| Cryptome DVDs are offered by Cryptome. Donate $25 for two DVDs of the Cryptome 12-years collection of 46,000 files from June 1996 to June 2008 (~6.7 GB). Click Paypal or mail check/MO made out to John Young, 251 West 89th Street, New York, NY 10024. The collection includes all files of cryptome.org, jya.com, cartome.org, eyeball-series.org and iraq-kill-maim.org, and 23,000 (updated) pages of counter-intelligence dossiers declassified by the US Army Information and Security Command, dating from 1945 to 1985.The DVDs will be sent anywhere worldwide without extra cost.

Web | cryptome.org | cryptome.info | jya.com | eyeball-series.org | cryptome.cn

5 May 1997

    Revised to add links to domestic terrorism statements of the Department
    of Defense and the FBI, annual reports on Global Terrorism, the Chemical
    Weapons Convention and ATF reports at end of this report.

    14 March 1997
    Revised to add links to related WMD documents at end of this report.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [Congressional Record: February 26, 1997 (Senate)]
    [Page S1658]
    From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
    [DOCID:cr26fe97-127]

     REPORT ON THE RESPONSE TO THREATS OF TERRORIST USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS
                 DESTRUCTION--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT--PM 17

      The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message
    from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying
    report; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

    To the Congress of the United States:
      The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public
    Law 104-201), title XIV, section 1411 requires the President to
    transmit a report to the Congress that assesses the capabilities of the
    Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents
    involving weapons of mass destruction and to support State and local
    prevention and response efforts. In accordance with this provision, I
    transmit the attached report on the subject issue.
                                                      William J. Clinton.
      The White House, February 26, 1997.

                              ____________________

    [Congressional Record: February 26, 1997 (House)]
    [Page H651-H660]
    From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
    [DOCID:cr26fe97-98]

      REPORT ON GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS
     INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF
                               THE UNITED STATES

      The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message
    from the President of the United States; which was read and, together
    with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the
    Committee on National Security:
    To the Congress of the United States:
      The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public
    Law 104-201), title XIV, section 1411 requires the President to
    transmit a report to the Congress that assesses the capabilities of the
    Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents
    involving weapons of mass destruction and to support State and local
    prevention and response efforts. In accordance with this provision, I
    transmit the attached report on the subject issue.
                                                      William J. Clinton.
      The White House, February 26, 1997.

     Report to Congress on Response to Threats of Terrorist Use of Weapons
                     of Mass Destruction, January 31, 1997

                               executive summary

           As the result of recent events, significant threats over
         the past few years, and the increased availability and
         proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)
         materials, there is an increasing concern for the potential
         of terrorist incidents occurring in the United States
         involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
           Under Presidential and Congressional direction, the Federal
         Government has made a concerted effort to better respond to
         domestic terrorist incidents involving WMD. These efforts
         include assessing current capabilities, identifying
         shortfalls, and taking steps to remedy them. The Federal
         Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as the lead agency for crisis
         management in response to a domestic terrorist threat or
         incident, has undertaken several initiatives to prevent,
         mitigate, and respond to the domestic terrorism threat. The
         Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with the
         responsibility for consequence management in response to a
         terrorist incident, has undertaken several initiatives to
         identify and enhance the Federal capability to respond to the
         consequences of a terrorist incident. Several departments and
         agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD),
         Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Health and Human
         Services (HHS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
         are involved in enhancing overall terrorism response
         capabilities, with others in the Federal response planning
         community actively supporting this effort.
           Local response to a terrorist event is critical to the
         success of the overall response. Even with a timely Federal
         response, local first responders have the immediate
         requirement to deal with the incident and care for victims.
         FEMA has been working with local and State governments to
         assess their response capabilities, identify shortfalls and
         take measures to remedy them. These activities include
         surveying State terrorism response capabilities, convening a
         focus group to discuss capabilities and needs of local
         government for NBC response, sponsoring a conference for fire
         chiefs from major metropolitan fire departments to discuss
         lessons learned from recent international terrorism
         incidents, conducting training activities, and developing
         exercises featuring terrorism scenarios to test various
         aspects of crisis and consequence management activities.
           In continuation of these efforts, the Federal Government
         has developed a program of activities in Fiscal Year (FY)
         1997 encompassing training, some equipment and capability
         enhancements, planning, exercises, and other activities
         involving Federal, State, and local governments to improve
         the current levels of preparedness and response. The initial
         focus for training and capability enhancement is to target FY
         1997 funding on cities and selected jurisdictions based on
         population, risk and geographic distribution. The FY 1997
         activities will form the basis for further training,
         planning, and capability building efforts in FY 1998 and
         beyond for a broader base of jurisdictions, depending on
         budget constraints and resource availability.

                                  introduction

         Background
           Recent trends indicate growing prospects for terrorist
         incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In
         1993, a bomb rocked the World Trade Center in New York City,
         NY; in 1995, Japanese extremists successfully conducted a
         chemical attack in the Tokyo subway system and a bomb
         destroyed

    [[Page H652]]

         the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK. The chance
         of a significant WMD incident occurring in the United States
         is heightened by several factors, including:
           Inexpensive production and availability of chemical/
         biological (C/B) agents;
           Easily obtainable chemical precursors and biological
         production processes;
           Portability of small amounts of C/B agents especially
         useful for clandestine purposes;
           Potential for large-scale public impact based on limited
         ability to quickly identify and/or contain the effects of
         such substances;
           Increased WMD stockpiles, with the potential for theft or
         acquisition of the weapons by terrorists groups;
           Capability of inflicting mass casualties; and,
           Increased media coverage of the use of WMD.
         Scope of the Report
           This report responds to the requirement in the Defense
         Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Title XIV,
         Section 1411 of Public Law 104-201 (also referred to as the
         Nunn-Lugar amendment), for the President to transmit a Report
         to Congress that assesses the capabilities of the Federal
         Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents
         involving WMD and to support State and local prevention and
         response efforts. Also, the report highlights results and
         insights gained from earlier Fiscal Year (FY) 1996
         initiatives and describes what is planned or under way in FY
         1997 to improve Federal, State, and local capabilities.
         Finally, it addresses measures to improve capabilities in
         future years, including funding requirements, legislative
         improvements, and research and development.
         Lead Agency Responsibilities
           The Department of Justice (DOJ), through the Federal Bureau
         of Investigation (FBI), has been assigned the lead
         responsibility for management of the U.S. Government (USG)
         response to terrorist incidents. The FBI derives its
         fundamental legal jurisdiction to deter terrorist incidents
         from an assortment of Federal statutes and Executive Branch
         directives.
           The FBI has the lead agency role in crisis management which
         entails the process of identifying, acquiring, and planning
         the use of resources needed to prevent and/or respond to a
         potential or actual terrorist incident. The crisis management
         response incorporates and emphasizes prevention, crisis
         mitigation efforts, and criminal prosecution of terrorists.
         Crisis management activities include proactive measures for
         prevention, immediate incident response, and post-incident
         response, including command of the operational response as
         the on-scene manager for an incident, in coordination with
         other Federal agencies and local and State authorities.
           FEMA has the responsibility for consequence management
         which entails preparedness and response for dealing with the
         consequences of a terrorist incident. Consequence management
         activities include measures to alleviate damage, loss of
         life, hardship, or suffering caused by the incident;
         protection of public health and safety; restoration of
         essential government services; and provision of emergency
         assistance. FEMA will act in support of the FBI in
         implementing consequence management response activities.
           The overall goal of Administration policy is to ensure that
         the United States is prepared to combat domestic and
         international terrorism in all its forms. Measures undertaken
         under this policy to deal with the terrorism threat include:
           Reducing vulnerabilities--To reduce vulnerabilities to
         terrorism both at home and abroad, all Federal department
         heads have been directed to ensure that their personnel and
         facilities are fully protected against terrorism. This
         activity includes reviewing the vulnerability of Government
         facilities and the critical national infrastructure; reducing
         vulnerabilities affecting civilian personnel and facilities
         abroad, military personnel and facilities, U.S. airports, and
         other transportation modes; and undertaking counterterrorism
         measures to reduce both the domestic and international
         terrorist threat.
           Deterring terrorist acts--To deter terrorism, the USG has
         made it clear that its policies will not be affected by
         terrorist acts and it will vigorously deal with terrorists
         and their sponsors to reduce terrorist capabilities and
         support. In this regard, the pursuit, arrest, and prosecution
         of terrorists are of the highest priority. Goals include the
         disruption of terrorist-sponsored activity including
         termination of financial support, arrest and punishment of
         terrorists as criminals, application of U.S. laws and new
         legislation to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the
         United States, and application of extraterritorial statutes
         to counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside
         the United States. Return of terrorists from overseas who are
         wanted for violation of U.S. law is of the highest priority
         and a central issue in bilateral relations with any country
         that harbors or assists them.
           Responding to terrorist acts--To respond to acts of
         terrorism, there must be a rapid and decisive capability to
         protect U.S. citizens, defeat or arrest terrorists, respond
         against terrorist sponsors, and provide relief to the
         victims. The goal during the immediate response phase of an
         incident is to terminate terrorist attacks so that the
         terrorists do not accomplish their objectives or maintain
         their freedom, while authorities seek to minimize damage and
         loss of life and provide emergency assistance to the affected
         area. In responding to a terrorist incident, the Federal
         Government is working to rapidly deploy the needed Federal
         capabilities to the scene, including specialized elements for
         dealing with specific types of incidents resulting from WMD
         threats.
         Recent Initiatives
           While the primary Federal focus historically has been on
         developing crisis management capabilities, recent events have
         necessitated placing an increased emphasis on building
         consequence management capabilities as well. Thus, guidance
         provided by USG policy has resulted in a number of
         initiatives being undertaken in FY 1996 to continue to build
         crisis management capabilities and to enhance consequence
         management capabilities by assessing Federal, State, and
         local capabilities to respond to the consequences of a
         nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) WMD terrorist event.
         Ongoing activities through FY 1997 build upon these
         initiatives and respond to new legislation. Some recent
         initiatives include:
           Development by the FBI of operational guidelines entitled
         Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment and Employment of
         U.S. Government Elements in Response to a Domestic Terrorist
         Threat or Incident.
           The formulation of the FBI Domestic Emergency Support Team
         (DEST) and the first deployment of the DEST in support of the
         1996 Democratic National Convention.
           Pilot test of a Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST) for
         the Washington, DC, area and in Atlanta, GA, at the 1996
         Summer Olympic Games, to provide immediate on-site medical
         support in response to a terrorist incident involving WMD.
           Multi-agency assessment of the capability of the Federal
         Response Plan (FRP) to respond to a WMD terrorist event.
           Exercises using terrorism scenarios that address various
         aspects of crisis management and consequence management.
           Planning, training, and exercises focusing on the terrorism
         threat conducted in preparation for the 1996 Summer Olympic
         Games, national political conventions, and the 1997
         Presidential Inauguration.
           Survey of State terrorism response capabilities conducted
         in conjunction with the National Governors Association (NGA).
           Focus group discussions with management and emergency
         responders from four major metropolitan areas on the
         capabilities and needs of local government to respond to NBC
         WMD terrorist incidents.
           Conference for fire chiefs of major metropolitan fire
         departments conducted in conjunction with the International
         Association of Fire Chiefs featuring lessons learned from
         recent international terrorism incidents.
           Conferences and exercises on health and medical
         requirements needed in response to chemical/biological (C/B)
         terrorism sponsored by the Department of Health and Human
         Services--Public Health Service (HHS-PHS).
           Numerous training activities sponsored by FEMA and the
         States to improve responder awareness of the terrorism threat
         and to begin to build the knowledge and skills required for
         response to such an incident.
           Development of the Terrorism Incident Annex to the FRP.
           Enhancement of 175 FBI Special Agents to work on WMD
         issues.
           Establishment of the Hazardous Materials Response Unit
         (HMRU) to provide scientific and technical expertise to
         enhance FBI forensic and evidence capabilities.

    assessment of federal capabilities to prevent and respond to the use of
                                      wmd

         Crisis Management/Prevention Capabilities
           Lead Agency Role
           The FBI has been designated as the lead agency for the
         management of the Federal response to terrorist incidents
         (hereafter referred to as crisis management). As the lead for
         crisis management, the FBI has the responsibility for
         proactive measures involving prevention, immediate incident
         response, and post-incident response, including functioning
         as the commander of the on-scene operational response.
           The FBI On-Scene Commander (OSC) is responsible at the
         incident site for all decisions to resolve the terrorist
         incident, unless the lead agency responsibility is
         transferred by the Attorney General (AG) to FEMA, as
         warranted. In support of the FBI OSC, or as the designated
         lead agency after transfer of the responsibility by the AG,
         FEMA coordinates all Federal assistance in support of
         consequence management needs resulting from the incident with
         the affected State and local governments.
           Operational guidelines (entitled Guidelines for the
         Mobilization, Deployment and Employment of U.S. Government
         Elements in Response to a Domestic Terrorist Threat or
         Incident) have been developed by the FBI and are awaiting
         final approval by the AG and the National Security Council
         (NSC). The Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), an
         interagency support component, has been developed and is
         managed by the FBI.
           During a significant terrorist threat or event including a
         WMD incident, the FBI may deploy a tailored DEST enhanced
         with specialized interagency components capable of responding
         to situations involving chemical/biological (C/B) or nuclear/
         radiological weapons or agents. The FBI-led response will be
         activated to provide a graduated, tailored response based on
         the type of incident, in accordance with the FBI's Nuclear or
         C/B Incident Contingency Plans.

    [[Page H653]]

           The FBI OSC, as lead agency official, retains the authority
         to take appropriate crisis management actions at all times
         during the crisis management response. On-scene decisions
         with interagency consultation are made with the Command Group
         at a Joint Operations Center (JOC), which includes the OSC,
         on-scene principals of the DEST agencies, other Federal
         agency representatives, and local and State representatives.
           The DEST Team Leader (DTL) is designated by the Director,
         FBI. The DTL is primarily responsible for providing the FBI
         OSC advice and guidance concerning other Federal capabilities
         available for use in resolving a WMD terrorist incident. This
         includes crisis management and consequence management
         assistance, technical or scientific advice, and contingency
         planning assistance. Upon arrival at a crisis location, the
         DEST conducts an initial situation assessment, develops
         appropriate Courses of Action (COAs), makes a consequence
         assessment, and provides the OSC with recommendations. The
         DTL coordinates this process and thereafter facilitates the
         implementation of the OSC's selected COA through specific
         taskings. The DTL ensures continuous coordination within the
         various DEST components and with the FBI command post
         elements, resolves issues within the DEST, ensures effective
         communications among response elements, and implements
         required changes within the DEST to achieve the most
         efficient and effective team possible.
           When determined appropriate by the OSC, the FBI command
         post will be modified to function as a JOC. The JOC
         configuration includes representatives of the primary
         participating agencies and Command, Operations, Consequence
         Management, and Support Groups as described below:
           Command Group--Comprised of senior officials of the FBI,
         DOE, DOD, HHS-PHS, FEMA, and other Federal and State
         agencies, as appropriate, to provide the OSC with a means to
         quickly coordinate and reach decisions on interagency matters
         that affect the resolution of the incident.
           Operations Group--Contains representatives of the
         organizations directly involved in actions in and around the
         crisis site and whose actions are deemed critical to the
         successful resolution of the crisis.
           Consequence Management Group--Contains decisionmaking and
         liaison representatives of consequence management
         organizations to provide advice on decisions that may have
         implications for consequence management, and to provide
         continuity in leadership should a consequence management
         response become necessary. If consequences become imminent or
         actually occur, State and local organizations will initiate
         their consequence management actions, with FEMA expediting
         the provision of Federal consequence management response
         support. The Group is coordinated by FEMA with an FBI liaison
         from the OSC.
           Support Group--Contains representatives of organizations
         whose primary task is to support members of the Operations
         Group. Depending on the nature of the crisis, organizations
         represented in the Operations Group will be asked to provide
         staff for various support components, including Logistics,
         Legal, Administrative, Liaison, and Media components. The
         Media component serves as the single point of contact for the
         coordination and release of public information to the media
         from the incident site. DOJ/FBI, in coordination with
         participating DEST agencies, will develop a strategy and
         procedures for responding to media inquiries. The overall
         intent will be for the Federal Government to speak clearly
         with one voice regarding any response to a terrorist
         incident.
           Lead Agency Initiatives
           As a result of recent terrorist incidents, and in
         recognition of the emerging threat of WMD, the FBI has
         enhanced and modified its capabilities. Some of the changes
         include:
           Establishment of a separate Domestic Terrorism/
         Counterterrorism Planning Section. This growing section
         includes separate units formed specifically to more
         effectively address Domestic Terrorism Operations, WMD,
         Special Events Management, and Domestic Terrorism Analysis.
         It is anticipated that during Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 the WMD
         Unit will divide into two separate units, one handling NBC
         proliferation matters, threats, and incidents and the other
         managing exercise and response components (such as the DEST)
         and implementing the first responder training initiative.
           Establishment of the Hazardous Materials Response Unit
         (HRMU) within the Laboratory Division. This unit is designed
         to lead and augment the Federal science and technology
         response capability to terrorist threats/incidents involving
         WMD and provide a law enforcement representative in evidence
         issues to enhance later prosecutive effectiveness and
         efficiency.
           Establishment of the Critical Incident Response Group
         (CIRG) at Quantico, VA. The CIRG is recognized as an FBI
         entity that provides coordinated support to the FBI OSC. The
         Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), which has been trained to operate
         in a HAZMAT environment, is part of the CIRG. To assist the
         HRT in protracted terrorist or other criminal incidents,
         regional FBI Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams have
         been enhanced to provide additional tactical support;
         however, at this time only the HRT has equipment and trains
         in a HAZMAT environment. The CIRG provides additional
         operations support in the areas of negotiation, behavioral
         profiling and assessment, and crisis management support.
           Interagency Capabilities
           To successfully resolve a WMD incident, closely coordinated
         efforts with appropriate Federal, State, and local law
         enforcement agencies and other authorities having emergency
         capabilities to respond to and mitigate the consequences of
         such an incident will be utilized by the FBI. Appropriate
         Federal agencies will support the FBI by providing personnel
         and equipment that will be rapidly deployed and made
         available for advice and assistance, as warranted by the
         situation and at the request of the OSC at the incident site.
         In order to develop close working relationships among Federal
         agencies concerned with a potential WMD incident, many
         interagency working groups (IWGs) have been established, some
         of which are:
           Various Coordinating Sub-Groups, including a Sub-IWG on
         Exercises co-chaired by the FBI, and a Sub-IWG on Nuclear
         Trafficking;
           Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) for research and
         development, science, and technology devoted to
         counterterrorism;
           Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT),
         Chemical/Biological/Radiological (CBR) Subcommittee;
           SHIELD Group dealing with C/B proliferation, chaired by the
         Department of State (DOS);
           Nuclear Export Violation Working Group (NEVWG);
           Missile Trade Analysis Group (MTAG); and
           Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEC).
           Interagency Roles and Responsibilities
           The primary agencies participating in the response to a WMD
         incident include DOJ, DOD, DOE, HHS, EPA, and FEMA. Depending
         on the specific details of an incident, the FBI may also
         request specialized assistance from other agencies, including
         the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of
         Agriculture (USDA), the Department of the Treasury, the
         Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DOS, and the U.S.
         Intelligence Community (IC). The participating agencies will
         be incorporated into the existing onscene FBI crisis
         management structure, which is designed to provide the FBI
         OSC with a graduated and flexible response capability. For a
         WMD incident, the DEST will include a specially configured
         nuclear or C/B response component with staffing and equipment
         from appropriate Federal agencies, including DOD, DOE, HHS,
         EPA, and FEMA. Other agencies may be tasked to support the
         FBI on a case-by-case basis in an effort to prevent,
         mitigate, and/or manage a WMD incident or threat. Department
         and agency responsibilities include the following:
           The Secretary of Defense has responsibility for:
           Providing military units that can assist in both the crisis
         management and consequence management aspects of a WMD
         incident;
           Designating the supporting equipment and those technical
         personnel who possess the required expertise to deploy with
         the DEST;
           Designating pertinent assets for technical response, such
         as the identification of on-site contaminants, sample
         collection and analysis, limited decontamination
         capabilities, air monitoring, medical diagnosis and treatment
         of casualties, and render-safe procedures for WMD material;
           Providing for the custody, transportation, and disposal of
         a C/B WMD when beyond the capability of an otherwise
         cognizant agency and after consultation with DOJ/FBI and EPA,
         or of nuclear and/or radiological material when beyond the
         capability of an otherwise cognizant agency (e.g., DOE or
         EPA) and after consultation with DOJ/FBI and DOE; and
           Providing other support to the OSC through the use of
         military assets.
           The Secretary of Energy has responsibility for:
           Analyzing threat messages, through the Communicated Threat
         Credibility Assessment Program, for technical content,
         nuclear design feasibility, and general credibility, and for
         providing such analyses to the FBI;
           Designating those technical personnel and supporting
         equipment to deploy with the DEST as the Nuclear/Radiological
         Advisory Team (NRAT). The NRAT will normally include a DOE
         Senior Official who will coordinate the overall DOE response
         at the scene and liaise with other agencies on matters of
         mutual concern. The responsibilities of the NRAT are to: Make
         a scientific and technical assessment of the situation,
         provide scientific and technical advice to the designated
         OSC, provide scientific and technical recommendations,
         including risk/consequence information and requirements for
         follow-on assets, support tactical operations as directed by
         the FBI OSC, and perform limited technical measurements and
         conduct liaison with appropriate DOE response assets.
           Designating those specialized personnel, along with
         specialized instrumentation and equipment, to assist Federal
         agencies in locating nuclear weapons or special nuclear
         material that may be lost, stolen, or associated with bomb
         threats using the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). The
         responsibilities of the NEST are to provide for: Search of
         nuclear materials, identification of nuclear materials,
         diagnostics and assessment of suspected nuclear devices, and
         disablement and containment programs.
           Providing scientific and technical assistance and support
         to the FBI, DOD, and FEMA in the areas of threat assessment
         and

    [[Page H654]]

         search operations, access operations, diagnostic and device
         assessment, disablement and render-safe operations, hazards
         assessment, containment, relocation and storage of special
         nuclear material evidence, and in post-incident cleanup;
           Acquiring, maintaining, and making available any special
         equipment and capabilities required to provide the necessary
         scientific and technical assistance; and,
           Providing tactical/operational advice and assistance in
         supporting the FBI for incidents on a DOE facility or
         involving weapons or material in DOE custody.
           The Secretary of Health and Human Services has
         responsibility for:
           Designating those technical personnel and supporting
         equipment to deploy with the DEST;
           Providing technical advice and assistance, such as threat
         assessment, identification of contaminants, sample collection
         and analysis, on-site safety and protection activities,
         medical management plans, and the provision of health and
         medical care;
           To support this effort, pertinent assets capable of
         representing the following resources will be made available
         to the FBI in response to a WMD incident or threat: Office of
         Emergency Preparedness/Office of Public Health Service (OEP/
         OPHS), Federal Interagency C/B Rapid Deployment Team (CBRDT),
         Medical Management Support Unit (MSU), Medical Response Teams
         and Specialty Teams, and Agency Support, Centers for Disease
         Control and Prevention (CDC); Food and Drug Administration
         (FDA); Agency For Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
         (ATSDR); National Institutes of Health (NIH); Substance Abuse
         and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA); Health
         Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).
           The Administrator of the EPA has responsibility for:
           Designating technical personnel and supporting equipment to
         deploy with the DEST;
           Providing technical advice and assistance, such as
         monitoring, identification of contaminants, sample collection
         and analysis, and on-site safety, prevention, and
         decontamination activities;
           Issuing any permits required for the custody,
         transportation, and disposition of chemical material; and
           Making appropriate assets from the following resources
         available to the FBI in response to a domestic WMD threat or
         incident: Office of the Emergency Coordinator, EPA,
         Environmental Response Team, Edison, NJ, Federal On-Scene
         Coordinators (FOSCs), located in all EPA Regional Offices,
         supported by technical assistance contractors to operate in
         contaminated environments; sample, monitor, cleanup, etc.,
         National Response Team (NRT), the 16-agency team chaired by
         EPA, Regional Response Teams (RRTs), 13 teams co-chaired by
         EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) that support the FOSCs,
         Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORJA)/Center for Risk
         Modeling and Emergency Response (CRMER), Radiological
         Emergency Response Team, National Enforcement Investigations
         Center (NEIC), and laboratory support, including: Regional
         Environmental Services Division and contract labs, Office of
         Water-Technical Support Division, Cincinnati, OH, National
         Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory (NAREL),
         Montgomery, AL, and Office of Radiation Programs, Las Vegas,
         NV.
           The Director of FEMA has responsibility for:
           Designating appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to
         deploy with the DEST; and
           Coordinating on-site consequence management activities with
         State, local, and appropriate Federal agencies.
         Consequence Management/Response Capabilities
           Lead Agency Role
           FEMA is responsible for the coordination of Federal
         emergency response activities in support of State and local
         governments. FEMA coordinates these activities using the
         concept of operations described in the interagency Federal
         Response Plan (FRP) and supports other Federal emergency
         response plans, as described below.
           A WMD terrorist incident may occur without warning and
         immediately impact large numbers of people. The incident may
         affect a local jurisdiction, several jurisdictions within a
         State, or several States. The existing emergency response
         system may be severely stressed in providing a timely and
         effective response to the consequences of the incident. Local
         resources are likely to be quickly exhausted or unavailable
         to meet the complex requirements of such an event, including
         immediate needs for lifesaving resources, resulting in a
         requirement for Federal assistance to augment State and local
         resources. Due to the potentially devastating impact,
         coordination at all levels of Government is critical to
         ensuring that response needs are met. In responding to the
         consequences of a terrorist incident, the primary objective
         of the Federal response is to assist State and local
         governments in carrying out their responsibilities to prevent
         or minimize the loss of life and property.
           Over the years, a significant base of capability has been
         developed at the local, State, and Federal levels of
         government for responding to natural disasters and
         technological emergencies, including incidents involving
         nuclear and chemical materials.
           The current response framework includes an array of
         emergency plans, capabilities, and resources of local, State,
         and Federal governments, and of private and voluntary
         organizations. At the Federal level, emergency plans deriving
         from statutory authorities. Executive orders, national
         security guidance, and other guidance are used by departments
         and agencies to carry out their emergency response missions.
         Under this response framework, Federal resources and
         capabilities are provided to augment those of State and local
         responders, including private and voluntary organizations.
         Existing Federal plans are also being adapted for response to
         the consequences of a terrorist incident. Current interagency
         plans include:
           The Federal Response Plan, supported by 29 departments and
         agencies, is used by FEMA for responding to any incident or
         situation requiring or potentially requiring Federal
         emergency or disaster assistance. The FRP implements the
         authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
         Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) to provide
         Federal assistance to save lives, protect property, ensure
         public health and safety, and recover from the impact of the
         incident or event.
           The Stafford Act provides FEMA with the authority to assign
         missions to any Federal department or agency in support of a
         disaster or emergency declared by the President.
           The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP),
         supported by 17 Federal departments and agencies, is used to
         coordinate the Federal radiological response to an incident
         involving nuclear materials. Radiological response activities
         under the FRERP include monitoring and assessing the
         situation, developing and recommending protective action
         recommendations for the affected population, and serving as
         the primary Federal source of technical and public
         information regarding the radiological incident.
           The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
         Contingency Plan, or National Contingency Plan (NCP),
         supported by 15 Federal departments and agencies, is used to
         coordinate the Federal environmental response to an incident
         involving HAZMAT, including chemical agents. Environmental
         response activities include monitoring, decontamination, and
         long-term restoration.
           As a supplement to the FRP, HHS has recently developed a
         Health and Medical Services Support Plan for the Federal
         Response to Acts of C/B Terrorism to coordinate the Federal
         public health and medical care response to an incident
         involving C/B materials, including biological agents. Public
         health and medical care response activities include
         assessment, triage, treatment, transportation,
         hospitalization, and followup of victims of a C/B incident.
           Assessment of Response Capabilities
           FEMA has been tasked by the NSC to review the adequacy of
         the FRP to respond to nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)
         WMD terrorism incidents and to identify and remedy any
         shortfalls in stockpiles, capabilities, or training that
         would affect our ability to respond. Scenarios describing NBC
         WMD incidents were used to help Federal, State, and local
         responders focus on the capabilities that would be required
         and to assess the adequacy of current capabilities to meet
         response requirements. The Federal effort included a review
         of the coordination of consequence management activities with
         crisis management activities, an examination of the
         relationships among existing Federal interagency emergency
         plans, an assessment of the capabilities of the FRP to
         respond to an NBC WMD incident, the availability of medical
         capabilities for terrorism response, and procedures for
         military support of medical facilities and decontamination
         activities.
           The assessment of the FRP and Federal capabilities focused
         on identifying shortfalls in stockpiles, capabilities, and
         training that would affect the Federal Government's ability
         to respond. In conducting the review and subsequent
         assessment, FEMA sought input from the 29 departments and
         agencies supporting the FRP. Comprehensive scenario-specific
         information was provided by key responding agencies including
         DOD, DOE, HHS, and EPA. Major findings from the assessment
         are grouped under the following categories:
           Planning and Coordination
           Need for baseline information on capability to respond at
         all levels.--Emergency planners at all levels lack adequate
         information on how local, State, and Federal responders are
         organized, equipped, and trained to respond to a terrorist
         incident. There is a need for a carefully structured national
         inventory of local, State, and Federal capability to respond
         to NBC WMD terrorist incidents.
           Need for better Federal interface with State and local
         authorities in planning for and developing a mutually
         supportive NBC WMD response capability.--A comprehensive
         system is required to provide effective coordination across
         political jurisdictions for organizing, training, exercising,
         and responding to a credible NBC WMD terrorist threat or
         actual terrorist incident, including a strategy for
         developing and sustaining fully interoperable capability,
         coordinating training, exercises and evaluation procedures,
         and supporting mutual operations needs.
           Need for a tailored and timely Federal response to support
         or augment local and State first responders.--Emergency
         response actions taken during the initial minutes and hours
         after an NBC WMD terrorist incident are critical. The
         capability of local and State first responders, augmented by
         the use of supplemental Federal resources, needs to be
         effectively understood and coordinated.

    [[Page H655]]

         Initial response options may be severely limited until
         reliable assessments are made of the NBC WMD consequences at
         the incident site; therefore, the enhancement of rapid
         assessment capabilities, including specialized information
         sharing systems for rapid identification of NBC WMD agents,
         needs to be a high priority.
           Need to finalize the FRP Terrorism Incident Annex.--The
         draft FRP Terrorism Incident Annex responds to NSC guidance
         by linking existing Federal authorities, plans, and
         capabilities that would be implemented in response to a
         terrorist incident. The Annex was used to help structure
         preparedness measures for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games and
         other special events.
           Need to prioritize the use of the transportation
         infrastructure to ensure rapid movement of critical, time-
         sensitive response resources.--Disaster response requires
         time-urgent actions by a large number of participants from
         the Federal, State, and local response communities. Unless
         prior planning and prioritization of critical lifesaving
         response resources are in place and appropriate discipline is
         maintained, critical elements of the coordinated Federal
         response in support of State and local authorities will not
         be available when needed. Plans for the response to an NBC
         WMD terrorist incident must include a prioritized listing of
         critical response assets and the assurance of the timely
         transportation, deployment, and support of time-sensitive
         critical resources.
           Need to deal with a large number of victims impacted by an
         NBC WMD terrorist incident.--Planning needs to address the
         management of large number of potentially contaminated
         victims and/or the disposition of human remains resulting
         from an NBC WMD incident. Adequate means must be developed
         for identifying and tracking victims who may suffer immediate
         or longer-term consequences from exposure to NBC WMD
         materials, and who experience psychological trauma from
         actual or perceived injury or contamination. Appropriate
         implementing procedures, including public information and
         other preparedness measures, should be included in all
         training and orientation efforts.
           Need to manage the stringent public safety measures in
         response to an NBC WMD terrorist incident.--Actions required
         to establish and maintain positive control of a potentially
         contaminated area involved in a terrorist incident will
         require aggressive and, at times, forceful action which is in
         sharp contrast to conventional disaster response operations.
         Immediate, assertive, and time-sensitive public safety
         actions might not be fully understood or accepted by local
         officials and the public. Therefore, public safety
         requirements need to be fully addressed in emergency and
         disaster planning in order to deal with the unique and
         demanding requirements of response to an NBC WMD terrorist
         incident in coordination with State and local authorities.
           Need for fully coordinated, timely, and accurate emergency
         public information.--With different emergency organizations
         responding, assessing, and reporting through a variety of
         Federal plans and programs (with many having no prior
         experience operating together in an NBC WMD environment),
         critical information may not be fully coordinated.
         Technically accurate, complete, and time-sensitive
         information will be urgently required by the OSCs, national
         authorities, and the public. Procedures should be established
         that mandate the establishment and coordinated use of a
         single Joint Information Center (JIC) that serves the
         combined response community. Sources of technically accurate
         information need to be identified, and where appropriate,
         comprehensive and time-sensitive information on NBC WMD
         protective measures should be developed and prepositioned to
         ensure immediate availability. Procedures need to ensure that
         the JIC is responsive to the particular threat and changing
         requirements of each phase of the disaster response.
           Need for an electronic information management and
         communications capability to facilitate response
         coordination.--There is no dedicated system for the
         electronic transfer of information among headquarters
         elements and other emergency operations centers at the
         national level. This lack of capability extends to State and
         local entities. Also, there is no national system of priority
         cellular access by emergency response personnel that ensures
         cellular access and allows coordination of critical assets
         within the disaster area. There is a need to continue
         development of an interagency electronic transfer mechanism
         that provides a dedicated forum for the electronic exchange
         of critical emergency response information among Federal
         departments and agencies.
           Equipment and Training
           Need for specialized equipment and coordinated training for
         response to an NBC WMD terrorist incident.--Local, State, and
         Federal organizations and personnel, and private industry
         supporting critical infrastructures need to be adequately
         equipped and trained to respond to an NBC WMD terrorist
         incident. there is a lack of specialized equipment and
         training, as well as standardization and interoperability
         necessary to fully respond in a safe, timely, and effective
         manner. A national program is needed to provide standards and
         resources for the organizing, equipping, and training of
         emergency personnel responding to NBC WMD acts of terrorism.
         This approach should build upon existing national programs
         and capabilities wherever possible and also identify
         opportunities for mutual support and cost savings in the
         procurement of equipment, delivery of specialized training,
         conduct of exercises, and operational evaluations.
           Need to adequately protect all responders.--Safety
         considerations for first responders and augmentees from all
         sources in the initial phases of consequence management need
         to be a major factor in planning and preparedness.
           Stockpiles
           Need for adequate medical supplies and pharmaceuticals to
         be available or stockpiled to respond to an NBC WMD terrorist
         incident in a timely manner.--HHS has noted that adequate
         medical supplies and pharmaceuticals are not prepositioned
         and readily available for timely use in response to NBC WMD
         incidents. Mitigating and antidote medications need to be
         stockpiled at multiple locations throughout the United
         States. These stockpiled medications should include specialty
         medicines, antidotes, diagnostic devices, and general
         medications for anticipated conditions resulting from a
         terrorist incident. The Department of Veterans Affairs
         hospital centers will serve as feasible stockpile locations
         in view of the multiple sites in the United States and
         distribution channels already in place. Discussion should
         also be initiated with specialty medicinal manufacturers
         regarding internal stockpiles of medications for immediate
         distribution to an incident site.
         Assessment Summary
           An NBC WMD terrorist incident may occur as a local event
         with potentially profound national implications. In
         responding to an NBC WMD incident, first responders must be
         able to provide critical resources within minutes to mitigate
         the effects of NBC materials. As the capability of the local
         government to deal with the immediate effects of an incident
         is essential to the success of any NBC WMD response,
         enhancing or building and maintaining the local capability
         with trained and adequately equipped responders are key
         components of a viable national terrorist response
         capability.
           While the assessment of the FRP and Federal capabilities
         found some deficiencies in overall capability, it also
         identified several current capabilities being built upon or
         expanded to ensure a more viable national NBC WMD responder
         capability. Current initiatives for supplementing existing
         plans, enhancing operations response capabilities, and
         increasing the availability of training are described in the
         Requirements for Improvements in Capabilities section of this
         report.

         assessment of federal capabilities to support state and local
                        prevention and response efforts

         Crisis Management/Support Activities
           Many law enforcement, public safety, and emergency response
         agencies in the United States are well trained and equipped
         to handle the events surrounding many natural and
         technological emergency situations, such as improvised
         explosive devices (IEDs) or HAZMAT spills, without the
         involvement of the Federal Government. However, it is
         anticipated that the threatened or actual use of WMD will
         rapidly overwhelm local and State capabilities and require
         Federal assistance. In addition to advanced technological
         assistance available from Federal departments and agencies
         for the disablement, transport, disposal, and decontamination
         of such weapons and their effects, the primary jurisdiction
         for the resolution of a terrorist or criminal incident
         involving WMD also rests with the Federal Government;
         therefore, a Federal response deployment will be needed to
         augment the initial local response.
           As the actions taken and notifications made within the
         first minutes of a response are critical to the ultimate
         resolution of the incident, first responders to a WMD
         incident need specialized training and equipment to ensure
         that their activities in response to the discovery or use of
         WMD are done in a manner that facilitates transition to
         Federal response operations. The FBI engages in a number of
         activities with State and local agencies to prevent and
         respond to acts of WMD terrorism, including planning,
         training, exercises, task forces, and intelligence sharing.
           Planning
           The FBI has been involved throughout the United States in
         developing plans to respond at a local level to a WMD event.
         Numerous FBI field offices have worked with State and local
         law enforcement and other emergency response agencies in
         planning the response to an event that incorporates the wide
         variety of resources that would be brought to bear on such an
         event. These plans are updated through continuous
         coordination and tested through various exercises.
           Police, fire, and emergency medical personnel need to
         better understand the FBI's role in coordinating the response
         to a WMD threat or incident. To that end, the FBI is in the
         process of coordinating and disseminating national and local-
         level plans for a WMD event relevant to the activities of
         First responders. This effort is further described in the
         section on Requirements for Improvements in Capabilities. As
         discussed below, the FBI also has dedicated significant
         resources for planning the design and content of a first
         responder training initiative.
           Training and Exercises
           This past year, the FBI tasked all 56 of its field offices
         to conduct C/B WMD terrorism exercises in each of their
         regions in accordance with guidelines set forth in the FBI's

    [[Page H656]]

         C/B Incident Contingency Plan. This includes coordination and
         participation by other public safety agencies that would be
         involved in a C/B WMD incident, including first responders,
         regional offices of supporting Federal agencies, and State
         emergency management agencies involved in consequence
         management. Each of the 56 field offices has taken action in
         response to this tasking, and all are in the process of
         planning and conducting C/B WMD exercises.
           The FBI is actively engaged with FEMA and other Federal
         agencies in developing WMD training for State and local
         emergency First responders. In training First responders
         throughout the country, this program will incorporate
         material from all aspects of the response to WMD terrorism,
         including both local crisis and consequence management
         activities. The approach to training and equipping Federal,
         State, and local officials for managing a crisis involving a
         use or threatened use of a WMD, including the consequences of
         the use of such a weapon, necessarily requires an
         understanding of the training mechanisms and delivery systems
         already in place that address target audiences on related
         matters and, which, with some adaptation, could accommodate
         the WMD subject matter. Thereafter, an assessment of the
         audiences and curricula that remain unaddressed can then be
         made. Many excellent training courses are currently available
         across the nation from Federal agencies including FEMA, DOD,
         DOE, EPA, and various State agencies. The FBI is working to
         incorporate law enforcement concerns into such training,
         including evidence protection and preservation.
           Another successful training initiative has been the DOE
         Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), which supports the FBI
         as lead Federal agency in various threats involving nuclear
         material. Through an ongoing cooperative FBI/DOE program,
         nuclear-related briefings are provided by NEST personnel at
         FBI field offices throughout the country. As part of this
         program, the field offices invite State and local law
         enforcement agencies, as well as first responders, to these
         briefings. Through these briefings, participants are made
         aware of the resources available and are provided with an
         overview of how the Federal Government investigates, manages,
         and responds to nuclear-related events. To date, 40 FBI field
         offices, including the largest metropolitan divisions, have
         received NEST briefings, and additional field offices are
         being briefed each month.
           In preparation for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, the FBI
         conducted a series of NBC-related counterterrorism exercises,
         including tabletop, command post, and full-field exercises.
         These exercises included participation by FEMA, EPA, HHS-PHS,
         DOD, and DOE; Georgia and Alabama State public safety and
         emergency management agencies; as well as city and county
         public safety and emergency management agencies. In addition,
         the FBI actively participated in several exercises hosted by
         other Federal agencies in preparation for the Olympics that
         focused on possible terrorist incidents, including WMD
         scenarios.
           The FBI actively runs the Awareness of National Security
         Issues and Response (ANSIR) program. The ANSIR program
         disseminates information to industry and the public in
         general concerning national security matters, particularly
         key issues dealing with terrorism, espionage, proliferation,
         economic espionage, targeting of the national information
         infrastructure, targeting of the U.S. Government, perception
         management, and foreign intelligence activities.
           Task Force/Intelligence Sharing
           The most effective response to any potential or actual WMD
         incident is a well-integrated effort across local, State, and
         Federal agencies. The FBI has been involved in a number of
         actions related to recent events within the United States.
         For example:
           Federal and local components of the FBI participated in the
         1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta, GA, including pre-event
         WMD training scenarios previously discussed, various
         interagency task forces involved with event management and
         intelligence activities, and other activities in support of
         the event.
           Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) components deployed
         in support of the 1996 Democratic National Convention in
         Chicago, IL. This deployment was the first of its kind under
         the DEST concept.
           The FBI is participating in the development of the
         Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams (MMSTs), organized by HHS
         to respond to incident health and medical services
         requirements.
           The FBI manages 12 standing law enforcement task forces
         throughout the country. These task forces include both local
         entities such as sheriffs and State police, as well as local
         representatives of Federal agencies such as the Immigration
         and Naturalization Service (INS), Secret Service, and the
         U.S. Marshals Service. These task forces are prevention-
         oriented groups that allow the exchange and coordination of
         intelligence and activities across the law enforcement
         community.
         Consequence Management/Support Activities
           Any assessment of Federal capabilities to support State and
         local response efforts must address the abilities of State
         and local governments to respond to an incident and their
         expectations related to Federal response and support.
         Obviously there is great variation in response capabilities
         between jurisdictions at both the State and local levels of
         government. Local and State capabilities to respond to the
         consequences of such an event also vary with the particular
         agent used and whether it involves NBC material. For example,
         States and communities in proximity to nuclear power
         plants have better developed capabilities for responding
         to nuclear incidents than those that are not. Similarly,
         States and communities in proximity to chemical weapon
         disposal sites will have expanded capabilities for
         responding to a terrorist event involving a chemical
         weapon. Finally, States and communities that have hosted
         special events that might pose a target for terrorism,
         such as the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, national political
         conventions, or high-visibility national conferences and
         gatherings, are likely to have more complete terrorism
         response plans than those that have not planned for such
         events.
           FEMA has been working closely with State and local
         governments to determine the extent to which their response
         capabilities are adequate to meet the challenges of
         responding to a WMD incident. Results from a National
         Governors Association (NGA) survey, a training focus group
         involving metropolitan area jurisdictions, and discussions
         with fire and emergency management constituencies provide
         good feedback on general State and local capabilities and
         support requirements. The scenarios describing WMD terrorist
         events involving NBC agents used in the Federal assessment
         also were used to help State and local responders focus on
         the capabilities that would be required and to assess the
         adequacy of their current consequence management
         capabilities. While the formats used for assessing the
         capabilities differed, the findings from the local and State
         efforts were surprisingly similar to the Federal findings.
           The following summarizes the findings regarding
         capabilities and deficiencies obtained from the NGA State
         survey and the metropolitan area training focus group under
         the categories of planning and guidance, response resources,
         and training and exercises. Included is an assessment of
         Federal support capabilities required in each area.
           Planning and Guidance
           The majority of the 22 States responding to the NGA survey
         and all 4 of the cities participating in the terrorism focus
         group indicated that their plans address or include response
         to a terrorist incident; however, the responses also
         indicated that current planning is not adequate. Many
         participants in the metropolitan area focus group had limited
         understanding of the provisions of the Stafford Act (which
         authorizes and funds support for Federally declared
         disasters) and the assistance available under the Federal
         Response Plan. The metropolitan areas in general did not have
         a good understanding of the resources and support which the
         Federal Government could provide and how they would go about
         accessing those resources. The need to continue to stress the
         importance of communication and coordination between those
         responsible for crisis management and consequence management
         at all levels of government was noted by both State and local
         officials.
           Other planning-related requirements included a need for a
         more thorough assessment and inventory of local response
         capabilities and expertise, expanded public awareness of the
         terrorism threat, additional planning for medical treatment
         and decontamination procedures (including management of mass
         fatalities), and legal guidance on the liabilities and
         authorities for governmental jurisdictions associated with
         response to NBC incidents. Many of these planning-related
         requirements parallel deficiencies noted in the State survey
         and the previously noted Federal assessment.
           Significant progress has been made in defining the
         responsibilities of various Federal agencies in a terrorist
         event through planning initiatives, exercises, and
         Administration guidance. While Federal agencies are assisting
         their various counterparts at the State and local levels in
         terrorism planning to the extent that their resources allow,
         continuing integration of Federal planning with State and
         local planning is needed to ensure interoperability between
         plans at the various levels of government.
           Response Resources
           Resource requirements identified by both State and local
         governments include detection equipment, personal protective
         equipment (PPE), decontamination equipment and techniques,
         medical supplies, and access to technical information and
         additional trained response personnel. Most Sates and
         communities have some resources and capabilities in each of
         the above areas, but given the possible magnitude of the
         incident and the involvement of unfamiliar and potentially
         lethal agents, most local responders felt that their existing
         capabilities were either inadequate (for certain C/B agents)
         or would be rapidly overwhelmed.
           While the Federal Government, especially DOD, DOE, HHS, and
         EPA, has relevant expertise and possesses some specialized
         equipment and supplies, the adequacy of the necessary
         equipment, supplies, and personnel to meet potential
         requirements and the Federal ability to get them to the
         incident site vary with both the particular resource required
         and the geographic location of the incident. Delays
         associated with getting the required equipment and technical
         expertise to the site where they are needed will likely
         result in increased fatalities; however, costs associated
         with providing appropriate equipment

    [[Page H657]]

         and supplies to all localities nationwide are extremely high.
           Training and Exercises
           Most States and major metropolitan areas have personnel
         trained in emergency response and disaster management with
         training delivery systems. In terms of nuclear and chemical
         WMD, many of the principles of HAZMAT and radiological
         incident response (e.g., scene management, decontamination,
         etc.) will apply with some modifications or enhancements.
         Training developed by FEMA and the DOD Chemical Stockpile
         Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) has direct
         applicability to terrorist events using chemical agents;
         however, relatively little training exists on management of
         incidents involving a biological agent. This is an area of
         concern for both State and local responders.
           Most requirements noted by both the States surveyed and the
         metropolitan focus groups addressed the unique
         characteristics of C/B WMD agents and the associated
         protective measures for response personnel, incident
         management skills to deal with potentially large numbers of
         casualties, and the political and public affairs challenges
         associated with a terrorist incident. Specifically, they
         noted a need for (1) additional training for first responders
         on response actions for incidents (where the hazard is known
         versus unknown) and use of the appropriate PPE for the
         various agents; (2) training on how to use the media
         effectively, coordinate media messages, and minimize public
         panic; (3) training on how to plan for and manage victim and
         family assistance in a mass casualty event; (4) training and
         assistance on medical management issues including triage and
         decontamination procedures, using available medical
         resources, and how to deal with immediate and long-term
         treatment issues; and (5) multi-agency and multi-
         jurisdictional training and exercising to clarify roles and
         responsibilities and improve interoperability of plans and
         procedures.
           With the possible exception of biological terrorism, there
         is considerable technical expertise and many existing
         training materials within the Federal community to address
         most of the requirements cited above; however, the size and
         diversity of the target audience compared with the resources
         available to deliver the training and to exercise plans
         limits the Federal Government's capability to provide the
         required support immediately, thus making this a multi-year
         effort.

                 REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN CAPABILITIES

           Assessments of Federal, State, and local capabilities to
         respond to WMD terrorist incidents have identified several
         areas where improvements are required. FY 1997 funds have
         been allocated to several agencies for WMD-related
         activities. The FBI has received $133.9 million for
         Counterterrorism (CT) enhancements. These funds include
         increased staffing to conduct CT field investigations
         regarding WMD threats, infrastructure vulnerability, key
         assets, and international terrorism; resources for improving
         forensic and crisis management capabilities including
         specialized equipment, deployable laboratories and teams,
         training, and forensic database development; and other
         staffing and resources for improving WMD prevention and
         response.
           Some $15 million has been allocated to FEMA for consequence
         management planning and coordination, assessment and
         training, personnel and protective measures, and grants for
         specialized training and equipment for firefighters. Besides
         the above, additional funds have been allocated to DOD, HHS,
         DOT, and other Federal agencies for terrorism-related
         activities.
           Several activities and initiatives are already under way to
         address requirements to improve capabilities for responding
         to the threat or occurrence of a WMD incident, focusing on
         training, equipment and capability enhancements, planning,
         exercises, new initiatives, and research and development to
         improve the overall local, State, and Federal response
         capability. All of these activities are being closely
         coordinated with those of local and State governments to
         ensure optimal sharing of knowledge and expertise in WMD,
         while deriving maximum benefit from available resources.
         Training
           This area involves training for individuals involved in all
         areas of WMD prevention and response. It includes developing
         and implementing an interagency strategy for meeting priority
         training requirements efficiently. Several facets of current
         training activities are described below.
           The FBI is pursuing significant efforts to prevent a WMD
         incident from occurring through continued proactive and
         interactive training, planning, exercising, intelligence
         gathering, and technology applications involving crisis
         management and consequence management agencies.
           The FBI continues with WMD-related interagency training
         involving nuclear and C/B incident contingency planning for
         FBI Headquarters personnel and field office managers. The FBI
         continues to coordinate with DOD and other government
         agencies to determine the best equipment, protective gear,
         and training available. Ongoing training related to
         successfully operating in a hostile WMD environment will be
         required for the FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and other FBI
         tactical personnel. Equipping and training of selected FBI
         field office Evidence Response Teams (ERTs) to augment the
         Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) in the forensic
         exploitation of potentially contaminated crime scenes will
         also be an ongoing activity.
           DOD, in coordination with DOE, FEMA, and other Federal
         agencies, including the FBI, is providing WMD training to
         State and local first responders, including local and State
         police, and fire and emergency medical personnel who would
         most likely represent the initial response at the site of a
         WMD incident.
           Since first responders will be required to establish
         preliminary perimeters, provide triage to victims, and
         conduct initial interviews, among other actions, their value
         to the ultimate success of the Federal Government in managing
         a WMD incident cannot be overestimated. Presently, most first
         responders have little, if any, specialized training in the
         WMD area, and as such, would become casualties at the
         incident scene.
           FEMA, DOE, DOD, HHS, EPA, and the FBI support training to
         develop a strong State and local first responder
         infrastructure. Some generic training is already being recast
         to address WMD requirements. For instance, FEMA and DOD
         currently have in place a training program for first
         responders in areas near chemical weapon storage sites under
         the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
         (CSEPP). A training program based on CSEPP and tailored for
         police/fire/rescue personnel in all jurisdictions is in the
         initial stages of coordination with FEMA, FBI, and DOD. FEMA
         is also building on its training for first responders
         conducted through its National Fire Academy and Emergency
         Management Institute. In addition, other agencies, such as
         DOE, DOT, and EPA provide training through their normal
         programs that are applicable to terrorism response.
           Funding targeted for training in WMD response is being
         provided through several different sources, as listed below
         by amount and agency:
           $51 million from DOD to the Nunn-Lugar;
           $5.3 million from FEMA in training grants, including
         firefighter training and equipment, to the States; and
           $5 million from the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
         responder training and equipment.
           Federal resources must be used effectively in meeting
         priority training needs of responders to the consequences of
         a WMD incident.
           Federal resources will not meet all of the anticipated
         requests for dealing with the terrorist threat, especially in
         the area of training. To ensure a coordinated training
         approach, FEMA convened a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) on
         consequence management to provide policy-level guidance in
         the development of a Governmentwide terrorism training
         strategy, as well as to address other issues related to
         consequence management. In support of the SIG, an interagency
         Training Task Group (TTG) was established to identify
         training audiences and performance requirements, suggest
         training design (including delivery methodology), define the
         relationship to existing and ongoing training and
         capabilities, and set training priorities and plans for
         short-term and long-term activities. The SICG will continue
         to monitor results from the TTG and other task groups and
         provide additional guidance for implementation of an
         interagency training strategy, which includes the following
         elements:
           Prioritize training under Nunn-Lugar.--In response to DOD's
         request for guidance from FEMA and the interagency community
         on the most appropriate way to allocate training resources to
         meet training requirements specified in Nunn-Lugar, Section
         1412, Emergency Response Assistance Program, the interagency
         strategy calls for allocation of Nunn-Lugar resources
         (including those provided to HHS for the development of the
         MMSTs in FY 1997) to target these resources to the 20 largest
         cities, plus any cities identified by the FBI as being at
         particularly high risk. Participating cities will be asked to
         complete an initial training needs assessment and Federal
         resources and expertise will be applied to meeting those
         needs, using existing training resources to the extent
         possible. This focus of Nunn-Lugar resources on the 20
         largest cities will in no way preclude other target audiences
         (States, communities, etc.) from eligibility for other
         training available from FEMA and other Federal agencies or
         for training resources that may become available in the
         future.
           Continue to analyze training needs on the basis of
         performance requirements.--Using the training requirements
         identified during the FY 1996 assessment initiatives as a
         base, a list of performance goals for communities in
         preparing to respond to WMD incidents will be developed to
         serve as a basis for a community's own needs assessment
         efforts; however, needs assessment must be an ongoing
         process, since training needs will evolve over time as new
         equipment is fielded and experience gained.
           Compile a compendium of existing training.--As noted
         earlier, many courses and training materials already exist
         that, with minor modifications, can begin to meet immediate
         training requirements. FEMA will serve as the repository for
         information on existing training courses and materials.
           Share courses and delivery systems among agencies.--The
         previously noted compendium of training resources maintained
         by FEMA will facilitate sharing of courses and expertise
         among agencies, thus reducing duplication of efforts.
           Deliver existing or modified training in non-traditional
         ways.--Alternative delivery

    [[Page H658]]

         strategies will be needed to reach more people than are
         currently reached with classroom, instructor-based training.
         Use of independent study, computer-based training, satellite
         broadcasts, etc., will be considered in the overall delivery
         strategy.
           Develop new training for unmet needs.--It is anticipated
         that FY 1997 will be used for assessment and delivery of
         existing training and that development of new training will
         begin in earnest during FY 1998.
           Enhance interface with States and cities.--To increase the
         success of the Federal interagency effort, full partnering
         with the States and communities and constituencies will help
         ensure that limited resources are applied most effectively.
         Equipment and Capability Enhancements
           This area involves identifying equipment and capabilities
         needed for a WMD response. It includes stockpiling
         specialized equipment, enhancing the medical response system
         to include developing specialized teams and managing mass
         casualties for a WMD incident, developing a master inventory
         list of equipment and assets that can be accessed by local
         and State responders, and undertaking other initiatives to
         improve operational procedures, including rapid deployment of
         resources to the incident site and improving communications
         access.
           The FBI is addressing the need for additional equipment for
         specialized teams operating in a WMD environment.--While the
         FBI relies on the support of other Federal agencies
         possessing specific technical expertise and equipment to
         respond to an NBC incident, those agencies do not have the
         law enforcement authority or expertise to collect and
         preserve evidence at a crime scene, nor to testify in court
         proceedings. In addition to the critical issue of evidence
         collection, the FBI may be faced with an incident that
         requires a tactical response in an environment contaminated
         with NBC material. The FBI currently possesses a limited
         capability to operate in such an environment; recent
         acquisition of funds will allow the for the purchase of
         HAZMAT protective suits and equipment for HRT and all field
         Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams. This acquisition
         followed by training will allow the FBI to enhance its
         capabilities to operate in a WMD environment.
           HHS is enhancing the capabilities of the medical response
         system to address WMD requirements.--The requirement for
         immediate and significant medical response to save and
         protect lives in incidents involving C/B WMD agents has led
         to several HHS initiatives to enhance the capabilities of the
         existing medical response system. The enhanced system would
         include trained and equipped local first responders, MMSTs,
         specialized medical teams for use in areas without MMSTs,
         Chemical/Biological Rapid Deployment Teams (CBRDTs), enhanced
         Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), patient evacuation
         and definitive care capabilities of the National Disaster
         Medical System (NDMS), pharmaceutical caches, and a
         nationwide network of facilities with specially trained staff
         equipped to treat WMD victims. Some of these activities are
         described below:
           HHS continues work on developing MMSTs composed of
         technical and medical resources for responding to C/B
         incidents. The MMSTs provide a mechanism for immediate
         medical response while additional Federal resources are being
         mobilized and deployed. Each MMST operates as a specially
         organized, trained, and equipped team and includes
         capabilities for agent detection and identification, patient
         decontamination, triage and medical treatment, patient
         transportation to hospitals, and coordination with local law
         enforcement activities. After testing the concept in the
         Washington, DC, metropolitan area and at the 1996 Summer
         Olympic Games, the Washington, DC, MMST established its
         initial operational capability in January 1997, and was
         available to support the 1997 Presidential Inauguration. The
         goal is to establish a total of 100 MMSTs in the next 5
         years.
           HHS is developing three specialized national response
         teams, dispersed geographically throughout the nation, to
         augment local capabilities in areas without MMSTs.
           The CBRDT is another capability developed by HHS providing
         a highly specialized, Federal, multi-agency C/B terrorist
         incident response, medical and health care, and technical
         assistance that supports the OSC for both crisis management
         and consequence management response.
           HHS is enhancing 21 of the highest readiness level NDMS
         DMATs with specialized equipment and training to provide
         further response augmentation.
           In concert with activities to enhance the medical response
         system, HHS is addressing the need to develop local response
         systems for the care of WMD victims. HHS is developing
         procedures for the handling of mass casualties that may
         result from an WMD incident to ensure that Federal resources
         will be available to augment local and State resources for
         dealing with a health problem of a large scale; however, a
         timely Federal response can only argument existing local
         capability and may not meet the needs of all of these
         victims.
           Federal logistics support capabilities are being enhanced
         for WMD response.--FEMA is working with DOD, DOT and the
         General Services Administration (GSA) to enhance basic
         logistics support capabilities by developing a disaster
         transportation management system. The system will include a
         Time-Phased Force Deployment Data and List (TPFDDL) to pre-
         identify logistics requirements for specialized teams,
         equipment, and supplies needed to respond to an NBC incident
         and to then optimize their movement to an incident site on a
         priority basis. A Movement Coordination Center (MCC) is also
         being developed to coordinate the transportation and movement
         activities of the critical resources to the affected area.
           FEMA is developing and implementing a Rapid Response
         Information System.--FEMA is developing guidance and format
         with data requirements for each FRP department and agency to
         use in compiling an inventory of its equipment and assets
         that could be made available to aid State and local officials
         in responding to a WMD incident. FEMA is working to ensure
         that FRP departments and agencies develop, maintain, and
         provide to FEMA their inventory lists for inclusion in a
         comprehensive Master Inventory, to be initially published by
         December 31, 1997, with annual updates. FEMA also will
         develop guidance on accessing and using the physical
         equipment and assets on the Master Inventory List, including
         a system to give Federal, State, and local officials
         controlled access. In coordination with DOD, FEMA will also
         prepare a database on C/B agents and munitions
         characteristics and safety precautions for civilian use.
         The initial design and compilation of this database is to
         be completed not later than December 31, 1997.
         Planning
           This area involves enhancing Federal contingency plans as
         well as national and regional response plans to better
         address the WMD threat. It also includes the development of
         guidance for local and State responders.
           Each FBI office is developing contingency plans for
         response to WMD incidents.--Each FBI field office has been
         requested to furnish an updated plan yearly with points of
         contact and area facilities that could pose a threat of a WMD
         incident, or could supply the agents needed for a WMD
         incident and resources that can be utilized to respond to the
         incident. Additionally all field offices have been tasked to
         maintain contingency plans that identify points of contact
         with regional emergency response agencies and to engage with
         local authorities in planned WMD exercises, review nuclear
         facility response plans, and proceed with other proactive
         initiatives to counter the threat of a WMD incident.
           All FBI field offices with DOE or NRC facilities within
         their territory maintain site-specific nuclear contingency
         plans that are updated annually. These plans ensure that the
         FBI possesses all necessary information regarding each DOE or
         NRC site to enable an effective FBI response to an incident
         at any of these sites. Classified and unclassified Nuclear
         and C/B Incident Contingency Plans have been updated,
         revised, and disseminated to all FBI Offices and OSCs. This
         year, all FBI field offices were tasked to provide
         unclassified versions of these plans to management levels of
         first responders, i.e., police, fire, and emergency medical
         personnel, to ensure their understanding and coordination
         during a unified Federal response.
           Federal emergency response plans are being refined to
         address WMD consequences.--The PDD-39 assessment validated
         the need to amend the FRP with incident-specific annexes to
         better address the unique aspects of the response to a
         terrorist event. The FRP Terrorism Incident Annex describes
         the concept of operations for a terrorism response involving
         the crisis management response, led by the FBI, and the
         consequence management response, led by FEMA. The Federal
         interagency community has concurred on the annex and it is
         scheduled for publication in early 1997.
           FEMA is also developing planning guidance on terrorism
         response for use by FEMA Regional Offices to incorporate into
         their interagency Regional Response Plans that describe how
         the FRP is implemented at the regional level.
           A draft FRP Radiological Incident Annex has been developed
         that describes the relationship of the FRP to the FRERP,
         which is used to coordinate Federal monitoring, assessment,
         and other technical resources in response to a radiological
         incident, including a WMD involving nuclear materials. The
         draft annex is being validated in several radiological
         incident exercises this year and is expected to be published
         in 1997.
           State and local governments are being supported in
         improving plans for responding to the consequences of a WMD
         incident.--States and localities face new planning challenges
         in preparing for response to a terrorist event using WMD.
         FEMA's experience in Oklahoma City and the feedback from the
         metropolitan area focus groups indicate a need for additional
         guidance by States and local governments for responding to a
         terrorist incident, including notification procedures,
         interface with law enforcement personnel, and access to
         unique Federal capabilities and resources. This is especially
         true for major metropolitan areas, where direct interface
         with Federal response personnel and unique Federal resources
         is more likely in a terrorist event than in a typical natural
         disaster; therefore, a terrorism supplement to the recently
         published Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning
         is a priority for FY 1997. In addition to operational
         planning guidance, there is a need to ensure that Governors
         and other State senior policy officials are familiar with the
         challenges they may face in responding to a terrorist event.
         To

    [[Page H659]]

         meet this need, a popular NGA handbook, A Governor's Guide to
         Emergency Management, will be updated to address terrorism-
         specific issues.
         Exercises
           Improved plans and access to technical information,
         equipment, and supplies will do little to improve terrorism
         response capabilities without trained personnel who have had
         the opportunity to test plans and procedures and assume their
         roles and responsibilities in exercises. Therefore, while one
         goal for FY 1997 addresses the development of an interagency
         strategy for the delivery of training to State and local
         responders, a related goal focuses on a coordinated approach
         to exercising plans and procedures.
           Agencies must test and evaluate plans, procedures, and
         coordination mechanisms for responding to a WMD incident.--
         Interagency WMD terrorism exercises are expensive and require
         extensive planning to ensure that all participating agencies
         most effectively test and evaluate their plans, procedures,
         and coordination mechanisms for responding to a WMD incident
         as part of the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST).
         Interagency participation in these exercises is vital to
         familiarize all members of the crisis management community
         with the command structures and functions of the various
         components.
           Despite the high costs, continuous efforts must be made to
         exercise for possible WMD contingencies. The FBI is co-chair
         and an active member of an interagency planning group for
         exercises, which includes all Federal agencies with a role in
         response to terrorism as members. WMD scenarios have been the
         focus of most of the recent exercises and continue to be
         highlighted in future exercise planning. The FBI Crisis
         Incident Response Group (CIRG) plays a critical and essential
         role in all exercise planning deployments and response to
         credible incidents.
           The FBI exercises with other Federal agencies extensively
         and anticipates participating in up to eight federally
         coordinated exercises and numerous State/local exercises
         annually. A full-field exercise should be scheduled and
         completed within the next two fiscal years.
           Exercises will be used to test and improve consequence
         management response capabilities.--This effort addresses the
         need for improved understanding of and interoperability
         between response plans at various levels of government and
         responds to the previously noted requirement for multi-agency
         and multi-jurisdictional training and exercising to clarify
         roles and responsibilities and improve interoperability of
         plans and procedures. FEMA's interagency National Exercise
         Schedule provides a mechanism for documenting and
         disseminating information on planned unclassified terrorism
         WMD exercises involving multiple agencies and/or levels of
         government.
           Recognizing that terrorism consequence management plans and
         procedures are either under development or just being
         finalized, the FY 1997 Federal emphasis will be on tabletop
         exercises in each FEMA Region to familiarize regional and
         State responders with the new FRP Terrorism Incident Annex
         and associated roles and responsibilities. This will
         culminate in a functional consequence management exercise,
         ILL WIND, which is scheduled for late FY 1997 in the
         Washington, DC, area. In addition, FEMA and some States and
         localities will be involved in exercises sponsored by other
         agencies that will likely address both crisis and consequence
         management issues.
           DOD recommends a multi-agency series of field exercises
         covering a wide range of C/B scenarios in order to build a
         solid understanding of potential C/B terrorism, and to
         systematically evaluate improved countermeasures to prevent
         and respond to such incidents.
           Finally, the SIG has expressed interest in reviewing a
         coordinated terrorism exercise strategy similar to that
         developed for training. In interfacing with State and local
         governments, given the very limited resources available,
         Federal coordination on planned exercises and priorities for
         addressing deficiencies is essential. This Federal
         coordination will occur in the Interagency Working Group-
         Counterterrorism (IWG-CT) Exercise Subcommittee.
         New Initiatives
           Stemming from the FY 1995 National Defense Authorization
         Act is a joint FBI and DOD initiative, in coordination with
         the State Department, DOE, the U.S. Customs Service, the
         Department of Commerce (DOC), and the Intelligence Community
         (IC) to provide law enforcement officials, judges, and
         prosecutors from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern
         Europe with training in countering nuclear/radiological
         smuggling/trafficking and C/B proliferation.
           This 3-year initiative, which includes the training of
         officials from 3 to 12 FSU/Southern Tier countries at the
         International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest,
         Hungary, or at the DOD facilities in Garmisch, Germany, is
         now under way. The initiative will also provide WMD detection
         equipment and training to law enforcement officials in their
         respective countries and undertake a review of each country's
         laws to recommend statutory changes to complement enforcement
         and training, as warranted.
           The FBI Laboratory Division has developed the Hazardous
         Materials Response Unit (HMRU) to resolve scientific and
         technical aspects of illegal acts involving NBC and
         environmental incidents. The Laboratory Division has also
         coordinated with DOD and the Commonwealth of Virginia for
         training of FBI first responders and the Evidence Response
         Teams (ERTs) on how to function in tandem with the military
         in the hostile environment of a WMD incident. In this manner,
         a sworn FBI evidence expert will direct the collection and
         preservation of evidence, while at the same time, rely on
         military advice and assets in order to mitigate a C/B agent
         and for transport of C/B agents for examination purposes. To
         date, more than 50 ERT members from 6 major metropolitan
         field offices have been trained and equipped with HAZMAT
         protective suits.
         Research and Development
           The FBI is currently pursuing a number of research and
         development (R&D) efforts to enhance detection capabilities,
         disablement tools, advanced render-safe techniques, and new
         forensic tools for identifying terrorist bombings. R&D
         projects include development of explosive detectors, research
         on explosives residues, and development of a portable device
         for the analysis of explosives, drugs, and chemical warfare
         agents using Raman Spectroscopy. Other R&D projects aimed at
         providing first responders with the technical capabilities to
         safely and effectively contain a WMD incident include
         development of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
         countermeasures for large vehicle bombs, development of an
         affordable miniaturized robotics vehicle capable of
         delivering explosive disablement tools, identification of
         render-safe procedures for improvised C/B devices, enhanced
         explosive detection capabilities for civilian bomb
         technicians, and the development of methods to identify
         forensically and capture residues left by improvised
         explosive charges used by terrorists.
           A number of agencies throughout the counterterrorism
         community participate in the Technical Support Working Group
         (TSWG), a subgroup of the NSC Interagency Working Group on
         Counterterrorism. The TSWG has the specific mission of
         conducting rapid research, development, and prototyping of
         counterterrorism technologies. Several different subgroups
         exist beneath the TSWG focusing on various aspects of
         counterterrorism. Continued funding of the TSWG and other
         research and development programs is critical to developing
         field-deployable technologies to deter, detect, prevent, and
         resolve potential WMD terrorist threats and incidents.

                        MEASURES TO ACHIEVE IMPROVEMENTS

           Building upon current activities, the following describes
         the requirements for continued funding, legislative
         improvements, authorities, and research and development (R&D)
         initiatives to enhance current weapons of mass destruction
         (WMD) prevention and response capabilities.
         Funding
           FY 1997 funding is supporting a variety of activities
         deriving from existing NSC guidance, Nunn-Lugar initiatives,
         and other programs to determine requirements, assess and
         remedy shortfalls, and enhance capabilities for WMD
         prevention and response. To maintain and enhance
         capabilities, continued funding in FY 1998 and beyond is
         required to support training, equipment and capability
         building, planning, and exercises. This requirement for
         continued funding assumes that State and local governments
         are also willing to share some of the costs of the capability
         building.
           In FR 1997, the coordinated interagency training strategy
         proposes to target the largest 20 cities to receive the
         majority of training and assistance provided via Nunn-Lugar,
         with the remaining resources spread among the many other
         jurisdictions and response groups. In FY 1998, additional
         jurisdictions are being added to increase the overall
         preparedness level of local governments to deal with WMD
         requirements. In support of this effort, training materials
         will need to be updated as plans and procedures are refined
         and responder needs are better defined.
           Specialized equipment and protective gear for personnel
         operating in a WMD environment are required by the FBI and
         other agencies. The Rapid Response Information System will
         require annual updating to ensure that the resource and
         capability information being accessed by local and State
         response agencies is accurate and complete.
           Continued interagency planning will be required to ensure
         close coordination among Federal departments and agencies and
         State and local emergency management agencies in dealing with
         WMD requirements.
           Finally, most of the exercises planned for FY 1997 are
         Federal/State tabletop exercises that are relatively
         inexpensive to plan and deliver. In subsequent years,
         functional and full-scale exercises involving all levels of
         government will need to be developed and implemented to
         ensure full capability.
         Legislation
           On April 24, 1996, the President signed into law the
         Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. This
         legislation, which was initially proposed by the President in
         the State of the Union Address in January 1995, represents
         the most significant and comprehensive antiterrorism
         legislative package ever enacted in the United States.
         Legislative proposals that remain relate to items that
         Congress dropped from the 1995 Administration proposal, or
         highly focused issues that have arisen in the course of
         administering existing law. Within this context, it is
         anticipated that DOJ will propose several items of
         legislation designed to enhance the Government's ability to
         combat terrorism.

    [[Page H660]]

           The first priority for additional legislation remains
         Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
         The CWC is the best means to ensure the nonproliferation of
         chemical weapons and their eventual destruction by all
         nations. This Convention makes it illegal to develop,
         produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer, use, own, or
         possess any chemical weapon, or to knowingly assist,
         encourage, or induce any person to do so, or attempt or
         conspire to do so. U.S. compliance with the CWC will require
         that changes be made to the existing criminal statutes
         relating to use of chemical weapons, 18 U.S.C. Section 2332c,
         and use of WMD, 18 U.S.C. Section 2332a. These legislative
         amendments have been drafted within DOJ and are currently
         undergoing review. Submission of such a legislative proposal
         would have to be closely coordinated with the
         Administration's efforts to achieve ratification of the CWC.
           Although the CWC was not designed to prevent chemical
         terrorism, certain aspects of the Convention, including its
         implementing legislation and nonproliferation provisions,
         will augment existing law enforcement efforts to fight
         chemical terrorism. Implementing legislation required by the
         CWC will strengthen legal authority to investigate and
         prosecute violations of the treaty and raise the level of
         public alertness to the threat and illegality of chemical
         weapons. For example, the proposed U.S. implementing
         legislation contains the clearest, most comprehensive, and
         internationally recognized definition of a chemical weapon
         available, far more precise than the term ``poison gas''
         contained in Title 18 of the Criminal Code. The definition
         contained in the implementing legislation will enable an
         investigator to request a search warrant on the basis of
         suspicion of illegal chemical weapons activity (such as
         production of a chemical weapon agent), rather than suspicion
         of conspiracy to commit terrorism, as exists under current
         U.S. law. By providing investigators and prosecutors a more
         precise legal basis for pursuing the development, production,
         transfer, or acquisition of chemical weapons, CWC
         implementing legislation improves prospects for detection,
         early intervention, and possibly even prevention of chemical
         terrorism in the United States.
         Research and Development
           New or enhanced technical capabilities needed to counter
         increasingly sophisticated terrorist organizations include
         the ability to intercept advanced telecommunications, with a
         primary focus on wireless and satellite-based systems;
         improved tracking and physical surveillance technologies for
         weapons, explosives, etc.; automatic language translation and
         text/key word recognition; and technology to support
         surreptitious entry.
           Current research and development funding is not adequate.
         Additional funding is needed to continue work on an indepth
         chemical characterization of foreign explosives and for
         continued development of contraband detection technology.
         Additional funding would accelerate development in a number
         of key technologies, particularly communications
         interception, tracking, covert communications, and
         surreptitious access. These technologies are critical to the
         support of counterterrorism investigations, especially WMD-
         related threats.
                                                                        ____

                                    ACRONYMS

         AG--Attorney General
         ANSIR--Awareness of National Security Issues and Response
         ATSDR--Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
         C/B--Chemical/Biological
         CBR--Chemical/Biological/Radiological
         CBRDT--Chemical/Biological Rapid Deployment Team
         CDC--Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
         CIRG--Crisis Incident Response Group
         COA--Course of Action
         CRMER--Center for Risk Modeling and Emergency Response
         CSEPP--Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
         CT--Counterterrorism
         CWC--Chemical Weapons Convention
         DEST--Domestic Emergency Support Team
         DMAT--Disaster Medical Assistance Team
         DOC--Department of Commerce
         DOD--Department of Defense
         DOE--Department of Energy
         DOJ--Department of Justice
         DOS--Department of State
         DOT--Department of Transportation
         DTL--DEST Team Leader
         EMS--Emergency Medical Services
         EOD--Explosive Ordnance Disposal
         EPA--Environmental Protection Agency
         ERT--Evidence Response Team
         ESF--Emergency Support Function
         FBI--Federal Bureau of Investigation
         FDA--Food and Drug Administration
         FEMA--Federal Emergency Management Agency
         FOSC--Federal On-Scene Coordinator
         FRERP--Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
         FRMAC--Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
         FRP--Federal Response Plan
         FSU--Former Soviet Union
         FY--Fiscal Year
         GSA--General Services Administration
         HAZMAT--Hazardous Materials
         HHS--Department of Health and Human Services
         HMRU--Hazardous Materials Response Unit
         HQ--Headquarters
         HRSA--Health Resources and Services Administration
         HRT--Hostage Rescue Team
         IC--Intelligence Community
         IED--Improvised explosive device
         IICT--Interagency Intelligency Committee on Terrorism
         ILEA--International Law Enforcement Academy
         INS--Immigration and Naturalization Service
         IWG--Interagency Working Group
         IWG-CT--Interagency Working Group-Counterterrorism
         JABC--Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
         JIC--Joint Information Center
         JOC--Joint Operations Center
         MCC--Movement Coordination Center
         MMST--Metropolitan Medical Strike Team
         MSU--Medical Management Support Unit
         MTAG--Missile Trade Analysis Group
         NAREL--National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory
         NBC--Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical
         NCP--National Contingency Plan
         NDMS--National Disaster Medical System
         NEIC--National Enforcement Investigations Center
         NEST--Nuclear Emergency Search Team
         NEVWG--Nuclear Export Violation Working Group
         NGA--National Governors Association
         NIH--National Institutes of Health
         NRAT--Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team
         NRC--Nuclear Regulatory Commission
         NRT--National Response Team
         NSC--National Security Council
         OEP/OPHS--Office of Emergency Preparedness/Office of Public
             Health and Science
         ORIA--Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
         OSC--On-Scene Commander
         PDD--Presidential Decision Directive
         PHS--Public Health Service
         PPE--Personal Protective Equipment
         R&D--Research and Development
         RRT--Regional Response Team
         SAC--Special Agent-in-Charge
         SAMHSA--Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
             Administration
         SIG--Senior Interagency Groups
         SWAT--Special Weapons and Tactics
         TEU--Technical Escort Unit
         TPFDDL--Time-Phased Force Deployment Data and List
         TSWG--Technical Support Working Group
         TTG--Training Task Group
         U.S.--United States
         USCG--U.S. Coast Guard
         USDA--United States Department of Agriculture
         USG--United States Government
         WMD--Weapons of Mass Destruction

                              ____________________

    ---------------------------------------------------------------

    [End]

    14 March 1997

    See related documents:

    "The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997":

       http://jya.com/ndatoc.htm  (70K toc; 1.5M full act)

    "The Antiterrorism Act of 1996":

       http://jya.com/pl104-132.txt  (358K)

    Senate "Intelligence Committee Report 1995-96":

       http://jya.com/sr105-1.htm  (135K)

    "Intelligence Authorization Act for 1997":

       http://jya.com/pl104-293.txt  (85K)

    "Executive Order 13010--Critical Infrastructure Protection":

       http://jya.com/eo13010.txt  (20K)

    "Implementation of Section 104 of the Communications Assistance
    for Law Enforcement Act":

       http://jya.com/fbi011497.txt  (71K)

    And several presidental orders and congressional reports on
    Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:

       http://jya.com/wmd022797.txt  (19K)
       http://jya.com/no111496.txt   (36K)
       http://jya.com/wmd092796.txt  (76K)
       http://jya.com/wmd092995.txt  (25K)
       http://jya.com/wmd060995.txt  (108K)
       http://jya.com/wmd100694.txt  (61K)

    5 May 1997

    Domestic terrorism measures by DoD and FBI:

       http://jya.com/dod041697.htm
       http://jya.com/fbi041797.htm

    Annual State Department reports on Patterns of Global Terrorism:

       http://jya.com/pgt1996.htm (note .htm)
       http://jya.com/pgt1995.txt
       http://jya.com/pgt1994.txt
       http://jya.com/pgt1993.txt

    Senate and White House on the Chemical Weapons Convention:

       http://jya.com/s495.htm
       http://jya.com/cwc042597.txt

    ATF on explosive materials and bomb threats:

       http://jya.com/atf042597.txt
       http://jya.com/bomb.htm