List of Attachments

[Tab H]

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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

JUL 7 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Allegations Regarding "Operation Tailwind"

The attached report reflects the review conducted by the Air Force in response to your June 9, 1998 directive.

I am confident that the report accurately supports the conclusion that no nerve gas was used by the Air Force during this Operation.

> [Signature]

> F. WHITTEN PETERS
> Acting Secretary of the Air Force

Attachment:
Report

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                         AIR FORCE HISTORY REPORT

                                    ON

                            OPERATION TAILWIND

                      Air Force History Support Office
                                16 July 1998

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                              TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                          Page/Appendix

    I.   Introduction

         A. Events Which Prompted DoD Review ...............Page 1

         B. SECDEF Directed Review .........................Page 1

         C. Conclusions ....................................Page 2

    II.  Conduct of the Review .............................Page 2

    III. Discussion

         A. Unclassified Account of TAILWIND ...............Page 6

         B. Related Topics
            1. Considerations: Nerve Agent Weapons .........Page 21
            2. Clay/Killpack Letter ........................Page 22
            3. Explanation of Research in SEADAB
                 and CACTA .................................Page 24

    [Note: Appendices not in report]

    IV.  Appendices

         A. Illustration of A-1 Skyraider with
              CBU-30 Munitions Load ........................Appendix A

         B. Messages from the Airborne Command
              and Control Center ...........................Appendix B

         C. Authorizations to Use CS "Riot Control"
              Tear Gas .....................................Appendix C

         D. Public Information About Nerve Agent Munition:
              New York Times Articles, 1969-1971............Appendix D

         E. Clay/Killpack Letter and Related
              Correspondence ...............................Appendix E

         F. List of Persons Interviewed and Interview Text  Appendix F

         G. Information on the Southeast Asian Data Base
              (SEADAB)......................................Appendix G

         H. Secretary Cohen's Directive ....................Appendix H

         I. Combat Air Activities (CACTA) Print-out.........Appendix I

         J. JRCC Search and Rescue Log .....................Appendix J

         K. 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron Messages.....Appendix K

         L. 1st Marine Air Wing Messages ...................Appendix L

         M. Tear Gas Rockets ...............................Appendix M

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                           AIR FORCE HISTORY REPORT

                              OPERATION TAILWIND

    I.   INTRODUCTION

         A.  Events Which Prompted DoD Review

         At 10:00 p.m. EDT on Sunday, 7 June 1998, Cable News Network

    (CNN) telecast the first edition of a new show, "NewsStand: CNN &

    Time," in coordination with Time magazine.  The lead story on the 7

    June telecast, called "Valley of Death," alleged that a U.S. Special

    Forces unit was inserted into Laos in September 1970 to kill U.S.

    military defectors.  The story claimed that during the operation, code

    named TAILWIND, the Special Forces unit assaulted an enemy base camp

    "village" and killed enemy troops, women, children, and U.S.

    defectors.  The telecast alleged that Air Force A-1 Skyraider

    aircraft dropped Sarin nerve gas CBU-15 munitions on the enemy base

    camp prior to the attack by the Special Forces unit.  The CNN telecast

    also claimed that during their extraction, the Special Forces

    personnel called in Air Force A-1s, which again dropped Sarin nerve

    gas weapons on enemy soldiers.

         The next day, Time magazine, dated 15 June 1998, included a

    similar story on Operation TAILWIND, written by CNN staff.

         B.  Review SECDEF Directed

         On Monday, 8 June, the Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen,

    announced a formal investigation of these charges.  A 9 June

    memorandum to the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

    (JCS) directed a 30-day investigation of the two charges that the

    TAILWIND operation was directed against U.S. military defectors and

    that Sarin nerve gas was used.  (See Appendix H)

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         C. Conclusions

         This Air Force report will only address the allegation that Air

    Force A-1s dropped Sarin nerve gas during Operation TAILWIND, 11-14

    September 1970.  The other allegation, that Operation TAILWIND was

    directed against U.S. military defectors, will be addressed by the

    U.S. Army and the JCS.

         Based on all of the information historians gathered in their

    investigation, Sarin nerve gas was not used by Air Force aircraft

    during Operation TAILWIND.  The historians could find no evidence that

    the CBU-15 nerve agent munition was an operational weapon or deployed

    to Southeast Asia at the time.

         On 13 and 14 September 1970, A-1s from the 56th Special

    Operations Wing dropped CBU-30 CS tear gas munitions to assist in the

    extraction of the Special Forces unit   The 13 September attempt was

    aborted, and the 14 September attempt succeeded.

         Authorization to use CS tear gas in Search and Rescue operations

    in Laos derives from a 20 January 1968 Secretary of Defense

    Memorandum.  (See Appendix C)

    II.  CONDUCT OF REVIEW

         On 3 June 1997, the Air Force Historian (HQ USAF/HO), Dr. Richard

    P. Hallion, was informed of the upcoming 7 June CNN story about nerve

    gas in Laos, 1970.  On 4 June, Air Force personnel began a thorough

    search to identify materials on TAILWIND and the use of gas of any

    kind in Southeast Asia.  Dr. Hallion spoke to several knowledgeable

    sources:  (1) Colonel Rod Paschall (retired Green Beret); (2) General

    Michael Dugan (retired Air Force Chief of Staff, A-1 pilot);  (3)

    Colonel Eugene Deatrick (retired A-l pilot); (4) Terry Bolstad

    (retired A-1 Search and Rescue (SAR) pilot); (5) Lt Col William

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    Flanagan (retired F-4 weapon systems operator); and Herbert Mason

    (historian for the Air Force Special Operations Command)

         After the telecast, the Secretary of Defense ordered an

    investigation of the allegations that TAILWIND was directed against US

    military defectors, and that Sarin nerve gas was used in the

    operation.  The Air Force Historian then ordered a program-wide search

    for relevant materials concentrating on the Air Force History Support

    Office (AFHSO), the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), and

    the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC).

         Additional Interviews:

         1.  Wayne Thompson (AFHSO) conducted interviews with Tom Stump,

    Don Feld, and Art Bishop, all of whom had been in the 56th Special

    Operations Wing (SOW) as A-1 pilots.  Feld and Bishop flew the CBU-30

    tear gas sorties on 14 September 1970.  Thompson also interviewed

    Covey Forward Air Controllers of the 20th Tactical Air Support

    Squadron:  Gary Green, George Boehmer, and Warner McGraw.

         2.  Diane Putney (AFHSO) interviewed Donald Knight and Wilfred

    Turcotte, officers who had commanded the 56 SOW's 456th Munitions

    Maintenance Squadron (MMS) in September 1970.

         3.  Yvonne Kinkaid (AFHSO) interviewed Lloyd O'Daniels, Covey FAC

    "Rider"; Lt Col Paul Spencer, Assistant Maintenance Supervisor, 456

    MMS; Lt Col Wilfred Turcotte, commander, 456 MMS; Col Donald Knight,

    commander, 456 MMS; SMSgt James McCoy, Munitions Services

    Superintendent, 456 MMS; and CMSgt Donald Guy, Munitions Services

    Superintendent, 456 MMS.

         4.  Sheldon Goldberg (AFHSO) also interviewed Lt Col Spencer,

    Assistant Maintenance Supervisor, 456 MMS.

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           Major Publications Examined:

           FM 3-10/AFM 355-4, Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents,
    31 March 1966.

           Conboy, Kenneth and James Morrison, Shadow War:  The CIA's Secret
    War in Laos, Boulder, CO:  Paladin Press, 1995.

           Cosmas, Graham & Lt Col T. P. Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam:
    Vietnamization and Redeployment:  1970-1971, Washington, DC, USMC,
    1986.

           Hammond, William M., Public Affairs:  The Military and the Media,
    1962-1968, Washington, DC, Center of Military History, 1988.

           Plaster, John L., SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in
    Vietnam, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1997.

           Van Buskirk, Robert and Fred Baver, Tailwind, Waco, TX, Word
    Books, 1983.

           The New York Times, 1969-1971.

           Project CORONA HARVEST Report, HQ PACAF (DOV), In-Country and
    Out-Country Strike Operations in Southeast Asia, l Jan 65 - 31 Dec 69,
    vol. 2, Hardware: Munitions, 2 November 1970, AFHSO.

           Burch, Maj R. M., Project Contemporary Historical Evaluation of
    Combat Operations (CHECO) SEA Report, "The ABCCC in SEA," 7 AF/DOAC,
    15 January 1969.

           U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "Command History 1970,
    Annex B, Studies and Observations Group," 8 April 1971.

           USAF Management Summary, Reference Data, Non-Nuclear Ordnance
    Characteristics, HQ USAF, 1967-1970.

           Guide to Air Force Armament Laboratory Non-Nuclear Munitions and
    Equipment, Part 1 & 2, AFATL, 1 September 1968.

           Hay, Lt Gen J. H., Jr., Vietnam Studies:  Tactical and Material
    Innovations, Washington, DC, DePt of Army, 1974.

           Schlight, Lt Col John, Project CHECO SEA Report, "Rescue at Ban
    Phanop, 5-7 December 1969," 7 AF/DOAC, 15 February 1970.

           JCS Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB), 1970-1972, in Center for
    Electronic Records, NARA.

           JCS Combat Air Activities (CACTA) File, 11-14 September 1970, in
    Center for Electronic Records, NARA.

           Seventh Air Force CHECO Microfilm, 1966-1970.

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          USAF Field Histories Consulted:

          Pacific Air Force, 1970
          Seventh Air Force, 1968-1971
          Ogden Air Materiel Area (OOAMA), 1964-1968
          OOAMA Southeast Asia Support, 1964-1968
          Air Force Armament Laboratory, 1964-1971
          Air Proving Ground Center, 1964-1971
          USAF Tactical Air Warfare Center, 1964-1971
          8th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-December 1970
          12th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-December 1970
          35th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-September 1970
          56th Special Operations Wing, 1969-1971
          366th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-December 1960
          388th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-September 1970
          400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater), 1964-1971
          432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, July-September 1970
          504th Tactical Air Support Group, July-September 1970
          41st Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing, July-September 1970
          3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group, July-September 1970

          Participants in Air Force History Research:

          Richard Hallion, The Air Force Historian

          Wayne Thompson, Air Force History Support Office

          Diane Putney, Air Force History Support Office

          Sheldon Goldberg, Air Force History Support Office

          Yvonne Kinkaid, Air Force History Support Office

          Capt Roy Stanley, Air Force History Support Office

          James Howard, Air Force Historical Research Agency

          TSgt David Byrd, Air Force Historical Research Agency

          Herbert Carlin, Air Force Materiel Command

          William Elliot, Air Force Materiel Command

          Vickie Johes, Air Force Materiel Command

          Dennis Casey, Air Intelligence Agency

          Lt Col Dale Wise, Secretary of the Air Force Declassification
          Team

          SMSgt Jean Hardin, Secretary of the Air Force Declassification
          Team

          MSgt Ray Bailey, Secretary of the Air Force Declassification Team

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          Richard Boylan, National Archives II-Textual Records

          Charles Shaughnessy, National Archives II-Textual Records

          Margret Adams, National Archives II-Center For Electronic Records

          Lee Gladwin, National Archives II-Center for Electronic Records

          Fred Graboske, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums

          William Siebert, National Personnel Records Center

    III.  DISCUSSION

          A. Unclassified Account of TAILWIND

          On 11 September 1970, Marine CH-53 helicopters and AH-1G Cobra

    gunships carried into Laos, near Chavane, a team of 16 Americans and a

    Special Commando Unit (SCU), consisting of Montagnard troops.  The

    Americans were in Company B, Command and Control Central, Military

    Advisory Command Studies and Observation Group (MACSOG).  Their

    mission, Operation TAILWIND, would last until 14 September 1970, and

    their objectives were reconnaissance, intelligence collection, and a

    diversion for a larger operation to the north.

         From landing zone preparation on 11 September to extraction on 14

    September, the team was provided continuous tactical air support by

    Air Force, Army, and Marine assets.  The enemy almost continuously

    attacked the team during the four days they were in Laos.  Air Force

    units under the operational control of the Seventh Air Force flew 76

    sorties for TAILWIND and provided Forward Air Control (FAC) and

    Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) aircraft and crews

    Pilots used the code words "Prairie Fire" to refer to the infiltration

    and exfiltration of the MACSOG team.  Similarly, MACSOG used the

    "Prairie Fire" code words to identify cross-border operations into its

    Laotian area of operations.

          The A-1 Skyraider aircraft which flew TAILWIND missions belonged

    to the 56th Special Operations Wing (SOW), stationed at Nakhon Phanom

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    (NKP) Air Base, Thailand.  The Thirteenth Air Force provided the wing

    with command, administration, facilities, and personnel, and the

    Seventh Air Force exercised operational control over the wing~s

    aircraft.  Three units flew the A-1s assigned to the 56 SOW:

               1st Special Operations Squadron at NKP

               602nd Special Operations Squadron at NKP

               Operating Location AA (OL-AA) at Da Nang Air Base,
                    South Vietnam

    In September 1970, the wing's 21st Special Operations Squadron (SOS)

    flew eleven CH-3E helicopters and one, new CH-53 helicopter which

    arrived at NKP on 8 August.  The squadron referred to the large CH-53

    as "BUFF," for "big, ugly, fat fellow," and this designation should

    not be confused with a similar BUFF nickname given to B-52 bombers.

    The helicopters of the 21 SOS did not participate in TAILWIND because

    they flew other combat missions in a "big operation," according to the

    squadron history, to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail in the Bolovens area of

    Laos.

          The A-1 pilots assigned to the 56 SOW flew four types of combat

    missions:  escort, strike, armed reconnaissance, and search and rescue

    (SAR).  During SAR missions to rescue downed pilots, the wing operated

    with the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, which flew the HH-3

    "Jolly Green Giant" helicopters.  The aircraft carried weapons

    appropriate for the type of mission flown.  For a "strike" operation,

    for example, the munitions maintenance crews would load high explosive

    and fragmentation bombs and napalm.  In "SAR support," at least one A-

    1 aircraft on the mission would carry M-47 smoke bombs and weapons

    with "CS" "riot control" tear gas, for use if warranted.  An Air Force

    history, written by Earl H. Tilford, Jr., and first published in 1980,

    explained that tear gas was employed on SAR missions:

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              As the war continued, the North Vietnamese, Viet Cong,
         and Pathet Lao used increasingly sophisticated weapons and
         tactics to frustrate rescue efforts.  Rescue forces reacted
         to these challenges by developing new weapons and changing
         tactics   Tear gas bombs and riot control chemicals were
         some of the most controversial weapons used to support
         rescue operations.  These weapons included Cluster Bomb Unit
         (CBU)-19A/B and CBU-30A antipersonnel area denial bombs,
         which were essentially tear gas bombs.

         The 56 SOW history for April-June 1969 identified the situations

    when the use of tear gas would be appropriate during SAR operations.

    The downed pilot himself would be deliberately gassed in some cases:

              CBU-19 could be used on enemy gun or troop
         concentrations when the enemy was not equipped with masks or
         other protective equipment.  In these areas it was more
         efficient to disable the enemy temporarily than to employ
         normal weapons.  It was most effective in areas of
         widespread small arms which were normally difficult to
         locate and silence.
              CBU-19 could be used directly on the survivor if the
         survivor was surrounded, had been captured, or was injured
         and unable to help himself and was in [imminent danger from
         advancing enemy forces.

    The report, "In-Country and Out-Country Strike Operations in Southeast

    Asia, 1 Jan 65-31 Dec 69," provided the five primary situations when

    CBU-19 and CBU-30 were employed in South Vietnam:

         To deny the enemy his use of base camps, bunkers, tunnels, and
         caves

         In prestrike operations in support of defoliation missions

         In SAR operations to prevent the capture of downed aircrews

         In offensive combat operations, such as assaults and suppression
         of small arms fire around helicopter landing zones

         In defensive combat operations such as perimeter defense

    The 56 SOW history for July-September 1970 referred to "gas birds" and

    defined them as aircraft carrying CBU-19/CBU-30.  Thus, the A-1s of

    the 56 SOW sometimes carried and delivered CS tear gas munitions.

         The word "incapacitating" was used to describe the CS weapons.

    The 56 SOW history in July described a SAR mission and mentioned

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    "incapacitating ordnance."  Another report, "USAF Search & Rescue in

    Southeast Asia, 1 Jul 69-31 Dec 70," provided a definition for "CS" in

    its glossary:  "personnel incapacitating agent."

         The CBU-19 gas bomb had been originally designed for helicopters,

    but within the Air Force, mostly A-1s expended them, and they were

    little used after 1969.  During 1970-1972 the Air Force principally

    used the CBU-30 tear gas cluster bomb.  Both propeller aircraft, A-1s,

    and jet aircraft, especially F-4s and F-100s, employed the CBU-30,

    which contained 66 pounds of CS tear gas, while the CBU-19 contained

    only 14 pounds.  The "In-Country and Out-Country Strike Operations"

    report described the CBU gas munitions:

               The CBU-19 chemical cluster was a 130-lb. modified
         U.S. Army dispenser intended for use on helicopters and
         consisted of two subclusters fitted to a strongback.  Each
         cluster contained 528 agent-filled canisters; each canister
         contained an incapacitating chemical, called CS, and a
         pyrotechnic fuze.  Upon ejection from the aircraft, the fuze
         ignited the CS, disseminating the CS for four to six
         seconds.  This required delivery below 600 feet AGL [above
         ground level] to insure that the chemical reached the
         ground.  Also, as the cluster had originally been designed
         for use on helicopters, delivery was restricted to use on
         the A-1 and A-37 because the cluster could not withstand the
         airloads encountered on faster aircraft.  The CBU-30
         consisted of the S W -13 downward ejection dispenser and
         1,280 BLU-39/B23 submunitions, each filled with CS.  Upon
         ejection, a pyrotechnic fuze in each submunition ignited,
         disseminating the agent into the air.  Delivery was
         restricted to below 600 feet AGL to insure ground coverage.
         Upon contact with the ground, the submunitions skittered
         about, disseminating the CS even further.  The CBU-30 was
         compatible with both low and high speed aircraft.

         In the Air Force, CS had replaced the older, less potent CN tear gas.

    A MACV directive, 28 March 1970, defined CN as a "standard tear agent

    employed by law enforcement agencies" and CS as "an improved agent

    developed for military use."  The BLU-52 consisted of CS-1, CS in a

    persistent powdered form, in a 750-lb. fire bomb casing.  Because CS-l

    tended to cake when wet, an oil-like substance was added to improve

    its flow qualities, and the improved fill was called CS-2 and the

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    munition was designated BLU-52A.  BLU-52s functioned as anti-personnel

    area denial and interdiction munitions.  They only recently were sent

    to the 56 SOW in September 1970 and caused problems.  The Munitions

    Maintenance Squadron reported: "BLU-52's have arrived and are causing

    a difficult storage situation because of lack of proper

    decontaminants.  These bombs will be restricted from use."

          The Tilford history provided an account of the use of tear gas

    which highlights its potency and shows that those who breathed the

    agent could experience very strong physical reactions.  It stated that

    on 15 February 1969, A-1 Skyraiders flew a SAR mission near the Laos-

    South Vietnam border and dropped CBU-19s. It continued:

               Braving the constant hail of antiaircraft fire, the
          Skyraiders made the required mile-long run at 300 feet and
          220 knots to hit all their targets--enemy antiaircraft gun
          positions.  While the gunners choked, coughed, cried, and
          retched uncontrollably, a Jolly Green [helicopter] with its
          crew wearing gas masks swooped in and saved the pilot.

          An Air Force historical CHECO report also included an account of the

    effects of tear gas.  It included a statement from a downed Air Force

    pilot describing the use of riot control agents (CBU-19, CBU-30, and

    BLU-52) during his rescue near Ban Phanop in Laos, lasting three-days

    in December 1969:

               They laid it all along the top of the ridge . . .[some
          of] it hit me . . . I might as well tell you what it feels
          like when that stuff goes off.  I ran into a tree and was
          wrapped around the tree urinating, defecating, and retching
          all at the same instant. . .It also made me want to sneeze.
          It was a beauty to have 500 pounders and everything go off
          because it would give me a chance to sneeze. . .It goes into
          effect instantaneously.  Physically and mentally you can't
          control yourself. . .After that every time I'd come up on the
          air and ask for Vodka (A-1s carrying CBU-19), as soon as I'd
          tell them where, how far and the heading, I'd tell them
          'Don't get it close to me.'

          The "USAF Search & Rescue Report, 1 Jul 69-31 Dec 70,~  which

    covered the time of the TAILWIND Operation, contained illustrations of

    the A-1 Skyraider carrying its various weapons loads, and for the SAR

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    support configuration it indicated that the A-1 carried two CBU-30

    weapons, and they were hung on the right and left "stubs" of the

    aircraft, which placed them under the right and left wing, immediately

    next to the fuselage.  (See Appendix A)  A set of notes dated January

    1970, which a 56 SOW A-1 pilot consulted before flying missions,

    provided a warning:  "To dispense CBU-30 consecutively, do not set

    train position.  Instead, set the stub selector switches to SALVO one

    at a time."

         The employment of tear gas "riot control" weapons in Southeast

    Asia by the Air Force and Army generated controversy, and appropriate

    officials in the chain of command authorized each use of the CS air

    weapon.  The Seventh Air Force required regular reports on the exact

    number of munitions expended during specified time periods.  Secretary

    of Defense Robert S. McNamara issued a key authorization for use of CS

    in Laos on 20 January 1968 when he sent a memorandum to the Chairman

    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stating, "With reference to JCSM 480-67

    of 26 August 1967, I approve at this time only so much of the JCSM

    recommendation as pertains to the use of riot control agent CS in

    combat aircrew recovery operations in Laos."  The MACSOG history which

    discussed TAILWIND noted, The authority to use CS/CN gas within the

    PF [Prairie Fire] AO [area of operations] was held by the US

    Ambassador to Laos.  Its use was considered on a case by case basis

    and was last utilized to assist in an extraction of an exploitation

    force on 14 September.   This date, 14 September 1970, matches last

    day of the TAILWIND operation when the team was extracted and the

    operation ended.  A MACV directive 25 December 1971 stated that the

    use of riot control agents commonly covered "extraction by helicopter

    of troops, medical evacuees, and downed aircrews."

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          The CBU-14 and CBU-25 weapons in the inventory of the 56 SOW

    deserve special consideration because the wing was discontinuing the

    use of CBU-14s and receiving CBU-25s in September 1970.  Both cluster

    bomb units used the suspension unit, universal (SUU)-14 dispenser,

    filled with submunitions.  Neither was a chemical munition.  The CBU-

    14 was designed for use against light materiel targets, such as

    trucks.  The CBU-25 was an anti-personnel weapon.  The CBU-14s had a

    high percentage of duds.  The 56 SOW history in September 1970

    reported:

                Other problems included the unforeseen change in
          ordnance types.  When the shipment of CBU-25 arrived, the
          CBU Storage Area was filled to capacity with CBU-14 leaving
          no room for storage.  The change was due to the
          characteristics of CBU-14 which sometimes hangs undetonated
          in trees, providing the enemy with a source of effective
          antipersonnel munitions for use against friendly troops in
          the form of booby traps. . . .  Due to the late arrival of
          CBU-25 ordnance (September) follow up action was not
          available for this report.  However, action was expected
          during October to request removal of CBU-14 from NKP.

    In September the A-1s of the 56 SOW expended both CBU-14 and CBU-25

    munitions.

          Also during September 1970, the three units of the 56 SOW which

    flew the A-1 Skyraiders participated in TAILWIND, and pilots from the

    wing dropped the CS weapons used during the operation.  The call sign

    of the A-1 pilots from the 1st Special Operations Squadron of the 56

    SOW was "Hobo."  Their squadron history for September stated:

               The [T]ailwind exfil on 13 and 14 September was
         heavily opposed, but with the help of numerous accurate low-
         level attacks by A-1s, from both NKP and Danang, the ground
         team was successfully extracted on the second day.  Many
         Hob[o] pilots were involved in this effort

         The squadron history for July 1970 referred to CBU-19/CBU-30 "gas

    birds," but the September history does not specifically state that the

    unit's aircraft dropped gas during TAILWIND.

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         The history of the 602nd Special Operations Squadron did not

    mention TAILWIND, but interviews confirmed that squadron pilots flew

    in support of the operation.  Among the weapons the squadron used in

    September were CBU-30s, CBU-14s, and CBU-25s.  No CBU-19s were used

    The tear gas expenditures for the month consisted of eight CBU-30 tear

    gas munitions.

         The 56 SOW's Operating Location AA, stationed at Da Nang,

    provided a description of its TAILWIND involvement in its September

    history.  The A-1 pilots' call sign was "Spad":

              On 11 September the Spads assisted in the infil of a
         unique long range reconnaissance team.  Also on that date,
         units of the Royal Laotian Government were fighting to
         interdict Rt 23 in the Laotian panhandle.  The
         reconnaissance team, code name "Tailwind," was three times
         their normal size and was intent on more than
         reconnaissance.  Scheduled to be a diversion for the Laotian
         unit, Tailwind on 12 September made contact with the enemy.
         In response to this contact, the Spads launched 10 sorties
         to support the tactical emergency which had developed.  On
         these sorties Spad pilots made numerous low altitude passes
         to .50 calibre and intense small arms and automatic weapons.
         Strikes were also directed against known mortar positions.
         By the 13th of September the enemy had definite knowledge he
         was fighting more than a standard reconnaissance team.  An
         aggressive effort was made to overrun the special forces.
         The Spads again responded to what had now become a Prairie
         Fire Emergency by providing twelve sorties.  Again low
         passes and precision delivery repelled hostile forces in
         their attempt to destroy the friendly team.  This lasted
         throughout the day, and efforts were made to prepare for a
         first light launch.
              On the 14th of September eight sorties were launched
         on this day to assist in the recovery of this team.  The
         team was safely extracted at 1400 hours on the 14th of
         September.  All total, the Spads provided thirty sorties in
         support of the "Tailwind."  The team reported over 400 KBA
         [killed by air] and suffered only three lost during its
         heroic activities.

    Among the munitions the OL-AA expended during the month were CBU-25s.

    In September 1970 the operating location expended no tear gas weapons.

         Information in the 56 SOW history indicates that the A-l

    Skyraiders which dropped tear gas during TAILWIND, expended CBU-30,

    not CBU-19, tear gas munitions.  Two other sources point to CBU-30 as

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    the gas weapon the A-1s dropped.  The computerized Southeast Asia Data

    Base (SEADAB) reveals that A-1s from NKP expended 6 CBU-30s on 13

    September and 6 CBU-30s on 14 September, in the area where the

    TAILWIND team was located.  The 12 CBU-30s used over the two-day

    period include the 8 CBU-30s specifically listed in the 602 SOS

    September history.  Art Bishop, one of the pilots who dropped the tear

    gas on the last day of the operation, 14 September, stated that he

    used CBU-30, and he is certain of the type because he consulted a

    diary in which he had written CBU-30.  The second pilot who dropped

    the gas bombs, Don Feld, clearly remembered it as tear gas, but could

    not recall the type of CBU.

              Other USAF tactical air (TACAIR) units and aircraft

    operating in the part of Laos where the TAILWIND team operated

    on 11-14 September 1970 were:  F-4s and AC-130s from the 8th

    Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), Ubon Air Base, Thailand; F-4s from

    the 388 TFW, Korat Air Base, Thailand; F-100s, probably from the

    35 TFW, Phan Rang Air Base, South Vietnam; F-100s from the 355

    TFW, Takhli Air Base, Thailand; AC-119s from the 18 SOS at Da

    Nang Air Base; and OV-10s from the 504th Tactical Air Support

    Group at NKP.  Most of the unit histories did not mention

    TAILWIND.  One did preserve the letter of congratulations from

    General Lucius Clay, Jr., Seventh Air Force commander, to the

    crews of the 8 TFW, for their participation in the operation.

    Clay singled out for special recognition the pilot and crew of

    an AC-130 Spectre gunship, call sign Moody 2, from the 16 SOS.

    SEADAB computerized data did not show any aircraft other than

    the A-1s from NKP as dropping gas munitions during TAILWIND.

         Among the responsibilities of the 456th Munitions Maintenance

    Squadron (MMS) of the 56 SOW were those to supply the wing with all

                                      14

[H-18]

    required munitions and associated components for combat missions and

    to support all loading, downloading, arming, and disarming of all wing

    aircraft requiring munitions.   During an interview, the commander of

    the 456 MMS at the time of TAILWIND, Lt. Col Wilfred N. Turcotte,

    USAF, retired, stated that the wing had in its inventory tear gas

    munitions, but no Sarin.  The idea of nerve agent munitions at NRP was

    a "startling concept" to him.  The men in his squadron who loaded the

    weapons on the aircraft did so with no protective gear and often

    worked in the hot climate "stripped to the waist," wearing shorts or

    long pants.  As commander, he was often on the flight line as

    munitions were prepared and loaded.  He certainly would have known if

    there was poison Sarin gas in the weapons his men handled.  There was

    none.  He would have been notified if Sarin gas was going to be used

    on a mission.  He was never so informed.

         During an interview, the Assistant Maintenance Supervisor of the

    456 MMS at the time of TAILWIND, Lt Col Paul C. Spencer, USAF,

    retired, explained that he had received formal training in identifying

    and handling munitions of all types, including nerve gas.  He said

    there was no Sarin at NKP.  Had there been he certainly would have

    been aware of it, and he knew how to recognize it.  He stated that had

    he seen any he would have immediately reported it to the Inspector

    General.  At no time while he was in the 56 SOW did he see special

    protective clothing, masks, rubber aprons, etc. necessary when storing

    and moving nerve agent munitions.  He was familiar with every storage

    and work area and went through them all   He checked munitions loads

    daily.  The gas munitions at NKP were there for search and rescue

    (SAR) missions.  These weapons were preloaded on trailers so they

    could quickly be uploaded to the SAR aircraft.

                                       15

[H-19]

         The officer who assumed command of the 456 MMS on 23 September

    1970, nine days after TAILWIND, Col. Donald L  Knight, USAF, retired,

    stated that the 56 SOW used tear gas on missions, but that he had

    received no information at all about nerve agent munitions ever being

    in the 56 SOW inventory of weapons.  He never heard anything about

    Sarin at NKP, and none was in the wing when he commanded the 456 MMS.

    He described how weapons were preloaded on trailers in the munitions

    area and driven over to the aircraft where 456 MMS members loaded them

    onto the aircraft.  The only protective equipment he remembered his

    munitions loaders wearing on the flight line were ear plugs.

         After the TAILWIND operation, General Clay, as commander of the

    Seventh Air Force, attended a briefing on the mission 11-14 September,

    given by one of the members of the ground element.  The briefer

    described in detail the combat action the group engaged in while in

    Laos, and the tactical air power his team relied upon   Clay wrote,

    "Describing the air support as 'magnificent,' the briefer further

    stated the mission could not have seen accomplished without the

    coordinated, accurate air support his forces received."

         Air Force units supported TAILWIND with effective and continuous

    air power, but at no time during the operation did any Air Force

    aircraft deliver Sarin nerve gas.  The A-1 Skyraiders did expend CBU-

    30 tear gas, which contributed to the successful extraction of the

    TAILWIND team.

                                       16

[H-20]

         TAILWIND from the ABCCC EC-130 Perspective Matched to SEADAB Data

         Two Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) EC-130 aircraft

    flew during TAILWIND and reported daily on the mission, starting on

    its second day, September 12, when a Prairie Fire Emergency was

    declared.  The ABCCC messages, matched to data in the computerized

    Southeast Asia Data Base, provide additional information about the

    operation.

         The calls signs for the two ABCCC aircraft were Moonbeam and

    Hillsboro.

         On 11 Sep 70 sorties by 8 TFW F-4s from Ubon dropped MK-82 bombs

    at a landing zone in southern Laos at YC 4370 0470.

         For the night of 12/13 Sep Moonbeam reported coverage by FLIP

    (1115), an AC-119 gunship from the 18 SOS (Danang), and Moody 1 and 2

    (1103 & 1119) AC-130 Spectre gunships from the 8 TFW at Ubon at

    coordinates YC 4362 0498.  The supporting aircraft could see mortar

    rounds, grenades, and rockets falling on Company B.  Firefly 44, an A-

    1 out of NKP (56 SOW), expended a load of CBU-25s in support of

    Tailwind that night, as did 18 Spad 01, an A-1 from 56 SOW OL-AA at

    Danang.  Both were guided by an Alma FAC.

         The Prairie Fire Emergency continued during 13 Sep 70.  ABCCC

    Hillsboro reported Company B moving from landing zone to landing zone,

    trying to exfiltrate the area.  They were not successful, and one

    Marine CH-53 (Gnat One) was destroyed but the crew was saved.

    Hillsboro reported 22 A-1 sorties and 8 quick-reaction force (QRF)

    sorties (F-4s) supporting Tailwind on 13 Sep   These sorties included

    Wolfpack 11 and 12 F-4s from 8 TFW (Ubon) dropping MK-82 bombs and

    CBU-24s at YC 4480 0570; Hobo 20 and 44 A-1s from 56 SOW (NKP)

    dropping CBU-25s; Spad 01 and 03 A-1s from 56 SOW OL-AA (Danang)

    dropping CBU-25s and BLU-32B fire bombs.

                                      17

[H-21]

         During the 13 Sep exfiltration attempts. CBU-30 tear gas bombs

    were dropped at YC 4450 0380 by Firefly 24 and Hobo 46, which were 56

    SOW A-1s from NKP.

         Later in the day, additional support was provided by Firefly 34

    and 35 (56 SOW A-1s from NKP) dropping CBU-25s at YC 4350 0450.

         During the night of 13/14 Sep Moonbeam ABCCC reported that

    Company B had 3 critical casualties, and 8 others wounded.  Gunships

    Greg 1 and 2, Will and Check, provided cover. Additional support was

    provided by Hobo 30 and 31; Firefly 42 and 43; and Spad 03 and 04

         Company B was extracted successfully at 1500L on 14 Sep 70.

    Another Marine CH-53 was lost in this effort.  Hillsboro reported that

    at least 10 A-1 and 8 QRF (F-4) sorties were flown in support of

    Tailwind on 14 Sep and guided by Gazor FACs.  Wolfpack 11, 21, 41, and

    51 F-4s (8 TFW from Ubon) dropped CBU-24s and MX 82 bombs at YC 4220

    0570.  Some of the A-1 sorties were Hobo 31 and 32 and Spad 01, 02, 03

    and 04 (56 SOW OL-AA from Danang) dropping CBU-25s.

         In support of the exfiltration on 14 Sep, CBU-30 tear gas was

    dropped by Firefly 44 and Hobo 20 (56 SOW A-1s from NKP) at YC 4450

    0380.

     SOURCES:

     1. 7AF ABCCC Msg & Narrative Rpts, 12-14 Sep 70.

     2  JCS SEADAB, 11-14 Sep 70.

                                        18

[H-22]

            Sources Cited in the Unclassified Account of TAILWIND

                      All material cited is unclassified

         U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History 1970
    Annex B, Studies and Observations Group, 8 April 1971, Air Force
    History Support Office (AFHSO), Bolling AFB, DC.

         History, 56th Special Operations Wing, July - September 1970,
    vols 1 and 2, microfilm, AFHSO.
         These volumes contain the monthly histories of 1st Special
    Operations Squadron (SOS), 21 SOS, 602 SOS, Operating Location AA, and
    456th Munitions Maintenance Squadron.

         Earl H. Tilford, Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975
    (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1980).

         History, 56th Special Operations Wing, April - June 1969, vol 1,
    microfilm, AFHSO.

         Project CORONA HARVEST Report, HQ PACAF (DOV), In-Country and
    Out-Country Strike Operations in Southeast Asia, 1 Jan 65 - 31 Dec 69,
    vol 2, Hardware: Munitions. 2 Nov 1970. AFHSO.

         Report, USAF Search & Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1 Jul 69-31 Dec
    70," microfilm, AFHSO.

         MACV Directive 525-11, 28 March 1970, "Employment of Riot Control
    Agents an Defense Against Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Attack,~
    copy from National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), AFHSO

         Lt Col John Schlight, Project CHECO SEA Report, "Rescue at Ban
    Phanop, 5-7 Dec 1969," 7 AF/DOAC, 15 February 1970. AFHSO.

         Photocopies of 456th Munitions Maintenance cards, faxed from Col
    Donald L. Knight, USAF, retired, to Diane T. Putney, AFHSO. 26 June
    1998. AFHSO.

         Memo, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Subject: "Use of
    Riot Control Agent (CS) in Combat Aircrew Recovery Operations in Laos
    and NVN," 20 January 1968, copy from NARA in AFHSO.

         MACV Directive 525-11, 25 December 1971, "Employment of Riot
    Control Agents and Defense Against Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear
    Attack," copy from NARA, AFHSO.

         Interview, Art Bishop (Major Arthur N. Bishop, USAF, in 1970), by
    Wayne Thompson, AFHSO, 16 June 1998.

         Interview, Don Feld (2Lt Donald H. Feld, USAF, in 1970), by Wayne
    Thompson, AFHSO, 17 June 1998.

         Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB) in
    Center for Electronic Records, NARA.

         Letter, Lucius D. Clay, Jr., 7AF/CC, to Colonel Larry M.

                                      19

[H-23]

    Killpack, 8TFW/CC, 8 October 1970, in History (S), "8th Tactical
    Fighter Wing," vol 2, microfilm, AFHSO.

         Interviews, Lt Col Wilfred N. Turcotte, USAF, retired, by Diane
    T. Putney, AFHSO, 26 June 1998, and Yvonne A. Kinkaid, AFHSO, 3 July
    1998.

         Interviews, Lt Col Paul C. Spencer, USAF, retired, by Yvonne A.
    Kinkaid, AFHSO, 3 July 1998, and Sheldon A. Goldberg, AFHSO, 3 July
    1998.

         Interviews, Col Donald L. Knight, USAF, retired, by Diane T.
    Putney, AFHSO, 26 and 29 June 1998, and Yvonne A. Kinkaid, AFHSO, 3
    July 1998.

         Messages and Narrative Reports, 7AF Airborne Command and Control
    Center (ABCCC), 12-14 September 1970, microfilm, AFHSO.

         John L. Plaster, SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in
    Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).

         Manuscript, Bernard C. Nalty, Interdiction in Southern Laos,
    1968-1972. AFHSO.

                                       20

[H-24]

               B.    Related Topics

                     1.   Considerations:  Nerve Agent Weapons

          The following describes an exercise with MC-1, a Sarin nerve

    agent munition, which shows the precautions necessary when handling

    lethal nerve gas.  In January 1969, the 313th Air Division informed the

    400th  Munitions Maintenance Squadron (MMS) and other interested USAF

    units on Okinawa of a USAF operational test and evaluation program for

    the 750 lb. MC-1 Sarin nerve gas bomb to be conducted at Dugway

    Proving Grounds, Utah, in March 1969.

          Leakproof containers were shipped in from Ogden Air Materiel Area

    (OOAMA), and Disaster Control Forces at Kadena were extensively

    trained.  Army and Air Force Technical Escort teams inspected the 25

    weapons carefully and supervised the loading into the containers which

    were then mounted on 9 pallets.

          On 27 March 1969, the convoy of bombs left the Chibana Army

    Ammunition Depot in tractor trailers for an hour and a half drive to

    Kadena.  They were escorted by Security Police, Disaster Control, and

    medical teams.  Loading into the C-141 took an hour.

          The C-141 flew to Dugway via Barber's Point, Hawaii.  The

    Technical Escort team and the aircrew had masks and Atropine.  The

    team worked in shifts to monitor the cargo by checking the pallet tie

    downs and the containers.  There was no way to check for leaks within

    the containers.  Since the gas was tasteless, odorless, and invisible,

    the method used to detect leaks indoors was to place several rabbits

    in cages around the area and see if they were affected.  This

    procedure was done on the flight.  The rabbits survived.  The trip was

    uneventful.

    SOURCES:  Trip Report, DTC 69-14, Tech Escort Support, 27-28 Mar 69,
    1Lt P.C. Spencer, 313 AD/DMW, 30 Apr 69, in History 400 MMS, Jan-JUn
    1969, and Interview with Lt Col P. C. Spencer, USAF, Ret., 3 Jul 1998.

                                       21

[H-25]

              2.   Clay/Killpack Letter (7 AF/CC Letter to 8 TFW/CC)

         At some point after 7 June 1998, CNN provided a copy of an Air

    Force letter from the Seventh Air Force (7 AF) Commander to the 8th

    Tactical Fighter Wing (8 TFW) Commander, congratulating the latter on

    his wing's performance in Operation TAILWIND.  The letter had a one-

    page attachment with excerpts from a TAILWIND after-action report.  At

    issue is an unreadable digit in the last paragraph of the excerpts

    page, referring to a cluster bomb unit (CBU) weapon, possibly CBU-15

    or CBU-25.

         The historians found a copy of the 7 AF letter in the history of

    the 8 TFW, July-September 1970.  It did not include the attachment.

    They also found correspondence forwarding the 7 AF letter to the Wing

    Director of Operations and the 16th Special Operations Squadron (16

    SOS) because the 7 AF letter singled out one AC-130 crew for special

    praise.

         On 30 June 1998, the historians received a copy of the TAILWIND

    after-action report delivered to General Abrams by Lt Van Buskirk in

    1970.  From the fax markings, the report seems to have come from the

    McCarley family.  Most of the quoted items in the excerpts page match

    the Van Buskirk report.  The use of CBU-25s is mentioned three times

    in the Van Buskirk account.  Van Buskirk's report identified the gas

    munition used on 14 September 1970 as CBU-19 tear gas   Actually, the

    historians have determined that it was CBU-30 tear gas.

         The historians were not able to find coverage of TAILWIND or the

    7 AF Commander's letter in the history of 7 AF, July-December 1970

    They could not find any similar congratulatory letters to any of the

    other 7 AF Wings participating in TAILWIND.

                                      22

[H-26]

         Attached to the copy of the 7 AF Commander's letter provided by

    CNN was a Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) listing for a

    September 1967 Air Proving Ground Command Report of an engineering

    evaluation of the CBU-15/A.

         The report covers test of the CBU-15/A with F-100, F-105, and F-

    4C aircraft from August 1964 through July 1967.  The Phase I bomb

    operated properly, but did not provide enough area coverage to meet

    the operational requirement.  It was also estimated that a larger

    Phase II bomb would not meet the operational requirement

         It was recommended that if six SUU-13/A dispensers were fitted to

    an F-4D, it might produce an area coverage to meet the operational

    requirement.

         The report shows that this munition was being tested on fast-

    moving jet aircraft.  There is no indication of compatibility testing

    with "slow moving" A-1 Skyraider aircraft.

                                       23

[H-27]

               3.    Explanation of Research in SEADAB and CACTA

           The Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB) is in the National

    Archives and Records Administration (NARA).  It describes fixed-wing

    combat air missions of the U.S. military services, from 1970 to 1975,

    and includes such data as mission dates, aircraft flown, weapons

    loads, and bomb damage assessments.  In 1977 the Joint Chiefs of Staff

    (JCS) gave the SEADAB computer tapes and SEADAB computer coding

    instructions dated 1975 to NARA.

           Early in 1993, an AF Reserve IMA officer assigned to the Air

    Force History Support Office (AFHSO) began work on decoding the SEADAB

    tapes in NARA.  The Office of the Air Force Historian (HQ USAF/HO)

    provided funding to a contractor which employed some personnel who

    worked with SEADAB in the early 1970s.  Additional funding was

    provided in 1996 by Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC),

    which needed the data for de-mining projects in SEA, in the effort to

    locate and detonate unexploded ordnance dropped during the conflict in

    SEA.  A full and accurate decoding of the more than 170 data fields

    for all of 1970-1975 requires significant additional research.

           WhiLe doing their TAILWIND research, Air Force historians

    requested that the Reserve officer generate a computer print-out from

    SEADAB showing any CBU-15 munitions dropped by A-1 aircraft,

    1970-1972.  The print-out showed that the A-1s dropped "CBU-15

    AntiMaterial" weapons more than 2,000 times.  The historians knew an

    error occurred because the CBU-15 is not an anti-materiel munition and

    the weight of the weapon was incorrect.  They doubted that the CBU-15

    nerve agent bomb could have been used secretly over 2,000 times.  They

    asked the USAF Reserve officer who had generated the print-out to see

    if the coding instructions could explain how the error occurred.

                                       24

[H-28]

           The officer consulted a second set of SEADAB computer card

    coding instructions which he had acquired from the Pacific Air Forces

    (PACAF) history office.  Both the PACAF coding instructions and the

    1975 JCS coding instructions referred to the same SEADAB data base,

    but the instructions were printed at different times.

           The PACAF coding instructions are in a binder titled "Old

    SEADAB Tables" and consist of two sets of print-outs showing the

    current status of the computer card coding instructions from August

    1970 to November 1974.  One set with data printed in a narrow, compact

    format identifies Code 415 in the munitions table (Table 8) as CBU-14

    Anti-Material, 250 lbs. from 1970 to 1974.  The other set, with a

    spread out full text format, shows Code 415 in Table 8 as CBU-14

    Anti-Material, 250 lbs. from August 1970 to September 1972   The 30

    October 1972 edition shows Code 41S as CBU-15, but still describes it

    as Anti-Material, 250 lbs.  This change continues through 1974.

           The bottom line was that in 1970, there was no code for CBU-15.

    Code 415 meant CBU-14 in the card coding instructions for 1970.  When

    the tape was run for 1970 using the 1970 card coding instructions, it

    showed CBU-14, 24, and 25 as anti-material and anti-personnel bomblets

    and CBU-30 tear gas.

           As a double check to the SEADAB data base, the historians

    studied a second computerized data base in NARA, the Combat Air

    Activities (CACTA) file.  CACTA contains data from combat air missions

    in Southeast Asia, October 1965-December 1970.  It was the official

    record for 1970 while SEADAB was still being tested. SEADAB became the

    official record for operational aircraft sorties on 1 January 1971

           NARA provided the historians with a CACTA computer data tape

    which contained information on all missions flown in September 1970.

                                      25

[H-29]

    The historians sent the tape to the contractors who had been working

    on SEADAB for the de-mining project.  The contractors worked over the

    4th of July weekend 1998 to extract data from the CACTA tape   They

    succeeded in producing a print-out of missions flown during the time

    of TAILWIND, 11-14 September 1970.

           The CACTA data on all missions flown during the TAILWIND

    Operation showed no CBU-15 sarin gas munitions expended.  No nerve

    agent weapons of any type showed up in the CACTA data.

           The SEADAB data had shown 4 sorties carrying CBU-30 on 13

    September 1970 and 4 sorties carrying CBU-30 on 14 September.

    Although the CACTA computer print-out was incomplete, it did show a

    "Hobo" mission, number 623, carrying CBU-30 to target coordinates

    YC44500380 on 14 September.  One of the sorties shown in SEADAB for 14

    September and expending CBU-30 also had the call sign "Hobo," mission

    number 623, and target coordinates YC44500380.  CACTA confirmed data

    in SEADAB that CBU-30 was expended on 14 September by an aircraft with

    the call sign "Hobo." "Hobo" was the call sign of the 1st Special

    Operations Squadron of the 56th Special Operations Wing, which flew the

    A-1 Skyraider missions on 14 September for Operation TAILWIND.

          See Appendices G and I.

    [Note: No appendices were provided]

                                       26

[End Tab H]