2 October 1997
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html

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[Congressional Record: October 1, 1997 (Senate)]
[Page S10298-S10299]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr01oc97-115]



 
                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

                                 ______
                                 

  REMARKS OF SENATOR JON KYL AT THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATIVE 
                                CONGRESS

<bullet> Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask that the text of the my remarks 
before the First International Conservative Congress be printed in the 
Record.
  The text of the remarks follows:

  Remarks by Senator Jon Kyl at the First International Conservative 
                      Congress--September 28, 1997


         defining a conservative approach to defending the west

       Thank you for inviting me to address the conference.
       A conservative and internationalist approach to foreign 
     policy is consistent. For example, during the Cold War Ronald 
     Reagan worked not just to contain communism but to expand 
     democracy. NATO expansion is a contemporary example where 
     conservatives believe the U.S. should remain involved 
     internationally to promote democracy, free markets, and to 
     hedge against a revival of communism. A successful 
     internationalist policy requires that you have firm clear 
     national goals and the means and will to achieve them 
     strategically.
       The Clinton Administration pursues a foreign policy without 
     clear goals or the will to act decisively and is squandering 
     the national security means left to it by a dozen years of 
     Republican presidency. It emphasizes hope over reality and 
     reliance on arms control agreements like the Comprehensive 
     Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
     Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) over a 
     stronger defense. And political benefit over national 
     security, as in its decisions to cave in to the concerns of 
     some in industry in irresponsibly relaxing export controls on 
     key items like encryption technology and supercomputers.
       Today's debate is similar to that which took place during 
     the Cold War between those who favored detente and arms 
     treaties and those who believed in a rational, tough policy 
     of peace through strength. During the Cold War, the 
     proponents of detente argued that the U.S. should overlook 
     violations of promises and arms control agreements because of 
     our tense relations with the Soviet Union and China. Today, 
     the supporters of ``engagement'' say we should overlook 
     violations of such treaties because of our improved relations 
     with Russia and China. The result is the same--a muddled, 
     confused foreign policy. But it hasn't stopped the 
     Administration from proposing even more treaties, even as 
     existing treaties are continually violated by all but the 
     U.S.


                             proliferation

       I want to focus on how conservatives in the West believe we 
     should deal with the threat posed by the proliferation of 
     weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, which is 
     the key national security challenge facing us today.
       As with so many other areas, the Clinton Administration's 
     efforts to address this issue have been long on rhetoric and 
     short on action. In 1994, President Clinton issued Executive 
     Order 12938 declaring that the proliferation of weapons of 
     mass destruction and the means of delivering them constitutes 
     ``an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
     security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
     States,'' and that he had, therefore, decided to ``declare 
     a national emergency to deal with that threat.'' The 
     President reaffirmed this Executive Order in 1995 and 
     1996. But since issuing this order, the Administration has 
     primarily focused on concluding arms control agreements 
     and sending diplomatic protest notes to combat this 
     growing threat.


                               The Threat

       Rogue nations that are hostile to the United States are the 
     primary proliferation threat, though the Russian arsenal 
     remains the largest potential threat. Iran is of particular 
     concern. Tehran is aggressively pursuing the development of 
     nuclear weapons. On January 19, 1995, the Washington Times 
     reported that Western intelligence agencies believe Iran is 
     using its civilian nuclear power program as a cover for 
     acquiring the technology and expertise to build nuclear 
     weapons. According to the Times, the CIA estimates Iran is 
     about 5-7 years away from building nuclear weapons, but could 
     shorten that timetable if it received foreign assistance.
       Iran's chemical and biological weapons programs began in 
     the early 1980's and are now capable of producing a variety 
     of highly lethal agents. Iran currently has Scud-B and Scud-C 
     missiles also working to develop the ability to domestically 
     produce longer-range missiles. On September 10, 1997, the 
     Washington Times disclosed that Russia is assisting Iran with 
     the development of two ballistic missiles that could be 
     fielded in as little as three years. One of the missiles will 
     reportedly have sufficient range to allow Tehran to strike 
     targets as far away as Germany. In addition, other rogue 
     states like Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea are also 
     aggressively pursuing ballistic missile and nuclear, 
     biological, and chemical weapons programs.


        How Should the West Respond to the Proliferation Threat?

       We need an integrated strategy combining three elements: 
     (1) responsible export controls, (2) firm economic and 
     diplomatic actions to create incentives and disincentives to 
     prevent the spread of missiles and weapons of mass 
     destruction, and, (3) ultimately, robust defenses to deter 
     and respond to attacks.
       The Clinton Administration has irresponsibly relaxed U.S. 
     export controls on key technologies like encryption, machine 
     tools, and supercomputers. For example, in 1994, the 
     Administration approved the sale of machine tools to China 
     that were intended to be used to produce McDonnell Douglas 
     civilian airliners. Just sic months after the export licenses 
     were approved, the company discovered the machine tools had 
     been diverted to a facility where cruise missiles and fighter 
     aircraft are produced for the Chinese military. In addition, 
     China has purchased 47 supercomputers form the U.S. and one 
     of Russia's premier nuclear weapons facilities has bought 
     four supercomputers from a U.S. firm as well.
       Multilateral control regimes like the Australia Group, 
     restricting chemical trade, the Missile Technology Control 
     Regime, and the Nuclear Supplier Group can limit the 
     spread of sensitive technology. But as we learned through 
     our experience with COCOM during the Cold War, even the 
     best controls only slow the spread of the technology 
     because determined nations find ways to circumvent the 
     controls or eventually develop the technology themselves. 
     We also must guard against a reliance on arms control 
     agreements like the CWC and the CTBT that are not global 
     or verifiable, and therefore not effective or useful.
       We should make it unprofitable for countries to supply 
     missiles and weapons of mass destruction technology to rogue 
     regimes. For example, the annual foreign aid bill recently 
     passed by the Senate conditions U.S. aid to Russia on a halt 
     to nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran. Western nations 
     can also impose economic sanctions on supplier countries and 
     companies to provide disincentives for them to continue this 
     dangerous trade. In addition, we should use convert action to 
     raise the costs to countries that are suppliers of this 
     sensitive technology.
       Ultimately, we need to maintain strong defense capabilities 
     to deter and respond to attacks involving weapons of mass 
     destruction and ballistic missiles. By maintaining a robust, 
     credible nuclear weapons capability, the U.S. can deter rogue 
     nations from using weapons of mass destruction against U.S. 
     forces or our allies. The U.S. should also improve our 
     chemical and biological defenses. As we learned during the 
     recent Senate debate over the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
     the U.S. military's chemical and biological defense programs 
     are underfunded and are inadequate to meet the current and 
     projected threat.


                       Ballistic Missile Defense

       The West is nearly defenseless against the expanding 
     missile threat we face. Space-based systems offer a promising 
     long-term solution and should be pursued. Sea-based missile 
     defenses based on the Navy's AEGIS class ships, however, have 
     the potential to provide near-term, flexible, and affordable 
     protection for U.S. forces and our allies abroad. Sea-based 
     systems would allow for ascent phase intercept of missiles 
     armed with chemical or biological warheads.
       Sea-based systems are more affordable because the U.S. has 
     already invested $50 billion in the AEGIS fleet. Development 
     of a sea-based theater missile defense could be completed in 
     five years and deployment of 650 interceptors on 22 ships 
     could cost as little as $5 billion. This system could then 
     evolve into a national missile defense system, whose 
     development, production, and deployment could be completed in 
     6-10 years for $12-17 billion, according to preliminary CBO 
     estimates.


                               Conclusion

       There are two points of view on how to address this threat. 
     We can either talk tough, and even in the face of 
     incontrovertible evidence, overlook arms control violations 
     for

[[Page S10299]]

     fear of damaging our relations with other nations. Or we can 
     follow the path of peace through strength.<bullet>

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