    22 March 1997
    Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html

    -------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [Congressional Record: March 18, 1997 (Extensions)]
    [Page E509]
    From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
    [DOCID:cr18mr97-50]

                          REDEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY

                                     ______

                               HON. BARNEY FRANK

                                of massachusetts

                        in the house of representatives

                            Tuesday, March 18, 1997

      Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, on Monday, March 10, in
    conjunction with our colleague, the gentleman from California, the
    ranking Democrat on the National Security Committee, along with the
    senior Senator from Oregon and the senior Senator from Minnesota, I
    participated in a day long meeting on the implications of allowing the
    military budget to stay at its current levels while trying to reduce
    the Federal deficit to zero. The basic point that we and others made is
    that unless we begin to make substantial reductions in the military
    budget, we will devastate a number of other important social and
    economic goals of our society by reducing Federal support for them to
    an unacceptably low level.
      But none of us would be for reducing American military spending if by
    doing so we were going to put at risk our national security. Therefore,
    we began the day with a discussion of the genuine needs of national
    security today, and the highlight of that was a thoughtful, well
    documented analysis of our national security situation presented by our
    colleague from California who is the former chairman and current
    ranking Democrat on the National Security Committee.
      The gentleman from California who came to Congress in 1971, after
    winning an election in which his criticism of the Vietnam War was a
    central factor, has become one of the undisputed experts in the country
    on national security policy. As my colleagues know, he combines a
    strong passion with an extremely powerful analytic intelligence and the
    result is an eloquent, forceful statement of the case for a more
    realistic and comprehensive national security policy, one which would
    allow us to save substantial resources from the military budget.
      Mr. Speaker, because the need to reduce the military budget and make
    funds available for important non-military purposes is the central
    issue facing this Congress, I take the unusual step of seeking
    permission to insert into the Record the extraordinarily thoughtful and
    useful remarks of Mr. Dellums on that occasion, even though it exceeds
    the normal length of remarks which are printed here. But with a
    military budget in hundreds of billions, tens of billions more than it
    needs to be, I believe that asking for the expenditure of a few hundred
    dollars here to bring the case for reduction before the American people
    is indeed a bargain.

                              ____________________

    [Congressional Record: March 13, 1997 (Extensions)]
    [Page E471-E474]
    From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
    [DOCID:cr13mr97-41]

                  ENVISIONING A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

                                     ______

                               HON. BARNEY FRANK

                                of massachusetts

                        in the house of representatives

                            Thursday, March 13, 1997

      Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following for
    printing in the Record:

    [[Page E472]]

                  Envisioning a New National Security Strategy

                          (By Hon. Ronald V. Dellums)

           The Cold War has been over now for several years.
         Throughout that era, congressional colleagues told me: We
         cannot make cuts in our military budget because of the world-
         wide threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies.
         Nonetheless, we believed then and we argued then that we
         could reduce military spending and thereby help to ratchet
         back the conflict. Indeed, throughout the last decade of the
         Cold War, the Congressional Black Caucus proposed a series of
         budgets to do precisely that.
           With the Cold War over, many colleagues now say: With one-
         third cuts in funding, force structure and personnel, we have
         gone far enough in our post Cold War draw down. They say that
         any more will leave us unable to respond to emerging
         challenges because of hollow forces untrained and unequipped.
         I say again, our current security environment both allows and
         demands that we reallocate significant resources from our
         military accounts, and redirect them into those domestic and
         foreign policy accounts that contribute equally importantly
         to our United States national security. Indeed, a strategy
         that ignores the contributions to national security made by
         foreign assistance and investments in education and science
         research and development, just to name two domestic accounts,
         is not a comprehensive strategy--and therefore it is one that
         is doomed to fail.
           Certainly instability and danger remain in various parts of
         the world, including in Russia and other nations of the
         former Soviet Union. Military modernization in China,
         Southeast Asia, Latin America and elsewhere--including within
         the United States--always should give pause for concern. The
         Persian Gulf and Korean Peninsula merit continued attention
         because of the possibilities for open warfare between
         nations. Humanitarian crises and instability throughout the
         globe will properly continue to require the involvement of
         the U.S. military at least in the near term--preferably
         through United Nations' sponsored undertakings in which the
         United States acts as a colleague which can bring special
         skills to the table. But we should not allow ourselves to be
         trapped into the belief that these challenges, only partially
         military in nature, represent anything requiring anywhere
         near our current force structure or modernization plans.
           Moreover, we should not view even these ``security''
         challenges in purely military terms. They must be seen in
         their economic, cultural and diplomatic frame of reference.
         Seen in that light, much of the instability that threatens
         human rights or outright bloodshed can be diminished and
         deflected through a robust program of sustainable economic
         development and timely diplomatic activity in behalf of
         crisis intervention and conflict resolution. As I noted
         throughout the Cold War, conflicts that are economic,
         political, social and cultural in their origins cannot be
         solved by resort to arms, but only by solving the underlying
         economic, political, social and cultural origins of the
         conflict.
           Viewed this way, it is clear there exists an imbalance in
         the funding of our three ``national security accounts.''
           In one account, we continue to make a commitment to find
         ways to finance a too-large military force structure, an
         overly aggressive and in many cases misguided weapons
         modernization program, and overly programmed requirements to
         maintain short-term readiness (while not planning
         successfully to pay for the involvement we will have in
         peacekeeping and humanitarian ventures). We fail to pay for a
         sufficient program of foreign assistance and much of what we
         do pay for goes for military security assistance which often
         compounds the problems that generate regional instability and
         hostility, rather than ameliorate the root causes of that
         instability. And, finally, we have already and continue to
         sacrifice the necessary investments in education, science,
         research and development, medical and infrastructure that
         are absolutely critical to the national security of our
         nation on the three-tiered alter of sustained military
         spending, balanced federal budgets and generalized tax
         breaks.
           It is clear to me that significant spending reductions can
         be achieved in our military account by a thoughtful
         application of analysis to understanding the threats and
         opportunities that great us in this new era. In this paper, I
         seek to set out the justification for such reductions--
         reductions which I believe represent both a down payment on
         durable savings in the years beyond which we are currently
         planning budgets and which will also shape and reduce the
         military investments that will be made by other nations in
         the future, especially including China and Russia.
           I will leave it to others to more carefully lay out the
         types of investments that could be made in both the foreign
         assistance and domestic investments. But let me assert in
         regard to both of them that fiscal investments in these
         priorities will bear enormous leverage toward creating
         international stability beyond our borders and to ensuring
         that we have a healthy and vibrant society and polity within
         our borders.
           In other words, contrary to those who worry that we spend
         too little on defense, I believe that our current level of
         spending--far in excess of our most robust potential
         adversary--is excessive and represents a long-term threat to
         our national economy and to the integrity of the national
         treasury and, therefore, to our national security.

                        The Military Funding ``Crisis''

           Much of the discussion to date from the new Congressional
         majority has centered on how to find equilibrium by an
         increase in the funding side of the military requirements-
         funding equation, rather than confronting whether or not the
         program side might be overly robust and therefore excess to
         our legitimate defense requirements. I believe, as I will set
         out below, that we should focus on the program side of the
         equation, and seek to find our equilibrium by scaling back
         excessive force structure and formulating our modernization
         effort to meet more appropriately the strategic challenges
         that will confront us in tomorrow's world. Indeed, when
         approached from that direction substantial savings can be
         generated.
           All of us--whatever our political viewpoint--should be able
         to agree that the United States has not fully reconfigured
         our forces or our thinking to meet the new realities of the
         post-Cold War era. The disagreement is over how we can meet
         them, what our strategy should be and what it will take to
         implement that strategy. Only when we have answered these
         questions can we proceed to assess the budgetary requirements
         to fulfill that strategy.
           My continued assessment of the type and scale of the
         dangers that exist, the proper response to them and the role
         of the United States in that response convinces me that we
         can over the coming five-year defense planning period, and
         prudence dictates that we should: first, make further
         reductions in our nuclear arsenal and the infrastructure that
         supports that arsenal; second weapons acquisition programs
         that were undertaken to meet Cold War threats and which no
         longer are required, or which are provocative and thereby
         detrimental to U.S. interests in long-term stability; third,
         reduce readiness requirements and plan to incorporate more
         effectively reserve; forces in our military planning by
         establishing less stringent planning requirements for
         conflicts; and fourth, make further marginal force
         reductions beyond those already projected, including in
         intelligence accounts.

                          REDUCING THE NUCLEAR DANGER

           The administration's Nuclear Posture Review failed to
         realize savings that could be made by scaling back our
         strategic arsenal. More recently, they have declined to
         pursue opportunities with Russia to undertake START III
         negotiations, which may prove essential to the Russian
         ratification of the START II treaty. Former Strategic Command
         Commander-in-Chief General Butler has quite appropriately
         shoved the debate over downsizing (towards elimination) of
         our arsenals right on to the front burner.
           It is such a promising opportunity, that we will fail to
         secure it at our peril. I have urged the administration,
         privately and in public, to take unilateral to go below START
         II levels. Such unilateral initiatives could set the stage
         for very deep cuts in weapons systems, and could be
         inspirational to those nations that are currently sitting on
         the fence as regards their own nuclear futures. The
         importance of containing the threat of proliferation, and its
         difficulties, can be seen in the debate regarding the
         extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Many
         nations, such as Egypt, appropriate pressed the United States
         and the other large nuclear powers to embrace and implement
         their responsibilities under Article VI of the NPT and to
         secure the adherence to the Treaty of those whose nuclear
         arsenals are less developed.
           It is potentially catastrophic to our national security to
         eschew the opportunity both to reduce significantly the
         nuclear threat that we currently face and to forstall the
         further proliferation of those threats. By failing to take
         such steps we also send clear signals to the Russians and the
         Chinese that their nuclear arsenals are prerequisites for
         them to maintain their super-power status. In that way we
         perpetuate the nuclear danger; and by failing to assume our
         Article VI responsibilities, we invite additional regional
         instability and new threats to emerge from prospective new
         members of the nuclear-weapons club.
           For those who worry about this threat to the point of
         wishing to revive an expensive anti-ballistic missile
         program, with what I believe is very limited utility to
         defend the United States from weapons of mass destruction, it
         strikes me that preventing the emergence or retention of the
         threats that such a system is designed to counter would be a
         cautious and cost effective strategy. Scaling back our own
         strategic forces would be critical to such a strategy.
           Although I believe it is possible to move beyond our
         reliance upon the traditional triad of strategic elements--
         sea-based missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and
         bombs dropped from the missiles launched from bombers--one
         can also maintain the triad, not have to spend the levels
         that are planned for in the administration budget request,
         and still move deliberately but cautiously down for force
         structure ladder. Obviously at some point, maintaining the
         triad, per se, no longer makes sense and we should move
         towards the most survivable leg of that triad--our submarine
         force.
           Making such adjustment could lead to new commitments by the
         Russians--who face devastating economic circumstances that
         will literally compel them to make savings when they perceive
         their strategic interests

    [[Page E473]]

         allow them to do so--who seem eager to negotiate
         reductions beyond the START II goals, and should give the
         Chinese reasons to moderate their on-going strategic-
         weapons modernization program.
           While this constitutes a more determined effort to scale-
         back our strategic arsenal than is contemplated by the
         administration, it would provide us with a ``hedge'' capacity
         in the event of the return of an implacably hostile
         relationship with Russia. It would place us on a path that
         signaled our willingness to lead the weapons reduction effort
         and would set the stage at the end of the five year budget
         period to implement a plan to reduce our arsenal to a minimum
         sufficient deterrent. This makes the achievement of nuclear
         disarmament a feasibility within our lifetimes.

                      End the Cold War Acquisition Program

           With the exception of a temporary reprieve from aggressive
         spending on acquisitions that was allowed by the force
         structure reductions that have been on-going during this
         decade, there has not been a fundamental rethinking of U.S.
         acquisition strategy. The administration has proposed that in
         this FYDP we will begin to invest significantly in weapons
         modernization--feeling that we have reached the limit of
         relying on the investment of the last decade. The Republican
         majority by both yesterday's technology and moan when they
         find they have boxed themselves out of affording the
         expensive modernization program the administration supports.
         Neither are awaiting the outcome of the Quadrennial Defense
         Review (QDR) that could--and should--dramatically alter the
         priorities that were laid down in the Bottom Up Review
         undertaken by Secretary Aspin--which will hopefully provide a
         careful review of programs such as the F-22, the New Attack
         Submarine and others which requirements were conceptualized
         during the Cold War.
           I believe strongly that we should avoid buying new systems
         that maintain the United States and the world on a treadmill
         of weapons development. Pressing ahead with such invites an
         arms race that we would be well advised to avoid. We should
         not fail, as we did in the run-up to MIRV technology, to
         realize the opportunity that may be available to turn the
         world away from an accelerated escalation in these types of
         programs; or we will face much more costly and deadly threats
         in the long run.
           In addition, we much avoid making purchases of systems that
         are excessive, redundant, and are designed to replace systems
         that currently work perfectly well because they are far
         superior to anything that they confront in a potential
         theater and will continue to do so into the mid-term future.
         In this regard, we must examine and scale back our ship
         purchasing, tactical air craft development, more rationalize
         our strategic lift program and various other programs.
           The budget savings in these accounts that would be achieved
         by the types of cutbacks above are, of course, sometimes
         offset by the need to acquire alternative in order to ensure
         that the first element of the acquisition requirement of
         equipping our force with safe and reliable systems is
         satisfied. The amounts of savings I am suggesting can be made
         are net adjustments that accommodate for the necessary
         acquisition of perfectly suitable current-generations systems
         to meet our foreseeable operational needs. This allows us to
         resist the temptation to rush new technologies to the
         battlefield ahead of requirements, but rests on an assumption
         that we will continue to make prudent investments in research
         and development.
           These more discerning measures of acquisition would allow
         us both to lead an effort to slow the level of weapons
         systems development, retard weapons sales internationally
         (thereby reducing the threats faced by U.S. and coalition
         forces), properly equip our forces for the challenges they
         will face in the near to mid term, and utilize our scarce
         resources to investigate new technologies that will be
         more important for the next century. Such a strategy would
         make the maximum return on investment, and would
         contribute the best to our effort to control the
         proliferation of exotic weapons technology.

                          Properly Sizing U.S. Forces

           Properly sizing U.S. forces is also important for ensuring
         that we do not place scarce defense resources into the wrong
         pots. The Bottom-Up Review's requirement to have forces
         sufficient to be able to meet, nearly simultaneously, two
         major regional contingencies without allied assistance
         exceeds that which was propounded by President Bush's Defense
         Secretary Dick Cheney--and exceeds in my judgment a
         reasonable planning orientation. It would be my hope that
         both the planning assumptions and the forces that emerged
         from the BUR will receive serious examination during the QDR.
           First, we should relax slightly the pace at which we
         believe we would need to respond to a developing crisis. By
         more deliberately ``metering'' forces into a theater--enough
         to halt aggression and provide for force protection quickly
         and then more deliberately once that state is achieved we can
         both reduce active force structure and readiness
         requirements. In addition, this expands the opportunities of
         time during which sanctions, negotiations and other non-
         military efforts can reverse the aggression through less than
         major armed confrontation. We should bear in mind that
         Operation Desert Storm commenced seven months after Iraq
         invaded Kuwait. We would establish a planning horizon to
         commence counter-offensive military operations more severe
         than was undertaken in that conflict.
           Second, a change in this pace of operations will allow for
         a more effective utilization of reserves, and indeed for
         returning more of our force structure to reserve components.
           Third, such a change will modify lift requirements, not
         only changing force structure but procurement requirements as
         well.
           Fourth, by changing the view regarding allied
         participation, we again can relax our planning requirements
         for force structure.
           The alternative that I present assumes that additional
         force structure reductions and realignments can be
         accomplished in all services through a change in these policy
         and strategy assumptions, and that these changes will not
         compromise our ability to meet our security requirements. It
         assumes the careful management of reserve resources and a
         continuing determination to work with our allies and others
         in coalition efforts. I believe that these modest
         adjustments, to be achieved within the FYDP, will leave us
         poised to make an assessment early in the next century as to
         whether or not we have gone far enough in realigning our
         forces to meet the world's new strategic threats.
           In addition to these larger changes, other miscellaneous
         savings can be achieved by changing how we do business. Of
         course, we must realign our priorities within the force in
         order to ensure that we have the proper types of units \1\ to
         meet the future challenges and change our operating methods
         in order to alleviate some of the operational tempo and
         personnel tempo problems that have arisen.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         \1\ I think especially of enhancing our abilities with, for
         example, AWACs, civic and public affairs units, water
         purification units and other types of units that are small,
         but for which there will continue to be an elevated level of
         demand.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           This issue of operational tempo (optempo), and ultimately
         personnel tempo (perstempo), stress has elevated visibility
         at the moment. Many blame the stress of deployment to meet
         contingencies as placing too great a burden on the shrinking
         force structure. However, when you compare the size of the
         force with the numbers involved in deployments, I believe
         that what is shown is that our ``business as usual'' is out
         of kilter and that we have too few of some particular types
         of units.
           By changing forward presence requirements for aircraft
         carriers, for example, we can reduce perstempo stress among
         naval forces significantly. And, as was demonstrated by the
         prompt movement of carriers from one theater to another when
         crises have emerged, such a decision does not diminish our
         ability to respond promptly and effectively in order to deter
         a crisis from erupting into large-scale violence.
           Finally, as we reduce force structure we should be mindful
         that better intelligence and assessments can offset the
         possibility of strategic surprise. Having said that there are
         substantial savings available within the intelligence
         accounts that could be achieved through various economies and
         they should be vigorously pursued.

                         The Imaginary Readiness Crisis

           Similarly, different scoring for training and an
         understanding that training goals are not arbitary standards
         that result in catastrophic lack of readiness if they are not
         fully met would change some of the discussion as well. Such
         an arbitary rating system led to the anecdotal evidence that
         there was a readiness crisis at the end of the 1994 fiscal
         year. We need to explore how steeply we can and cannot tier
         our readiness; we need to ensure that our services are
         preparing, as well, for the contingencies that should occupy
         them more and more--humanitarian assistance, conflict
         resolution, peacekeeping, etc. But, most importantly, by
         changing the assumption regarding the pace at which personnel
         will flow into a potential conflict, we can achieve
         significant savings in training and other readiness
         requirements.
           In addition, this budget would enhance environmental
         cleanup and conversion funds that are critical to the
         successful transformation of our defense infrastructure to
         civilian use. We cannot walk away from these communities, who
         have served the nation, and now want to return to civilian
         activities. These funds are vital to the future well-being of
         our nation, and to its national security--and they more
         easily allow us to close excess infrastructure. We should
         continue to plan to pay for them in the years to come.

                        A Properly Sized Military Budget

           In this paper, I have avoided proposing specific
         programmatic cuts and have talked more thematically. However,
         the numbers presented below represent savings that are built
         from real force structure cuts, real acquisition program
         termination, from real changes in operation and training
         tempos. They have been ``scored'' by CBO to ensure that their
         authority and outlay savings were properly measured.
           Importantly, they are only one approach to organizing a
         properly sized, properly equipped and properly trained force
         for the challenges of the 21st Century. Others could choose
         different pathways, but they would achieve similar savings.
           I felt it important not to get bogged down in a debate over
         this or that weapon system, this or that force structure
         element or this or that method of operation. Suffice it to
         say, if the budget were cut by these levels, we could provide
         for a sufficient military

    [[Page E474]]

         force to defend the United States and its interests,
         participate effectively as a world leader in international
         affairs and free up resources vitally needed for our other
         ``national security'' accounts. Our failure to do so will,
         as I have indicated elsewhere, be to our long-term
         national security detriment. It is with that analytical
         framework and in that spirit that I believe we could
         achieve these levels of savings in the military account
         over the coming five fiscal years:

                            [In billions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Authority      Outlay
                      Fiscal year                     savings      savings
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1998..........................................      $27.365      $18.761
    1999..........................................       34.713       29.071
    2000..........................................       44.845       36.219
    2001..........................................       48.685       41.818
    2002..........................................       51.630       56.221
                                                   -------------------------
    1998-2002.....................................      217.238      172.090
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

           Let me reiterate my view that these represent savings in
         one of three national security accounts, funds that can be
         urgently spent in our other two national security accounts:
         foreign assistance and domestic programs critical to our
         well-being and health as a nation. For without strong healthy
         cities to defend, cohesive communities, an educated citizenry
         to run our economy and our political institutions, we will
         wither and decline socially, politically, economically and
         culturally. We are way past due making these investments, and
         we fail to make them at our peril. The time is ripe and the
         opportunity exists to transfer this scale of resources and we
         should not fail to do so as we think of what type of society
         and what type of world we seek to build for our children and
         their children.

                                    DELLUMS NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET PROPOSAL SAVINGS
                                           [050 Budget authority in billions]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      Fiscal year--
                                                 -------------------------------------------------------   FH 1998-
                                                     1998       1999       2000       2001       2002        2002
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    050 account--Administration's FY 98 budget
     proposal...................................   $265.3     $269.2     $275.0     $281.5     $289.1     $1,642.3
    Total savings 1998-2002.....................     27.365     34.713     44.845     41.818     51.630      217.238
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                    DELLUMS NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET PROPOSAL SAVINGS
                                                [050 Outlays in billions]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      Fiscal year--
                                                 -------------------------------------------------------   FH 1998-
                                                     1998       1999       2000       2001       2002        2002
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    050 account--Administration's FY 98 budget
     proposal...................................   $263.0     $266.3     $270.0     $269.0     $269.0     $1,601.4
    Total savings 1998-2002.....................     18.761     29.071     36.219     41.818     56.221      172.090
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              ____________________

    -------------------------------------------------------------------------