5 October 1998
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html

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[Congressional Record: September 28, 1998 (Extensions)]
[Page E1843]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr28se98-34]


               UNIFIED STRATEGY NEEDED TO FIGHT TERRORISM

                                 ______


                            HON. IKE SKELTON

                              of missouri

                    in the house of representatives

                       Monday, September 28, 1998

  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, the August 7 bombings outside U.S.
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, were the
latest crimes to be added to a growing list of terrorists attacks where
Americans died brutally, without warning, and unnecessarily. These
bombings join a list which includes the World Trade Center in New York
City, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the Federal Building in
Oklahoma City.
  Our Nation did respond to the killing of 12 Americans and nearly 300
Kenyans and Tanzanians. Based on evidence that further attacks were
planned, United States armed forces struck terrorist-related facilities
in Afghanistan and Sudan, targeting one of the most active terrorist
bases in the world and a factory involved in the production of
materials for chemical weapons. Two suspects have been arrested and
others are being pursued. But in this tragedy's aftermath, the U.S.
must also learn from the incidents and take steps to ensure that our
citizens and installations are protected in the future.
  Since June of 1997, I have released four reports prepared by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) detailing U.S. efforts to combat
terrorism. The first report, entitled, ``Combating Terrorism: Status of
DOD Efforts to Protect its Forces Overseas,'' dealt with anti-
terrorism. It concluded that uniform security standards were necessary
to ensure the safety of Americans around the world.
  In September of 1997, GAO released a second report entitled,
``Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National
Security Policy and Strategy.'' This report focused on counter
terrorism--those offensive measures for deterring, resolving, and
managing terrorist acts. It outlined specific roles and
responsibilities of the 40 Federal departments, agencies, and bureaus
involved in counter terrorism, as well as their respective
capabilities.
  ``Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires
Better Management and Coordination'' was released in December of 1997.
This third GAO report focused on total government-wide spending levels
to combat terrorism. While it revealed that a significant amount of
resources--more than $7 billion a year--were committed annually to
combat terrorism, there were some deficiencies, including the absence
of regular government-wide priorities, and the lack of an assessment
process to coordinate and focus government efforts. Moreover, the
report found that no government office or entity maintained the
authority to enforce coordination.
  In its fourth report, ``Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk
Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments,'' GAO
reviewed the implementation of the 1996 Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act, popularly known as the Defense Department's Nunn-
Lugar-Domenici program. It recommended the adoption of a formal threat
and risk assessment process to enhance state and local capabilities and
suggested that the FBI lead this effort.

  These GAO reports marked the first attempt by any government agency
to take a comprehensive look at federal activities to fight terrorism.
While we learned a great deal from these reports, we still have a long
way to go. As the work of the GAO has helped us discover, our approach
may be fundamentally flawed: Too many different federal agencies and
local governments possess existing or emerging capabilities for
responding to a terrorist attack; there are uneven and nearly
incompatible levels of expertise; and our efforts are complicated by
duplication and poor communication. To put it simply, with so many
agencies involved, the left hand may not know what the right hand is
doing. We must have a unified strategy to fight terrorism--we cannot
have agencies fighting turf battles.
  There has been some movement in the right direction to respond to the
threat of terrorism. In May, the Administration announced the formation
of ten regional rapid assessment teams. These teams are part of the
Defense Department's overall effort to support local, state, and
federal civil authorities in the event of an incident involving the use
of weapons of mass destruction. Congress has included money in the
Fiscal Year 1999 DOD Authorized bill for this program, which is
coordinated through the National Guard. The Missouri National Guard
will play a leading role as host to one of the ten regional terrorism
response teams.
  The recent bombings are a terrible reminder that we must take the
threat of terrorism seriously. We must realize that the struggle
against terrorism will be protracted, and moreover, we must resist
complacency--we must not too quickly forget the death and destruction
that can be wreaked by fanatical extremists committed to waging war on
the United States.
  America has battled terrorism for many years. We have acted to bring
terrorists to justice, to penetrate their organizations, to disrupt
their plans, and to isolate their sponsors. Nevertheless, it is a
virtual certainty that American citizens and American facilities will
be attacked again, and not just in the traditional terrorist ways. To a
distressing extent, the information and components necessary to build
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction are
increasingly and readily accessible. In addition, the dependence of our
military services and critical civilian infrastructures on information
technology has made us vulnerable to information warfare. This
vulnerability requires vigilance and the development of protective and
redundant systems so that we can maintain our decisive technological
edge.
  If Congress and the Administration are willing to develop a unified
strategy and commit adequate resources, we can prepare an effective
defense against terrorism. First, we must give careful scrutiny to the
United States counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism programs and
policies. In addition, we must insist that our military, law
enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic forces are effectively
arrayed, equipped, and trained, and that they are given the authority
to take action against terrorists. Finally, we must ensure that both
anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts are comprehensive and
efficient.

                          ____________________


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[Congressional Record: April 30, 1998 (Extensions)]
[Page E717-E718]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr30ap98-7]


  COMBATING TERRORISM: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
  SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE; COMMITTEE ON
                    GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

                                 ______


                            HON. IKE SKELTON

                              of missouri

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, April 30, 1998

  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, on Thursday, April 23, 1998, I testified
before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs,
and Criminal Justice; Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. On
this occasion, I discussed a series of reports, prepared at my request
by the General Accounting Office (GAO). These reports detail the United
States' substantial efforts to combat terrorism. I share my remarks
with the Members of the House.

 Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National, International Affairs,
  and Criminal Justice Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
                             April 23, 1998

       Chairman Hastert, members of the subcommittee, it gives me
     great pleasure to appear before you today. I appreciate the
     opportunity not only to speak about an important issue to our
     nation but also to bring attention to a substantial body of
     work produced by the General Accounting Office (GAO). This
     ``work in progress''--to date, a series of four report--will
     eventually produce the most comprehensive overview of our
     nation's effort to combat terrorism. As Chairman Hastert
     knows all too well, this is a daunting task. Without his
     leadership and effort, we would have a far more vague picture
     of our government's activities. Let me briefly review these
     recent findings.
       First, GAO released a July 1997 report entitled,
     ``Combating Terrorism: Status of DoD Efforts to Protect Its
     Forces Overseas.'' Dealing with Anti-terrorism, this report
     concluded that uniform security standards were necessary to
     assure the safety of Americans around the world.
       Second, GAO released a September 1997 report entitled,
     ``Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement
     National Security Policy and Strategy.'' Focused on
     Counterterrorism--or those offensive measures for deterring,
     resolving, and managing terrorist acts--this second report
     represents the first comprehensive examination of federal
     activities to combat terrorism. It pointed out that more than
     40 federal departments, agencies, and bureaus, are involved
     in this activity. It also outlined specific roles and
     responsibilities of federal agencies, as well as their
     respective capabilities.
       GAO released its third report in December of 1997. Focused
     on total government-wide spending levels to combat terrorism,
     this product--and the process leading up to its publication--
     closely tracked with congressional interest in the subject.
     As many of you know, during floor consideration of the fiscal
     year (FY) 1998 Defense Authorization Bill, an amendment--my
     amendment--was accepted to require the Office of Management
     and Budget (OMB) to disclose overall spending levels directed
     against terrorism. Known as Section 1051 and taken together
     with GAO's third report, enough evidence surfaced to offer
     both encouragement and concern. Although it seemed that a
     significant amount of resources were annually committed to
     combat terrorism, the following inefficiencies were exposed:
       No regular government-wide collection and review of funding
     data existed;
       No apparent government-wide priorities were established;
       No assessment process existed to coordinate and focus
     government efforts; and
       No government office or entity maintained the authority to
     enforce coordination.
       As a result, the third report recommended that the National
     Security Council (NSC), OMB, the departments, and agency
     heads--such as the State Department and the Federal Bureau of
     Investigation (FBI)--build upon the new statutory requirement
     embodied in Section 1051. I am also pleased to report that
     this remains an annual obligation, requiring by March of each
     year an annual overview of government-wide efforts to combat
     terrorism around the globe.
       Finally, at the request of Chairman Hastert and myself, GAO
     has recently released its fourth and latest product on the
     subject, entitled ``Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk
     Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Investments.''
     Again, enough evidence has been provided to question the
     federal government's level of funding. This last report--
     responsible for reviewing the implementation of the Nunn-
     Lugar-Domenici domestic response program--hopefully will
     assist with the establishment of consistent national
     standards and priorities.

                               The Threat

       Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:
       In your mind's eye, join me and imagine what it was like in
     1995 for the Senior Airman at a remote location in a foreign
     land, relaxing after a long, hot, stressful day in the
     Arabian desert;
       Imagine, too, what it was like in 1996 for the federal
     employee beginning the day in Oklahoma, pouring coffee,
     grabbing a breakfast snack, and preparing for morning
     briefings;
       Imagine what it was like in 1993 for Americans--
     businesswomen, diplomats, tourists, visitors--milling
     innocently about in the heart of New York City, one of our
     nation's busiest locations;
       Imagine, if you can, what it was like for these individuals
     before these three locations became infamous for the
     catastrophic events that followed. To a person, none expected
     anything but completion of an average day; yet all
     experienced a jolt, a shock, a sense of horror, as chaos and
     bedlam brought an abrupt halt to their respective routines.
       The bombing victims at Khobar Towers in Saudia Arabia were
     trained military professionals in a foreign land. The bombing
     victims at the Oklahoma City Federal Building and the World
     Trade Center, were average American citizens--civilians--at
     home in their communities, totally unprepared for the
     violence they were forced to experience.
       Despite the different circumstances, all three events share
     in common one unavoidable, tell-tale truth: Americans died
     brutally, without warning, unnecessarily, and in a manner
     that will almost certainly be imitated in the future. In 1995
     and 1996, about one-fourth of all international terrorist
     acts were against U.S. targets; and although the number of
     terrorist incidents both worldwide and in the United States
     has declined in recent years, the level of violence and
     lethality of attacks has increased. Violent events in the
     past, may encourage further attempts to strike America in
     places such as our own yards, back home in our districts, and
     other places where attacks might be least expected. Enemies
     of the United States, I fear, have adopted effective methods
     and means to strike against America.
       Surely, enemies to America--both foreign and domestic--
     recognize the military capabilities of the United States. It
     is hard to ignore our successes throughout history and around
     the globe; it is difficult not to marvel at our technological
     advancements; and it is nearly impossible to overlook our
     massive military might at sea, in the air, and on the ground.
     Our naval, air, ground, and Marine forces remain superior and
     unmatched in today's world.
       Further, enemies to America--both foreign and domestic--
     almost certainly recognize

[[Page E718]]

     the capabilities of our domestic law enforcement and
     emergency response officials. The Federal Bureau of
     Investigations, or FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, the Bureau
     of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), U.S. Customs, and the
     Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are highly
     respected worldwide. Their standards currently set those of
     the international community.
       But what of the point at which the responsibilities of
     these two communities intersect? Do our domestic law
     enforcement capabilities effectively coordinate with those of
     the Department of Defense? In the case of another incident on
     American soil, are Defense Department officials prepared to
     effectively support local officials? Are existing programs--
     such as the Emergency Response Assistance program, the Rapid
     Response Information System, and the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
     ``First Responder Training'' program--adequately funded to
     handle a future incident, particularly one involving a weapon
     of mass destruction (WMD) such as a biological or chemical
     agent, or nuclear device?
       We better be sure.
       Is the threat real? I believe wholeheartedly that it is.
       Are we in danger of overstating the threat? I am not sure.
     But, let me share with you something about which there is no
     doubt. I implore you to consider two lists, one based on
     capabilities, the other based on alleged activities. I ask
     you first to consider the list of nations around the globe
     known to either possess or nearly possess the capability
     to produce chemical and biological weapons--you are, of
     course, familiar with the unclassified list: North Korea,
     China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and
     Russia. Second, I ask you to consider the group of nations
     singled out by the State Department for engaging in state-
     sponsored terrorism. Again, you are familiar with the
     list's membership: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea,
     Sudan, and Syria. Finally, I ask you to look at the
     correlation between these lists and ask you to decide. Are
     you willing to risk the potential consequences of not
     being prepared?

                              The Response

       To properly prepare for potential terrorist acts we must
     set forth with a political commitment to attain both
     efficiency and adequate resource levels across the entire
     federal government.
       The recent past offers a bit of optimism. A relatively high
     level of Congressional support has existed:
       The 1994 National Defense Authorization Act expressed a
     sense of Congress that the President should strengthen
     federal interagency response planning for early detection and
     warning of--and response to--potential use of chemical or
     biological agents and weapons.
       The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 required
     the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy to
     submit to Congress a joint report on military and civil
     defense response plans.
       The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act required the
     President to take immediate action to enhance the capability
     of the Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist
     incidents involving WMD and to provide enhanced support to
     improve both the response and deterrent capabilities of state
     and local emergency response agencies. More than $50 million
     in assistance was authorized.
       And just this past year, the budget request for the Defense
     Department included $49.5 million for support of the domestic
     emergency preparedness program. The resulting 1998
     authorization provided for this request as well as an
     additional $10 million for equipment for the Marine's
     Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force and $10 million
     to support development of a domestic/biological counter-
     terrorism mission for the National Guard.
       But I am concerned about our nation's ability over the next
     few years to attain efficiency or to sustain such a
     commitment. The Defense Department rightly assumes a
     supportive role during a terrorist incident within the United
     States, leaving the Department of Justice the primary
     responsibility for response and coordination. Yet even a role
     supportive in nature has come at a great cost--in both
     manpower and dollars. Much of the highly specialized
     expertise resides in DoD; and most of the highly-trained
     individuals necessary for such tasks are also from the
     Department of Defense. Unfortunately--for them, for their
     families, and for our nation--these same individuals are
     often needed elsewhere, in overseas contingencies around the
     world. In these strict budgetary times, support and training
     assistance to domestic authorities is placing Defense
     personnel under a terrible strain.
       This year's budgetary constraint is particularly tight and
     I have not received information to cause me to believe that
     anything might be different in the near future. This is not
     to say there aren't several matters to provide encouragement,
     such as the recent announcement to authorize 10 Rapid
     Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams within the
     Guard and Reserve components. Indeed, the collocation of
     these teams with FEMA regional offices just might provide the
     necessary ``bridge'' between federal and state officials and
     spawn better coordination.
       Yet, I am aware of the Defense Department's budgetary
     struggle to meet existing requirements and must assume that
     this new effort might also find itself at risk of receiving
     inadequate resources. We should look closely at this
     recommendation before committing a large sum of our
     precious--and increasingly scarce--financial resources. And
     we should recognize that this resource pool is declining
     further now that FEMA has recently decided to withdraw itself
     from any lead-agency role. Without its assistance, the
     Defense Department must now find additional, previously
     unanticipated budget authority over the next 4 years to
     support this requirement.
       As the work of GAO has helped us discover, our approach may
     be fundamentally flawed: perhaps too many different federal
     agencies and local governments possess existing or emerging
     capabilities for responding to a WMD attack; uneven and
     nearly incompatible levels of expertise often exists;
     duplication and poor communication may complicate our effort;
     and public complacency may threaten to weaken our overall
     capability. To be sure, if I must leave only one message
     today, let it be this: coordination problems may exist; but
     these problems pale in comparison with the potential problems
     resulting from public complacency.
       Mr. Chairman, there is a Chinese proverb that states, ``May
     you live in interesting times.'' We should be thankful that
     we do. We also live during challenging times. At a time of
     budget cuts, force drawdowns, streamlining, and reductions in
     military personnel endstrength levels, we are faced with a
     familiar threat that is growing in importance. To counter the
     terrorist threat--to provide as much safety to Americans at
     home and abroad--we may need to not only strengthen and
     reinforce existing capabilities but legislate additional
     resources. If we fail in this calling, we may face another
     day when--without warning--an innocent American again falls
     victim to such evil.



                          ____________________


