15 October 1998
Source: Hardcopy from US Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Virginia; (703) 299-3700. Thanks to MP.

See related court docket: http://jya.com/dsb101498.htm

              AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, ARREST
                      WARRANT, AND SEARCH WARRANTS

         I, Stephanie Douglas, being duly sworn, hereby state the
    following under penalty of perjury:

         1.  I am a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI) and have been so employed for approximately
    nine years. I am currently assigned to the Washington Field
    Office to a squad responsible for foreign counterintelligence
    matters; I have worked in this field for approximately four
    years. As a result of my involvement in counterintelligence
    investigations, and foreign counterintelligence training I have
    received, I am familiar with the tactics, methods and techniques
    of foreign intelligence services and their agents.

         2.  As more fully described below, DAVID SHELDON BOONE, an
    American citizen and retired United States Army Non-Commissioned
    Officer, has acted clandestinely, corruptly, and illegally as an
    agent of the Committee for State Security (Komitet
    Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosty or KGB) of the Union of Soviet
    Socialist Republics (USSR), and for its direct successor agency,
    the Russian Federation foreign intelligence service, Sluzhba
    Vneshney Razvedki Rossii (SVRR), jointly referred to herein as
    the KGB/SVRR. By his actions, BOONE has committed violations of
    18 U.S.C. § 794(a), that is, with reason to believe that it was
    to be used to the injury of the United States and the advantage
    of a foreign nation, he knowingly and unlawfully communicated,
    transmitted and delivered to a foreign government, specifically
    the USSR, documents relating to the national defense of the

                                    1

    United States. The investigation reveals that since September
    1988, the USSR has paid BOONE more than $60,000 for his unlawful
    acts, and that during 1998 BOONE accepted an additional payment
    of $9,000 from an agent he believed to be acting for the
    KGB/SVRR.

         3.  Information in this affidavit is based on my personal
    knowledge and on information provided to me by other
    counterintelligence investigators and law enforcement officers
    during this investigation, which is being conducted jointly by
    the FBI and the United States Army Intelligence and Security
    Command (INSCOM). This affidavit also relies on information
    provided by agencies of the United States Intelligence Community,
    which have cooperated with this investigation, and on
    consensually-monitored meetings and conversations involving
    BOONE. This affidavit is not intended to be an exhaustive
    summary of the investigation against BOONE, but is for the
    purpose of setting out probable cause in support of:

              a.  a complaint charging DAVID SHELDON BOONE with a
    violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(a)
    (espionage);

              b.  an arrest warrant for DAVID SHELDON BOONE;

              c.  a search warrant for Room 1431 of the Washington
    Dulles Airport Marriott Hotel, and any luggage and personal items
    of DAVID SHELDON BOONE which are within Room 1431 of this hotel
    located at Dulles Airport in the Eastern District of Virginia;
    and

                                    2

              d.  a search warrant for a laptop computer and computer
    carrying case belonging to DAVID SHELDON BOONE, which are either
    in his personal possession or within Room 1431 of the Washington
    Dulles Airport Marriott Hotel located at Dulles Airport in the
    Eastern District of Virginia.

                               BACKGROUND

         4.  DAVID SHELDON BOONE is a United States citizen (SSAN
    547-98-0810), born on August 26, 1952, in Flint, Michigan. He is
    divorced from his first wife, with whom he had two children; he
    remarried and currently resides in Germany with his second wife,
    who is a German citizen.

         5.  I have reviewed BOONE's United States Army records.
    These records show that BOONE enlisted in the United States Army
    in October 1970, and served continuously until retiring as an E7
    Sergeant First Class effective June 1, 1991. Upon enlisting, on
    October 15, 1970, Boone signed an oath in which he swore that:
    "I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States
    against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true
    faith and allegiance to the same, and that I will obey the orders
    of the President of the United States and the orders of the
    officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God."

         6.  Pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and its predecessor
    Executive Orders, information which if disclosed without
    authorization could reasonably be expected to cause
    "exceptionally grave damage to the national security" must be

                                    3

    classified as TOP SECRET and properly safeguarded. When a
    classified document can be released to a particular country, the
    originating agency will usually place markings at the top of the
    document to show that it is releasable to that country.
    Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) is classified
    information concerning or derived from intelligence sources,
    methods, or analytical processes which is required to be handled
    within formal limited-access control systems established by the
    Director of Central Intelligence.

         7.  United States Army records show that BOONE held TOP
    SECRET clearances beginning in 1971, was indoctrinated for access
    to SCI in 1976, and had regular, frequent access to sensitive
    classified information. I know that a person who receives such
    clearances and access is required to be briefed on the procedures
    for properly handling classified information and the penalties
    for failing to do so, and that such a person must sign
    certifications of understanding and agreement in connection with
    those briefings. I have reviewed a "Classified Information
    Nondisclosure Agreement," which BOONE signed on March 28, 1986,
    in which he acknowledged that he was aware that unauthorized
    disclosure of classified information could cause irreparable
    injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a
    foreign nation, that he would never divulge such information to
    an unauthorized person without prior written authorization, that
    he understood he was obligated to comply with laws and
    regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of

                                    4

    classified information, and that he further understood such an
    unauthorized disclosure could constitute a violation of United
    States criminal law. I have also reviewed a "Certification Upon
    Indoctrination for Access to Critical Nuclear Weapon Design
    Information," signed by BOONE and dated September 4, 1987, in
    which he certified that he fully understood the provisions of a
    Department of Defense Directive regarding Access to and
    Dissemination of Restricted Data as it Pertains to Critical
    Nuclear Weapon Design Information, and agreed that he would not
    make unauthorized disclosure of such information.

         8.  During most of his Army service, BOONE was a signals
    intelligence analyst. He received training in crypto analysis,
    and took two Russian language training courses at the Defense
    Language Institute. BOONE was assigned as a crypto analyst to
    the United States Army Field Station (USAFS) in Augsburg,
    Germany, from August 1974 to December 1976, and again from July
    1979 to May 1985. From June 1985 until October 1988, BOONE was
    assigned as a Senior Cryptologic Traffic Analyst at the National
    Security Agency (NSA) at Fort George G. Meade ("Ft. Meade") in
    Maryland. At NSA, BOONE was assigned to a unit which analyzed
    and produced reports on Soviet Fire Support Operations; among
    other things, he had access to sensitive information about the
    capabilities and movements of Soviet forces, and about Soviet
    tactical nuclear weapons. From October 1988 to June 1991 he
    served for a third time at USAFS Augsburg.

                                    5

                             THE INVESTIGATION

         9.  The FBI/INSCOM investigation has revealed that in 1988
    BOONE was undergoing severe financial and personal difficulties.
    In February 1988, BOONE took a signature loan for $2,000.
    According to United States Army records, during 1988 BOONE and
    his wife had become estranged. On October 19, 1988, BOONE and
    his wife entered into a voluntary separation agreement. The
    agreement provided that BOONE's entire United States Army pay
    would go to his wife, who would then furnish him with $250 per
    month; BOONE had no other known legitimate source of significant
    income. BOONE's wife received custody of both their children.
    Neither she nor the children accompanied BOONE on his assignment
    to USAFS Augsburg in 1988. According to Boone, for financial
    reasons he petitioned the Army in 1988 to allow his family to
    reside on a military base in the United States while he served in
    Germany, but the request was denied. Before leaving for
    Augsburg, BOONE took an advance of three months' pay. BOONE's
    last performance evaluation while assigned to NSA, which he
    signed on October 21, 1988, rated his overall performance as
    "fair" and his promotion potential as "marginal." The evaluation
    noted BOONE had a "lack of self-motivation," and that he "lacks
    attention to detail and tenacity in areas outside of his
    technical specialty" and "fails to lead by example."

         10.  At USAFS Augsburg, BOONE was assigned as the senior
    enlistee in an Army Technical Control and Analysis Element (TCAE)
    unit. According to Army publications, the TCAE is responsible

                                   6

    for assisting in the technical management and tasking of military
    Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Electronic Warfare (EW)
    systems. TCAE personnel also analyze and report signal
    intercepts, and maintain an extensive technical data base to
    support SIGINT agencies. The TCAE unit at USAFS Augsburg was
    located within a limited-access Sensitive Compartmented
    Information Facility (SCIF). BOONE's duties brought him in
    regular contact with highly classified and extremely sensitive
    national defense information.

         11.  Shortly after arriving in Germany, BOONE met a female
    German citizen, and in March 1989 he began living with her at her
    home in Augsburg. BOONE disclosed this relationship to Defense
    Investigative Services (DIS) investigators in June 1990 during
    his security clearance background reinvestigation.

         12.  In June 1990, one of BOONE's supervisors informed DIS
    investigators that BOONE was severely in debt and owed money to
    creditors, and that BOONE's estranged wife had written to BOONE's
    commander claiming BOONE was wrongfully retaining, from his pay,
    funds that were due her. BOONE acknowledged to the DIS
    investigators that he owed creditors, and told them he had
    deliberately allowed the debts to accumulate to cause his
    military pay to be garnished, and thus to deprive his wife of the
    money.

         13.  In June 1990, BOONE's access to classified information
    was suspended because of his lack of personal and professional
    responsibility. BOONE was reassigned to serve as Sergeant of the

                                   7

    Guard in a United States military hospital at Augsburg, where he
    remained until his retirement effective June 1, 1991.

         14.  Since retiring from the United States Army, BOONE has
    continued to reside in Germany. Since September 1991, BOONE has
    been employed as a sales engineer, a product support employee,
    and a support account manager for three successive German
    computer companies. His divorce was final in December 1991, and
    in 1994 he married the German woman with whom he had lived since
    1989.

     September 5, 1998 Conversation, and Subsequent Trip to London

         15.  On September 5, 1998, an FBI operational asset
    (hereafter "OA") had a telephone conversation with BOONE. The OA
    indicated to BOONE that he (the OA) was associated with the
    KGB/SVRR and wanted to meet with BOONE to discuss some proposals
    that BOONE had previously made, to discuss the status of BOONE's
    reserve account, and to get BOONE's expert opinion on another
    matter. BOONE replied: "Where and when?" The OA suggested BOONE
    meet the OA in London, England, the following weekend, and BOONE
    agreed to do so. The OA instructed BOONE to check into a hotel
    in London on September 11, 1998, and await the OA's call the
    following morning.

         I know from my training and experience that "reserve
    account" is a term used by the KGB/SVRR to refer to an escrow
    account in which espionage payments are set aside for future
    disbursement to a person acting as an agent for the KGB/SVRR.

                                    8

         16. On September 11, 1998, BOONE traveled to London,
    England, checking his luggage at the airport and carrying a black
    canvas bag that appeared to be a laptop computer case; the
    luggage and computer case were with BOONE when he checked into
    the hotel in London.

                       September 12, 1998, Meeting

         17.  On the morning of September 12, 1998, the OA phoned
    BOONE at the hotel and instructed him to come to a second hotel.
    There, BOONE met the OA for approximately four hours and forty-
    five minutes. The OA specifically identified himself to BOONE as
    a KGB/SVRR officer, explaining that BOONE's previous contact with
    the KGB/SVRR (identified by BOONE as "Igor") had retired and was
    no longer available, but that the OA had reviewed BOONE's
    KGB/SVRR file and had been tasked to re-contact BOONE. BOONE
    told the OA: "I'm at your disposal."

         18.  BOONE freely provided the OA with specific details as
    to how and why he volunteered to the Soviets in 1988, including
    the following:

              a.  BOONE walked into the Soviet Embassy on 16th
    Street, Washington, D.C., during 1988, when he was finishing his
    tour of duty at the NSA at Ft. Meade, and before he left on
    assignment to USAFS Augsburg. BOONE described the inside of the
    Embassy with specificity. Based upon information provided by
    persons having actual knowledge of the interior of that Soviet
    Embassy, I know that BOONE's description was accurate.

                                    9

              b.  BOONE gave his Ft. Meade and Army photo
    identification badges to an Embassy employee and, after waiting
    for some time, was interviewed by three or four Soviets. BOONE
    gave them a classified document that he had written based on
    decrypted NSA intercept information, and they paid BOONE $300.

              c.  The Soviets scheduled a second meeting and provided
    BOONE with a wig and mustache to use as a disguise when he
    returned for the second meeting. He was driven out in a closed
    van and dropped off some blocks away.

              d.  On a later date, as pre-arranged with the Soviets,
    BOONE rode his motorcycle to approximately six to seven blocks
    away from a Soviet building complex located in a residential area
    of Northwest Washington, D.C.

              e.  After parking his motorcycle, BOONE, wearing the
    wig and moustache, walked to the Soviet complex and entered it.
    BOONE was led through underground corridors and tunnels, and into
    a room. BOONE was interviewed by the Soviets for numerous hours,
    during which time BOONE provided additional NSA documents which
    he had selected to demonstrate his access to such information.
    The Soviets and BOONE discussed where BOONE was going in Germany
    and "when and where to make the first meeting in Germany," and
    the Soviets gave BOONE approximately $1,500. Afterwards, BOONE
    was taken out of the complex in a closed van, again wearing his
    disguise, and was dropped off near his motorcycle.

                                    10

              f.  BOONE told the OA that to get documents through
    security and out of the NSA building at Ft. Meade he would fold
    up to 15-20 pages of documents and conceal them under the half-
    liner of his Army windbreaker.

              g.  BOONE told the OA that he had first approached the
    Soviets because: "I needed money. Plus, well, plus I was
    extremely angry."

         19.  BOONE told the OA that, after arriving in Germany in
    October 1989, he was contacted by a KGB/SVRR officer whom he came
    to know as "Igor." During their first meeting, BOONE gave "Igor"
    classified documents, and "Igor" gave BOONE a communications plan
    that included an emergency meeting site and signal sites.

         20.  BOONE told the OA that, between late 1988 and the time
    he retired in 1991, he met with "Igor" approximately four times a
    year at various locations along the Rhine River. At each
    meeting, BOONE gave "Igor" classified documents he had obtained
    since the previous meeting, "Igor" gave BOONE money for the
    documents BOONE had previously passed, and they would schedule
    their next meeting. BOONE told the OA that he received $5,000 to
    $7,000 at each meeting, and once received a $5,000 bonus, and
    that these payments amounted to $20,000 to $22,000 a year, for a
    total of more than $60,000 for the period he was associated with
    the KGB/SVRR. BOONE told the OA that he did not deposit the
    money in a bank, explaining: "It's called a paper trail. Don't
    leave something for anyone to track. It's called, it's called,
    uh, paranoia." BOONE told the OA that he used the cash "for

                                  11

    normal living expenses." BOONE explained that his separation
    agreement required him to give his entire pay check to his
    estranged wife, who was supposed to then give BOONE $500 per
    month for living expenses, but that his wife never actually sent
    him any money. (I have ascertained that the separation agreement
    actually required BOONE's wife to give him $250 per month.)

         21.  BOONE told the OA that on one occasion he left
    documents in a "drop," following instructions "Igor" had given
    him, and BOONE described the "drop" procedure in detail.

         I know from my training and experience that a "drop" or "dead
    drop" is a prearranged location where a foreign agent and
    intelligence officer may use impersonal, clandestine means of
    communication to exchange tangible objects. For example, an
    agent may pass classified documents to his handling officer by
    placing them in a trash bag and secreting the bag in a log or
    pipe; later, the handling officer can retrieve the bag without
    having had personal contact with the agent. Such a technique can
    reduce the chance that illegal clandestine activity will be
    detected.

         22.  BOONE told the OA that during the three-years he worked
    for the KGB/SVRR, he chose classified United States Government
    documents to give to the KGB/SVRR based on three factors: 1)
    their value to the KGB/SVRR, 2) the amount of detailed
    information they contained, and 3) the variety of information
    they represented. BOONE told the OA that "Igor" would task BOONE
    for documents he knew BOONE had access to or for documents that

                                   12

    were referenced in documents the KGB/SVRR had previously
    obtained. On one occasion, "Igor" told BOONE that the KGB/SVRR
    had access to United States Signals Directive (USSID) Zero, which
    was an index of all other USSIDs, and from this index IGOR asked
    BOONE to obtain specific USSIDs. I have ascertained that USSIDs
    are classified NSA publications for use in providing Signals
    Intelligence (SIGINT) support to the United States military.

         23.  BOONE told the OA that he had given "Igor" a photocopy
    of an NSA document entitled "United States Signals Intelligence
    Directive (USSID) 514," dated May 6, 1988. BOONE told the OA
    that this USSID was unusual because it was one of few USSIDs to
    be classified TOP SECRET rather than SECRET. BOONE told the OA
    that USSID 514 was not widely disseminated but that one copy had
    been at USAFS Augsburg. BOONE told the OA that he further
    particularly recalled this document because of its "frightening"
    topic, which he described as "tasking the targeting of U.S.
    nuclear weapons against Soviet targets." BOONE told the OA that
    he provided USSID 514 to the KGB/SVRR because it would furnish
    the Soviets with information regarding United States intentions
    concerning the potential use of nuclear weapons.

         The FBI/INSCOM investigation has determined that one copy of
    USSID 514, dated May 6, 1988, was distributed to USAFS Augsburg.
    Each page of USSID 514 is marked as classified TOP SECRET and
    "NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS."

         24.  BOONE volunteered to the OA that on one occasion in
    1989 he gave "Igor" an original document which BOONE said was

                                    13

    entitled "Joint Tactical Exploitation Manual" and was probably
    produced in 1988. BOONE explained that although this document
    was strictly controlled, BOONE had access to two numbered
    originals at USAFS Augsburg and believed one would not be missed.
    BOONE told the OA the document was classified TOP SECRET UMBRA,
    and described the document as 300 to 400 three-hole-punched pages
    long. BOONE told the OA that he had told "Igor" he thought this
    document was "especially valuable" and that he asked "Igor" for an
    increased payment for it; at the next meeting, "Igor" gave him a
    $5,000 bonus. BOONE told the OA that, based upon his having
    provided this document, a reserve fund was set up for him in a
    Soviet bank, into which additional funds were deposited.

         The FBI/INSCOM investigation has ascertained that in 1988 a
    limited quantity of a manual called the "Joint-Service Tactical
    Exploitation of National Systems (J-TENS) Manual" had been
    distributed to military facilities, including two numbered
    originals to USAFS Augsburg. The J-TENS consists of approximately
    300 double-sided pages and is three-hole punched. Each page is
    marked TOP SECRET UMBRA, NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION, and bears
    other SCI access-restriction markings. The J-TENS is the
    handbook of United States reconnaissance programs and collection
    systems. It is for use by United States military units in
    obtaining critical time-sensitive information to support tactical
    military operations. The J-TENS contains a statement that:
    "Disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons would
    gravely damage the national security of the United States."

                                   14

         25.  BOONE told the OA that when he lost his access to
    classified information and was arranging to retire, his
    cooperation with the KGB/SVRR ended. At that time, BOONE let
    "Igor" know that "I would be willing to help," although BOONE did
    not specify any particular things that he could do.

         26.  At the end of their meeting on September 12, 1998,
    BOONE agreed to meet with the OA again on the following day to go
    over additional questions and to affirm future plans. BOONE also
    agreed to prepare a written proposal of the information and
    assistance he felt he could provide to the KGB/SVRR in the
    future.

                       September 13, 1998, Meeting

         27.  On September 13, 1998, BOONE met with the OA at the
    second hotel for approximately one hour and forty-five minutes.
    BOONE brought with him his luggage and the black canvas laptop
    computer case.

         28.  During this meeting, BOONE provided more detailed
    information about having obtained classified materials for the
    KGB/SVRR between 1988 and 1991. BOONE also brought, and gave to
    the OA, a handwritten page on which he had noted how he could
    assist in providing information to the KGB/SVRR in the future.

         29.  BOONE asked the OA if their business arrangement would
    be on a part-time or full-time basis. BOONE suggested that if
    the KGB/SVRR had in mind a full-time position for him, he would
    be willing to move with his wife back to the United States to
    live. BOONE suggested that he could set up a business at home as

                                   15

    a cover for him to travel to various locations and to meet
    different people on behalf of the KGB/SVRR, if needed. BOONE
    told the OA that he thought it might be cheaper this way. BOONE
    included this suggestion on the proposal page he gave to the OA.

         30.  At the end of this meeting, BOONE accepted $9,000 in
    pre-recorded United States currency from the OA. BOONE also
    agreed to travel to the United States on October 2, 1998, to meet
    again with the OA. BOONE agreed to fly to Dulles International
    Airport, in the Eastern District of Virginia, on October 2, 1998,
    check into the Washington Dulles Airport Marriott Hotel located
    at Dulles Airport, meet with the OA the next day, and fly back to
    Germany on October 4, 1998.

         31.  While planning the October 2, 1998, meeting, BOONE took
    a laptop computer out of the black canvas bag, and logged on to
    check his schedule. The OA asked: "You have your computer here?"
    BOONE replied: "I always take it with me." BOONE entered the
    agreed-upon travel and meeting dates into his computer. When the
    OA sought to confirm that BOONE had the OA's phone number, BOONE
    referred to the computer and stated that he had previously
    entered the number incorrectly; BOONE corrected the number and
    told the OA: "Just so you know, you're listed as Georgi Bucharich
    [phonetic transcription] from Intertrust in London." This is
    neither the OA's name or his affiliation, and the OA had not
    provided that name or affiliation to BOONE.

         32.  BOONE then left the OA and took a taxi to the airport;
    while BOONE rode in the taxi, he worked on his laptop computer.

                                   16

    At the airport, BOONE checked his luggage and carried the black
    canvas laptop computer case on board.

                 September 18 and 21 1998, phone calls

         33.  On September 18, 1998, BOONE left a voicemail message
    on the telephone bearing the number which the OA had given him.
    In the message, BOONE advised that "the 2nd to the 4th might be
    difficult" for "the seminar," and that "the 9th, 10th and 11th"
    would be preferable. BOONE asked the OA to call him.

         34.  On September 21, 1998, the OA phoned BOONE and they
    agreed that BOONE would travel to Dulles on October 9, 1998, and
    check into the "the hotel that we discussed," where the OA would
    call BOONE at 9:00 am on October 10, 1998.

            BOONE's Travel to the Eastern District of Virginia

         35.  On October 9, 1998, BOONE was brought into the Eastern
    District of Virginia when he flew non-stop from Munich, Germany,
    to Dulles International Airport. FBI personnel observed BOONE
    leave the airport with his luggage and a black canvas computer
    case similar to the one he carried to London for his September
    1998 meetings with the OA.

         36.  In the course of their last contact, the OA instructed
    BOONE to check into the Washington Dulles Airport Marriott Hotel
    upon arrival, where Room 1431 has been reserved for him. At their
    London meeting, BOONE followed the OA's instructions and checked
    into the hotel that the OA had directed him to check into. The
    Washington Dulles Airport Marriott Hotel is located at 45020
    Aviation Drive, Dulles, Virginia. It is a three-story building

                                    17

    located at the intersection of Aviation Drive and Autopilot
    Drive. Displayed in the front of the building is a sign reading
    "Marriott Hotel." Room 1431 is located on the ground floor of
    building number four of the complex. Room 1431 is accessed from
    a common hallway. Facing room 1431, one sees a wood-grain door
    with a "Non smoking" sign affixed to the door. Underneath this
    sign is a peephole. Adjacent to the door on the right-hand side
    is a beige block bearing burgundy numbers "1431."

         37.  In preparation for a past meeting with the OA, Boone
    prepared a handwritten note describing how he could assist the
    KGB/SVRR, and the OA suggested Boone do the same in preparation
    for the October 10, 1998 meeting. Furthermore, Boone did not
    take his laptop computer to the first London meeting with the OA,
    leaving it behind, presumably in his London hotel room. Based on
    these facts, I have probable cause to believe that Boone will
    have on his person or among his possessions similar notes (either
    in hard copy or computer format) and/or documents describing how
    he believes he can continue to assist the KGB/SVRR.

          PROBABLE CAUSE BASIS FOR COMPLAINT AND ARREST WARRANT

         38.  Based on the above facts and circumstances, there is
    probable cause that DAVID SHELDON BOONE has committed espionage,
    in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(a).

                  ITEMS TO BE SEARCHED FOR AND SEIZED

         39. Based on my experience and training, and on information
    provided by other law enforcement agents experienced in this
    field. I know that:

                                    18

    	  a.  Agents of foreign intelligence services are not
    unlike any other person in our society in that they maintain
    documents and records, often for long periods of time regardless
    of whether their value to the agent has diminished. These agents
    maintain documents and records which will identify and
    corroborate travel made in connection with clandestine espionage
    activity, including personal meetings with foreign intelligence
    officers. These documents and records include passports, visas,
    calendars, journals, date books, telephone numbers, address
    books, credit cards, hotel receipts, airline records,
    correspondence, carbon copies of money orders and cashier's
    checks evidencing cash expenditures, and accounts and records in
    fictitious names.

              b.  Agents of foreign intelligence services often
    maintain and conceal identity documents, including those
    utilizing fictitious identities, U.S. and foreign currency,
    instructions, maps, photographs, U.S. and foreign bank account
    access numbers and instructions, and other papers and materials
    relating to emergency contact procedures and escape plans.

              c.  Computer hardware and software may be utilized to
    store records which include but are not limited to those relating
    to business activities, criminal activities, associate names and
    addresses, and the identity and location of assets illegally
    obtained through criminal activity.

         40.  Based on information provided to me by law enforcement
    agents experienced in the field of computers, I know that

                                    19

    searches and seizures of computers commonly require law
    enforcement agents to seize all computer items (hardware,
    software, and instructions) to be processed later by a qualified
    computer expert in a laboratory or other controlled environment.
    This is necessary because of the following:

              a.  Computer storage devices (like hard disks,
    diskettes, and others) can store the equivalent of tens of
    thousands of pages of information. Especially when the user
    wants to conceal criminal evidence, he or she often stores it in
    random order with deceptive file names. This requires searching
    authorities to examine all the stored data to determine whether
    it is included in the warrant. This sorting process can take
    weeks or months, depending on the volume of data stored, and it
    would be impractical to attempt this kind of data search on site.
    Moreover, searching computer systems for criminal evidence is a
    highly technical process requiring expert skill and a properly
    controlled environment. Most computer experts specialize in
    certain systems and applications, so it is difficult to know
    before a search which expert should analyze the system and its
    data. The search of a computer system is an exacting scientific
    procedure which is designed to protect the integrity of the
    evidence and to recover even "hidden," erased, compressed,
    password-protected, or encrypted files. Since computer evidence
    is extremely vulnerable to tampering or destruction (either from
    external sources or from destructive codes embedded in the system
    as a "booby trap"), the controlled environment of a laboratory is

                                    20

    essential to its complete and accurate analysis.

              b.  In order to fully retrieve data from a computer
    system, the analyst needs all magnetic storage devices as well as
    the central processing unit. In addition, the system software
    (operating system or interfaces, and hardware drivers) and any
    applications software (which may have been used to create the
    data, whether stored on hard drives or on external media), would
    also be needed.

              DESCRIPTION OF ITEMS AND PLACES TO BE SEARCHED

         41.  Based on the facts and circumstances stated herein, I
    believe there is probable cause that evidence, fruits,
    instrumentalities, and proceeds of these offenses, as described
    above, and as further described in ATTACHMENT A, which is
    incorporated herein, are located in:

    	  a. Room 1431 of the Washington Dulles Airport Marriott
    Hotel and any luggage and personal items of DAVID SHELDON BOONE
    which are located in Room 1431 of this hotel located at Dulles
    Airport in the Eastern District of Virginia; and

    	  b. a laptop computer, computer peripherals and black
    canvas computer carrying case belonging to DAVID SHELDON BOONE,
    which are either in his personal possession or located in Room
    1431 of the Washington Dulles Airport Marriott Hotel located at
    Dulles Airport in the Eastern District of Virginia.

              AFFIDAVIT AND ACCOMPANYING PAPERS UNDER SEAL

         42.  I ask that this Affidavit and the accompanying
    Complaint, applications, and warrants be placed under seal until

                                   21

    BOONE's initial appearance pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 5, or until
    further order of this Court. Disclosure of these documents
    before arrest and execution of the search warrants could cause
    BOONE to destroy evidence and flee the United States.

         43.  The above facts are true and correct to the best of my
    knowledge and belief.

                                    [No signature]
                                    _______________________________
                                    Stephanie Douglas
                                    Special Agent
                                    Federal Bureau of Investigation

    Sworn to and subscribed before me this 9th day of October, 1998.

                                    [No signature]
                                    _______________________________
                                    UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
                                    Alexandria, Virginia

                                    22

                              Attachment A
                           ITEMS TO BE SEIZED

    1. Documents and records related to travel made in connection with
    clandestine espionage activity, including personal meetings with
    foreign intelligence officers or persons believed to be foreign
    intelligence officers. These documents and records include
    passports, visas, calendars, journals, date books, telephone
    numbers, address books, credit cards, hotel receipts, airline
    records, correspondence, carbon copies of money orders and
    cashier's checks evidencing cash expenditures, accounts and records
    in fictitious names, handwritten notes and other documentary items
    reflecting espionage activities, whether found on Boone's person,
    in his computer or computer peripherals, in his hotel room, or in
    his luggage.

    2. Any identity documents, including those utilizing fictitious
    identities, U.S. and foreign currency, instructions, maps,
    photographs, U.S. and foreign bank account access numbers and
    instructions, and other papers and materials relating to emergency
    contact procedures and escape plans, whether found on Boone's
    person, in his computer or computer peripherals, in his hotel room,
    or in his luggage.

    3. Any and all tapes, cassettes, cartridges, computer software
    and hardware, computer disks, computer disk drives, disk
    application programs, system disk operating systems, magnetic media
    floppy discs and any other computer peripherals utilized to store
    records which include but are not limited to those relating to
    business activities, criminal activities, associate names and
    addresses, and the identity and location of assets illegally
    obtained through criminal activity, whether found on Boone's
    person, in his computer or computer peripherals, in his hotel room,
    or in his luggage.

    4. Any and all books, ledgers, address books, names, and lists of
    names of individuals, code words, diaries, notebooks, notes and
    records bearing on or potentially relating to espionage activities,
    espionage plans (either in the past or in the future) emergency
    contact procedures, escape plans, or financial transactions
    relating to espionage activities, whether found on Boone's person,
    in his computer or computer peripherals, in his hotel room, or in
    his luggage.

    (The foregoing constituting evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities
    of violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(a)).

                                          23

    [End]

                                    U.S. Department of Justice
                                    United States Attorney
                                    Eastern District of Virginia

                                    2100 Jamieson Avenue
                                    (703) 299-3700
                                    Alexandria, Virginia 22314

                             PRESS RELEASE

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
    OCTOBER 13, 1998
    ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

    FORMER UNITED STATES ARMY CRYPTO ANALYST ARRESTED ON CHARGES OF
    SPYING ON BEHALF OF THE FORMER USSR AND RUSSIA

         HELEN F. FAHEY, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE EASTERN
    DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA AND JIMMY CARTER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR IN CHARGE
    OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE, THE
    NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE
    AND SECURITY COMMAND ANNOUNCED TODAY THE ARREST OF DAVID SHELDON
    BOONE ON CHARGES THAT BOONE, DURING THE YEARS 1988 THROUGH 1991,
    DELIVERED TO AGENTS OF THE KGB, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE
    SOVIET UNION, HIGHLY CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL
    DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES.

         ACCORDING TO A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT UNSEALED TODAY IN THE UNITED
    STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, BOONE
    SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY FROM OCTOBER 1970 UNTIL HIS
    RETIREMENT IN JUNE OF 1991. DURING MOST OF HIS ARMY SERVICE, BOONE
    WAS A SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYST. BOONE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE
    UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD STATION IN AUGSBURG, GERMANY, FROM AUGUST
    TO DECEMBER 1976, AND THEN AGAIN FROM JULY 1979 TO MAY 1985.
    AFTER HE SPENT THREE YEARS WORKING AS A SENIOR CRYPTOLOGIC TRAFFIC
    ANALYST AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA), HE WAS REASSIGNED IN
    1988 TO AUGSBURG, GERMANY. DURING HIS SERVICE AS A CRYPTO ANALYST,
    BOTH IN AUGSBURG AND IN THE UNITED STATES, BOONE HAD REGULAR ACCESS
    TO HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AND EXTREMELY SENSITIVE NATIONAL DEFENSE
    INFORMATION INCLUDING DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE CAPABILITIES AND
    MOVEMENTS OF SOVIET FORCES, AND ABOUT SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR
    WEAPONS.

         ACCORDING TO THE COMPLAINT, BOONE BEGAN SPYING FOR THE SOVIET
    UNION IN 1988 AFTER HE WALKED INTO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN
    WASHINGTON, D.C. AND VOLUNTEERED HIS SERVICES. IN THIS INITIAL
    MEETING BOONE PROVIDED TO SOVIET EMBASSY EMPLOYEES A CLASSIFIED
    DOCUMENT THAT HE HAD WRITTEN BASED ON DECRYPTED NSA INTERCEPT
    INFORMATION. THE SOVIETS PAID BOONE $300 FOR THIS DOCUMENT.

         IN A LATER MEETING WITH THE SOVIETS, BOONE AND THE SOVIETS
    MADE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOONE TO CONTINUE HIS ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES
    OVERSEAS WHEN HE WAS REASSIGNED TO AUGSBURG. HE WAS PAID
    APPROXIMATELY $1,500 DURING THIS SECOND MEETING.

         AFTER BOONE WAS REASSIGNED TO AUGSBURG HE WAS CONTACTED BY A
    SVRR (THE SVRR IS THE SUCCESSOR ORGANIZATION TO THE KGB)
    OFFICER WHOM HE CAME TO KNOW AS	"IGOR."	DURING THEIR FIRST
    MEETING, BOONE DELIVERED TO "IGOR" CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS, AND
    "IGOR" GAVE BOONE A COMMUNICATIONS PLAN THAT INCLUDED AN EMERGENCY
    MEETING SITE AND SIGNAL SITES. ACCORDING TO THE COMPLAINT, BOONE
    MET WITH HIS SOVIET HANDLER "IGOR" APPROXIMATELY FOUR TIMES A YEAR
    BETWEEN LATE 1988 AND THE TIME BOONE RETIRED FROM THE ARMY IN 1991.
    DURING EACH OF THESE MEETINGS BOONE PASSED CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS
    RELATING TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE TO HIS SOVIET HANDLER. ACCORDING
    TO THE COMPLAINT, BOONE RECEIVED $5,000 TO $7,000 AT EACH MEETING,
    AND ONCE RECEIVED A $5,000 BONUS, FOR A TOTAL PAYMENT OF MORE THAN
    $60,000 FOR THE PERIOD HE COMMITTED ESPIONAGE ON BEHALF OF THE
    SOVIETS.

         ACCORDING TO THE COMPLAINT, DURING THE TIME PERIOD BOONE SPIED
    ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIETS HE PASSED TO THEM HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AND
    EXTREMELY SENSITIVE DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY
    CAUSE GRAVE HARM TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.
    ACCORDING TO THE COMPLAINT, BOONE PASSED TO THE SOVIETS, AMONG
    OTHER THINGS, DOCUMENTS DETAILING THE UNITED STATES' TARGETING OF
    TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CASE OF NUCLEAR ATTACK BY THE SOVIETS
    AND DOCUMENTS DETAILING THE UNITED STATES MILITARY'S USE OF SIGNALS
    INTELLIGENCE. MANY OF THE DOCUMENTS BOONE DELIVERED TO THE SOVIETS
    WERE CLASSIFIED AT THE "TOP SECRET" LEVEL AND DESIGNATED AS
    "SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION."

         ACCORDING TO THE COMPLAINT, IN SEPTEMBER OF 1998, BOONE WAS
    CONTACTED BY AN INDIVIDUAL WORKING ON BEHALF OF THE FBI WHOM BOONE
    BELIEVED TO BE AN AGENT OF THE SVRR. ACCORDING TO THE COMPLAINT,
    DURING TWO SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL BOONE AGREED TO
    WORK FULL-TIME ON BEHALF OF THE SVRR AND CONTINUE HIS ESPIONAGE
    ACTIVITIES. BOONE WAS ARRESTED AT A LOCAL HOTEL ON OCTOBER 10,
    1998 WHEN HE FLEW INTO THE UNITED STATES TO MEET WITH THE PERSON HE
    BELIEVED TO BE HIS SVRR CONTACT.

         BOONE WILL REMAIN IN CUSTODY PENDING HIS INITIAL APPEARANCE
    WHICH IS TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 4 P.M. OCTOBER 13, 1998, BEFORE
    THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE WELTON C. SEWELL. IF
    CONVICTED OF THE ESPIONAGE CHARGE FOR WHICH HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED,
    BOONE FACES LIFE IMPRISONMENT, OR THE DEATH PENALTY IF CERTAIN
    STATUTORY CONDITIONS ARE MET.

         MS. FAHEY WISHES TO COMMEND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
    INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
    COMMAND FOR THEIR WORK IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE, AND SHE
    EXPRESSES HER GRATITUDE TO THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
    FOR ITS FULL COOPERATION IN THIS MATTER. THIS CASE IS BEING
    PROSECUTED FOR THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE BY ASSISTANT
    UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS THOMAS O. CONNOLLY AND CHARLES P.
    ROSENBERG.

         FURTHER INQUIRIES MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY'S OFFICE.

                               #####

    [End]

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