23 June 1999
Source: http://www.usia.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/latest&f=99062201.elt&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml

USIS Washington File
_________________________________

22 June 1999

### RICHARDSON JUNE 22 SENATE TESTIMONY ON RUDMAN REPORT

    (Accountability, responsibility, authority key for reform) (2310)

    Washington -- The overarching principle directing efforts to improve
    the Department of Energy's security procedures is that the Secretary
    of Energy "must be accountable, responsible, and must have full
    authority," Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson said in June 22
    testimony before a joint hearing of the Senate Select Intelligence,
    Armed Services, and Governmental Affairs and Natural Resources
    Committees.

    Richardson outlined four guidelines for current reform efforts:

    -- one, ensuring that there is a clear chain of command and
    accountability for implementing national security policy;

    -- two, raising the profile and authority of the nuclear weapons
    program to overcome the systemic and long-lived security problems
    identified by both the Cox and Advisory Board reports;

    -- three, ensuring that Security and Counterintelligence programs have
    a senior Departmental advocate, with no conflicts of interest; and

    -- four, ensuring that "Stockpile Stewardship" doesn't lose its link
    to cutting edge science.

    Richardson expressed strong concerns about a proposal by former
    Senator Warren Rudman and the President's Foreign Intelligence
    Advisory Board (PFIAB) to create a semi-autonomous agency within the
    Department of Energy to oversee nuclear security.

    "From my experience, the Department needs more engagement from the
    Secretary of Energy and his or her office in the nuclear weapons
    program. I am concerned that fencing-off the nation's nuclear weapons
    program would blur the cabinet secretary's role," he said.

    Richardson added that "our ability to ensure the safety and
    reliability of the nuclear deterrent depends upon cutting-edge
    science. An autonomous agency would partition the laboratory system
    and ultimately undermine the science on which our national security
    depends."

    "A bureaucratic 'Berlin Wall' between the weapons labs and the science
    labs would hamper the joint research they perform and weaken the
    quality of basic science at the weapons labs. The nuclear weapons
    program depends on unclassified, cutting-edge science; requires active
    engagement with the other national laboratories and contact with the
    international community; and needs overall scientific excellence to
    recruit and retain the best and brightest scientific minds for the
    weapons program," he said.

    Following is the text of Richardson's testimony, as prepared for
    delivery:

    (begin text)

    PREPARED WRITTEN STATEMENT OF SECRETARY BILL RICHARDSON
    U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
    BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE
    JUNE 22, 1999

    Thank you, Mr. Chairmen and Members of the Committees, for the
    opportunity to discuss how to improve security and counterintelligence
    at the Department of Energy.

    No mission is more important to me than taking the actions necessary
    to ensure that America's nuclear secrets are well guarded. We've made
    considerable progress, but I won't admit perfection. And I'm looking
    forward to working with the Congress and Senator Rudman on ways to
    make things better.

    PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD REPORT

    Senator Rudman and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
    have prepared a thorough, hard-hitting report that identifies the root
    causes of the long-standing security and counterintelligence problems
    at the Department of Energy. A confusing organizational structure.
    Lack of accountability. Unclear roles and responsibilities. And a lack
    of attention to security.

    I want to thank Chairman Rudman and his Panel for recognizing the
    aggressive steps we've already taken to address serious and systemic
    security problems at the Department's labs; and for making additional
    recommendations that can help address the critical nature of the
    problems.

    Chairman Rudman identifies a list of attributes that must characterize
    meaningful reform. I agree with virtually all of the attributes --
    such as the need for leadership, clarity of mission, and streamlined
    field operations.

    The Presidential Decision Directive and the reforms I've undertaken
    are based on some of the same basic principles -- about what is needed
    to address the underlying problems. After several months of wrestling
    with the problems at the Department, I think it is essential that any
    reform of Departmental organization ensure that certain criteria are
    met:

    PRINCIPLES

    The overarching principle is that the Secretary of Energy must be
    accountable, responsible, and must have full authority.

    First: We must ensure that there is a clear chain of command and
    accountability for implementing national security policy.

    I have already undertaken a major reorganization of the
    headquarters-to-field relationship, which clarifies reporting lines
    and responsibilities across the complex. In my plan, the chain of
    command is clear and accountability is established for the nuclear
    weapons program -- the three weapons laboratories and all of our
    nuclear weapons sites and facilities throughout the complex report to
    the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs.

    Second: We must raise, not lower, the profile and authority of the
    nuclear weapons program to overcome the systemic and long-lived
    security problems identified by both the Cox and Advisory Board
    reports. From my experience, the Department needs more engagement from
    the Secretary of Energy and his or her office in the nuclear weapons
    program. I am concerned that fencing-off the nation's nuclear weapons
    program would blur the cabinet secretary's role.

    Third: We must ensure that Security and Counterintelligence programs
    have a senior Departmental advocate, with no conflicts of interest.
    The only way to assure that is to have a separation between the office
    responsible for the nuclear weapons program and the office responsible
    for establishing and monitoring security and counterintelligence
    policies.

    That's the only way you can assure that security decisions aren't
    shortchanged and that they are not competing for the time and
    attention of senior management, as well as budgetary resources.

    And Fourth: We must ensure that Stockpile Stewardship doesn't lose its
    link to cutting edge science. Our ability to ensure the safety and
    reliability of the nuclear deterrent depends upon cutting-edge
    science. An autonomous agency would partition the laboratory system
    and ultimately undermine the science on which our national security
    depends.

    A bureaucratic "Berlin Wall" between the weapons labs and the science
    labs would hamper the joint research they perform and weaken the
    quality of basic science at the weapons labs. The nuclear weapons
    program depends on unclassified, cutting-edge science; requires active
    engagement with the other national laboratories and contact with the
    international community; and needs overall scientific excellence to
    recruit and retain the best and brightest scientific minds for the
    weapons program.

    REFORMS

    When I went through all the recommendations that the PFIAB proposes --
    43 in number -- I found that my new security plan embraces 38 of them.
    That's almost 90 percent. That's a lot of common ground on which we
    can work. Let me quickly run through some of the reforms we've already
    put in place.

    1. Counterintelligence

    In February 1998, President Clinton ordered that the Department of
    Energy improve its security dramatically, and implement an innovative,
    comprehensive counterintelligence and cyber-security plan.

    By November of last year, I approved a far-reaching, aggressive new
    plan, improving background checks on visitors; document controls; use
    of polygraphs; and increases in our counterintelligence budget --
    which has grown by a factor of 15 since 1996.

    In March, we took additional steps for counterintelligence upgrades,
    security training, and threat awareness, and focused an additional $8
    million dollars on further securing classified and unclassified
    computer networks.

    And when I was informed of the serious computer transfer issue at Los
    Alamos, I ordered a complete stand-down of the classified computer
    systems at our three weapons laboratories -- Los Alamos, Lawrence
    Livermore, and Sandia -- to accelerate computer security measures
    already underway. The systems only went back on-line only when I was
    convinced that significant progress had been made.

    As of today, we have implemented 85 percent of the key recommendations
    in our Counterintelligence Action plan.

    2. Security

    I came to the Department of Energy after having served about 12 years
    on the House Energy and Commerce Committee, where I came to understand
    the magnitude of the security management problems facing the
    Department. You see, Chairman Dingell had held a few hearings on this
    subject.

    One of the first steps I undertook was figure out how to untangle the
    maze of illogical reporting relationships between the labs, the field
    offices and headquarters to clarify chain of command and establish
    accountability. That reorganization was completed April 21st. Then on
    May 11th, I took the next step needed to bring about accountability
    and put some teeth into the security operation with the
    farthest-reaching security reorganization in the Department of
    Energy's history.

    We established a new, high-level Office of Security and Emergency
    Operations -- gathering all Departmental security functions in one
    place and answering directly to me. Last Thursday, retired four star
    general Gene Habiger accepted the position as the Department's first
    Director of the Office of Security and Emergency Operations.

    General Habiger brings to this job his experience as the Commander in
    Chief of Strategic Command where he was in charge of the U.S. nuclear
    forces.

    As Security Czar, General Habiger will rebuild the entire Department's
    security, cyber-security and counterterrorism apparatus, as well as
    our emergency response operations. He will be the single focal point
    for security policy and ensuring that security is rigorously
    implemented across the Department complex.

    We all know that any organizational structure is only as good as its
    people. We should all thank General Habiger for being willing to serve
    his country once more. This is itself an endorsement that the Office
    of Security and Emergency Operations will succeed.

    These are some of the measures that we've already undertaken. I
    believe that these changes embody the attributes that the PFIAB
    identifies as critical to meaningful reform and have already had a
    dramatic impact on the security of the labs.

    But clearly more needs to be done. And I am looking carefully at the
    recommendations in the PFIAB report; I've been meeting with Senators
    and Congressmen as we try to sort out what additional steps are
    needed, and which of these changes or measures we should codify to
    ensure that the changes are institutionalized and last beyond the
    tenure of any one Secretary of Energy or Committee Chairman.

    There is much common ground. I think we can work from that common
    ground to build on what has already been accomplished and make even
    more-sweeping Department reforms than the Advisory Board recommends.

    But I do have concerns about the creation of the autonomous or
    semi-autonomous entity -- especially if we're trying to solve the
    security and counterintelligence problems at the Department. Security
    and counterintelligence problems cut across all of the Department's
    missions, and are not limited to the weapons labs and production
    sites.

    We need to improve security at all sites -- and fencing off the
    weapons complex is not the answer. Plutonium located at our
    environmental management sites demands the same level of security as
    plutonium at Los Alamos.
    And classified research at Argonne National Laboratory must be as
    secure from espionage as classified nuclear information at Livermore
    National Laboratory.

    That's why we need oversight organizations -- in Counterintelligence,
    Health and Safety, and Security -- that make policy to cover the
    entire Department and that are separate from the office implementing
    security. This is the only -- let me emphasize: the only -- effective
    way for senior Department managers and Congress to get independent
    information about what is going on within the Department.

    This is also the exact model that NSA, NRO, DOD, CIA, and others use.

    The problems we have had in the past have been directly related to the
    fact that there have not been strong independent organizations whose
    sole mission is counterintelligence or security. Security and
    counterintelligence competed against requirements of the stockpile
    stewardship program for resources and the time and attention of senior
    managers. Security and counterintelligence did not have the clout to
    effect change.

    We've taken action to correct this situation with the creation of an
    independent offices of Counterintelligence, Security and Oversight
    reporting directly to me. It would be a step backward to put these
    functions under the thumb of the director whose operations they are
    supposed to be evaluating.

    Let me illustrate this with one example. Chairman Thompson's Senate
    Governmental Affairs Committee is one of the most active oversight
    committees in Congress. Imagine how Department of Energy oversight
    would be hurt if Chairman Thompson and Ranking member Lieberman were
    my employees. I would think that was great -- no hearings, no
    interviews, no document requests that I didn't support. But it
    wouldn't make for good oversight.

    Let me conclude by saying that organizational changes alone are not
    sufficient. The Rudman report states that "even if every aspect of the
    ongoing structural reforms is fully implemented, the most powerful
    guarantor of security at the nation's weapons laboratories will not be
    laws, regulations, or management charts. It will be the attitudes and
    behavior of the men and women who are responsible for the operation of
    the labs each day. These will not change overnight, and they are
    likely to change only in a different cultural environment -- one that
    values security as a vital and integral part of day-to-day activities
    and believes it can coexist with great science."

    And this is an extremely important point: I think the Rudman report
    should be required reading for every employee at the Department of
    Energy and its national labs. I think it's a wake-up call.

    Last week, after reading the report, I ordered all managers and
    employees at three nuclear defense national laboratories -- Los
    Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia -- to undergo a full-scale security
    immersion program.

    For two days -- yesterday and today -- the labs are focusing on
    training so that each and every employee knows their security
    responsibilities.

    Change will not occur overnight, and our goal here today should be to
    focus on how we can ensure that the changes we undertake are indeed
    lasting changes.

    There is a large patch of common ground here. Let's work together to
    find the best way to institutionalize changes that will ensure that
    this department provides science and security at its best.

    (end text)