSP).]
29. | DODIIS Network Connectivity | AMHS 2.x does not support DNSIX. Site Specific [Site DNSIX requirements must be documented here.]
30. | Connectivity to Other AISs and Networks | Site Specific [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
31 & 32. | Personal Computer Security Requirements | Site Specific [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
33. | System High and Compartmented Mode Workstation Req'ts | Site Specific [Site requirements for system high workstations used to host AMHS applications must be documented here.]

4.b Planned Safeguards to Fulfill the Administrative, Environmental, and Technical Security Requirements for a Separately Accredited Network Mode of Operation

[NOTE:The responses below should address the sufficiency of the particular mechanisms or conventions chosen to implement the safeguards and protective features for each requirement. Vulnerabilities should be identified and countering mechanisms should be recommended, where possible. In many cases, vulnerabilities can be countered by procedural mechanisms. External dependencies should also be identified. This occurs when a security aspect of the system is dependent on some external factor.

It will be useful in completing this document to have the similar section of Volume 2 (System Security Requirements), Section 5.b, side-by-side with this section for reference. The detailed descriptions of the requirements are provided in the Handbook, Orange Book, or DIA CMW Evaluation Criteria, Ver 1, respectively; "Security Req't" numbers below correspond to paragraphs in the Handbook].

| Security Req't | Safeguards, Vulnerabilities, and Analysis
--- | --- | ---
43. | Appt. of Network Manager | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: The network manager/administrator is responsible for overall operation and control of the network.]
44. | Security Report | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: A routine security report will be made of a network or subscriber malfunction that has potential security implications for the overall security of the network and its subscribers. The ISSO will immediately notify the NSO of system abnormalities that provide reason to suspect any violation of the overall integrity of the network and its subscribers.]
45. | Accreditation/ Reaccreditation | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: The telecommunications equipment must be considered when accrediting a network. Each network must be formally reaccredited every five years or when significant changes occur in the operational environment, whichever occurs first.]
46. | Joint Accreditations | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: For multiple government activities sharing the same network.]
47. | Interim Approval to Operate | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: Pending accreditation, an Accrediting Authority may grant interim approval to operate provided 4 conditions are met: a. A security survey has been completed, b. The system security plan has been developed, c. A schedule describing steps to advance to accreditation exists, d. (Classified Handbook Guidance).]
48. | Security Briefings | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: All AMHS users will be briefed on the need for exercising sound security practices in protecting the intelligence information processed and/or stored in the AMHS, including marking and reviewing all input and output.]
49. | Automated Guard Processors and Filters | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: The site must document software, firmware, or hardware/software techniques or specialized equipment that filter information in a data stream based on associated data labels.]
50. | Protected Software and Hardware | Site Specific [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
51. | Shipment of Equip. to High-Risk Area | Site Specific [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
52. | COMSEC | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: The communications links connecting the components of the AMHS, associated data communications, and networks must be protected with COMSEC policies and procedures applicable to the sensitivity level of intelligence data being transmitted over such links.]
53. | TEMPEST | Site Specific [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
54. | Physical Security | Site Specific [The AMHS and all central and remote equipment will reside in a Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facility (SCIF).] [Handbook Guidance: The AMHS and all central and remote facilities housing attached equipment must comply with DIAM 50-3, Physical Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facilities (SCIFs).]
55. | Personnel Security | Site Specific [Users will be granted access to the network only after: a. Favorable adjudication of clearance for access to SCI, b. Favorable administration determination of need-to-know, c. Verification of indoctrination by the SSO.]
56. | Commercial Vendor Maintenance | Site Specific [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
57. | Integrity of Intelligence Data | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: The network interface components of a system-high mode network will assure the integrity of the intelligence they transmit, and must provide or support a reliable mechanism for enforcing need-to-know separation of t he data transmitted between AISs over the network. The network interface component, together with the security mechanisms of the network and its attached AISs, will assure that each subscriber (e.g., AIS or individual workstation) receives from and/or transmits to the network only that intelligence inform ation to which the subscriber is authorized.]
58. | Network Activity Audit Trails | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: Audit trails of network activities should be maintained and should include at minimum the following: (1) A record of each action together with appropriate identification parameters, (2) A record of the starting and ending times of each connection, (3) A record of any exceptional conditions detected during the transactions between two (or more) subscribers, (4) Such information as is necessary to allow association of the network activities with corresponding user audit trails and records. The network audit trail should additionally contain references to more detailed identification of exceptional conditions that are recorded in local AIS audit trails.]
59. | OPI for each Protected Resource | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: Each protected resource (e.g., file, database) in each participating AIS will have an Office of Primary Interest (OPI) that functions as the cognizant authority responsible for establishing policies governing maintenance, classification, and other security parameters of the resource, such as granting access privileges to users or groups of users.]
60. | Security Markings for Exported Intelligence | Site Specific [The AMHS ensures a valid classification line is included within each message to be transmitted. Data exported by other means are not labeled.]
61. | Session Security Parameters (ASPs) | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: If a network and all its connected AISs function at the system-high mode, means will be provided to establish a session security parameter at the beginning of each work session. Each AIS initiating a network connection with another AIS will be identified to the latter AIS host at least once per connection. Each user will be identified for each AIS to which the user establishes network access, at least once per connection. The session security parameter must be included in the Accredited Security Parameters (ASPs) for the network and the attached AISs that are accessible by the user.]
62. | Transmission of ASPs and Markings | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: For all intelligence information exchanged between AISs, two kinds of security control information will be provided: (1) Information security of the intelligence, (2) (Classified Handbook Guidance).]
63. | Maintenance of User Authentication Data | Site Specific [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
64. | Protection of Network Control Facilities | Site Specific [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
65. | Integrity of Security Parameters with Associated Data | Site Specific [Handbook Guidance: The network interface component will assure the integrity of all security parameters provided to it by the subscriber (e.g., AIS, human user at a workstation or terminal) and must assure that the association between an element of data to be transmitted and the security parameters that pertain to it is not disturbed.]
66. | Configuration Management | Site Specific [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]
67. | Protected Distribution | Site Specific [(Classified Handbook Guidance).]

4.c Safeguards to Satisfy Security Requirements Due to Other Network Connections

[Site Specific: List the safeguards and requirements in the format of 4.a above.]

4.d Safeguards to Satisfy Security Requirements Required by Data Originators

[Site Specific: List the safeguards and requirements in the format of 4.a above.]

4.e Safeguards to Satisfy Security Requirements from the Accrediting Authority

[Site Specific: List the safeguards and requirements in the format of 4.a above.]

4.f Safeguards to Reduce the Risk Exposure for Significant Risks Identified During a Threat Assessment

A Threat Assessment is not required for AMHS 2.x.

5. Revised Exceptions to Security Requirements

[SITE SPECIFIC: REFERENCE HANDBOOK, SECTION 1, P.9.]

6. Vulnerabilities and Levels of Risks

[SITE SPECIFIC: THIS CONCLUDING SECTION SHALL REITERATE AND SUMMARIZE FROM SECTION 5 THE SPECIFIC VULNERABILITIES TO THIS AIS/NETWORK BASED ON SECURITY REQUIREMENTS NOT FULLY SATISFIED OR THOSE NEEDING EXCEPTIONS. FOR EACH OF THE VULNERABILITIES, A LEVEL OF RISK WILL BE DESIGNATED (LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH). THE ACCREDITATION PROCESS WILL ULTIMATELY EVALUATE THE VULNERABILITIES AND RISK LEVELS TO DETERMINE IF THE AIS/NETWORK CAN BE ALLOWED TO OPERATE.]

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