15 July 1998
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html

105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-271

DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION __________

###

MESSAGE

FROM

## THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

transmitting

A REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12938 OF NOVEMBER 14, 1994, IN
RESPONSE TO THE THREAT POSED BY THE PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS
(``WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION'') AND OF THE MEANS OF
DELIVERING SUCH WEAPONS, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 1703(c)

June 9, 1998.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed

To the Congress of the United States:

As required by section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I transmit herewith a 6-month report on the national emergency declared by Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994, in response to the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass destruction'') and of the means of delivering such weapons.

William J. Clinton.

The White House, June 9, 1998.

(ii)

                       Report to the Congress on
                   the National Emergency Concerning
                      Weapons of Mass Destruction

    On November 14, 1994 in light of the dangers of the
    proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons
    ("weapons of mass destruction" -- WMD) and of the means of
    delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order No. 12938,
    and declared a national emergency under the International
    Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
    Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
    1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary
    date of its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal
    Register and transmit to the Congress a notice of its
    continuation. Because the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary
    threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy
    of the United States, on November 13, 1997, I extended the
    national emergency declared in Executive Order No. 12935.

    The following report is made pursuant to Section 204 of the
    International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703)
    and Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
    1641(c)), regarding activities taken and money spent in the
    last six months pursuant to the emergency declaration.
    Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical
    and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts is
    contained in the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation
    of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and
    Chemical Weapons, provided to Congress pursuant to Section 1097
    of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992
    and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the "Nonprolifera-
    tion Report," and the most recent annual report provided to the
    Congress pursuant to Section 303 of the Chemical and Biological
    Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 ~Public haw
    102-132), also known as the "CBW Report."

    Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW)

    The export control regulations issued as part of the Enhanced
    Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remained fully in force
    and continue to be applied in order to control the export of
    items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons or
    unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.

    Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat
    to our security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the
    Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
    Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
    (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) entered into force with
    87 of the CWC's 165 signatories as original States Parties.
    The United States was among their number, having deposited its
    instrument of ratification on April 25. Russia ratified the

                                  (1)

                                   2

    CWC on November 5 1997 and became a State Party on December 5
    1997. As of April 15, 1998, 107 countries have become States
    Parties.

    The implementing body for the CWC -- the Organization for the
    Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) -- was established at
    entry-into-force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997.
    The OPCW, located in The Hague is responsible for implementing
    the CWC. It collects declarations, conducts inspections, and
    serves as a forum for consultation and cooperation among States
    Parties. It consists of the Conference of States Parties, the
    Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS).

    The EC consists of 41 States Parties (including the
    United States) and acts as the governing body for the
    OPCW between meetings of the Conference of States Parties.
    Since EIF, the EC has met numerous times to address issues
    such as scale of assessments, CW production facility conversion
    requests, facility and transitional verification arrangements,
    and staff regulations.

    The TS carries out the verification provisions of the CWC, and
    has a staff of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors
    trained and equipped to inspect military and industrial facili-
    ties throughout the world. The OPCW has conducted nearly 200
    routine inspections in some 20 countries. Nearly 50 of those
    inspections were conducted in the United States. The OPCW
    maintains a permanent inspector presence at operational U.S.
    CW destruction facilities in Utah, Maryland, Nevada, and
    Johnston Island.

    The United States is determined to seek full implementation of
    the concrete measures in the CWC that will raise the costs and
    the risks for any states' or terrorists' attempting to engage
    in chemical weapons-related activities. The CWC's declaration
    requirements will improve our knowledge of possible chemical
    weapons activities. Its inspection provisions provide for
    access to declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus
    making clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling
    more difficult, more risky and more expensive.

    Due to the lack of implementing legislation, the U.S. has not
    submitted its industrial declaration to the OPCW, and therefore
    is in non-compliance with the Convention. The implications of
    U.S. non-compliance are serious. It has, among other things,
    undermined our ability to get other States Parties to make
    complete and accurate declarations, and to submit their
    declarations on time.

    Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically
    isolated and banned from trading with States Parties in certain
    key chemicals. The relevant treaty provision is specifically

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    designed to penalize in a concrete way countries that refuse to
    join the rest of the world in eliminating the threat of chemical
    weapons.

    The United States also continues to play a leading role in
    the international effort to reduce the threat from biological
    weapons (BW). We are an active participant in the Ad Hoc
    Group (AHG) striving to create a legally binding protocol to
    strengthen and enhance compliance with the Convention on the
    Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
    Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
    Destruction (The Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). This
    Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 CWC Special
    Conference. The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November
    1996, urged the AHG to complete the protocol as soon as possible
    but not later than the next Review Conference to be held in
    2001. Work is progressing on a draft rolling text through
    insertion of national views and clarification of existing text.
    Four AHG working sessions were scheduled for l998. Two have
    been completed and two are scheduled: one for the summer
    (June 22-July 10), and one in the fall (September-October).

    On January 27, 1998, during the State of the Union Address, I
    announced that the U.S. would lead the effort to erect stronger
    international barriers against the proliferation and use of
    BW by strengthening the BWC with a new international system to
    detect and deter cheating. The U.S. is seeking to conclude the
    framework for a strong BWC protocol by the end of 1998. The
    U.S. will work closely with U.S. industry to develop and reach
    international agreement on: declarations, voluntary visits,
    non-challenge clarifying visits, and challenge investigations.

    The United States continued to be a leading member of the
    30-member Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime.
    The U.S. attended the most recent annual AG plenary session
    from October 6-9, 1997, during which the Group continued
    to focus on strengthening AG export controls and sharing
    information to address the threat of CBW terrorism. At the
    behest of the United States, the AG first began in-depth
    political-level discussion of CBW terrorism during the 1995
    plenary session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack
    earlier that year. At the 1996 plenary, the U.S. urged AG
    members to exchange national points of contact for AG terrorism
    matters. At the 1997 plenary, the AG accepted a U.S. proposal
    to survey all AG members on legal and regulatory efforts each
    has taken to counter this threat.

    The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief
    that full adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way
    to achieve permanent global elimination of CBW, and that all
    states adhering to these Conventions have an obligation to
    ensure that their national activities support this goal.

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    AG participants continue to seek to ensure that all relevant
    national measures promote the object and purposes of the BWC
    and CWC. The AG nations reaffirmed their belief that existing
    national export licensing policies on chemical weapons-related
    items fulfill the obligation established under Article I of the
    CWC and Article VI of the BWC that States Parties never assist
    in any way, the acquisition, retention, transfer, or use of
    chemical or biological weapons. Given this understanding, the
    AG members also reaffirmed their commitment to continuing the
    Group's activities now that the CWC has entered into force.

    The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue its
    active outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries,
    and to promote regional consultations on export controls and
    nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of
    national policies in these areas.

    During the last six months, we continued to examine closely
    intelligence and other reports of trade in chemical weapons-
    related material and technology which might require action
    including evaluating whether sanctions under the Chemical and
    Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991
    were warranted. In February 1998, the U.S. Government imposed
    trade sanctions on Berge Aris Balanian, a fugitive from justice
    previously residing in Germany and last known to be in Lebanon.
    We determined he knowingly and materially contributed to the
    Libyan CW program.

    The United States continues to cooperate with its AG partners
    in stopping shipments of proliferation concern. By sharing
    information through diplomatic and other channels, we and
    our AG partners have been successful in interdicting various
    shipments destined to CBW programs.

    Missiles for Weapons of Mass Destruction Delivery

    During the reporting period the United States carefully
    controlled exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery
    systems for weapons of mass destruction and closely monitored
    activities of potential missile proliferation concern. We also
    continued to implement missile sanctions provisions in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and
    1993 in cases where sanctionable activity was determined to
    have occurred. In August 1997, we imposed sanctions against
    two North Korean entities determined to have engaged in missile
    proliferation activities. Similar sanctions imposed in May 1996
    remain in effect against two entities in Iran and one entity
    in North Korea for transfers involving Category II Missile
    Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex items. In April 1998,
    we imposed sanctions on a North Korean and a Pakistani entity

                                   5

    involved in the transfer of MTCR-controlled equipment and
    technology from North Korea to Pakistan.

    During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to share
    information about proliferation problems with each other, and
    with other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment
    states. Partners also emphasized the need for implementing
    effective export control systems. This cooperation has resulted
    in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for
    use in missile programs of concern.

    The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's
    Twelfth Plenary Meeting in Tokyo, Japan, November 2-7, 1997.
    At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners reaffirmed their commitment
    to controlling exports to prevent the proliferation of missiles
    capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. They also
    recognized the need to build additional support for the Regime,
    and issued an appeal to all countries to support the MTCR's
    nonproliferation goals and abide by its Guidelines. In
    addition, the Partners undertook to continue to increase their
    efforts to promote openness and transparency through enhanced
    dialogue with countries outside the Regime. In particular, the
    Partners recognized the utility of expert level workshops at
    which Partners and non-members work side-by-side to increase
    their understanding of priority missile nonproliferation
    issues -- such as risk assessment in licensing and combating
    proliferators' misuse of brokering -- and devise practical
    solutions. They also recognized the usefulness of contacting
    non-members via regional security fora.

    At Tokyo, the MTCR Partners also recognized that missile
    proliferation presents a serious threat to regional stability
    and global security and agreed to continue to give priority to
    this issue. Regional proliferation issues will be a key topic
    of discussion at the MTCR's May 1998 Reinforced Point of Contact
    (RPOC) meeting. The Partners also decided at Tokyo to continue
    to share information about activities and programs of missile
    proliferation concern and to consider additional steps they
    can take, individually and collectively, to prevent the
    proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass
    destruction.

    In addition to their policy discussions, the MTCR Partners
    also reviewed technical issues at Tokyo. They agreed to several
    changes to the MTCR Annex including adopting a U.S. proposal
    to control titanium-stabilized duplex stainless steel (TI-DSS)
    under Category II, Item 8. TI-DSS is used to produce SCUD
    missiles.

                                   6

    As noted above, regional proliferation will be a key agenda
    issue for the MTCR's RPOC meeting. The United States plans
    to encourage the Partners to pay special attention to the
    missile proliferation threat posed by Iran's ongoing pursuit
    of an indigenous missile production capability. We also will
    encourage the MTCR Partners to adopt concrete steps that they
    can take individually and collectively to address the Regime's
    regional proliferation concerns.

    During this reporting period, the United States also continued
    to work unilaterally and in concert with other MTCR Partners
    to combat missile proliferation and to encourage non-MTCR
    countries to adopt responsible export control practices and
    to adhere unilaterally to the MTCR Guidelines. Since the last
    report, we have continued our missile nonproliferation dialogue
    with China, the Republic of Korea, and North Korea. We also
    have pursued missile nonproliferation talks with Egypt, India,
    Pakistan. and Ukraine.

    In addition, in response to reports that Iranian entities
    continued to seek sensitive items from Russian firms for use
    in Iran's missile program the United States continued its
    intensive, high-level dialogue with Russia on Russia-Iran
    missile cooperation. We remain concerned about this issue,
    and we are working closely with Russia to halt all cooperation
    between Russian entities and the Iranian missile program. This
    effort has achieved some significant results. For example, on
    January 22, Russia took an important step by issuing an execu-
    tive order that substantially strengthened the Russian export
    control system and provided the GOR with new authority to stop
    all transfers of goods and services to foreign missile programs
    and programs of weapons of mass destruction.

    Putting this legal authority in place was an important step,
    but problems remain. Our focus now is on implementation and
    enforcement. The United States and Russia are working together
    bilaterally to continue to strengthen Russian export controls,
    including implementation of the new "catch-all" authority.
    We will monitor closely progress in this area.

    Nuclear Weapons

    In May 1998, after this report was written but before it was
    submitted, India and then Pakistan conducted a number of nuclear
    tests. A complete analysis of these disturbing events and of
    the U.S. and international response will be provided in a
    subsequent report.

    Notwithstanding these developments, the past few years have
    witnessed progress in our efforts to curb the broader spread of
    nuclear weapons. In a truly historic step, the 50th UN General

                                   7

    Assembly on September 10, 1996, adopted and called for signature
    of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiated
    in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The overwhelming
    passage of this UN resolution (158-3-5) demonstrates the
    CTBT's strong international support and marks a major success
    for United States foreign policy. On September 24, 1996, I
    and other national leaders signed the CTBT in New York.

    During 1997 and the first part of 1998, CTBT signatories have
    conducted numerous meetings of the Preparatory Commission in
    Vienna, seeking to promote rapid completion of the International
    Monitoring System established by the Treaty. On September 22,
    1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, requesting prompt
    advice and consent to ratification.

    In banning all nuclear explosions, the CTBT will serve several
    United States national security interests. It will constrain
    the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons;
    end the development of advanced new types; contribute to the
    prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear
    disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security.
    The CTBT marks an historic milestone in our drive to reduce the
    nuclear threat and to build a safer world.

    Formal preparations for the year 2000 Review Conference for
    the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
    continued in 1998 with the second of three annual Preparatory
    Committee meetings of the Parties to the Treaty. The U.S.
    is committed to working to ensure that the 2000 NPT Review
    Conference will further strengthen the NPT and reinforce
    global nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Since the 1995
    NPT Conference, eight additional states have joined the NPT,
    leaving only five states worldwide currently outside the NPT
    regime. The NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee added China to
    its membership in 1997.

    The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continued its efforts
    to upgrade control lists and export control procedures.
    NSG members confirmed their agreement to clarifications to
    the nuclear trigger list to accord with trigger list changes
    agreed to by the members of the NPT Exporters (Zangger)
    Committee, and the International Atomic Energy Agency published
    these understandings on September 16, 1997. The NSG also is
    actively pursuing steps to enhance the transparency of the
    export regime in accordance with the call in Principles 16
    and 17 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

    The NSG held an export control seminar in Vienna on October a
    and 9, 1997, which described and explained the role of the NSG
    (and the Zangger Committee) in preventing nuclear proliferation.
    The NSG also continued efforts to enhance information sharing

                                   8

    among members regarding the nuclear programs of proliferant
    countries by (1) "officially" linking the NSG members through a
    dedicated computer network allowing for real-time distribution
    of license denial information, and by (2) creating a separate
    session for exchange of information on the margins of NSG
    plenary meetings.

    NSG membership increased to 35 with the addition of Latvia.
    The ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement of
    all suppliers, including nations not members of the regime,
    to control nuclear and nuclear-related exports in accordance
    with the NSG guidelines.

    Expenses

    Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act
    (50 U.S.C. 1641 (c)), I report that there were no expenses
    directly attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred
    by the declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order
    12930 during the period from November 14, 1997, through May 14,
    1998.

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