28 December 1998
Source: http://web7.whs.osd.mil/corres.htm

DOD Directive 5100.20 The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service

DOD Directive 5100.23 Administrative Arrangements for the National Security Agency

DOD Directive 5100.35 Military Communications-Electronics Board (MCEB)

DOD Directive 5100.47 National Cryptologic School

DOD Directive 5100.85 Intelligence Systems Board (ISB)

DOD Instruction 5105.58 Management of Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)

DOD Directive 5148.11 Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO))

DOD Directive 5160.54 Critical Asset Assurance Program (CAAP)

DOD Directive 5200.1 DoD Information Security Program

DOD Directive 5205.8 Access to Classified Cryptographic Information

DOD Directive 5210.45 Personnel Security in the National Security Agency

DOD Directive 5210.70 DoD Cryptologic Training

For more publications see: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/index.html

    Department of Defense

    DIRECTIVE

    NUMBER 5100.20

    December 23, 1971

    Administrative Reissuance Incorporating Through Change
    4, June 24, 1991

    ASD(I)

    SUBJECT:  The National Security Agency and the Central
    Security Service

    References:  (a)  National Security Council Intelligence
    Directive No. 6

    1.  PURPOSE

    This directive prescribes authorities, functions, and
    responsibilities of the National Security Agency (NSA)
    and the Central Security Service (CSS).

    2.  CONCEPT

    2.1.  Subject to the provisions of NSCID No. 6, and
    the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and pursuant
    to the authorities vested in the Secretary of Defense,
    the National Security Agency is a separately organized
    agency within the Department of Defense under the direction,
    supervision, funding, maintenance and operation of the
    Secretary of Defense.

    2.2.  The National Security Agency is a unified organization
    structured to provide for the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
    mission of the United States and to insure secure communications
    systems for all departments and agencies of the U.S.
    Government.

    2.3.  The Central Security Service will conduct collection,
    processing and other SIGINT operations as assigned.

     Declassified on May 22, 1990

    by the Director of Administration and Management,

    Office of the Secretary of Defense

    (Authority:   E.O. 12356, April 6, 1982)

    3.  DEFINITIONS

    3.1.  Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)  is a category of
    intelligence information comprising all Communications
    Intelligence (COMINT), Electronics Intelligence (ELINT),
    and Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT).

    3.2.  COMINT  is technical and intelligence information
    derived from foreign communications by other than the
    intended recipients.   COMINT is produced by the collection
    and processing of foreign communications passed by electromagnetic
    means, with specific exceptions stated below, and by
    the processing of foreign encrypted communications,
    however transmitted.   Collection comprises search,
    intercept, and direction finding.   Processing comprises
    range estimation, transmitter/operator identification,
    signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysts, decryption,
    study of plain text, the fusion of these processes,
    and the reporting of results.   COMINT shall not include:

    3.2.1.  Intercept and processing of unencrypted written
    communications, except the processing of written plain
    text versions of communications which have been encrypted
    or are intended for subsequent encryption.

    3.2.2.  Intercept and processing of press, propaganda
    and other public broadcasts, except for processing encrypted
    or "hidden meaning" passages in such broadcasts.

    3.2.3.  Oral and wire interceptions conducted under
    DoD Directive 5200.24.

    3.2.4.  Censorship.

    3.3.  ELINT  is technical and intelligence information
    derived from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic
    radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation
    or radioactive sources.   ELINT is produced by the collection
    (observation and recording), and the processing for
    subsequent intelligence purposes of that information.

    3.4.  TELINT  is technical and intelligence information
    derived from the intercept, processing, and analysis
    of foreign telemetry.

    3.5.  SIGINT  operational control is the authoritative
    direction of SIGINT activities, including tasking and
    allocation of effort, and the authoritative prescription
    of those uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT
    information is collected, processed and reported.

    3.6.  SIGINT resources  comprise units/activities and
    organizational elements engaged in the conduct of SIGINT
    (COMINT, ELINT or TELINT) activities.

    4.  APPLICABILITY

    The provisions of this directive apply to the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Department,
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified
    Commands, the National Security Agency, the Central
    Security Service, and other Defense Agencies hereinafter
    called Department of Defense Components.

    5.  ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES

    5.1.  The SIGINT resources of the Department of Defense
    will be structured to accomplish most efficiently and
    effectively the SIGINT mission of the U.S.

    5.2.  The National Security Agency shall consist of
    a Director, a Headquarters, and such subordinate units,
    elements, facilities, and activities as are assigned
    to the National Security Agency by the Secretary of
    Defense in his role as the executive agent of the Government
    for the conduct of SIGINT.

    5.3.  The Central Security Service is comprised of a
    Chief, Central Security Service, a Deputy Chief, a jointly
    staffed headquarters, Army, Navy/Marine Corps and Air
    Force operating elements, and such other subordinate
    elements and facilities as may be assigned to the Central
    Security Service by the Secretary of Defense.

    5.4.  The Director, National Security Agency, shall
    also be the Chief, Central Security Service.

    5.5.  The Director of the National Security Agency/Chief,
    Central Security Service shall have a Deputy Director
    for the National Security Agency and a Deputy Chief,
    Central Security Service.   To provide continuity in
    SIGINT matters the Deputy Director, National Security
    Agency, shall be a technically experienced civilian.
      The Deputy Chief, Central Security Service, shall
    be a commissioned officer of the Military Services,
    of not less than two star rank, designated by the Secretary
    of Defense.   The Deputy Chief will normally not be
    selected from the same Military Service as the Chief.

    5.6.  The Director and Deputy Director of the National
    Security Agency shall be designated by the Secretary
    of Defense, subject to the approval of the President.
      The Director shall be a commissioned officer of the
    Military Services, on active or reactivated status,
    and shall enjoy not less than three star rank during
    the period of his incumbency.

    5.7.  The Director, National Security Agency/Chief,
    Central Security Service shall report to the Secretary
    of Defense.

    5.8.  The Commanders of the Service cryptologic organizations
    and their subordinate activities which conduct SIGINT
    operations will be subordinate to the Chief, Central
    Security Service, for all matters involving SIGINT activities.
      In this role they will be designated as Service element
    commanders and subordinate activities of the Central
    Security Service.   Unless otherwise specifically provided
    in this directive, the Service cryptologic organizations
    will remain in their parent Services, for the purpose
    of administrative and logistic support.

    5.9.  The Secretary of Defense with the advice of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff may specifically designate other
    SIGINT-related resources of the Department of Defense
    which will be subordinate to the Chief, Central Security
    Service for SIGINT operations.

    6.  RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

    6.1.  Subject to the direction, authority and control
    of the Secretary of Defense, the Director, National
    Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service shall:

    6.1.1.  Accomplish the SIGINT mission of the National
    Security Agency/Central Security Service.

    6.1.2.  Act as principal SIGINT advisor to the Secretary
    of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff.   As principal SIGINT advisor
    to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director, National
    Security Agency will keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    fully informed on SIGINT matters.

    6.1.3.  Exercise SIGINT operational control over SIGINT
    activities of the U.S. Government to respond most effectively
    to military and other SIGINT requirements.   In the
    case of mobile military SIGINT platforms, he shall state
    movement requirements through appropriate channels to
    the military commanders, who shall retain responsibility
    for operational command of the vehicles.

    6.1.4.  Provide technical guidance to all SIGINT or
    SIGINT-related operations of the U.S. Government.

    6.1.5.  Formulate programs, plans, policies, procedures
    and principles.

    6.1.6.  Produce and disseminate SIGINT in accordance
    with the objectives, requirements and priorities established
    by the Director of Central Intelligence.   (This function
    will not include the production and dissemination of
    finished intelligence which are the responsibilities
    of departments and agencies other than the National
    Security Agency/Central Security Service.)

    6.1.7.  Manage assigned SIGINT resources, personnel
    and programs.

    6.1.8.  In relation to the Department of Defense SIGINT
    activities, prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense
    a consolidated program and budget, and requirements
    for military and civilian manpower, logistic and communications
    support, and research, development, test and evaluation,
    together with his recommendations pertaining thereto.

    6.1.9.  Conduct research, development and systems design
    to meet the needs of the National Security Agency/Central
    Security Service and coordinate with the departments
    and agencies their related research, development, test
    and evaluation in the SIGINT field.

    6.1.10.  Determine and submit to the Secretary of Defense
    logistic support requirements for the National Security
    Agency, and the Central Security Service, together with
    specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible
    departments and agencies of the Government should supply.

    6.1.11.  Develop requisite security rules, regulations
    and standards governing operating practices in accordance
    with the policies of the U.S. Intelligence Board and
    the U.S. Communications Security Board.

    6.1.12.  Prescribe within his field of authorized operations
    requisite security regulations covering operating practices,
    including the transmission, handling, and distribution
    of SIGINT material within and among the elements under
    his control; and exercise the necessary monitoring and
    supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations.

    6.1.13.  Make reports and furnish information to the
    U.S. Intelligence Board or the U.S. Communications Security
    Board, as required.

    6.1.14.  Respond to the SIGINT requirements of all DoD
    components and other departments and agencies.

    6.1.15.  Eliminate unwarranted duplication of SIGINT
    efforts.

    6.1.16.  Standardize SIGINT equipment and facilities
    wherever practicable.

    6.1.17.  Provide for production and procurement of SIGINT
    equipments.

    6.1.18.  Provide the Director of Central Intelligence
    through the Secretary of Defense with such information
    as required on the past, current and proposed plans,
    programs, and costs of the SIGINT activities under his
    control.

    6.1.19.  Provide guidance to the military departments
    to effect and insure sound and adequate military and
    civilian SIGINT career development and training programs,
    and conduct, or otherwise provide for, necessary specialized
    and advanced SIGINT training.

    6.1.20.  Provide technical advice and support to enhance
    SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments, and conduct,
    as authorized, SIGINT exchanges with foreign governments.

    6.1.21.  Perform such other functions as the Secretary
    of Defense assigns.

    7.  AUTHORITIES

    7.1.  Subject to the authority, direction and control
    of the Secretary of Defense, the Director, National
    Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, is
    specifically delegated authority to:

    7.1.1.  Exercise SIGINT operational control over SIGINT
    activities of the United States.

    7.1.2.  Issue direct to any of his operating elements
    such instructions and orders necessary to carry out
    his responsibilities and functions.

    7.1.3.  Have direct access to, and direct communications
    with, any element of the U.S. Government performing
    SIGINT functions.

    7.1.4.  The authority in paragraphs 7.1.1.,7.1.2., and
    7.1.3. above is subject to review, approval and control
    in accordance with procedures determined by the Secretary
    of Defense.

    7.1.5.  Adjust as required, through the Service cryptologic
    organizations, personnel resources under his SIGINT
    operational control.

    7.1.6.  Centralize or consolidate SIGINT operations
    for which he is responsible to the extent desirable,
    consistent with efficiency, economy, effectiveness,
    and support to field commanders.

    7.1.7.  Submit, as appropriate, concurrent/letter of
    evaluation efficiency/fitness reports on the commanders
    of subordinate elements of the Central Security Service
    in accordance with parent Service procedures.

    7.1.8.  Delegate SIGINT operational tasking of specified
    SIGINT resources and facilities for such periods and
    or such operational tasks as required or as directed
    by the Secretary of Defense.

    7.1.9.  Prescribe SIGINT procedures for activities to
    whom he provides technical guidance.

    7.1.10.  Prescribe, or review and approve security rules,
    regulations and instructions, as appropriate.

    7.1.11.  Conduct those SIGINT operations undertaken
    in support of certain missions within the purview of
    NSCID No. 5.

    7.1.12.  Obtain such information and intelligence material
    from the departments and agencies (Military Departments,
    other Department of Defense agencies, or other departments
    or agencies of the Government) as may be necessary for
    the performance of the National Security Agency/Central
    Security Service functions.

    7.1.13.  Maintain a departmental property account for
    the National Security Agency and the Central Security
    Service headquarters.

    7.2.  Other authorities, specifically delegated by the
    Secretary of Defense or by other proper authority to
    the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central
    Security Service in other directives or issuances, will
    be referenced in an Enclosure to this directive.

    8.  RELATIONSHIPS

    8.1.  In the performance of its responsibilities and
    functions, the National Security Agency/Central Security
    Service shall:

    8.1.1.  Coordinate actions, as appropriate, with other
    DoD Components, and other departments and agencies of
    the Government.

    8.1.2.  Maintain direct liaison, as appropriate, for
    the exchange of information and advice in the field
    of its assigned responsibility with other DoD Components
    and other departments and agencies of the Government.

    8.1.3.  Coordinate with other DoD Components and other
    departments and agencies of the Government to make maximum
    use of established facilities to preclude unnecessarily
    duplicating such facilities.

    8.1.4.  Provide for direct liaison by representatives
    of the intelligence components of individual departments
    and agencies regarding interpretation and amplification
    of requirements and priorities within the framework
    of objectives, requirements, and priorities established
    by the Director of Central Intelligence.

    8.2.  Other DoD Components shall provide support, within
    their respective fields of responsibility, to the Director,
    National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service
    as may be necessary to carry out his assigned responsibilities
    and functions.

    9.  ADMINISTRATION

    9.1.  To the extent applicable and consistent with the
    functions assigned to the National Security Agency/Central
    Security Service, Department of Defense policies, regulations
    and procedures will govern.

    9.2.  The National Security Agency/Central Security
    Service will be authorized such personnel, facilities,
    funds and other administrative support as the Secretary
    of Defense deems necessary for the performance of its
    functions.   Other DoD Components shall provide support
    for the Agency/Service as prescribed in specific directives
    or support agreements.

    10.  CANCELLATION

    To the extent they are inconsistent herewith, DoD Directive
    S-5100.20, "The National Security Agency," dated March
    19, 1959, DoD Directive S- 3115.4, "Communications Intelligence,"
    dated March 19, 1959, and DoD Directive S-3115.2, "Electronics
    Intelligence," dated February 7, 1967 are hereby canceled.

    11.  EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

    11.1.  This directive is effective upon publication.

    11.2.  To meet the provisions of this Directive, the
    Director, National Security Agency will develop a plan
    to implement this Directive including establishment
    of the Central Security Service for approval by the
    Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff.

    11.3.  When the Central Security Service is established
    under the terms of this Directive and the approved implementing
    plan, all Department of Defense Components will review
    their existing directives, instructions, and regulations
    for conformity and submit necessary amendments thereto
    to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
    within ninety (90) days.

    Enclosures - 1

    1.  Listing of Specific Delegations of Authority

    E1.  ENCLOSURE 1

    Listing of Specific Delegations of Authority by the
    Secretary of Defense to the Director of the National
    Security Agency

    E1.1.1.  Administrative authorities required for the
    administration and operation of the National Security
    Agency, as prescribed in DoD Directive 5100.23, dated
    May 17, 1967.

    E1.1.2.  Authority to authorize or request the procurement
    of cryptologic material and equipment by the Military
    Departments, as prescribed in DoD Directive 5160.13,
    dated March 20, 1956.

    E1.1.3.  Authority to establish and administer programs
    of training, as prescribed in DoD Directive 1430.4,
    dated August 5, 1969.

    E1.1.4.  Authority to assign the classification of TOP
    SECRET, as prescribed in DoD Directive 5200.1, "DoD
    Information Security Program Regulation," authorized
    by DoD Directive 5200.1, June 1, 1972.

    E1.1.5.  Authority to determine the eligibility of individual
    civilian officers and employees to transport or store
    their privately owned motor vehicles at Government expense,
    in accordance with provisions of DoD Directive 1418.3,
    dated June 28, 1965.

    Department of Defense

    DIRECTIVE

    NUMBER 5100.23

    May 17, 1967

    Administrative Reissuance Incorporating Through Change
    2, November 1, 1985

    SUBJECT:  Administrative Arrangements for the National
    Security Agency

    References:  (a)  DoD Directive S-5100.20, "The National
    Security Agency"

    (b)  DoD Directive 5100.23, "Administrative Arrangements
    for the National Security Agency," August 25, 1959 (hereby
    canceled)

    1.  PURPOSE

    This Directive prescribes certain administrative arrangements
    and delegates administrative authorities required for
    the administration and operation of the National Security
    Agency (NSA).

    2.  ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

    The National Security Agency is a separately organized
    agency within the Department of Defense under the direction,
    authority and control of the Secretary of Defense who
    acts as executive agent of the Government for the maintenance
    and operation of the National Security Agency.   To
    the extent applicable and consistent with the functions
    assigned to the Agency, Department of Defense policies,
    regulations, and procedures will govern the Agency's
    operations.   When DoD directives, instructions, or
    other authoritative issuances hereafter published refer
    to DoD Components or Defense Agencies, these terms include
    NSA unless the issuance itself specifically exempts
    NSA, or the Agency had obtained an exception or modification
    as provided below:

    2.1.  Originators of DoD directives, instructions, and
    substantive changes to these documents shall ascertain
    and consider the views of the Director, NSA as appropriate.

    2.2.  If the Director, NSA, determines that DoD issuances
    would adversely affect the conduct of the mission of
    the Agency or interfere with its security requirements,
    he shall recommend to the Secretary of Defense exceptions
    or modifications to these issuances within 90 days from
    the date of their promulgation.

    3.  ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

    The following specific arrangements and provisions will
    be applied in the administration and operation of the
    NSA:

    3.1.  Programming, budgeting, financing, accounting,
    and financial reporting activities of NSA will be in
    conformance with policies established by the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).   Disbursing services
    will be provided by the Military Departments.

    3.2.  The Director, NSA, will develop, in collaboration
    with the Military Departments, and submit to the Secretary
    of Defense, in accordance with applicable directives
    consolidated cryptologic plans and programs, together
    with the Director's recommendations as to requirements
    for military and civilian manpower, operating costs,
    investment in facilities and capital equipment, and
    research, development, test and evaluation.

    3.3.  The Director, NSA, shall make maximum use of the
    established facilities and services of the Military
    Departments and other DoD Components wherever practicable
    to achieve maximum efficiency and economy.

    3.3.1.  The Military Departments and other DoD Components
    shall provide such support to the NSA within their capabilities
    as may be necessary to carry out the assigned responsibilities
    of the Agency.

    3.3.2.  The need for and propriety of items procured
    for the NSA shall be determined by the Director, NSA,
    subject to DoD procurement regulations.

    3.3.3.  Although the Agency will operate its own printing
    plants, it will utilize the facilities of the Military
    Departments for the disposal of printing, binding, and
    related equipment that is surplus to the needs of the
    Agency.   Such equipment will be removed promptly from
    the Agency facility by the Military Department concerned.
      When such equipment is being replaced, it will be
    removed concurrently with or prior to, as appropriate,
    the delivery of the replacement items.   In other instances,
    when it is necessary for the convenience of the Agency
    that surplus printing equipment be removed prior to
    its final disposition by a Military Department or the
    General Services Administration, the cost of the removal
    will be borne by the Agency.

    3.3.4.  Other excess or surplus equipment and supplies
    of the Agency will be disposed of in accordance with
    DoD directives.

    3.4.  Statistics, reports or information which will
    disclose the organization or any function of the NSA,
    any of its activities, or the names, titles, salaries,
    or number of persons employed by the Agency will not
    be released outside the DoD to any individual, organization,
    or Government department or agency except when authorized
    by the Director, NSA, the Secretary of Defense, or other
    proper authority, or when required by law.   Statistics
    and progress or status reports, including those pertaining
    to personnel employed by or assigned to the NSA, which
    are required by activities of the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense will be submitted by the Agency to the Directorate
    of Statistical Services, OASD(Comp), in accordance with
    the provisions of DoD Instruction 7700.3.

    3.5.  All military and civilian positions of the NSA
    are hereby designated as "critical sensitive positions"
    and will be treated as such in connection with investigative,
    security clearance, and employment matters.

    4.  DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

    An enclosure to this directive contains delegations
    of the various administrative authorities required by
    the Director, NSA to administer and direct the operations
    of the Agency.

    5.  EFFECTIVE DATE AND CANCELLATION

    This directive is effective upon publication.   Reference
    (b) is hereby superseded and canceled.

    Enclosures - 1

    1.  Delegation of Authority

    E1.  ENCLOSURE 1

    DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY

    E1.1.1.  Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary
    of Defense, the following authorities, as required in
    the administration and operation of the National Security
    Agency, (NSA), are hereby delegated, subject to the
    authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
    Defense, to the Director, NSA, or in the event of the
    absence or incapacity of the Director, to the person
    acting for him to:

    E1.1.1.1.  Exercise the powers vested in the Secretary
    of Defense by Sections 302 and 3101 of Title 5, United
    States Code, and Sections 2 and 4 of Public Law 86-36,
    as amended (50 USC 402 note), pertaining to the establishment
    of positions; the fixing of basic compensation; the
    employment, direction, and general administration of
    civilian personnel of the NSA subject to the following
    provisions:

    E1.1.1.1.1.  Positions established at the basic compensation
    equal to rates of basic compensation authorized for
    Grades 16, 17 and 18 of the General Schedule (5 USC
    5332) are subject to the approval of the Secretary of
    Defense, and

    E1.1.1.1.2.  The rates of compensation for positions
    established under the provisions of Section 4 of Public
    Law 86-36, as amended (50 USC 402 note) will be subject
    to approval by the Secretary of Defense.

    E1.1.1.2.  Fix rates of pay for wage board employees
    in relation to prevailing rates for comparable job in
    the locality.

    E1.1.1.3.  Prescribe, as conditions of employment, that
    NSA employees (a) must serve any place in the world
    as the needs of the Agency dictate, and (b) must forego
    personal unofficial travel when the Director, NSA, determines
    that travel in the proposed area would constitue a hazard
    to national security.

    E1.1.1.4.  Administer oaths of office incident to entrance
    into the Executive Branch of the Federal Government
    or any other oath required by law in connection with
    employment therein, in accordance with the provisions
    of 5 USC 2903, and to designate in writing, as may be
    necessary, officers and employees of the NSA to perform
    this function.

    E1.1.1.5.  Grant additional compensation to civilian
    officers and employees of the National Security Agency
    who are citizens or nationals of the United States,
    in accordance with and not to exceed additional compensation
    authorized by regulations of the State Department or
    the Civil Service Commission, whichever is applicable,
    for employees whose rates of basic compensation are
    fixed by statute.

    E1.1.1.6.  Establish advisory committees and employ
    or procure the services of part-time advisors as consultants
    and experts as approved by the Secretary of Defense
    for the performance of NSA functions pursuant to the
    provisions of 10 USC 173, 5 USC 3109, and the agreement
    between the Department of Defense and the Civil Service
    Commission on the employment of experts and consultants
    dated July 22, 1959; and waive compliance with any part
    or all of the requirements of rules 1, 2, and 3 in paragraph
    V.A. of DoD Directive 5030.13, dated April 20, 1962,
    for any advisory committee, other than an industry advisory
    committee, when the Director, NSA finds that compliance
    would render effective utilization of the committee
    impracticable and that such waiver would be in the public
    interest.

    E1.1.1.7.  Establish an NSA Incentive Awards Board and
    pay cash awards to, and incur necessary expenses for
    the honorary recognition of (a) civilian employees of
    the Government whose suggestions, inventions, superior
    accomplishments, or other personal efforts, including
    special acts or services, benefit or affect NSA or its
    subordinate activities in accordance with the provisions
    of 5 USC 4501-4506 and Civil Service Commission and
    DoD regulations, and (b) military assignees to the Agency
    whose suggestions, inventions scientific achievements
    or other meritorious special acts or services in connection
    with or related to their official duties benefit or
    affect NSA or its subordinate activities in accordance
    with 10 USC 1124 and DoD Directive 5120. 15, dated 3
    December 1965.

    E1.1.1.8.  Authorize persons to be provisionally employed
    before the completion of a full field investigation
    provided such persons are not given access to sensitive
    cryptologic information while so employed, in accordance
    with Section 302(a) of Public Law 88-290.   In an exceptional
    case in which the Director makes a determination in
    writing that his action is necessary or advisable in
    the national interest, authorize the employment of any
    person, or the detail or assignment of any person to
    the Agency, and grant to any such person access to sensitive
    cryptologic information, on a temporary basic pending
    the completion of a full field investigation, provided
    in such a case priority shall be given to the full field
    investigation, in accordance with Section 302(a) of
    Public Law 88-290, DoD Directive 5210.8, dated 15 February
    1962, and 5210.45, dated 9 May 1964.

    E1.1.1.9.  Provide for and establish boards of appraisal
    to assist the Director in discharging his personnel
    security responsibilities to appoint the members of
    such boards and to make the determination that a person's
    employment, detail, assignment, or access to classified
    information is or is not in the national interest, in
    accordance with Section 302(b) of Public Law 88- 290
    and the provisions of Department of Defense Directive
    5210.45.

    E1.1.1.10.  Authorize the suspension, but not to terminate
    the services of an employee in the interest of national
    security in positions within the NSA, in accordance
    with the provisions of 5 USC 3571, 5594, 7312, 7532,
    Executive Order 10450 dated April 27, 1953, as amended,
    and DoD Directive 5210.7 dated September 2, 1966.

    E1.1.1.11.  Clear persons for access to classified Defense
    material and information under the custody or jurisdiction
    of the NSA in accordance with the provisions of DoD
    Directive 5210.8, dated February 12, 1962, and DoD Directive
    5210.45, dated May 9, 1964.

    E1.1.1.12.  Promulgate regulations governing the granting
    or denial of industrial clearances for access to sensitive
    cryptologic information and to regulate physical security
    in industry or NSA sponsored contracts for sensitive
    cryptologic materials, in accordance with Executive
    Order 10065, as amended.

    E1.1.1.13.  Conduct counterintelligence and personnel
    security investigations relating to civilians and members
    of the armed forces who are employed in, or assigned
    to, the NSA.

    E1.1.1.14.  Promulgate the necessary security regulations
    for the protection of property and places under the
    jurisdiction of the Director, NSA, pursuant to the provisions
    of DoD Directive 5200.8 dated August 20, 1954.

    E1.1.1.15.  Classify, declassify and downgrade or upgrade
    the classification of defense information or material
    for which the NSA has responsibility pursuant to Executive
    Order 10501, dated November 5, 1953, as amended, and
    DoD Directive 5200.1 , dated July 8, 1957, and to designate
    in writing, as may be necessary, officers and employees
    within the NSA to perform these functions.

    E1.1.1.16.  Act, with respect to NSA employees, as agent
    for the collection and payment of taxes imposed by Subtitle
    C of Title 26, United States Code, and as such agent,
    to make all determinations and certifications required
    or provided for under Section 3122 of Title 26, United
    States Code, and Section 205 (p) (1) and (2) of the
    Social Security Act, as amended (42 USC 405 (p) (l)
    and (2)).

    E1.1.1.17.  Authorize and approve overtime work of NSA
    civilian officers and employees of NSA in accordance
    with the provisions of Section 550.11 of the Civil Service
    Regulations.

    E1.1.1.18.  Authorize and approve:

    E1.1.1.18.1.  Travel for NSA civilian officers and employees
    in accordance with Joint Travel Regulations, Volume
    2, Department of Defense Civilian Personnel, dated July
    1, 1965, as amended;

    E1.1.1.18.2.  Temporary duty travel only for military
    personnel assigned or detailed to NSA in accordance
    with Joint Travel Regulations, Volume 1, for the Uniformed
    Services, dated July 1, 1965, as amended;

    E1.1.1.18.3.  Invitational travel to persons serving
    without compensation whose consultive, advisory, or
    other highly specialized technical services are required
    in a capacity that is directly related to or in connection
    with NSA activities, pursuant to 5 USC 5703.

    E1.1.1.19.  Approve the expenditure of funds available
    for travel by military personnel assigned or detailed
    to NSA for expenses incident to attendance at meetings
    of technical, scientific, or professional or similar
    organizations in such instances where the approval of
    the Secretary of Defense or his designee is required
    by law (37 USC 412).

    E1.1.1.20.  Develop, establish, and maintain an active
    and continuing Records Management Program, pursuant
    to the provisions of Section 506 (b) and (c) of the
    Federal Records Act of 1950, as amended (44 USC 396
    (b)), and when authorized, operate a records center
    pursuant to the provisions of 506 (c) of the Federal
    Records Act of 1950 (44 USC 396 (c)).

    E1.1.1.21.  Enter into and administer contracts in accordance
    with applicable laws, DoD regulations and the Armed
    Services Procurement Regulations, directly or through
    a Military Department, a DoD contract administration
    services component, or other Government Department or
    agency, as appropriate, for supplies, equipment and
    services required to accomplish the mission of the NSA.
      To the extent that any law or executive order specifically
    limits the exercise of such authority to persons at
    the Secretarial level of a Military Department, such
    authority will be exercised by the Assistant Secretary
    of Defense (Installations and Logistics).

    E1.1.1.22.  Establish and use Imprest Funds for making
    small purchases of material and services other than
    personal for NSA when it is determined more advantageous
    and consistent with the best interests of the Government,
    in accordance with the provisions of DoD instruction
    7280.1, dated January 5, 1962, and the Joint Regulations
    of the General Services Administration -- Treasury Department
    -- General Accounting Office, entitled "For Small Purchases
    Utilizing Imprest Funds."

    E1.1.1.23.  Establish and maintain appropriate property
    accounts for NSA and to appoint Boards of Survey, approve
    reports of survey, relieve personal liability and drop
    accountability for NSA property maintained in the authorized
    Departmental Property Account which has been lost, damaged,
    stolen, destroyed, or otherwise rendered unserviceable,
    pursuant to the provisions of applicable laws and regulations.

    E1.1.1.24.  Act for the Secretary of Defense before
    the Joint Committee on Printing, the Public Printer,
    and the Director, Bureau of the Budget on all matters
    pertaining to printing, binding, and publication requirements
    of the NSA.

    E1.1.1.25.  Publish advertisements, notices, or proposals,
    in newspapers, magazines, or other public periodicals
    as required for the effective administration and operation
    of the NSA (44 USC 324).

    E1.1.1.26.  Enter into support and services agreements
    with the Military Departments, other DoD Components,
    and other Government agencies as required.

    E1.1.1.27.  The Director, NSA, may redelegate these
    authorities, as appropriate, and in writing, except
    as otherwise specifically indicated above or as otherwise
    provided by law.

    Department of Defense

    DIRECTIVE

    NUMBER 5100.35

    March 10, 1998

    ASD(C3I)

    SUBJECT:  Military Communications-Electronics Board
    (MCEB)

    References:  (a)  DoD Directive 5100.35, "Military Communications-Electronics
    Board," May 6, 1985 (hereby canceled)

    (b)  Public Law 104-106, “Subdivision E of the Clinger-Cohen
    Act of 1996,” February 10, 1996 (formerly the Information
    Technology Management Reform Act of 1996)

    (c)  Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Implementation
    of Subdivision E of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (Public
    Law 104-106),” June 2, 1997

    (d)  DoD Directive 4650.1, "Management and Use of the
    Radio Frequency Spectrum,” June 24, 1987

    1.  REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

    This Directive reissues reference (a) to update the
    mission, organization, functions, responsibilities,
    and relationships prescribed herein.

    2.  APPLICABILITY

    This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the
    Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the
    Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter
    referred to collectively as "the DoD Components").

    3.  MISSION

    3.1.  The MCEB shall consider those military communications-electronics
    matters, including those associated with National Security
    Systems (NSS) as defined in reference (b), referred
    to it by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DoD Chief Information Officer,
    and other officials designated in section 5.2., below.

    3.2.  The MCEB mission shall be, as follows:

    3.2.1.  Obtain coordination among the DoD Components,
    between the Department of Defense and other Governmental
    Departments and Agencies, and between the Department
    of Defense and the representatives of foreign nations
    as to matters under MCEB jurisdiction.

    3.2.2.  Provide guidance and direction to the DoD Components.

    3.2.3.  Furnish advice and assistance, as requested.

    4.  ORGANIZATION

    4.1.  The MCEB shall be composed of the following:

    4.1.1.  The Director for Command, Control, Communications,
    and Computer Systems, Joint Staff, (J-6), who shall
    serve as the Chair.

    4.1.2.  The Vice Director for Command, Control, Communications,
    and Computer Systems, Joint Staff, (VJ6) representing
    the Combatant Commands.

    4.1.3.  The Director of Information Systems for Command,
    Control, Communications, and Computers (C4), U.S. Army.

    4.1.4.  The Director, Space, Information Warfare, Command
    and Control, U.S. Navy.

    4.1.5.  The Director, Communications and Information,
    U.S. Air Force.

    4.1.6.  The Assistant Chief of Staff, Command, Control,
    Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, U.S. Marine
    Corps.

    4.1.7.  The Assistant Commandant for Systems, U.S. Coast
    Guard.

    4.1.8.  The Director, Defense Information Systems Agency,
    or designee.

    4.1.9.  The Director, National Security Agency, or designee.

    4.1.10.  The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,
    or designee.

    4.2.  The Chair, MCEB, may request representatives from
    the other DoD Components and Government Agencies to
    participate with the MCEB on any matter in which that
    Component or Agency has an interest.

    4.3.  The MCEB shall be supported by a permanent Secretariat
    provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    5.  FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

    5.1.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall
    provide overall guidance and direction to the MCEB.

    5.2.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments, and
    the Heads of the DoD Components shall refer military
    communications-electronics and NSS matters to the MCEB
    for coordination, or other applicable action.

    5.3.  The Chair, Military Communications-Electronics
    Board, shall:

    5.3.1.  Preside at MCEB meetings or designate a member
    to act as the Chair in his or her absence.

    5.3.2.  Determine whether matters referred to the MCEB
    are appropriate for MCEB consideration.

    5.3.3.  Redirect matters referred to the MCEB if the
    Chair, MCEB, determines that such matters are best accomplished
    by referral to another DoD Component.

    5.3.4.  Determine whether issues referred to the MCEB
    can be resolved by MCEB action.

    5.3.5.  Inform the DoD CIO of all MCEB-related matters,
    which may have an impact on the responsibilities of
    the CIO as provided in the Secretary of Defense’s Memorandum
    (reference (c)).

    5.3.6.  Make decisions for the MCEB when consensus is
    not reached on matters referred to the MCEB.

    5.3.7.  Determine the subsequent disposition of matters
    referred to the MCEB that are not resolved by MCEB action.

    5.3.8.  Establish administrative and procedural arrangements
    for the MCEB, to include managing the MCEB Secretariat.

    5.3.9.  Provide a conflict resolution forum for frequency
    spectrum issues.

    5.3.10.  Recommend guiding policy and develop procedures
    in support of radio frequency management functions and
    requirements of the Military Departments, the Combatant
    Commands, and Defense Agencies, in accordance with DoD
    Directive 4650.1 (reference (d)).

    5.3.11.  Develop, review, and implement procedures for
    participation in the DoD Electromagnetic Compatibility
    Program.

    5.3.12.  Coordinate changes to, and promulgate allied
    communications publications and joint Army, Navy, and
    Air Force publications.   Determine format, assign printing
    responsibilities, and distribute communications-electronics
    publications, except those communications security publications
    that are the responsibility of other DoD elements.

    5.3.13.  Develop, review, and coordinate joint and allied
    communications-electronics operating procedures.

    5.3.14.  In accordance with the procedures of the OSD
    and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the
    approval of U.S. positions, coordinate and participate
    in the development of changes to joint and allied principles,
    technical standards, and procedures for obtaining interoperability,
    compatibility, and standardization of C4 equipment,
    including communications-electronics standardization
    agreements (STANAGs) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
      Manage the DoD review process when ratification of
    any communications-electronics STANAGs is under consideration
    and serve as office of record for all ratified agreements.

    5.3.15.  Develop and process the DoD position for negotiation
    with representatives of other nations on communications-electronics
    matters for which the MCEB is responsible.

    5.3.16.  Communicate directly with all the DoD Components,
    with the other Departments and Agencies of the Government
    and with representatives of other nations on communications-electronics
    and NSS matters for which the MCEB is responsible.

    5.3.17.  Establish and direct, as required, subsidiary
    panels to support MCEB activities.

    5.3.18.  Coordinate membership for applicable allied
    technical panels and working groups.

    5.3.19.  Serve as the United States principal member
    to the Combined Communications-Electronics Board.

    5.4.  The Members of the MCEB shall:

    5.4.1.  Participate in the activities of the MCEB and
    vote on matters placed before the MCEB for decision.

    5.4.2.  Designate an alternate whom, when participating
    in MCEB activities for his or her principal, shall have
    plenary power to act for same.

    5.4.3.  Request, individually or as a group, reconsideration
    by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, as applicable, of a decision made by
    the Chair, MCEB, under paragraph 5.3.6. above.   Such
    a request shall be submitted through the Chair, MCEB,
    for comment.   When reconsideration by the Secretary
    of Defense is requested, the request also shall be accompanied
    by the comments of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff.

    6.  ADMINISTRATION

    6.1.  The permanent MCEB Secretariat shall consist of
    military and civilian personnel, with necessary funding
    support, provided by the Director for Command, Control,
    Communications and Computers (J-6), the Joint Staff.

    6.2.  The Heads of DoD Components shall provide qualified
    personnel (within their capability and normally on an
    additional duty basis) when requested by the Chair,
    MCEB, to serve on subsidiary MCEB panels.

    7.  RELATIONSHIPS

    7.1.  The Chair, MCEB, shall make reports and furnish
    recommendations on the activities of the MCEB to the
    Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff.

    7.2.  The Chair, MCEB, shall provide information on
    MCEB actions to, and coordinate activities with, the
    DoD CIO.

    8.  EFFECTIVE DATE

    This Directive is effective immediately.

    Department of Defense

    DIRECTIVE

    NUMBER 5100.47

    April 30, 1965

    ASD(SIS)

    SUBJECT:  National Cryptologic School

    References:  (a)  DoD Directive S-3115.2, March 19,
    1959

    (b)  DoD Directive S-3115.4, March 19, 1959

    1.  PURPOSE

    This Directive provides for the establishment of the
    National Cryptologic School as a professional educational
    institution of the National Security Agency (NSA).

    2.  MISSION

    The National Cryptologic School will conduct courses
    of instruction related to cryptologic functions designed
    to:

    2.1.  Enhance the preparation of selected military officers
    and civilian personnel for important command, staff,
    and policy-making positions in the national and international
    security structure.

    2.2.  Prepare military and civilian personnel for duty
    in cryptologic and related activities.

    2.3.  Assist the broad career development of military
    and civilian personnel assigned to cryptologic functions.

    3.  APPLICABILITY

    The provisions of this Directive apply to all Components
    of DoD.

    4.  FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

    Under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the
    Director, NSA shall:

    4.1.  Operate and control the National Cryptologic School.

    4.2.  Determine the level and scope of courses of instruction
    to be offered by the School for both resident and non-resident
    use, as required for accomplishment of cryptologic missions,
    and establish the necessary training programs and courses.

    4.3.  Establish for the School:

    4.3.1.  The total enrollment and allocation of student
    quotas for resident courses.

    4.3.2.  Criteria for selection of students for resident
    courses.

    4.3.3.  Prerequisites and regulations for participation
    in correspondence courses.

    4.4.  Reallocate equitably unfilled quotas for resident
    courses.

    4.5.  Select the Chief, National Cryptologic School.

    5.  ADMINISTRATION

    5.1.  The staff and faculty will be provided from civilian
    and military personnel on duty with NSA and by detail
    from the Military Departments to the School for specific
    training requirements.

    5.2.  Clerical support for specialized and advanced
    courses conducted by the School for the departments
    will be provided by NSA.

    5.3.  Except as provided below, NSA will be responsible
    for programming, budgeting, and financing of expenses
    incident to the National Cryptologic School:

    5.3.1.  The pay, allowances (including subsistence)
    of military personnel, and the permanent change of station
    travel costs of military and civilian personnel assigned
    to the staff or faculty of the School will be borne
    by the DoD Components from which assigned.

    5.3.2.  Pay, allowances and travel costs (not integral
    to courses of instruction) of military and civilian
    personnel assigned as students at the School will be
    borne by their respective sponsoring DoD Components.

    5.3.3.  Equipments peculiar to cryptologic missions
    and required to support specialized and advanced training
    for the Military Departments will be programmed, budgeted
    and provided to the School by the DoD components in
    accordance with established DoD procedures and the related
    Combined Cryptologic Program.

    5.4.  The Director, NSA, shall report annually to the
    Secretary of Defense on the operations of the School,
    including recommendations as appropriate.

    6.  AUTHORITY

    The appropriate provisions of DoD Directives S-3115.2
    and S-3115.4 (references (a) and (b)) apply to the Director,
    NSA, and his designees, in the discharge of the functions
    and responsibilities assigned by this Directive.

    7.  EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

    This Directive is effective upon publication.   Its
    provisions will be implemented as determined by the
    Director, NSA.

    Department of Defense

    DIRECTIVE

    NUMBER 5100.85

    June 27, 1995

    ASD(C3I)

    SUBJECT:  Intelligence Systems Board (ISB)

    References:  (a)  Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense
    Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," March
    23, 1994

    (b)  Title 10, United States Code

    (c)  Title 50, United States Code

    (d)  Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence
    Activities," December 4, 1981

    (e)  DoD Directive 5137.1, "Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
    (ASD(C3I))," February 12, 1992

    (f)  DoD Directive 5100.35, "Military Communications-Electronics
    Board," May 6, 1985

    (g)  DoD Directive 5205.9, "Joint Military Intelligence
    Program (JMIP)," April 7, 1995

    1.  PURPOSE

    This Directive establishes a joint ISB (hereafter referred
    to as "the Board") composed of representatives of the
    Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.
      The Board is to ensure the interoperability of automatic1
    intelligence information systems is met effectively
    and efficiently, in a manner conducive to national security,
    and consistent with the authorities and duties of the
    Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence
    under references (b), (c), and (d).

    ____________________

     1 Reference (a) uses "automatic" rather than "automated"
    in systems such as this.

    2.  APPLICABILITY

    This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Combatant
    Commands, the Inspector General of the Department of
    Defense, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities
    (hereafter referred to collectively as "the DoD Components").

    3.  DEFINITIONS

    3.1.  Automatic Intelligence Information Systems.
     Electronic data processing and communications systems
    and facilities, and related operating standards and
    procedures used in or intended for use in the collection,
    processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence;
    includes automatic systems that support the exchange
    and dissemination of intelligence data through transformation,
    indexing, storage, retrieval, presentation, telecommunications,
    and teleprocessing.

    3.2.  Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP).
     A program for planning and budgeting Defense-wide initiatives
    and activities that provide intelligence information
    and support to multiple DoD customers.   Included are
    the Defense Cryptologic Program; the Defense Imagery
    Program; the Defense Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
    Program; and the Defense General Intelligence and Applications
    Program.

    3.3.  National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP).
       A planning and resources management program for which
    responsibility has been assigned by the President to
    the Director of Central Intelligence and having components
    as defined in 50 U.S.C. 401.a. (reference (c)).   Included
    are the program on the Central Intelligence Agency,
    the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense
    Intelligence Program, and certain other programs within
    the Department of Defense.   Also included are the foreign
    intelligence and counterintelligence programs of the
    Departments of State, Treasury, and Energy, and the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation.

    3.4.  Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA).
       Those DoD intelligence activities planned and programmed
    by the sponsoring organization as required for support
    of the planning and conduct of tactical military operations
    by United States Armed Forces.

    4.  ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

    4.1.  The ISB

    4.1.1.  The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence
    and Security) (DASD(I&S)), representing the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,
    and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) and the Executive Director
    for Intelligence Community Affairs representing the
    Director of Central Intelligence, shall Co-Chair the
    Board, which shall meet on the call of either Co-Chair.

    4.1.2.  Members of the Board shall be senior representatives
    of the:

    4.1.2.1.  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

    4.1.2.2.  NFIP Program Managers.

    4.1.2.3.  JMIP Program Managers.

    4.1.2.4.  Military Service TIARA Managers.

    4.1.2.5.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    4.1.2.6.  Director, Defense Information Systems Agency.

    4.1.2.7.  Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation.

    4.1.2.8.  Community Open Source Program Office.

    4.1.2.9.  Chairperson, Military Communications-Electronics
    Board.

    4.1.2.10.  Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; Headquarters
    (HQ), Department of the Army.

    4.1.2.11.  Director of Naval Intelligence, Department
    of the Navy.

    4.1.2.12.  Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, HQ,
    Department of the Air Force.

    4.1.2.13.  Director of Intelligence, HQ, U.S. Marine
    Corps.

    4.1.3.  The Co-Chairs may invite other organizations
    having an interest in automatic intelligence information
    systems to be represented at the Board sessions on an
    ex-officio basis, or to participate in the Board meetings
    when matters germane to their interests are addressed.

    4.2.  The Intelligence Systems Secretariat (ISS)

    4.2.1.  ISS (hereafter referred to as "the Secretariat")
    shall operate under the guidance of the Co-Chairs of
    the Board.

    4.2.2.  The Secretariat Director shall be appointed
    by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the
    Director of Central Intelligence.   The Deputy Director
    shall be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence
    in consultation with the Secretary of Defense.

    4.2.3.  As the staff element of the Board, the Secretariat
    shall be staffed jointly by the Department of Defense
    and non-DoD intelligence elements.

    4.2.4.  The Secretariat Director may establish subcommittees,
    working groups, and advisory bodies, as necessary, to
    support activities of the Board.

    4.2.5.  With approval of the Board Co-Chairs, the Secretariat
    Director may invite U. S. Government organizations not
    represented on the Board to participate in specific
    programs or activities sponsored by the Board.

    5.  RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

    5.1.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
    Control, Communications, and Intelligence, under DoD
    Directive 5137.1 (reference (e)), as the principal staff
    assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
    of Defense for information management matters, shall
    represent the Secretary of Defense on Board-related
    matters.   In the exercise of these responsibilities,
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
    Communications, and Intelligence shall:

    5.1.1.  Issue relevant DoD policy guidance, as necessary.

    5.1.2.  Nominate to the Secretary of Defense, in consultation
    with the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretariat
    Director, and consult with the Director of Central Intelligence
    on appointment of the Secretariat Deputy Director.

    5.1.3.  Ensure appropriate participation by the DoD
    Components in activities of the Board and the Secretariat,
    including DoD representation in the Secretariat.

    5.1.4.  Ensure that the Secretariat shall operate under
    the guidance and direction of the Board Co-Chairs, and
    serves as the supporting staff element of the Board.

    5.2.  The Intelligence Systems Secretariat shall, in
    cooperation with the intelligence functional managers,
    provide administrative support to the Board, and shall
    conduct the day-to-day staff activities necessary to
    support accomplishment of the Board's responsibilities.

    5.3.  The Intelligence Systems Board shall:

    5.3.1.  Advise and make recommendations, under the guidance
    of its Co-Chairs, to the Secretary of Defense and the
    Director of Central Intelligence on policy and requirements
    on the design, development, acquisition, and operation
    of automatic intelligence information systems and architectures
    used by the DoD Components and by non-DoD organizations
    within the NFIP concerning:

    5.3.1.1.  Enhancing interoperability of existing and
    planned automatic intelligence systems designed or intended
    for intelligence support to the U.S. Armed Forces.

    5.3.1.2.  Integrating and enhancing interoperability
    among automatic intelligence information systems functioning
    within or among elements of the NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA
    aggregate.

    5.3.1.3.  Improving interoperability between intelligence
    and military command and control systems.

    5.3.1.4.  Defining interorganizational intelligence
    information architectures.

    5.3.1.5.  Establishing an automatic intelligence information
    systems management security policy.

    5.3.1.6.  Defining and coordinating common information
    handling standards and procedures.

    5.3.1.7.  Developing program and budget guidance affecting
    the development and operation of automatic intelligence
    information systems.

    5.3.1.8.  Evaluating and adopting new and improved automatic
    intelligence information management technologies.

    5.3.1.9.  Designating a DoD or NFIP Component to serve
    as the Executive Agent for processes or activities of
    common concern.

    5.3.1.10.  Identifying priority automatic intelligence
    information systems that require funding support for
    acquisition and/or operations.

    5.3.1.11.  Designating of an Executive Agent(s) to implement
    and operate automatic intelligence systems as a service
    of common concern.

    5.3.2.  Emphasize the means to enhance the interoperability
    of existing and planned automatic intelligence information
    system support to operational military components.

    5.3.3.  In the interest of furthering interoperability
    of present and planned automatic intelligence information
    systems, serve as the channel for communications and
    other interface between the DoD Components represented
    on the ISB and the Military Communications-Electronics
    Board (MCEB) under DoD Directive 5100.35 (reference
    (f)).   In this interface role, review and provide recommendations,
    as appropriate, on all communications between the ISB
    member Components and the MCEB that relate to automatic
    intelligence information systems and architectures.

    5.4.  The Chairperson of the Military Communications-Electronics
    Board shall provide a senior member to serve as a member
    of the ISB, and ensure that communications between the
    MCEB and the DoD Components represented on the ISB are
    sent to the ISB Secretariat for review by the ISB if
    they relate to automatic intelligence information systems
    and architectures.

    5.5.  The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

    5.5.1.  Provide senior-level representation to serve
    on the Board.

    5.5.2.  Provide qualified representatives, as coordinated
    with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
    Control, Communications, and Intelligence to the Secretariat
    on a detail, non-reimbursable, rotational basis.

    5.5.3.  Participate, where appropriate, in working groups
    and panels established by the Secretariat Director to
    address tasks assigned by the Board Co-Chairs.

    5.5.4.  Provide information and data to the Secretariat
    as required to enable the Board to fulfill its responsibilities.

    5.5.5.  Upon designation by the Secretary of Defense
    and Director of Central Intelligence, and with arrangements
    for necessary funding, serve as the Executive Agent
    for implementation and/or operation of automatic intelligence
    information systems as a service of common concern.

    6.  EFFECTIVE DATE

    This Directive is effective immediately.

    DODI 5105.58  Management of Measurement and Signature Intelligence
    (MASINT), February 9, 1993, ASD(C3I)

    **** Text of the Regulation ****
    References:  (a)  DoD Directive 5137.1, "Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
    Intelligence," February 12, 1992
    (b)  DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency,"
    May 19, 1977
    (c)  DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities,"
    April 25, 1988
    (d)  Title 10, United States Code
    (e)  National Security Act of 1947
    (f)  Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence
    Activities," December 4, 1981

    A.  PURPOSE

    This Instruction assign responsibilities for the central management of
    MASINT within the Department of Defense, pursuant to references (a), (b),
    and (c), to ensure that U.S. Government intelligence and Defense
    operational, acquisition, and other needs for MASINT are met effectively
    and efficiently in a manner conducive to national security and consistent
    with the authorities and duties of the Secretary of Defense and the
    Director of Central Intelligence under references (d), (e), and (f).

    B.  APPLICABILITY

    This Instruction applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
    the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
    the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, the Defense
    Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter referred to collectively
    as "the DoD Components").

    C.  DEFINITION

    MASINT.  Technically derived intelligence (excluding Signals
    intelligence and traditional imagery intelligence) that, when collected,
    processed, and analyzed, results in intelligence that locates, tracks,
    identifies, or describes the signatures sources.  It includes the advanced
    (distinctive characteristics) of fixed or dynamic target data processing
    and exploitation of data from overhead and airborne imagery collection
    systems.  MASINT data can be acquired from a variety of satellite,
    airborne, or shipborne platforms; remotely piloted vehicles; or from
    mobile or fixed ground-based collection sites.  Its sensors include, but
    are not limited to, radar, laser, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear,
    radiation, detection, spectroradiometric, and seismic systems, as well as
    gas, liquid, and solid materials sampling systems.

    D.  RESPONSIBILITIES

    1.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
    Communications, and Intelligence, as the designated principal staff
    assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for
    intelligence matters under DoD Directive 5137.1 (reference (a)), shall be
    responsible for MASINT policy development, program oversight and
    evaluation, and resource management.

    2.  The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, shall:

    a.  Provide central management for MASINT in accordance with DoD
    Directive 5105.21 (reference (b)), DoD Directive 5240.21 (reference (c)),
    and this Instruction.

    b.  Establish a Central MASINT Office (CMO) within the Defense
    Intelligence Agency (DIA), which shall be responsible for providing
    support to the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency
    (CIA), and other Federal Government Departments and Agencies on MASINT
    matters relating to national security.  The Director, DIA, shall exercise
    authority, direction, and control over the CMO.  The CMO shall consist of
    a Director, appointed by the Director, DIA, a central MASINT tasking
    authority, and such other subordinate organizational elements as the
    Director, CMO, establishes within the resources made available.  The
    Director, CMO may also have direct access to the Director of Central
    Intelligence as required to fulfill Intelligence Community requirements.

    c.  Provide administrative support to the Director, CMO, including
    personnel, budget execution, and contracting services.  The Director, CMO,
    may also receive administrative support, to the extent permitted by the
    law and approved by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central
    Intelligence, from the Central Intelligence Agency or other Departments or
    Agencies of the Federal Government.  Resources for the CMO shall be
    provided through the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and the
    budget aggregation known as "Tactical Intelligence and Related
    Activities," in accordance with applicable planning, programming, and
    budgeting system procedures.

    d.  Ensure that the Director, Central MASINT Office, shall:

    (1)  Organize, direct, and manage the CMO and all assigned resources.

    (2)  Manage the establishment of national MASINT collection
    requirements consistent with the guidance received from the Director of
    Central Intelligence under E.O. 12333 (reference (f).

    (3)  Provide responsible MASINT support to the Department of Defense,
    the CIA, and, as appropriate, other Federal Government Departments and
    Agencies, including the coordination of MASINT collection tasking,
    collection processing, exploitation, and dissemination.

    (4)  Task MASINT collection elements of the Department of Defense to
    meet national intelligence requirements, including requirements
    established by the Director of Central Intelligence, in accordance with
    the "National Security Act of 1947" and E.O. 12333 (references (e) and
    (f)), except that the Director, CMO, shall advise MASINT collection
    elements on collection of MASINT to meet such national intelligence
    requirements when the collection element both (a) is assigned to, or under
    the operational control, of the Secretary of a Military Department or a
    commander of a unified or specified combatant command and (b) is not
    allocated by the Secretary of Defense to meet national intelligence
    requirements.

    (5)  Advise MASINT collection elements of the Department of Defense on
    the collection of MASINT to meet non-national intelligence requirements.

    (6)  Establish the architectures for MASINT tasking, collection,
    processing, and dissemination in the Department of Defense, in
    coordination with the DoD Components and consistent to the maximum
    practicable extent with the overall functional architectures of the
    Department of Defense.  Also, to the extent authorized by the heads of
    other Departments or Agencies with MASINT tasking, collection, processing,
    exploitation, and dissemination functions, establish the architectures for
    MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination in
    those other Departments and Agencies.

    (7)  Establish, in coordination with the Director of the Defense
    Information Systems Agency and the DoD Components, as appropriate,
    standards for MASINT systems for which the Department of Defense has
    responsibility and ensure compatibility and interoperability for such
    systems, and, to the extent authorized by the heads of the other
    Departments or Agencies with MASINT systems, establish standards and
    ensure compatibility and interoperability for the systems of those other
    Departments or Agencies.

    (8)  Serve as the functional manager for the MASINT programs in the
    NFIP consistent with applicable guidance received from the Director of
    Central Intelligence in accordance with the "National Security Act of
    1947" and E.O. 12333 (references (e) and (f)).

    (9)  Serve as the functional manager, an advisor to the ASD(C3I) and
    the DoD Components, for the MASINT programs in the budget aggregation
    known as the "Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities".

    (10)  Evaluate the performance of MASINT components of the Department
    of Defense in meeting national and non-national intelligence requirements
    and, to the extent authorized by the heads of the other Departments or
    Agencies with MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and
    dissemination functions, evaluate the performance of the MASINT components
    of those other Departments or Agencies in meeting national and non-
    national intelligence requirements.

    (11)  Develop and make recommendations on national and non-national
    MASINT policy, including relationships to international matters, for the
    approval of appropriate Federal Government officials.

    (12)  In coordination with the appropriate DoD Components, support and
    conduct research, development, test, and evaluation activities related to
    MASINT tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination,
    consistent with applicable law and DoD Directives.

    (13)  Protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
    disclosure, in accordance with guidance received from the Director of
    Central Intelligence under the "National Security Act of 1947" and E.O.
    12333 (references (e) and (f)).

    (14)  In coordination with the appropriate DoD Components, establish
    standards for training personnel performing MASINT tasking, collection,
    processing, exploitation, and dissemination functions.

    (15)  Advise the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central
    Intelligence on future needs for the MASINT systems.

    (16)  Coordinate the use of MASINT systems that support military
    forces in exercises.

    (l7)  Make use of established facilities and services in the
    Department of Defense or other governmental Agencies, to the extent
    permitted by law, whenever practicable, to achieve maximum efficiency and
    economy.  Special emphasis will be made on maximizing the use of existing
    personnel, facilities and services of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
    Further, resources of the Central Intelligence Agency and other
    Departments or Agencies will be used to the extent authorized by the
    Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of other Departments and
    Agencies of the Federal Government.

    (l8)  Perform such other functions related to MASINT as the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
    Intelligence may direct.

    3.  The Heads of the DoD Components shall support the Director, CMO,
    in carrying out assigned functions by the following:

    a.  Ensure compliance with national intelligence tasking issued under
    paragraph D.3.d above.

    b.  Ensure compliance with the architectures and standards established
    by the Director, CMO, under paragraphs D.3.f and D.3.g above.

    c.  Assist the Director, CMO, in the Director's assigned
    responsibility as functional manager for national and tactical MASINT
    programs under paragraphs D.3.h., D.3.i. and D.3.n. above.

    d.  Submit MASINT collection requirements to the Director, CMO,
    through appropriate validation authorities.

    E.  EFFECTIVE DATE

    This Instruction is effective immediately.

    CHARLES A. HAWKINS, JR.
    Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Command, Control, Communications,
    and Intelligence

    Department of Defense

    DIRECTIVE

    NUMBER 5148.11

    July 1, 1994

    DA&M

    SUBJECT:  Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO))

    References:  (a)  Title 10, United States Code

    (b)  DoD Directive 5148.11, "Assistant to the Secretary
    of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)," December 1, 1982
    (hereby canceled)

    (c)  Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence
    Activities," December 4, 1981

    (d)  DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities,"
    April 25, 1988

    (e)  through (k), see enclosure E1.

    1.  REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

    Under the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense
    by Section 113 of reference (a), this Directive reissues
    reference (b) to update the responsibilities, functions,
    relationships, and authorities of the ATSD(IO), as prescribed
    herein.

    2.  APPLICABILITY

    This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Combatant
    Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the
    Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, and the
    DoD Field Activities (hereafter referred to collectively
    as "the DoD Components").

    3.  DEFINITION

    3.1.  Propriety.    Refers to the standards for intelligence
    activities promulgated in Executive orders, Presidential
    Directives, and DoD Directives.   Other terms used herein
    are defined in references (c), (d), and (e).

    4.  RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

    The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
    Oversight shall be responsible for the independent oversight
    of all intelligence activities in the Department of
    Defense.   In this capacity, the ATSD(IO) shall ensure
    that all activities performed by intelligence units
    and all intelligence activities performed by non-intelligence
    units, are conducted in compliance with Federal law
    and other laws as appropriate, Executive orders and
    Presidential Directives, and DoD Directives System issuances.
      In the exercise of this responsibility, the ATSD(IO)
    shall:

    4.1.  Develop intelligence oversight policy and, in
    coordination with the General Counsel of the Department
    of Defense (GC, DoD), issue intelligence oversight guidance
    to the DoD intelligence components, including regulatory
    guidance implementing intelligence oversight aspects
    of E.O. 12333 (reference (c)).

    4.2.  Review, in consultation with the GC, DoD, all
    allegations that raise questions of the legality or
    propriety of intelligence activities in the Department
    of Defense.

    4.3.  Investigate intelligence activities that raise
    questions of legality or propriety.

    4.4.  Conduct vigorous and independent inspections of
    the DoD Components that engage in intelligence activities
    for the purpose of verifying that personnel are familiar
    and in compliance with E.O. 12333 (reference (c)) and
    its DoD implementing documents.   At the request of
    senior leadership of the Department, and as practicable,
    the ATSD(IO) will assess and evaluate the performance
    of DoD's intelligence activities during the course of
    scheduled inspections and site visits.   Reports in
    these areas of special interest will be provided to
    the requesting official and the Secretary of Defense
    for information.

    4.5.  Monitor investigations and inspections conducted
    by the DoD Components related to intelligence activities,
    evaluate the findings and, if appropriate, submit recommendations
    for corrective action to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
    of Defense.

    4.6.  Report the following to the Secretary and Deputy
    Secretary of Defense, and the Intelligence Oversight
    Board of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
    Board, established under E.O. 12863 (reference (f)),
    at least quarterly, in consultation with the GC, DoD:

    4.6.1.  Any significant oversight activities undertaken;
    and

    4.6.2.  Any DoD intelligence activities of questionable
    legality or propriety, the investigative action on them,
    an evaluation of completed investigations, and the action
    taken on completed investigations.

    4.7.  Participate as a member of the Defense Counterintelligence
    Board (DoD Directive 5240.2, reference (g)).

    4.8.  Pursuant to DoD Directive 5240.12 (reference (h)),
    review and conduct an annual financial audit of all
    funds generated by DoD Intelligence Commercial Activities,
    and report the results to the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence.

    4.9.  Review DoD clandestine intelligence activities
    to ensure compliance with special constraints and controls.

    4.10.  Evaluate the effectiveness of the DoD intelligence
    components' efforts to protect HUMINT sources, in accordance
    with DoD Directive S-5205.1 (reference (i)).

    4.11.  Participate in the Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations
    approval process.

    4.12.  Conduct liaison with Federal intelligence and
    law enforcement agencies (e.g., Central Intelligence
    Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Drug Enforcement
    Administration) at the national level and field locations,
    as required, to ensure DoD intelligence activities and
    DoD intelligence support to law enforcement agencies
    are being conducted properly.

    4.13.  Review the DoD sensitive support provided to
    the DoD Components and other Federal Agencies, pursuant
    to DoD Directive S-5210.36 (reference (j)), to ensure
    compliance with DoD policy.

    4.14.  Coordinate, as appropriate, with the DoD Inspector
    General (DoD IG) on matters relating to the DoD IG's
    area of responsibility in accordance with DoD Directive
    5106.1 (reference (k)).

    4.15.  Perform such other functions as the Secretary
    of Defense may prescribe.

    5.  RELATIONSHIPS

    5.1.  In the performance of assigned responsibilities
    and functions, the ATSD(IO) shall serve under the authority,
    direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense,
    and shall:

    5.1.1.  Report directly to the Secretary and Deputy
    Secretary of Defense.

    5.1.2.  Coordinate and exchange information with other
    OSD officials, heads of the DoD Components, and other
    Federal officials having collateral or related functions.

    5.1.3.  Use existing facilities and services of the
    Department of Defense and other Federal Agencies, when
    practicable, to avoid duplication and to achieve maximum
    efficiency and economy.

    5.2.  Other OSD officials and heads of the DoD Components
    shall coordinate with the ATSD(IO) on all matters related
    to the responsibilities and functions cited in section
    4., above.

    6.  AUTHORITIES

    The ATSD(IO) is hereby delegated authority to:

    6.1.  Obtain reports, information, advice, and assistance,
    consistent with DoD Directive 8910.1 (reference (l)),
    as necessary, in carrying out assigned functions.

    6.2.  Communicate directly with the heads of the DoD
    Components and, with notification to the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Commanders of the
    Unified Combatant Commands, as necessary, in carrying
    out assigned functions.

    6.3.  Request such temporary assistance from the DoD
    Components as may be required for the conduct of inspections
    or investigations, to include personnel, facilities,
    and other services.   Requests for needed support shall
    be made in accordance with established procedures.

    6.4.  Communicate directly with the Intelligence Oversight
    Board of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
    Board, the Director of Central Intelligence, other Federal
    officials, representatives of the legislative branch,
    members of the public, and representatives of foreign
    governments, as appropriate, in carrying out assigned
    functions.

    6.5.  Have complete and unrestricted access to all available
    intelligence-related information, regardless of classification
    or compartmentation, from all DoD Components and personnel,
    as required, in carrying out assigned functions.   This
    includes specifically the authority to:

    6.5.1.  Require an Inspector General or other cognizant
    investigative official of a DoD Component to report
    allegations of improprieties or illegalities of intelligence
    activities by, or within, a DoD Component; and

    6.5.2.  Obtain information on the status, proceedings,
    and findings or to obtain copies of reports of investigations
    or inspections of such allegations.

    6.6.  Deal directly with the head of the element inspected
    or investigated, conduct interviews, take depositions,
    and examine records incident to an inspection or investigation
    of any DoD Component, as required, in carrying out assigned
    functions.

    7.  EFFECTIVE DATE

    This Directive is effective immediately.

    Enclosures - 1

    1.  References, continued

    E1.  ENCLOSURE 1

    REFERENCES, continued

    (e)  DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities
    of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States
    Persons," December 1982, authorized by DoD Directive
    5240.1, April 25, 1988

    (f)  Executive Order 12863, "President's Intelligence
    Advisory Board," September 13, 1993

    (g)  DoD Directive 5240.2, "Department of Defense Counterintelligence,"
    June 6, 1983

    (h)  DoD Directive 5240.12, "Department of Defense Intelligence
    Commercial Activities," December 2, 1992

    (i)  DoD Directive S-5205.1, "Acquisition and Reporting
    of Information Relating to National Security (U)," January
    31, 1983

    (j)  DoD Directive S-5210.36, "Provision of DoD Sensitive
    Support to DoD Components and Other Departments and
    Agencies of the U. S. Government (U)," June 10, 1986

    (k)  DoD Directive 5106.1, "Inspector General of the
    Department of Defense," March 14, 1983

    (l)  DoD Directive 8910.1, "Management and Control of
    Information Requirements," June 11, 1993

    Department of Defense

    DIRECTIVE

    NUMBER 5160.54

    January 20, 1998

    USD(P)

    SUBJECT:  Critical Asset Assurance Program (CAAP)

    References:  (a)  DoD Directive 5160.54, "DoD Key Asset
    Protection Program (KAPP)," June 26, 1989 (hereby canceled)

    (b)  DoD Directive 3020.36, "Assignment of National
    Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Responsibilities
    to Department of Defense Components," November 2, 1988

    (c)  DoD Directive S-3600.1, "Information Operations
    (IO) (U)," December 9, 1996

    (d)  DoD 5160.54-R, "Industrial Facilities Protection
    Regulation," March 1977, authorized by this Directive

    (e)  through (n), see enclosure 1

    1.  REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

    This Directive:

    1.1.  Reissues reference (a) to update DoD policies
    and responsibilities for the protection and assurance
    of DoD and non-DoD Critical Assets worldwide, to support
    the requirements of reference (b), and to implement
    the policies established by reference (c) as they pertain
    to Critical Assets that are, include, or depend upon
    Information Systems.   (See definition E2.1.9.)

    1.2.  Expands the requirement to identify Critical Assets
    and assure their integrity, availability, survivability,
    and capability to support vital DoD missions across
    the full range of military operations.

    1.3.  Provides for an integrated infrastructure vulnerability
    assessment and assurance program based on an analysis
    of the identified Critical Assets using risk management
    principles.   The risk management-based analysis provides
    the information necessary to effectively allocate available
    resources necessary for assurance.

    1.4.  Continues the authorization to publish reference
    (d), and authorizes the publication of DoD 5160.54-M,
    consistent with DoD 5025.1-M (reference (e)).

    2.  APPLICABILITY

    This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the
    Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the
    Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter
    referred to collectively as "the DoD Components").

    3.  DEFINITIONS

    The terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure
    2.

    4.  POLICY

    It is DoD policy to:

    4.1.  Identify and ensure the availability, integrity,
    survivability and adequacy of those assets, (domestic
    and foreign) whose capabilities are deemed critical
    to DoD Force Readiness and operations in peace, crisis,
    and war by providing for their protection from all hazards;
    mitigating the effect of their loss or disruption; and/or
    planning for timely restoral or recovery.   The level
    of assurance appropriate for each asset is a risk management
    decision of the owning or controlling DoD Component,
    made in coordination with those dependent on the asset,
    and based on its criticality, the threat, and resources
    available.

    4.2.  Recognize that critical DoD equipment, facilities,
    and services are dependent upon non-DoD assets -- the
    international and national infrastructures, other facilities
    and services of the private sector, and those of other
    Government Departments and Agencies; and that non-DoD
    assets essential to the functioning of DoD Critical
    Assets are also Critical Assets of concern to the Department
    of Defense.   Critical Assets include information systems
    and computer-based systems and networks that can be
    distributive in nature.

    4.3.  Recognize that in peacetime responsibility for
    protecting non-DoD Critical Assets and designing their
    security rests primarily with the civil sector owners
    and with local, State, and Federal law enforcement authorities
    and that responsibility for protecting non-U.S. Critical
    Assets rests with the appropriate national authority.
      However, the Department of Defense must participate
    with the civil sector, emergency preparedness and law
    enforcement authorities in planning for Critical Asset
    assurance during an emergency, and must be prepared,
    in concert with the appropriate authorities and within
    defense priorities, to assist in their protection during
    emergencies, including natural disaster, physical or
    technical attack, and technological or other emergency
    that seriously degrades or threatens DoD operations.
      (See DoD Directives 3025.1, 3025.12, and 3025.15,
    references (f) through (h).)

    4.4.  Provide an integrated asset and infrastructure
    vulnerability assessment and assurance program for the
    protection and assurance of DoD and non-DoD Critical
    Assets worldwide through the CAAP.   The CAAP must provide
    a comprehensive and integrated decision support environment
    to represent the relationship between Critical Assets
    and force readiness and operations in peace, crisis
    or war that can be used to assess the dependencies,
    vulnerabilities and effects of the disruption or loss
    of Critical Assets or supporting infrastructures on
    their plans and operations.   The CAAP must also provide
    the capability for Critical Asset assurance analysis,
    planning, prioritization, resource programming and response
    necessary to mitigate the disruption or loss of Critical
    Assets.   It must also ensure that the collection, retention,
    and dissemination of CAAP information are in compliance
    with applicable U.S. law, statutes, directives, and
    policies as delineated by the established intelligence
    oversight program.   See DoD Directive 5240.1 and DoD
    5240.l-R (references (i) and (j)).

    5.  RESPONSIBILITIES

    5.1.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:

    5.1.1.  Provide policy direction and guidance for the
    development and implementation of CAAP as an element
    of national security emergency preparedness.

    5.1.2.  Represent the Secretary of Defense with other
    Federal Departments and Agencies and with industry in
    the development, review, and approval of standards for
    the assurance of all Critical Assets and coordinate
    such agreements as may be appropriate for this program.

    5.1.3.  Develop and lead a process for annual program
    review of the CAAP with the Components and the DoD Executive
    Agent that includes an analysis of the program effectiveness
    in meeting goals and objectives, an assessment of the
    performance of organizations in accomplishing their
    roles and responsibilities, a review of threats and
    technologies, and the status of planning and analysis
    for the assurance of Critical Assets to ensure compliance
    with this Directive.

    5.1.4.  Exercise classification authority for CAAP,
    and publish classification guidance.

    5.1.5.  Establish, support and provide the Co-Chair
    (with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)
    for the Critical Infrastructure Protection Working Group
    (CIPWG).

    5.1.6.  Maintain and revise this Directive.

    5.2.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
    and Technology shall:

    5.2.1.  Comprehensively integrate the policies established
    by this Directive in acquisition policy guidance, to
    include the Federal Acquisition Regulations System (reference
    (k)); develop assurance standards; and ensure that internal
    and external infrastructure protection, mitigation,
    detection, reaction and recovery measures are designed
    into the acquisition process, systems being developed
    and acquired, and the supporting industrial base.

    5.2.2.  Foster research on infrastructure systems assurance
    and analysis and promote development of infrastructure
    interdependency analysis.   Identify technologies that
    represent threats to Critical Assets or related infrastructures
    (e.g., information or command and control systems),
    countermeasures technologies for existing or emerging
    threats, and technologies that may have inherent susceptibilities
    or vulnerabilities.

    5.2.3.  Provide policy to assess and mitigate infrastructure
    dependencies and vulnerabilities of specific DoD installations,
    facilities and supporting private sector facilities
    and systems.

    5.2.4.  In accordance with instructions from the DoD
    Executive Agent, provide DoD installations and facilities
    database support to facilitate maintenance of Critical
    Assets data by the DoD Components for inclusion in the
    CAAP.

    5.3.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
    Control, Communications, and Intelligence shall:

    5.3.1.  Integrate the policies established by this Directive
    into policy guidance and standards promulgated for functional
    areas assigned by DoD Directive 5137.1 (reference (l)).
      Ensure, in consultation with Under Secretary of Defense
    for Acquisition and Technology, infrastructure dependencies
    and protection, mitigation, detection, reaction and
    recovery measures are considered during command, control,
    communications, intelligence, information and security
    systems development and acquisition.   Ensure that intelligence,
    counterintelligence, and security countermeasure programs
    support the protection, survivability, availability,
    integrity and recovery of Critical Assets.

    5.3.2.  Provide the Co-Chair (with the Office of the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) for the CIPWG.

    5.3.3.  Require the Director, Defense Investigative
    Service (DIS), to:

    5.3.3.1.  Conduct, in coordination with the appropriate
    DoD Component and with permission of the owners, on-site
    surveys, to include vulnerability analyses to physical
    and technical threats, for each non-DoD Industrial and
    Infrastructure Critical Asset designated by the DoD
    Executive Agent as requiring on-site survey.

    5.3.3.2.  Maintain liaison with the DoD Executive Agent,
    the responsible DoD Component, and consult with industry,
    as appropriate.   Develop CAAP survey procedures in
    coordination with the DoD Executive Agent, and support
    courses of instruction to orient and train Government
    and industry personnel on CAAP surveys.   Obtain technical
    assistance from other Components, as required.

    5.3.4.  Require the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
    (DIA), in coordination with the National Security Agency
    (NSA), the DIS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
    (FBI), and the Director, Central Intelligence, to develop
    procedures for continuous analysis of the hostile intelligence;
    special operations; and technical, terrorist, criminal
    and other transnational threats to Critical Assets and
    Infrastructures; develop and maintain a Critical Asset
    and Infrastructure Threat Assessment, and advise the
    DoD Executive Agent, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff and the DoD Components of hostile threats to
    Critical Assets and Infrastructures in their areas of
    responsibility as evolving threats become known.   These
    activities must be accomplished within the provisions
    of DoD Directive 5240.1 and DoD 5240.1-R (references
    (i) and (j)).

    5.3.5.  Require the Director, National Imagery and Mapping
    Agency, to support the DoD Executive Agent's requirements
    for imagery and maps needed for CAAP.

    5.3.6.  Require the Director, Defense Information Systems
    Agency, to:

    5.3.6.1.  Provide, in conjunction with the DoD Components,
    for the assurance of the Defense Information Infrastructure
    (DII) and mitigation of the effects of its loss or disruption.

    5.3.6.2.  Coordinate with the National Communication
    System (NCS) to identify National Information Infrastructure
    (NII) assets critical to the DoD operations and National
    Security and Emergency Preparedness telecommunications.
      Identify to the DoD Executive Agent and the appropriate
    DoD Components the Critical Assets of the DII and the
    NII whose disruption or loss would seriously affect
    DoD operations and the nature of those effects.   Coordinate
    with the DoD Executive Agent, the DoD Components, and
    the NCS regarding actions taken to increase the reliability,
    redundancy, protection, and restoral of information
    systems supporting Critical Assets.

    5.3.6.3.  Provide for overall coordination of the Computer
    Emergency Response Team (CERT) activities of the DoD
    Components and their interface with CERT-related activities
    of the Federal Government (to include the FBI), the
    NSA for national security systems, and private sector.

    5.4.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

    5.4.1.  Ensure identification of Critical Assets necessary
    for the execution of Deliberate and Crisis Action Plans
    and plan for mitigation of their loss or disruption.
    Identify those Critical Assets to the DoD Executive
    Agent.

    5.4.2.  Ensure that disruption and loss of Critical
    Assets, to include supporting national infrastructures,
    are scripted and responded to in Joint Exercises.

    5.5.  The Secretary of the Army, as the DoD Executive
    Agent, shall:

    5.5.1.  Develop, implement and administer the CAAP to
    meet the requirements described in subsection 4.4.,
    above.   Obtain Critical Asset nominations from the
    DoD Components, integrate them into the CAAP, and program
    and provide CAAP resources for support of CAAP decision
    support systems, analytic and management activities.
      Provide the capability for each DoD Component to use
    the CAAP for identification, analysis and assurance
    of assets critical to its operations.   In coordination
    with the DoD Components, establish priorities for infrastructure
    analysis and remediation, recommend actions to the Components
    based upon the CAAP and DIA threat analysis, and review
    the CAAP annually with the Under Secretary of Defense,
    for Policy (USD(P)) and the Components.

    5.5.2.  Develop, publish and administer DoD 5160.54-R
    (reference (d)), and 5160.54-M, consistent with DoD
    5025.l-M (reference (e)).

    5.5.3.  Coordinate with other Departments and Agencies,
    as required, to solicit nominations of Infrastructure
    Assets critical to national defense applications.
    Designate non-DoD Industrial and Infrastructure Critical
    Assets that require on-site surveys and vulnerability
    assessments.   Coordinate with DIS regarding conduct
    of industrial Critical Asset site surveys and vulnerability
    assessments.

    5.5.4.  Ensure that regulations, plans, and procedures
    governing military support to law enforcement in civil
    disturbances, as promulgated under DoD Directive 3025.12
    (reference (g)), facilitate response by the DoD Components
    to protect Critical Assets under any conditions or circumstances
    covered by that Directive.

    5.6.  The Secretary of the Navy shall require the Program
    Manager, Joint Program Office for Special Technology
    Countermeasures, to provide the infrastructure assurance
    analysis and vulnerability assessment support to the
    DoD Executive Agent.

    5.7.  The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

    5.7.1.  Identify those assets critical to their operations
    (to include the supporting DoD and non-DoD infrastructures
    and other civil sector facilities and services), nominate
    those Critical Assets for inclusion in the CAAP, conduct
    risk assessments, and designate their category of importance
    in accordance with the instructions of the DoD Executive
    Agent.

    5.7.2.  Retain overall responsibility for the assurance
    of the Critical Assets subject to their authority or
    control.   Program and provide for increased Critical
    Asset reliability, security and redundancy; plan for
    their disruption or loss and subsequent restoral; and
    develop systems that are less dependent upon vulnerable
    infrastructures and systems.   Program and provide for
    supplemental integrated infrastructure vulnerability
    assessment and assurance capability when requirements
    exceed organic capabilities.   Provide for a CERT capability.

    5.7.3.  Include a contractual requirement for cooperation
    in vulnerability assessments and assurance planning
    when contracting for private sector facilities, services
    and products, and consider all-hazard assurance of service
    when awarding contracts.

    5.7.4.  Review annually all Critical Asset nominations
    and recommend changes in accordance with the instructions
    of the DoD Executive Agent.   Review the CAAP annually
    with the USD(P) and the DoD Executive Agent.   Provide
    senior (flag or senior executive service) representation
    on the CIPWG.

    5.7.5.  Assign personnel to the Executive Agent to support
    the CAAP and comply with the requirements of the DoD
    Executive Agent in accordance with this Directive.

    5.7.6.  Require that commanders of DoD installations
    conduct an annual review with all tenant activities
    of all Critical Assets associated with their installation,
    to include supporting DoD and non-DoD infrastructures
    and other civil sector facilities and services upon
    which the Critical Assets depend.   This review shall
    include the validation of data on facilities and their
    dependencies, an examination of Installation and tenants'
    plans for increasing reliability, reducing vulnerabilities,
    mitigating hazards to and the restoration of Critical
    Assets, and a review of these plans with the FBI, local
    emergency services personnel (including local law enforcement),
    the National Guard, and the representatives of critical
    infrastructure and support service providers, as appropriate.
      Assist tenant activities in direct coordination with
    local providers of critical infrastructure and other
    support services necessary to the operation of the their
    Critical Assets.   Require that commanders of DoD Installations
    report through their chains of command the review results
    to the DoD Executive Agent so that plans and requirements
    can be fully coordinated and supported across the Department.

    6.  INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

    The collection of installations and facilities data
    identified in paragraph 5.2.4., above, is assigned Report
    Control Symbol DD-A&T(A)760, and the collection of Critical
    Asset data identified in paragraphs 5.5.1. and 5.7.1.,
     above, is assigned Report Control Symbol DD-POL(A)1747,
    in accordance with DoD 8910-M (reference (m)).   The
    information collections in paragraphs 5.3.3.1., 5.3.4.,
    and 5.7.6., above, are exempt from licensing in accordance
    with reference (m).

    7.  EFFECTIVE DATE

    This Directive is effective immediately.

    Enclosures - 2

    1.  References

    2.  Definitions

    E1.  ENCLOSURE 1

    ENCLOSURE 1

    REFERENCES, continued

    (e)  DoD 5025.l-M, "DoD Directives System Procedures,"
    August 1994, authorized by DoD Directive 5025.1, June
    24, 1994

    (f)  DoD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil
    Authorities (SCA)," January 15, 1993

    (g)  DoD Directive 3025.12, "Military Assistance for
    Civil Disturbances," February 4, 1994

    (h)  DoD Directive 3025.15, "Military Assistance to
    Civil Authorities," February 18, 1997

    (i)  DoD Directive 5240.1, "DoD Intelligence Activities,"
    April 25, 1988

    (j)  DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities
    of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States
    Persons," December 1982, authorized by DoD Directive
    5240.1, April 25, 1988.

    (k)  Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations, "Federal
    Acquisition Regulations System," October 1, 1996

    (l)  DoD Directive 5137.1, "Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
    (ASD (C3I))," February 12, 1992

    (m)  DoD 8910.1-M, "DoD Procedures for Management of
    Information Requirements," November 28, 1986, authorized
    by DoD Directive 8910.1, June 11, 1993

    (n)  DoD Directive 5200.8, "Security of DoD Installations
    and Resources," April 25, 1991

    E2.  ENCLOSURE 2

    DEFINITIONS

    E2.1.1.  Assurance.    In the context of CAAP, assurance
    is a process of identifying assets deemed critical to
    the Department of Defense in peacetime, crisis and war;
    assessing the potential threats to these assets and
    the capabilities they provide; quantifying the likely
    non-availability to the Department of Defense under
    various hazard scenarios; identifying potential actions
    that can be taken to restore those assets (or functionality
    they provide) if they are lost, damaged, corrupted,
    or compromised; and identifying and recommending options
    to protect, mitigate, and improve the availability of
    these Critical Assets to the DoD organizations that
    own, use, and control them.   It includes a range of
    activities to systematically inform planners and decisionmakers
    of the probability of availability and quality (e.g.,
    integrity, reliability, confidentiality, survivability,
    endurability, capacity, adequacy) of specific assets
    or services under given scenarios; quantifying the likely
    impact of non-availability to the military operation
    or defense activity; and identifying and prioritizing
    options to improve the likelihood of the availability
    of specific assets or services in specific scenarios.
      Examples of assurance activities that can improve
    the likelihood of asset availability include protection
    (preventing, by whatever means, the disruption or corruption
    of an asset); mitigation or moderation of the effects
    of disruption or corruption (by controlling the damage,
    providing alternative services, and reducing demand
    on the asset); and planning for and providing timely
    restoral or recovery.   Alternatively, plans can be
    made to absorb the loss of otherwise anticipated services.
      Assurance of a Critical Asset is the responsibility
    of the owning or controlling DoD Component.

    E2.1.2.  Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT).
     An organization chartered by an information system
    owner to coordinate and/or accomplish necessary actions
    in response to computer emergency incidents that threaten
    the availability or integrity of its information systems.

    E2.1.3.  Critical Asset.    Any facility, equipment,
    service or resource considered essential to DoD operations
    in peace, crisis and war and warranting measures and
    precautions to ensure its continued efficient operation,
    protection from disruption, degradation or destruction,
    and timely restoration.   Critical Assets may be DoD
    assets or other government or private assets, (e.g.,
    Industrial or Infrastructure Critical Assets), domestic
    or foreign, whose disruption or loss would render DoD
    Critical Assets ineffective or otherwise seriously disrupt
    DoD operations.   Critical Assets include both traditional
    "physical" facilities or equipment, non-physical assets
    (such as software systems) or "assets" that are distributed
    in nature (such as command and control networks, wide
    area networks or similar computer-based networks).

    E2.1.4.  DoD Executive Agent.    The individual designated
    by position to have and to exercise the assigned responsibility
    and delegated authority of the Secretary of Defense,
    as specified in this Directive.

    E2.1.5.  DoD Infrastructure.    Infrastructure owned,
    operated or provided by the Department of Defense.
     DoD Infrastructures include the DII, C4ISR, Space,
    Financial Services, Logistics, Public Works (includes
    DoD-owned or -operated utilities, roads, rails and railheads
    and their interface to commercial and other Government
    Systems), Personnel, Health Affairs and Emergency Preparedness.
      See also definitions of Infrastructure and National
    Infrastructure, below.

    E2.1.6.  DoD Installation.    A facility subject to
    the custody, jurisdiction, or administration of any
    DoD Component.   This term includes, but is not limited
    to, military reservations, installations, bases, posts,
    camps, stations, arsenals, or laboratories where a DoD
    Component has operational responsibility for facility
    security and defense.   Examples are facilities where
    orders or regulations for protection and security have
    been issued by the military commander or other specified
    DoD official under provisions of DoD Directive 5200.8
    (reference (n)).   Both industrial assets and infrastructure
    assets, not owned by the Department of Defense, may
    exist within the boundaries of a military installation.

    E2.1.7.  Industrial Asset.    Any factory, plant, building
    or structure used for manufacturing, producing, processing,
    repairing, assembling, storing, or distributing a product
    or components that supports a DoD Component.   A Critical
    Industrial Asset is an industrial asset deemed essential
    to DoD operations or the functioning of a Critical Asset

    E2.1.8.  Information Assurance.    Information Operations
    that protect and defend information and information
    systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication,
    confidentiality, and non-repudiation.   This includes
    providing for restoration of information systems by
    incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.
      (See DoD Directive S-3600.1, reference (c).)

    E2.1.9.  Information System.    The entire infrastructure,
    organination, personnel and components that collect,
    process, store, transmit, display, disseminate and act
    on information under reference (c).

    E2.1.10.  Infrastructure.    The framework of interdependent
    networks and systems comprising identifiable industries,
    institutions, and distribution capabilities that provide
    a continual flow of goods and services essential to
    the defense and economic security of the United States,
    the smooth functioning of government at all levels,
    or society as a whole.

    E2.1.11.  Infrastructure Asset.    Any Infrastructure
    facility, equipment, service or resource that supports
    a DoD Component.   A Critical Infrastructure Asset is
    an infrastructure asset deemed essential to DoD operations
    or the functioning of a Critical Asset.

    E2.1.12.  National Infrastructure.    Those infrastructures
    essential to the functioning of the nation and whose
    incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating
    regional or national impact.   National infrastructures
    include telecommunications, electrical power systems,
    gas and oil transportation and storage, water supply
    systems, banking and finance, transportation, emergency
    services, and continuity of government operations.

    E2.1.13.  Technical Attack.    An attack that can be
    perpetrated by circumventing or nullifying hardware
    or software protection mechanisms, or exploiting hardware
    or software vulnerabilities, rather than physical destruction
    or by subverting system personnel or other users.

    Department of Defense

    DIRECTIVE

    NUMBER 5200.1

    December 13, 1996

    ASD(C3I)

    SUBJECT:  DoD Information Security Program

    References:  (a)  DoD Directive 5200.1, subject as above,
    June 7, 1982 (hereby canceled)

    (b)  Executive Order 12958, “Classified National Security
    Information,” April 20, 1995, as amended

    (c)  Information Security Oversight Office Directive,
    “Classified National Security Information,” October
    13, 1995

    (d)  DoD Instruction 5230.21, “Protection of Classified
    National Security Council and Intelligence Information,”
    March 15, 1982 (hereby canceled)

    (e)  through (i), see enclosure l

    1.  REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

    This Directive:

    1.1.  Reissues reference (a) to update policy and responsibili-ties
    for the DoD Information Security Program under references
    (b) and (c).

    1.2.  Replaces references (d) through (f) .

    1.3.  Continues to authorize the publication of DoD
    5200.1-R (reference (g)), in accordance with DoD 5025.1-M
    (reference (h)).

    2.  APPLICABILITY

    This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the
    Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the
    Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities (hereafter
    referred to collectively as “the DoD Components”).

    3.  DEFINITIONS

    3.1.  Compromise.   A communication or physical transfer
    of classified information to an unauthorized recipient.

    3.2.  Information.   Any knowledge that may be communicated
    or documentary material, regardless of its physical
    form or characteristics, that is owned by, produced
    by or for, or is under the control of, the Department
    of Defense.

    3.3.   National Security.   The national defense or
    foreign relations of the United States.

    4.  POLICY

    It is DoD policy that:

    4.1.  National security information shall be classified,
    declassified and safeguarded, in accordance with national-level
    policy issuances.   Misclassification shall be avoided.

    4.2.  Declassification of information shall receive
    equal attention with classification to ensure that information
    remains classified only as long as required by national
    security considerations.

    4.3.  The volume of classified national security information
    shall be reduced to the minimum necessary to meet operational
    requirements.

    4.4.  An active security education and training program
    shall be established and maintained to ensure that DoD
    military and civilian personnel who require access to
    classified national security information in the conduct
    of official business are familiar with their responsibilities
    for protecting such information from unauthorized disclosure.

    5.  RESPONSIBILITIES

    5.l.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
    Control, Communications, and Intelligence shall:

    5.1.1.  Serve as the Senior Agency Official for the
    Department of Defense under subsection 5.6.(c) of E.O.
    12958, as amended (reference (b)).

    5.1.2.  Direct, administer, and oversee the DoD Information
    Security Program to ensure that the program is efficient,
    recognizes assigned authorities and responsibilities,
    and that appropriate management safeguards are in place
    to prevent fraud,waste, and abuse.

    5.1.3.  Approve, when appropriate, requests for exceptions
    to DoD Information Security Program policies and procedures.

    5.1.4.  Approve and publish DoD Instructions and Publications,
    as necessary, to guide, direct, or help DoD Information
    Security Program activities, consistent with DoD 5025.1-M
    (reference (h)).

    5.1.5.  Encourage liaison between the DoD Components
    and industry; professional associations; academia; Federal,
    State, and local government organizations; and international
    organizations to acquire information that may be of
    use in improving the DoD Information Security Program.

    5.1.6.  Assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
    and Technology, as required, in implementing the DoD
    Acquisition Systems Protection Program, both by establishing
    security policy and providing technical security support
    to that program.

    5.2.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:

    5.2.1.  Direct, administer and oversee that portion
    of the DoD Information Security Program pertaining to
    Special Access Programs, foreign government (including
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization) classified information,
    the National Disclosure Policy and security arrangements
    for international programs.

    5.2.2.  Approve, when appropriate, requests for exception
    to policy involving any programs listed in paragraph
    5.2.1., above.

    5.3.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public
    Affairs shall:

    5.3.1.  Direct and administer a DoD Mandatory Declassification
    Review Program under subsection 3.6. of E.O. 12958 (reference
    (b)).

    5.3.2.  Establish policies and procedures for processing
    mandatory declassification review requests, including
    appeals consistent with subsection 3.6.(d) of reference
    (b) and Section 2001.13 of the Information Security
    Oversight Office Directive (reference (c)), which make
    maximum use of DoD Component resources and systems established
    to implement DoD Directive 5400.7 (reference (i)).

    5.4.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
    and Technology shall serve as the office of primary
    responsibility and provide day-to-day direction and
    management of the DoD Acquisition Systems Protection
    Program.

    5.5.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments, as
    Agency Heads under reference (b), and the Heads of the
    Other DoD Components, shall:

    5.5.1.  Designate a senior agency official for their
    respective Departments who shall be responsible for
    the direction and administration of the Department’s
    information security program, to include active oversight,
    classification, declassification and security education
    and training programs to ensure effective implementation
    of reference (b) and DoD 5200.1-R (reference (g)).

    5.5.2.  Ensure that funding and resources are adequate
    to carry out such oversight, classification, declassification
    and security education and training programs.

    5.5.3.  Consider and take action on complaints and suggestions
    from persons in or outside the Government regarding
    the Department’s Information Security Program.

    5.6.  The Director, National Security Agency, shall,
    as the designee of the Secretary of Defense, when necessary,
    impose special requirements on the classification, declassification,
    marking, reproduction, distribution, accounting, and
    protection of and access to classified cryptologic information.

    6.  EFFECTIVE DATE

    This Directive is effective immediately.

    Enclosures - 1

    1.   References

    E1.  ENCLOSURE 1

    REFERENCES, continued

    (e)  DoD Instruction O-5230.22, “Security Controls on
    the Dissemination of Intelligence Information,” August
    17, 1988 (hereby canceled)

    (f)  DoD Directive 5200.12, “Conduct of Classified Meetings,”
    July 27, 1992 (hereby canceled)

    (g)  DoD 5200.1-R, “Department of Defense Information
    Security Program Regulation,” January 17, 1997 authorized
    by this Directive

    (h)  DoD 5025.1-M, “DoD Directives System Procedures,”
    August 1994, authorized by DoD Directive 5025.1, June
    24, 1994

    (i)  DoD Directive 5400.7, “DoD Freedom of Information
    Act Program,” May 13, 1988

    Department of Defense

    DIRECTIVE

    NUMBER 5205.8

    February 20, 1991

    ASD(C3I)

    SUBJECT:  Access to Classified Cryptographic Information

    References:  (a)  National Telecommunications and Information
    Systems Security Policy (NTISSP) No. 3, "National Policy
    for Granting Access to U.S. Classified Cryptographic
    Information," December 19, 1988

    (b)  Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence
    Activities," December 4, 1981

    (c)  National Telecommunications and Information Systems
    Security Instruction (NTISSI) No. 4001, "Controlled
    Cryptographic Items," March 25, 1985

    (d)  DoD 5200.l-R, "Information Security Program Regulation,"
    June 1986, authorized by DoD Directive 5200.1, June
    7, 1982

    (e)  through (i), see enclosure E1.

    1.  PURPOSE

    This Directive establishes under reference (a) a program
    to govern the granting of access to classified cryptographic
    information that is owned, produced by or for, or is
    under the control of the Department of Defense and is
    in accordance with reference (b) to protect national
    security information.

    2.  APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

    This Directive:

    2.1.  Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD), the Military Departments, the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Unified
    and Specified Commands, the Defense Agencies, and the
    DoD Field Activities (hereafter referred to collectively
    as "the DoD Components").

    2.2.  Applies to all members of the U.S. Armed Forces,
    civilian employees of the Department of Defense and
    employees of agents of the DoD Components who have access
    to classified cryptographic information.   The term
    "agents," as used herein, refers to contractors, consultants,
    and other persons affiliated with the Department of
    Defense.

    2.3.  Pertains to persons whose duties require continuing
    access to classified cryptographic information.   (See
    section 3., below.)   Accordingly, this Directive concerns
    those persons assigned:

    2.3.1.  As cryptographic material custodians, alternates,
    or their equivalents.

    2.3.2.  As producers or developers of cryptographic
    key or logic.

    2.3.3.  As cryptographic maintenance, engineering, or
    installation technicians.

    2.3.4.  To supply points where cryptographic keying
    materials are generated or stored, and to those having
    access to such materials.

    2.3.5.  To secure telecommunications facilities located
    on the ground, on board ship, or on communications support
    aircraft and whose duties require keying of cryptographic
    equipment.

    2.3.6.  To prepare, authenticate, or decode nuclear
    control orders (valid or exercise).

    2.3.7.  Any responsibility requiring or enabling access
    to classified cryptographic media.

    2.4.  Is not applicable to individuals whose duties
    are to operate (not to key or maintain) systems using
    cryptographic equipment.

    2.5.  Excludes Controlled Cryptographic Items as defined
    in NTISSI No. 4001 (reference (c)).

    3.  DEFINITION

    3.1.  Classified Cryptographic Information, with respect
    to this access program, is specified as:

    3.1.1.  Cryptographic key and authenticators that are
    classified pursuant to DoD 5200.l-R (reference (d))
    and are designated as SECRET CRYPTO, or TOP-SECRET CRYPTO.

    3.1.2.  Classified cryptographic media that embody,
    describe, or implement a classified cryptographic logic,
    to include, but not be limited to, full maintenance
    manuals, cryptographic descriptions, drawings of cryptographic
    logic, specifications describing a cryptographic logic,
    and cryptographic computer software.

    4.  POLICY

    It is DoD policy that a person may be granted access
    to classified cryptographic information, as specified
    in sections 2. and 3., above, only if that person:

    4.1.  Is a U.S. citizen;

    4.2.  Is a civilian employee of the Department of Defense,
    a member of a Military Service, a DoD-cleared contractor
    or employee of such contractor, or is employed as a
    DoD representative (including consultants of the Department
    of Defense);

    4.3.  Requires access to perform official duties for,
    or on behalf of, the Department of Defense;

    4.4.  Possesses a security clearance and personnel security
    investigation appropriate to the level of the classified
    cryptographic information to be accessed, in accordance
    with DoD 5200.2-R (reference (e));

    4.5.  Receives a security briefing appropriate to the
    cryptographic information to be accessed;

    4.6.  Acknowledges the granting of access by signing
    a cryptographic access certificate;

    4.7.  Agrees to report foreign travel and any form of
    contact with foreign citizens, in accordance with DoD
    5200.2-R (reference (e)); and

    4.8.  Acknowledges the possibility of being subject
    to a non-lifestyle, counterintelligence scope polygraph
    examination administered in accordance with DoD Directive
    5210.48 (reference (f)).

    5.  RESPONSIBILITIES

    5.1.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
    Control, Communications, and Intelligence shall oversee
    and review the implementation of this Directive.

    5.2.  The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

    5.2.1.  Control access to classified cryptographic information
    in accordance with section 4., above.

    5.2.2.  Establish, implement, and administer a cryptographic
    access program within their respective organizations.
      This program shall include providing Cryptographic
    Access Briefings (sample in enclosure E2.) and executing
    Cryptographic Access Certificates (sample in enclosure
    E3).

    5.2.3.  Implement, in accordance with DoD Directive
    5210.48 (reference (f)), a counterintelligence scope
    polygraph examination program in support of this Directive.

    5.2.4.  Maintain records on all individuals who have
    been granted cryptographic access or have had their
    cryptographic access withdrawn, and arrange for retention
    of Cryptographic Access Certificates or legally enforceable
    facsimiles in accordance with the DoD Component records
    disposition schedules.

    5.2.5.  Accept as valid the cryptographic access granted
    by other DoD Components.

    5.2.6.  Deny or withdraw cryptographic access to those
    individuals who fail to agree to or comply with the
    specific criteria identified in section 4., above.

    6.  EFFECTIVE DATE

    This Directive is effective immediately.

    Enclosures -  3

    1.  References, continued

    2.  Sample - Cryptographic Access Briefing

    3.  SD Form 572 - Cryptographic Access Certification
    and Termination

    E1.  ENCLOSURE 1

    REFERENCES, continued

    (e)  DoD 5200.2-R, "DoD Personnel Security Program,"
    January 1987, authorized by DoD Directive 5200.2, December
    20, 1979

    (f)  DoD Directive 5210.48, "DoD Polygraph Program,"
    December 24, 1984

    (g)  DoD Directive 5220.22, "DoD Industrial Security
    Program," December 8, 1980

    (h)  DoD 5220.22-R, "Industrial Security Regulation,"
    December 1985, authorized by DoD Directive 5220.22,
    December 8, 1980

    (i)  DoD 5220.22-M, "Industrial Security Manual for
    Safeguarding Classified Information," March 1989, authorized
    by DoD Directive 5220.22, December 8, 1980

    E2.  ENCLOSURE 2

    SAMPLE

    CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS BRIEFING

     You have been selected to perform duties that will
    require access to classified cryptographic information.

       It is essential that you be made aware of certain
    facts relevant to the protection of this information
    before access is granted.   You must know the reason
    why special safeguards are required to protect classified
    cryptographic information.   You must understand the
    Directives that require these safeguards and the penalties
    you may incur for the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized
    retention, or negligent handling of classified cryptographic
    information.   Failure to properly safeguard this information
    could cause serious or exceptionally grave damage, or
    irreparable injury, to the national security of the
    United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign
    nation.

     Classified cryptographic information is especially
    sensitive because it is used to protect other classified
    information.   Any particular piece of cryptographic
    keying material and any specific cryptographic technique
    may be used to protect a large quantity of classified
    information during transmission.   If the integrity
    of the cryptographic system is breached at any point,
    all information protected by the system may be compromised.

      The safeguards placed on classified cryptographic
    information are a necessary component of Government
    programs to ensure that our nation's vital secrets are
    not compromised.

     Because access to classified cryptographic information
    is granted on a strict need-to-know basis, you will
    be given access to only that cryptographic information
    necessary in the performance of your duties.   You are
    required to become familiar with (insert, as appropriate,
    Department or Agency implementing Directives covering
    the protection of cryptographic information).   Cited
    Directives are attached in a briefing book for your
    review at this time.

     Especially important to the protection of classified
    cryptographic information is the timely reporting of
    any known or suspected compromise of this information.

      If a cryptographic system is compromised, but the
    compromise is not reported, the continued use of the
    system can result in the loss of all information protected
    by it.   If the compromise is reported, steps can be
    taken to lessen an adversary's advantage gained through
    the compromise of the information.

     As a condition of access to classified cryptographic
    information, you must acknowledge that you may be subject
    to a non-lifestyle, counterintelligence scope polygraph
    examination.   This examination will be administered
    in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.48 and applicable
    law.   The relevant questions in this polygraph examination
    will only encompass questions concerning espionage,
    sabotage, or questions relating to unauthorized disclosure
    of classified information or unreported foreign contacts.

      If you do not, at this time, wish to sign such an
    acknowledgment as a part of executing a cryptographic
    access certification, this briefing will be terminated
    at this point and the briefing administrator will so
    annotate the cryptographic access certificate.   Such
    refusal will not be cause for adverse action but will
    result in your being denied access to classified cryptographic
    information.

     You should know that intelligence services of some
    foreign governments prize the acquisition of classified
    cryptographic information.   They will go to extreme
    lengths to compromise U.S. citizens and force them to
    divulge cryptographic techniques and materials that
    protect the nation's secrets around the world.   You
    must understand that any personal or financial relationship
    with a foreign government's representative could make
    you vulnerable to attempts at coercion to divulge classified
    cryptographic information.   You should be alert to
    recognize those attempts so that you may successfully
    counter them.   The best personal policy is to avoid
    discussions that reveal your knowledge of, or access
    to, classified cryptographic information and thus avoid
    highlighting yourself to those who would seek the information
    you possess.    Any attempt, either through friendship
    or coercion, to solicit your knowledge regarding classified
    cryptographic information must be reported immediately
    to (insert appropriate security office).

     In view of the risks noted above, unofficial travel
    to certain communist or other designated countries may
    require the prior approval of (insert appropriate security
    office).   It is essential that you contact (insert
    appropriate security office) if such unofficial travel
    becomes necessary.

     Finally, you must know that, should you willfully or
    negligently disclose to any unauthorized persons any
    of the classified cryptographic information to which
    you will have access, you may be subject to administrative
    and civil sanctions, including adverse personnel actions,
    as well as criminal sanctions under the Uniform Code
    of Military Justice (UCMJ) and/or the criminal laws
    of the United States, as appropriate.

    E3.  ENCLOSURE 3

    SD FORM 572 - CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS CERTIFICATION AND
    TERMINATION

    Department of Defense

    DIRECTIVE

    NUMBER 5210.45

    May 9, 1964

    SUBJECT:  Personnel Security in the National Security
    Agency

    References:  (a)  Public Law 88-290, An Act to Amend
    the Internal Security Act of 1950

    1.  PURPOSE

    The purpose of this directive is to prescribe policies
    and procedures to implement Public Law 88-290 the objective
    of which is to strengthen personnel security In the
    National Security Agency.

    2.  PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARD

    No person shall be employed in, or detailed or assigned
    to, the National Security Agency, and no person shall
    have access to classified information of the Agency,
    unless his employment, detail, or assignment to the
    Agency, or his access to classified information of the
    Agency, is clearly consistent with the national security.

    3.  FULL FIELD INVESTIGATION

    3.1.  No person shall be finally employed in the National
    Security Agency until he has been the subject of a full
    field investigation.   A person may, however, be provisionally
    employed before the completion of a full field investigation
    in his case, but he may not be given access to sensitive
    cryptologic information while he is so employed.   His
    provisional employment is conditional upon the successful
    outcome of a full field investigation in his case.

    3.2.  No person shall be assigned or detailed to the
    Agency without the agreement of the Agency that its
    security requirements are met; each such person shall
    be the subject of a full field investigation in connection
    with such assignment or detail unless he has a current
    security clearance for sensitive cryptologic information
    which was granted under the same or equivalent standards
    as are prescribed by the Agency.

    3.3.  The Director of the Agency may, in an exceptional
    case, temporarily waive the requirement for a full field
    investigation if he personally determines in writing
    that such action is advisable in the national interest
    and is clearly consistent with the national security.
      In such a case priority shall be given to the full
    field investigation.   This authority of the Director,
    NSA, cannot be redelegated.

    4.  BOARDS OF APPRAISAL

    4.1.  The Director of the Agency shall establish one
    or more boards of appraisal of three members each to
    be assigned personnel security responsibility as set
    forth below.   Members of a board shall be senior officials
    with broad experience, shall be specially trained for
    their duties, and shall have been the subject of a full
    field investigation, and have been cleared for access
    to classified information, in connection with their
    appointment

    4.2.  The Director of the Agency shall refer to a board
    those cases in which he determines that there is a doubt
    as to eligibility for access to classified information
    of an employee or person assigned or detailed to the
    Agency.   The board shall appraise the loyalty and suitability
    of persons whose cases have been referred to it and
    advise the Director whether access to classified information
    by such persons is clearly consistent with the national
    security.   In applying the foregoing standard, the
    board shall use the criteria which have been prescribed
    by the U.S. Intelligence Board and Department of Defense
    Directive 5210.8 dated February 15, 1962.

    4.3.  Proceedings of a board shall not include notice
    to the individual, right to a hearing, or appeal from
    an adverse recommendation.   A board shall submit to
    the Director a report and recommendation on each case
    referred to it.   The report shall not be made available
    to the person.   No person shall be cleared for access
    or continued access to Agency classified information
    contrary to the recommendation of a board except on
    the authority of the Director or, upon the referral
    by the Director, of the Secretary of Defense.   In such
    a case, the Director or the Secretary shall make a determination
    in writing that the employment, detail, assignment or
    access is in the national Interest.

    4.4.  Appraisal by a board is not required before action
    may be taken under Section 14 of the Act of June 27,
    1944, Chapter 287, as amended (5 U.S.C. 863), Section
    l of the Act of August 26, 1950, Chapter 803, as amended
    (5 U.S.C. 22-1), or any other similar provision of law.
      The objective in establishing the boards(s) is to
    assure further that the access of each person to classified
    information is clearly consistent with the national
    security in consonance with the requirements and standards
    of the U.S. Intelligence Board and the Department of
    Defense.

    5.  TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

    5.1.  Section 303(a) of Public Law 88-290 authorizes
    the Secretary of Defense to terminate employment of
    any officer or employee of the National Security Agency
    in his discretion whenever (1) he considers such action
    to be in the interest of the United States, and (2)
    he determines that the procedures prescribed in other
    provisions of law that authorize the termination of
    employment of that officer or employee cannot be invoked
    consistently with the national security.   The Secretary's
    action to terminate employment is final.   The statute
    provides, however, that the individual whose employment
    has been terminated under this authority may seek or
    accept employment in any other Government Agency provided
    that the Civil Service Commission determines he is eligible
    for such employment.

    5.2.  When the two conditions cited above do not exist,
    the Director, NSA, shall, when appropriate, take action
    pursuant to other provisions of law, as applicable,
    to terminate the employment of a civilian officer or
    employee.   The Director shall recommend to the Secretary
    of Defense the exercise of the authority of Section
    303(a) only when the termination of the employment of
    a civilian officer or employee cannot, because of paramount
    national security interests, be carried out under any
    other provision of law.

    6.  IMPLEMENTATION

    Proposed implementing regulations of the National Security
    Agency shall be coordinated with the General Counsel
    of the Department of Defense prior to their publication.

    7.  EFFECTIVE DATE

    This directive becomes effective immediately.

    Department of Defense

    DIRECTIVE

    NUMBER 5210.70

    November 3, 1980

    ASD(C3I)

    SUBJECT:  DoD Cryptologic Training

    References:  (a)  National Security Council Intelligence
    Directive No.6 (NSCID No. 6)

    (b)  DoD Directive S-5100.20, "The National Security
    Agency and the Central Security Service," December 23,
    1971

    (c)  DoD Directive 5100.47, "National Cryptologic School,"
    April 30, 1965

    1.  PURPOSE

    This Directive establishes uniform policies, standards,
    and procedures for the conduct of cryptologic training;
    and assigns responsibilities to ensure that adequate
    and responsive training within the various Components
    of the Department of Defense is carried out.

    2.  APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

    2.1.  The provisions of this Directive apply to the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military
    Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter called "DoD
    Components").   As used herein, the term "Services"
    refers to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

    2.2.  Its provisions encompass all elements of the Department
    of Defense engaged in cryptologic and cryptologic-related
    training that supports operations contained in the Consolidated
    Cryptologic Program (CCP) or Tactical Cryptologic Program
    (TCP).

    3.  DEFINITIONS

    3.1.  Cryptologic Training.    Institutional training
    in skills unique to the cryptologic mission.

    3.2.  Common Cryptologic Training.    Training in identical
    skills that are essentially similar for personnel of
    more than one Military Department or for the National
    Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS).

    3.3.  Unique Cryptologic Training.    Training in cryptologic
    skills that is either used by only one of the DoD Components
    engaged in cryptologic operations, or sufficiently dissimilar
    among the DoD Components as to make consolidated or
    collocated intercomponent training infeasible.

    3.4.  Cryptologic-Related Training.    Training that
    is a prerequisite for, or an adjunct to, cryptologic
    training and job performance when the subject matter
    is not in itself cryptologic but is of overriding importance
    to the conduct of cryptologic operations; the noncryptologic
    applications of such subjects are excluded.

    4.  POLICY

    The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central
    Security Service (DIRNSA/CHCSS), as principal signals
    intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense and
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff (NSCID No. 6. (reference (a))
    and DoD Directive S-5100.20 (reference (b))), shall
    ensure the technical adequacy of all cryptologic training.

    5.  RESPONSIBILITIES

    5.1.  The Director, National Security Agency/Chief,
    Central Security Service, shall:

    5.1.1.  Submit requirements to the OSD for inclusion
    in the Consolidated Guidance (or Intelligence Annex
    thereto) for the direction of programming and budgeting
    for Military Department cryptologic and cryptologic-related
    training programs, and provide program manager's guidance
    for cryptologic training.

    5.1.2.  Review Military Department program submissions
    on cryptologic and cryptologic-related training.

    5.1.3.  Provide technical guidance, minimum standards,
    and support for all course development and all ongoing
    cryptologic and cryptologic-related training.

    5.1.4.  Review course documentation to ensure the technical
    adequacy of cryptologic and cryptologic-related course
    content.

    5.1.5.  Maintain and operate the National Cryptologic
    School (NCS) in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.47
    (reference (c)).

    5.1.6.  Coordinate, with the Military Departments, proposed
    changes to training requirements, resources, and courses
    as initiated by NSA/CSS, to include training development
    for new systems and the procurement of technical training
    equipment.

    5.1.7.  Establish, in coordination with the Military
    Departments, policy, missions, objectives, standards,
    curricula, and types and sources of training used to
    satisfy requirements.

    5.1.8.  In cooperation with the Military Departments,
    provide for the periodic review and analysis of all
    common and unique cryptologic training courses to determine
    the potential for interservice or intercomponent consolidation
    and/or collocation.   When such action is determined
    to maintain or enhance the effectiveness of training
    and to be economical, arrange for the consolidations
    and/or collocations or, as appropriate, make recommendations
    to the Secretary of Defense for decisions on specific
    courses of action.

    5.1.9.  Establish, in coordination with the Military
    Departments, an evaluation and information feedback
    system that incorporates Military Service evaluation
    methods.

    5.1.10.  Establish a Cryptologic Training Council to
    provide a forum wherein policy matters, training issues,
    and other related topics may be addressed.   The Council
    shall be chaired by the Training Director, NSA/CSS (TDNC),
    and be composed of representatives from each Military
    Department and the NSA/CSS.

    5.1.11.  Prescribe administrative procedures for compliance
    with appropriate security directives pertaining to special
    clearance requirements for all NSA/CSS personnel involved
    with cryptologic training and curriculum development.

    5.2.  The Training Director, National Security Agency/Central
    Security Service shall serve as the principal executive
    for DIRNSA/CHCSS in matters related to cryptologic training.

    5.3.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

    5.3.1.  Incorporate guidance from OSD and the NSA/CSS
    in the development of cryptologic training, planning,
    programming, and budgeting documents.

    5.3.2.  Coordinate, with NSA/CSS, deviations and proposed
    changes to training requirements, resources, and courses
    initiated by the Military Departments, to include training
    development for new systems and the procurement of technical
    training equipment that affect the capability to execute
    training programs.

    5.3.3.  Assemble and maintain, for all DoD Components,
    a current record of all DoD common and unique training
    requirements and programs under their cognizance.

    5.3.4.  Establish, maintain, and operate cryptologic
    training schools that provide training for DoD Components
    agreed upon among the Military Departments and the DIRNSA/CHCSS.

    5.3.5.  Provide cryptologic instructional material for
    Reserve components, correspondence students, and proficiency
    training for all military personnel.

    5.3.6.  Provide facilities for the use of DoD Components
    for training that can be effectively and efficiently
    conducted on a collocated basis.

    5.3.7.  Coordinate actions with NSA/CSS and maintain
    liaison with other DoD Components and appropriate Government
    Departments and Agencies on matters that affect the
    conduct and development of assigned cryptologic training
    programs.

    5.3.8.  Prescribe administrative procedures for compliance
    with appropriate security directives pertaining to special
    clearance requirements for all personnel of their respective
    Military Departments involved with cryptologic training
    and curriculum development.

    6.  PROCEDURES

    6.1.  Personnel shall be assigned to the staffs and
    faculties of the cryptologic training schools by their
    respective Military Services.

    6.2.  Manpower authorizations for joint Service staffs
    and faculties shall be prorated among the Military Departments,
    based upon participation in terms of student weeks.

    6.3.  The Military Departments and NSA/CSS shall program
    and budget for all expenses incidental to the operation,
    maintenance, and base-operating support of their respective
    cryptologic training schools.

    6.4.  The pay, allowances, and permanent change of station
    travel and per diem costs of Military Department personnel
    assigned as faculty or staff of the cryptologic training
    schools shall be borne by the sponsoring DoD Component.

    6.5.  NCS administrative financial functions shall be
    conducted in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.47 (reference
    (c)).

    6.6.  The regulatory controls for cryptologic training
    shall be defined in a series of NSA/CSS circulars that
    shall be initiated by DIRNSA/CHCSS and coordinated with
    the Military Departments.

    7.  EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

    This Directive is effective immediately.   Forward two
    copies of implementing documents to the Assistant Secretary
    of Defense (Command, Communications, Control and Intelligence)
    within 120 days.