24 June 1998

    Date: Wed, 24 Jun 1998 105900 -0400
    From: "Kawika Daguio" <Kdaguio@aba.com>
    To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz
    Cc:cryptography@c2.net
    Subject: Re NSA Declassifies Algos -Reply

    Releasing these algos was a smart and sound move on the NSA's part.

    I have spent way too much time over the last 5 years trying to get
    the NSA to be more open than they have been and to take more risks
    to support their protection mission.  They are doing a tremendous
    job compared to a few years ago and we have welcomed their actions
    which acknowledge that protection is becoming as important as
    exploitation.  This move gives me hope that this trend will continue
    if not accelerate.

    The NSA has worked with the banking industry for over 20 years to
    guide the industry away from a number of potentially problematic
    infosecurity approaches thus helping vendors to meet the banking
    industry assurance requirements as well as guidance to help limit
    implementation problems.   Their most important contributions have
    come in the area of development of security standards in ANSI X9F
    committees.  While we have had disagreements in the past that led to
    the enactment of the Computer Security Act, and other fallout, there
    is a growing, but still limited trust between our two worlds. I
    would expect that those that examine the algorithms will find they
    have practical application and non-conspiracy theorists will find
    comfort in their provenance rather than a threat.

    We have hoped that the NSA would be more active, visible, and open
    about the algorithms in their vaults and those the private sector
    develops. Unfortunately, however,  any public activity on their part
    usually brings immediate and overwhelming negative public relations
    consequences regardless of the nature of their initiative.  As a
    result even when the wish to help industry more they are reluctant
    to actually face the risks involved.  To my regret, because of the
    Clipper and KR debate related public relations damage, the Agency
    has been unwilling to contribute an algorithm to the AES beauty
    contest despite my requests that they do so in the interest of
    advancing national security.

    We rejected using SJ/KEA  and fortezza cards for a PKI almost 4 years
    ago when the government offered them to us even in a built in a way
    that would have separated us from the government KE/KR infrastructure.
    Among the original 5 public reviewers of these algorithms are a couple
    from our community, and we were also offered an opportunity to review
    the algorithms on an indepth basis.

    The banking industry wants more good choices and our sector believes
    that alot can be learned from an "allied" group that hammers on crypto
    on an unparalleled basis in a production oriented environment.
    Brilliant academics and entrepreneurial technologists have great
    potential and have contributed much, but nothing beats money, manpower,
    and experience.  Transferring some of the fruits of  this experience is
    a recommendation that I made while on a PCCIP (critical infrastructure)
    R&D committee appointment.

    I hope that they share more of the fruits of their past efforts on terms
    negotiated with N and industry.   I believe that it is entirely
    appropriate that they have declassified these algorithms and they should
    continue along this line by being more visibly active in the AES
    evaluations now that the time for submissions has passed.  Also, given
    the expected adoption of the ECDSA by a number of critical infrastructure
    sectors, it is thus reasonable to expect that a significant level of
    resources be expended to insure that no surprises arise after it is made
    a standard, and implemented widely.

    We have repeatedly argued that equivalent resources be allocated early
    in the standards process to the algorithms that industry is pursuing as
    if an actively hostile nation were using it.   We would expect that
    information be shared and guidance be forthcoming to ensure that a
    "known" problem in the secret world be shared with those operating or
    supplying technology solutions to critical infrastructure sectors.

    Transferring these algorithms is a great start, but continued openness
    and advancement of mutual interests requires the NSA and the private
    sector to be open and take risks and extend some measure of trust beyond
    their own domains.  I hope it happens, if it does I am confident we will
    all benefit.

    -----

    The above represent my views and not to be considered the views of the
    american bankers association or the financial institutions we represent
    unless otherwise indicated.

    kawika daguio