23 July 1999
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/fr-cont.html

For amendments 1256, 1257, 1258 (Dept. of Energy Nuclear Security)
and 1259: http://cryptome.org/hr1555-amend.txt

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[Congressional Record: July 20, 1999 (Senate)]
[Page S8854-S8862]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr20jy99-152]


          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the clerk will
report the bill.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 1555) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
     year 2000 for intelligence and intelligence-related
     activities of the United States Government, the Community
     Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
     Retirement and Disability System, and other purposes.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous consent agreement, the
junior Senator from Arizona, Mr. Kyl, is to be recognized to offer an
amendment after the general statements.
  Mr. SHELBY. What is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized to make
an opening statement on the bill.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, on May 5 of this year the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence unanimously reported out of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. It subsequently referred to the
Committee on Armed Services, where it was reported out on June 8.
  Senator Kerrey and I have once again worked very closely together to
address our critical need for high-quality intelligence by allocating
resources in a manner designed to ensure that this need is met.
  In preparing this legislation, the committee conducted a detailed
review of the administration's three major intelligence budget requests
for fiscal year 2000. They are the National Foreign Intelligence
Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities of the Military Services.
  The committee held briefings and hearings with senior intelligence
officials, reviewed budget justification materials, and considered
responses to specific questions posed by the committee.
  As in the past, the committee also impaneled a group of outside
experts composed of distinguished scientists, industry leaders, and
retired general and flag officers to review specific technical issues
within the intelligence community.
  The panel is known as the Technical Advisory Group and is similar to
the Defense Department's Defense Science Board in some ways.
  This group brings an invaluable level of expertise to the committee's
work, and we owe them a debt of gratitude for their service.
  Many of their recommendations have been incorporated into this bill
before the Senate this evening.
  Once again the committee has focused on what we refer to as the
``five C's''. They are: counterproliferation, counterterrorism,
counternarcotics, covert action, and counterintelligence.
  The last of the five, counterintelligence, has received a great deal
of congressional and media attention in recent months in light of
revelations of espionage activities by the People's Republic of China.
  I am proud to say that the Intelligence Committee has been attempting
to address the shortcomings of the Department of Energy's
counterintelligence program for nearly 10 years, often to no avail.
  In fact, it was the Intelligence Committee that directed the study
that finally led to the drafting and signing of Presidential Decision
Directive 61.
  Before I turn to the legislative provisions in this bill, I feel
compelled to share with our colleagues some comments about the current
state of our defense and intelligence preparedness.
  In the immediate aftermath of the cold war, optimistic appraisals of
our

[[Page S8855]]

intelligence and security requirements generated calls for dramatic
cuts in defense and intelligence spending.
  The first national security decision made by President Clinton on
taking office in 1993 was to cut more than $120 billion from the
defense budget. Substantial cuts were also made to classified
intelligence programs.
  Unfortunately, such optimistic estimates have proved sadly wrong.
  Today we face a series of transnational threats spanning the spectrum
of conflict from terrorist acts committed on U.S. territory to the
development of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery
by Third World countries.
  I recently traveled to the Balkans and reviewed some of our
intelligence activities in Europe. Military and civilian personnel were
routinely working in excess of 80 hours a week, and that pace was
nonstop throughout the Kosovo conflict.
  Regretfully, the problems the military and the intelligence community
are experiencing are partly our fault. Congress accepted ``defense on
the cheap,'' and we have gotten exactly what we paid for as we always
do--an intelligence community and military force stretched to its
limits.
  I believe the result is clear: We are not prepared to meet the
challenges of a complex and dangerous world.
  National security cannot be had on the cheap, and we have attempted
to address some of the shortfalls in this year's bill.
  The bill's classified schedule of authorizations and annex--I remind
every Senator--are available for review just off the Senate floor. I
repeat: The bill's classified schedule of authorizations and annex are
available to every Senator in this body for review just off the Senate
floor.
  I will now discuss the significant unclassified legislative
provisions contained in the bill.
  First, section 304 directs the President to require an employee who
requires access to classified information to provide written consent
that permits an authorized investigative agency to access information
stored in computers used in the performance of Government duties.
  This provision is intended to avoid the problems we have seen with
the FBI's reluctance to access ``Government'' computers without a
warrant in the course of an espionage investigation.
  There should be no question--yes, there should be no question--that
investigative agencies may search the computer of an individual with
access to classified information. This provision makes that perfectly
clear.
  Second, sections 501 through 505 comprise the Department of Energy
Sensitive Country Foreign Visitors Moratorium Act of 1999.
  What is that? Section 502 establishes a moratorium on foreign
visitors to classified facilities at Department of Energy National
Laboratories.
  The moratorium applies only to citizens of nations on the Department
of Energy ``sensitive countries list.''
  Section 502 also provides for a waiver of the moratorium on a case-
by-case basis if the Secretary of Energy justifies the waiver and
certifies that the visit is necessary for the national security of the
United States.
  Section 503 requires that the Secretary of Energy perform background
checks on all foreign visitors to the National Laboratories. The term
``background checks'' means the consultation of all available,
appropriate, and relevant intelligence community and law enforcement
databases.
  Section 504 requires an interim report to Congress on the
counterintelligence activities at the National Laboratories and a net
assessment of the Foreign Visitors Program at the National Laboratories
to be produced by a panel of experts.
  Most importantly, the report must include a recommendation as to
whether the moratorium should be continued or repealed.
  The Senate Intelligence Committee has been critical of the Department
of Energy's counterintelligence program for nearly 10 years. Beginning
in 1990, we identified serious shortfalls in funding and personnel
dedicated to protecting our Nation's nuclear secrets.
  Yet year after year--and this year as well--the committee has
provided funds and directed many reviews and studies in an effort to
persuade the Department of Energy to take action.
  Unfortunately, this and prior administrations failed to heed our
warnings.
  Consequently, a serious espionage threat at our National Labs has
gone virtually unabated and it appears that our nuclear weapons program
may have suffered extremely grave damage.
  I believe we must take steps to ensure the integrity of our National
Labs. We understand that a moratorium on the Foreign Visitors Program
may be perceived by some as a draconian measure, but until the
Department of Energy fully implements a comprehensive and sustained
counterintelligence program, we believe that we must err on the side of
caution. The stakes are too high.
  The moratorium requires a net assessment to be conducted by a panel
of experts; this is an integral part of a comprehensive report by the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the FBI on the
counterintelligence activities at the National Laboratories.
  Only then should we decide whether to lift the moratorium in favor of
a comprehensive plan. I believe this is a very important point.
  During our preliminary look in the committee into the problems at the
DOE labs, we were convinced that the FBI could and should be required
to inform an agency or department that they are investigating an
employee of that particular agency.
  Accordingly, section 602 of the bill requires the FBI to establish
meaningful liaison with the relevant agency at the beginning stages of
a counterintelligence investigation.
  This section also amends the Intelligence Authorization Act for
fiscal year 1995 to make clear that the FBI's obligation to consult
with departments and agencies concerned begins when the FBI has
knowledge of espionage activities from other sources or as a result of
its own information or investigation.
  In closing, I must remind the Members of this body, my colleagues, of
an unfortunate fact. This is the last time that Senator Kerrey, the
distinguished senior Senator from Nebraska, will bring an intelligence
authorization bill to the floor of the Senate as the vice chairman of
the committee.
  Senator Kerrey's tenure on the committee will conclude at the end of
this year.
  This past March 14, as some of you will recall, marked the 30th
anniversary of the day that Lieutenant, Junior Grade, Bob Kerrey,
leading his SEAL team on an operation on an island in the bay of Nha
Trang earned our Nation's highest award for valor, the Medal of Honor.
  No one who knows Bob Kerrey's military record would question his
physical courage, but I would like to talk for just a few minutes about
another type of courage he has, and that is moral courage.
  In a town like Washington that rewards neither, he is the rare man
who has both, I believe. The wartime history of the United States Navy
has documented his physical courage, but I want to recognize his moral
courage. And I want to tell you why.
  Senator Kerrey has taken stands that many of us would consider
politically unwise.
  He took a stand on entitlements reform here in the Senate long before
it was politically wise to do so. It can be said he laid his bare hand
on the ``third rail of American politics'' and took the heat--something
few in this body were willing to attempt.
  As vice chairman of this committee, Senator Kerrey has often taken
issue with his own administration when he believed it was in the
national interest to do so. Indeed, he always puts the interests of the
Nation ahead of politics.
  Also, Senator Kerrey's knowledge of our intelligence needs is
unparalleled in the Senate. And I will miss his service, as others
will, on the Intelligence Committee.
  Senator Kerrey has set a very high standard for his successor, and I
thank him for his dedication and integrity, and also for his personal
friendship. It has been a pleasure and an honor to work with Nebraska's
senior Senator.
  I look forward to joining him on the floor one last time when the
conference report for this bill reaches the floor later this year.
  Until that time, though, we will continue to work closely to conduct
vigorous oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States
in the

[[Page S8856]]

nonpartisan spirit that created this important and unique committee.
  Mr. President, before I yield the floor, I ask unanimous consent that
a copy of the Congressional Budget Office cost estimate for S. 1009 be
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

     S. 1009--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000
       Summary: S. 1009 would authorize appropriations for fiscal
     year 2000 for intelligence activities of the United States
     government, the Intelligence Community Management Account,
     and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
     System (CIARDS).
       This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
     the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that enacting
     the bill would result in additional spending of $172 million
     over the 2000-2004 period, assuming appropriation of the
     authorized amounts. The unclassified portion of the bill
     would affect direct spending; thus, pay-as-you-go procedures
     would apply. However, CBO cannot give a precise estimate of
     the direct spending effects because the data necessary to
     support a cost estimate are classified.
       The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) excludes from
     application of that all legislative provisions that are
     necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that
     the unclassified provisions of this bill either fit within
     that exclusion or do not cover intergovernmental or private-
     sector mandates as defined by UMRA.
       Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
     budgetary impact of the unclassified portions of S. 1009 is
     shown in the following table. CBO cannot obtain the necessary
     information to estimate the costs for the entire bill because
     parts are classified at a level above clearances held by CBO
     employees. For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that
     the bill will be enacted by October 1, 1999, and that the
     authorized amounts will be appropriated for fiscal year 2000.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     By fiscal years in millions of dollars--
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                                                   1999    2000    2001    2002    2003    2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

Spending Under Current Law for Intelligence Community
 Management:
  Budget Authority \1\..........................................     102       0       0       0       0  ......
  Estimated Outlays.............................................     104      39       9       2       0  ......
Proposed Changes:
  Authorization Level...........................................       0     172       0       0       0  ......
  Estimated Outlays.............................................       0     106      52      10       3  ......
Spending Under S. 1009 for Intelligence Community Management:
  Authorization Level\1\........................................     102     172       0       0       0       0
  Estimated Outlays.............................................     104     145      61      12       3       0

                                           CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING

Estimated Budget Authority......................................       0   (\2\)   (\2\)   (\2\)   (\2\)   (\2\)
Estimated Outlays...............................................       0   (\2\)   (\2\)   (\2\)   (\2\)  (\2\)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 1999 level is the amount appropriated for that year.
\2\ CBO cannot give a precise estimate of direct spending effects because the data necessary to support a cost
  estimate are classified.

       Outlays are estimated according to historical spending
     patterns. The costs of this legislation fall within budget
     function 050 (national defense).
       The bill would authorize appropriations of $172 million for
     the Intelligence Community Management Account, which funds
     the coordination of programs, budget oversight, and
     management of the intelligence agencies. In addition, the
     bill would authorize $209 million for CIARDS to cover
     retirement costs attributable to military service and various
     unfunded liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is considered
     mandatory, and the authorization under this bill would be the
     same as assumed in the CBO baseline.
       Section 305 would allow an individual who is or has been
     affiliated with a Communist or similar political party to
     become a naturalized citizen, if the individual has made a
     contribution to the national security or national
     intelligence mission of the United States. Under current law,
     such individuals are not allowed to become naturalized
     citizens, unless the affiliation was involuntary. Enacting
     this provision could effect certain federal assistance
     programs and the amount of fees collected by the Immigration
     and Naturalization Service. Because the number of affected
     individuals is expected to be very small, however, CBO
     estimates that any effects on direct spending would not be
     significant.
       Section 402 of the bill would extend the authority of the
     Central Intelligence Agency to offer incentive payments to
     employees who voluntarily retire or resign. This * * * which
     is currently scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year
     1999, would be * * * through fiscal year 2000. Section 402
     would also require the CIA to make a deposit to the Civil
     Service Retirement and Disability Fund equal to 15 percent of
     final pay for each employee who accepts an incentive payment.
     CBO estimates that these payments would amount to less than
     $3 million. We believe that these deposits would be
     sufficient to cover the cost of any long-term increase in
     benefits that would result from induced retirements, although
     the timing of agency payments and the additional benefit
     payments would not match on a yearly basis. CBO cannot
     provide a precise estimate of the direct spending effects
     because the data necessary for an estimate are classified.
       Section 501 of the bill would require a background
     investigation of citizens of a foreign nation before they
     could enter a national laboratory of the Department of
     Energy. Based on information from two of the three national
     laboratories, CBO expects the laboratories to host about
     10,000 foreign visitors a year. The cost to conduct an
     investigation would depend on the type of background check.
     According to the Defense Department, the cost for a minimum
     national agency check is about $70, and the cost can increase
     to $300 with additional credit bureau or local police agency
     checks. Because some of these costs would be incurred under
     current law, CBO estimates that the additional costs of
     section 501 would be minimal.
       Pay-as-you-go considerations: Sections 305 and 402 of the
     bill would affect direct spending, and therefore the bill
     would be subject to pay-as-you-go procedures. CBO estimates
     that the direct spending costs of section 305 would be very
     small. CBO cannot estimate the precise direct spending
     effects of section 402 because the necessary data are
     classified.
       Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The Unfunded
     Mandates Reform Act excludes from application of the act
     legislative provisions that are necessary for the national
     security. CBO has determined that the unclassified provisions
     of this bill either fit within that exclusion or do * * *
     intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined by
     UMRA.
       Previous CBO estimate: On May 5, 1999, CBO prepared a cost
     estimate for the unclassified portion of H.R. 1555, the
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as
     ordered reported by the House Permanent Select Committee on
     Intelligence, The House version authorizes * * * Intelligence
     Community Management, and the estimated costs of H.R. 155 are
     * * * higher.
       Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Estimate for
     Naturalization Provision: Valerie Baxter. Estimate for
     Voluntary Separation Pay: Eric Rollins. Estimate for
     Remaining Provisions: Dawn Sauter. Impact on State, Local,
     and Tribal Governments: Teri Gullo. Impact on the Private
     Sector: Eric Labs.
       Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant
     Director for Budget Analysis.

                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following
members of the committee staff be granted floor privileges during the
pendency of this bill: Dan Gallington, Jim Barnett, Al Cumming, Pete
Dorn, Peter Flory, Lorenzo Goco, Ken Johnson, Ken Myers, Linda Taylor,
Jim Wolfe; and also Dr. Michael Cieslak on Senator Bingaman's staff.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Smith of Oregon). Without objection, it is
so ordered.
  Mr. SHELBY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to join my chairman, Senator Shelby
of Alabama, with whom I have had the pleasure to work now for several
years. This is my last year on this select committee. It has been an
opportunity, for the last 8 years, to acquire an understanding of what
it takes to collect intelligence, to analyze that intelligence, to
process it, produce it, and disseminate it.
  It is nowhere near as easy as it used to be. In the old days, you
basically sent human beings out there to try to figure out what was
going on. You hoped they spoke the language and were smart enough to
figure things out. They would come back and bring you the best stuff
they could. Oftentimes it would be too late to act upon it.
  I had a small piece of that some 30 years ago in the service, where
we used to collect intelligence as well. So I have at least some
independent understanding of the difficulty, especially on the human
side. But the importance of what intelligence can bring to an operation
cannot be overstated-- the recent operation in Kosovo, the Dayton peace
agreement, incident after incident that cannot be disclosed to the
public because most of it occurs in a secret environment where
warfighters and policymakers get information in a timely fashion and,
as a consequence, lives are saved, success is achieved, and national
security is improved.
  This bill is a result of a bipartisan effort to make the year 2000 a
watershed year for intelligence. This bill sets the intelligence
community on a course to respond to the very complex world we are
facing. The era of downsizing has ended. Intelligence must be
positioned to collect, analyze, and inform policymakers on the complex
threats we face.

[[Page S8857]]

  As my colleagues are no doubt aware, most of the bill is classified.
As always, Chairman Shelby and I have made the classified sections
available to our colleagues for their review. Further, committee staff
is readily available to brief on any aspect of this bill. I believe
Members have found the bill to be the result of a completely bipartisan
effort to fund intelligence activities in fiscal year 2000.
  Chairman Shelby and I have tried, and I think on most occasions have
consistently applied a single test, to determine whether or not a
funding level or a provision or an oversight hearing or a letter or
some other action is required. And that test is, will this make the
people of the United States of America and our interests more secure as
a consequence? If the answer is yes, we have done it. If the answer is
no, we have not.
  We do not, in these committees, check with our leadership to
determine whether or not there is a Democratic position or a Republican
position. What we do is check to determine whether or not the action
will be in the best interest of the United States of America and keep
the United States as secure as our best judgments can make it. It has
been a pleasure to work with Senator Shelby, and it has been an honor
for me to have the opportunity to watch him participate and to
experience his leadership on this committee.
  As I said, I believe the year 2000 must be a watershed year for
intelligence. That is because the intelligence community has been
significantly downsized in the decade of the 1990s. Again, in
classified briefings, we are pleased to provide Members with the
information on that. I think most Members will be shocked to see the
budget and the number of people, especially the number of people we
have today, who are doing the collection, doing the analysis, doing the
work of trying to figure out, with new technologies, how to produce and
then how to disseminate this intelligence as quickly and accurately as
possible. The number of people doing that has gone down.

  This is not a simple task, such as we sometimes see in crime reports,
where somebody will go into a 7-Eleven store, and they will have a
camera that shows who they are. It is not that simple. These are, on
the imaging side, complicated images; on the signal side, complicated
signals; and always, on the human side, a very complicated set of
circumstances out there that have to be first observed and then
interpreted by men and women who have the requisite skills to get the
job done.
  Furthermore, we are making decisions today that don't just affect
this year. We are making decisions today that will affect intelligence
collectors and intelligence efforts 10 years from now.
  In the area of technology, one has to try to anticipate where the
world is going to go. The chairman and I put together what is called a
technical advisory group, a group of not only highly skilled but highly
motivated men and women, who love their country and are concerned about
what we need to do to keep our country safe. We were able to basically
take very complicated subjects; in my case--I am sure it is not true
for the chairman --they had to convert sophisticated subject matter
into very unsophisticated phrases so I would be able to understand what
it was they were saying and make better judgments as well about what we
need to do. Their contributions have been enormously important and have
added significant value to our ability to make these kinds of
decisions.
  I pay them a very high compliment and urge my colleagues to consider
that it is not just the highly professional and skilled staff--a couple
years ago, we went away from a system where Republicans got so many
staff members, Democrats got so many staff members or an individual got
staff as well, to a professional staff--we have enjoyed the benefit of
tremendous input coming from our private sector technical advisory
group.
  The cold war has ended.
  And it is quite appropriate for us to have downsized our intelligence
collection. As I said, in my strong and considered judgment, we have
reached the point of no return. We have reached the point now where we
are beginning to drawdown, as we say in farm country, our seed corn. We
are drawing down our basic stockpile of resources to the point where we
are doing great damage to our ability to answer the call of
warfighters.
  Though nobody knew the direction the world was going to take, or the
size and seriousness of the threats the United States was going to face
after the cold war, during the transition I believe it was quite
correct to restructure many national priorities and get our economy
back on sound footing. However, this transition must be considered to
be open especially now that we have a better understanding of where the
rest of the world is heading and we have a much more precise
understanding of the kinds of threats the people of the United States
face in that world.
  Unfortunately, in some areas in the world, the world is heading in
the wrong direction. Rogue states are trying to acquire chemical,
nuclear, and biological weapons for the purpose of threatening us and
our friends. Many countries are actively pursuing long-range missile
programs, which also threaten international peace.
  A potential strategic partner, Russia, is in the midst of economic
chaos and under extreme political difficulties. In recent war game
exercises involving 50,000 conventional forces in Russia, the defense
minister said those conventional forces did not have the capability
they had 7 or 8 years ago when it was the Soviet Union. They have now
made a decision to use nuclear weapons much more quickly than under
previous battlefield instructions. That increases the threat to the
people of the United States and signals the kind of decisionmaking that
other powers out there that do not have conventional parity with the
United States and other powers with bad intent might do in order to
compensate for their lack of conventional strength.
  Even more problematic, Russia's nuclear stockpile is aging. It is
subject to the vagaries of the political and economic problems that
confront its national leaders and too large to serve its essential
defense requirements. Moreover, other nations are either at war or on
the brink of war.
  Prior to the Fourth of July recess, I spoke on the floor about the
escalating military confrontation building between India and Pakistan.
That conflict appears to have been resolved and a stand-down has
occurred, but that conflict could flash up in an instant and put the
interests of the people of the United States at considerable risk.
Elsewhere, in Kosovo and Bosnia, and with Serbia, as well, our
relations are extremely unsettled and are the focus of very close
attention.
  The list goes on and on. We have 37,000 Americans forward deployed in
South Korea. Americans are forward deployed in many other regions in
this world for the purpose of stabilizing those parts of the world. We
believe--and I think quite correctly--that forward deployment increases
stability in the world and adds to the chances of success to the
struggling democratic nations--struggling to make the transition from
command economies to market. It is very important for the United States
to deploy our forces. It tends to act as a deterrent against potential
bad actors. We have a mission in Iraq we are flying on a daily basis,
and we are trying to watch literally the entire planet simultaneously
so as to prepare our policymakers for something that could happen which
could put American lives and interests at risk.

  I am not trying to turn this statement into an international tour de
force over foreign or defense policy. Instead, I want to remind my
colleagues and the citizens whom they represent, that in many regions
the world order is very disordered, and the Intelligence Community is
the edge our policymakers must have in order to stay ahead of what has
happened.
  Without timely intelligence support, we cannot respond effectively.
This means the era of downsizing intelligence has to end or we will
find ourselves at a point where Congress discovers there are things we
can't do. There is a tendency to take our intelligence efforts for
granted and see it as sort of an invisible force. We see an image that
is presented to us, such as a bomb damage assessment, and we don't
understand what went into that. We didn't merely pull it off of a
shelf. Or we see a report of an analysis that

[[Page S8858]]

is done, where decisions are made and troops are deployed, and we don't
ask ourselves as often as we should what was the intelligence
collection fraction that went into that effort.
  Was it possible to just pick up the forces and go into an area? The
answer is no. A significant amount of analysis is done, and that
analysis has given us an edge. It gives us battlefield superiority and
the capability of doing things that, in previous wars, we were simply
unable to do.
  Our enemies know that. Our intelligence capability, all by itself,
acts as a considerable deterrent. Because people know we have the
capabilities, they are much less likely to take an action that would be
hostile to us, dangerous to us and at the end of the day dangerous for
them as well.
  As colleagues may recall, last year when introducing the Fiscal Year
1999 Intelligence Authorization Act, I referred, as I mentioned, to
this technical advisory group that Chairman Shelby had the foresight to
create. This highly qualified group of Americans evaluated some of the
most esoteric and technical subjects the committee had to confront in
order to position intelligence for future challenges. We used their
services this year. They provided us with extremely valuable advice and
saved taxpayers, my guess is--it would not be out of line to say they
have saved hundreds of millions of dollars.
  They have identified the areas where we might be able to use
technology to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Because
of the enormous contributions these men and women on the technical
advisory group have made to the intelligence oversight effort, we had
the ability not to just write a bill but, as I have said, write a bill
that will keep Americans more safe.
  I would be remiss if I didn't mention a subject that held a lot of
media attention over the past 3 or 4 months, and that is
counterintelligence. This bill contains provisions intended to help
intelligence and law enforcement meet the espionage challenges we face.
I am sure it is obvious that because of who we are, many nations want
to know what we do. Espionage is a fact of life. We should act
decisively when we detect it and prosecute fully those who engage in
it. But it will not go away. Thus, we need to strengthen
counterintelligence to meet the challenges. The bill contains important
provisions to help us attack this very real and present danger.

  As my colleagues are no doubt also aware, there will be an important
amendment on the bill concerning a reorganization of parts of the
Department of Energy. Most of the amendment is not about intelligence
or counterintelligence; it is about nuclear weapons security. The
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board's report entitled
``Science At Its Best, Security At Its Worst'' reminds us it is also
about accountability.
  I look forward to a full debate on the amendment of which I am a
cosponsor and to our discussion on the intelligence and
counterintelligence provisions.
  Again, I thank Senator Shelby, the chairman of the committee, for his
bipartisan and patriotic approach to developing this bill. I thank the
entire staff for their work to present the committee a bill they could
fully support. Because of the spirit of working together, the bill was
reported out of committee unanimously. I urge my colleagues to support
it.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, under the previous order, is it in order to
proceed to the Kyl-Domenici amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. KYL. Is the amendment already at the desk or does it need to be
called up?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is not at the desk.

                           Amendment No. 1258

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative assistant read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl], for himself, Mr.
     Domenici, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Specter, Mr.
     Gregg, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Warner, Mr. Bunning,
     Mr. Helms, Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Lott, Mr. Kerrey, Mrs.
     Feinstein, and Mr. Smith of New Hampshire, proposes an
     amendment numbered 1258.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under
``Amendments Submitted.'') [ http://cryptome.org/hr1555-amend.txt ]
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me first compliment Senator Shelby and
Senator Kerrey, the chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, for their work in presenting the intelligence authorization
bill to the floor. This amendment to the Intelligence Authorization
bill deals with the all-important question of how the Department of
Energy will be reorganized to ensure the theft of our nuclear secrets,
as has occurred in the past, will be a question of the past and will
not occur in the future.
  As we heard earlier today, over the past several months, there have
been a lot of sobering stories about how our Nation's security has been
damaged by China's theft of America's most sensitive secrets--literally
the crown jewels of our nuclear arsenal. In searching for a solution to
this problem and examining how best to safeguard our Nation and its
nuclear secrets, it has become clear the only way this can be
accomplished is through a complete overhaul of how the Department of
Energy is organized and how it is managed.
  I think everyone can agree the system is broken. As the bipartisan
Cox committee report pointed out, security and counterintelligence at
U.S. nuclear facilities has been grossly deficient for many years,
enabling China to steal classified information on all of the nuclear
warheads currently deployed by the United States, as well as the
neutron bomb, and a variety of other military know-how, including
missile guidance and reentry vehicle technology.
  This is incredibly important when a nation has been able to steal the
secrets on how to build the most sophisticated weapons ever devised by
mankind, those most sophisticated nuclear weapons in our arsenal.
  When reports of the Chinese espionage at our nuclear labs became
public earlier this year, President Clinton asked his Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, led by former Senator Warren Rudman, to
investigate the cause of these terrible security breaches. Over the
course of several weeks, the Presidential panel reviewed more than 700
reports and studies, thousands of pages of classified and unclassified
documents, conducted interviews with scores of senior Federal
officials, and visited the Department of Energy sites at the heart of
the inquiry.
  At the end of this exhaustive investigation, the panel concluded that
the root cause of the Energy Department's dismal security and
counterintelligence report was ``organizational disarray, managerial
neglect, and a culture of arrogance . . . [which] conspired to create
an espionage scandal waiting to happen.''
  The Presidential board went on to note that the Department of Energy
(DOE) ``represents the best of America's scientific talent and
achievement, but it has also been responsible for the worst security
record on secrecy that the members of this panel have ever
encountered.''
  Senator Rudman and his colleagues pulled no punches in describing the
problems that exist at DOE or in prescribing bold solutions stating,

       Reorganization [of DOE] is clearly warranted to resolve the
     many specific problems with security and counterintelligence
     in the weapons laboratories, but also to address the lack of
     accountability that has become endemic throughout the entire
     Department.

  The Rudman report noted that,

       The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy
     that has proven it is incapable to reforming itself.
     Accountability at DOE has been spread so thinly and
     erratically that it is now almost impossible to find. The
     long traditional and effective method of entrenched DOE and
     lab bureaucrats is to defeat security reform initiatives by
     waiting them out.

  That is from the Rudman report.
  I ask that our colleagues keep that in mind when they consider
amendments that may be offered a little bit later to this amendment--
amendments that people at the Department of Energy

[[Page S8859]]

would very much like to see passed because it would leave them in
control, the very situation that the Rudman report notes is
unacceptable and must be changed.
  Furthermore, the authors of the Rudman report go on to say,

       We are stunned by the huge numbers of DOE employees
     involved in overseeing a weapons lab contract. We repeatedly
     heard from officials at various levels of DOE and the weapons
     labs how this convoluted and bloated management structure has
     constantly transmitted confusing and often contradictory
     mandates to the labs.

  Although Energy Secretary Richardson has announced several new
initiatives to change management and procedures at DOE, the
Presidential panel's report states, ``we seriously doubt that his
initiatives will achieve lasting success,'' and notes, ``moreover, the
Richardson initiatives simply do not go far enough.''
  In their report, the Presidential board also described the record of
problems with implementing organizational changes ordered by previous
Energy Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries, since the entrenched
bureaucracy has often reverted to its old tricks once these people
left. For example, the report notes that in 1990, then-Secretary
Watkins ordered a new series of initiatives on safeguards and security
to be implemented. According to the Rudman panel, once Secretary
Watkins left two years later, ``the initiatives all but evaporated.''
And furthermore, the panel's report notes, ``Deputy Secretary Charles
Curtis in late 1996 investigated clear indications of serious security
and counterintelligence problems and drew up a list of initiatives in
response. Those initiatives were also dropped after he left office.''
  It is because of these problems that the Presidential panel
recommended that Congress act to reorganize the Department by statute,
so that the bureaucracy could not simple wait out another Secretary of
Energy. Senator Domenici, Senator Murkowski, and I have written
legislation to implement the group's recommendations. Our proposal
would gather all of the parts of our nation's nuclear weapons research,
development, and production programs under one semi-autonomous agency
within the Energy Department.
  We need to create a specific separate organizational structure for
the weapons programs at DOE, managed by one person who reports only to
the Secretary of Energy. And furthermore, we need to separate the
nuclear weapons programs at DOE from the rest of the Department that is
responsible for energy conservation and environmental management
issues. As the Rudman report concluded, semi-autonomous agency, created
by statute, is the only way we are going to solve the problems with
DOE's management of the nuclear weapons complex.
  Before explaining the details of this amendment, let me first mention
that while the Cox Committee and the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, led by Senator Rudman, have done a great service to the
nation by producing high quality reports with excellent
recommendations, they are by no means the first people to recommend
such changes. Over the past 20 years, at least 29 GAO reports, 61
internal DOE studies, and more than a dozen reports by outside
commissions have called for restructuring how the Department is
managed. Let us not wait until another forest is consumed to print more
studies before we act to correct the serious management problems at
DOE.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, may I interrupt to make a unanimous consent
request.

                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Robert Perret, a fellow
in my office, be entitled to floor privileges during the pendency of
this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. I apologize to my friend.
  Mr. KYL. I am happy to comply.
  Mr. President, the point of referring to these 29 GAO reports, 61
internal DOE studies, and more than a dozen reports by outside
commissions over the past 20 years is to make the point that now is the
time for us to move forward and not to await important studies, and not
to await more discussions about how this ought to be done. We have
enough evidence of what needs to be done. It is now time to get on with
the serious subject of fixing this broken management structure at DOE.
  Here is the summary of the amendment.
  This amendment would create a semi-autonomous agency within DOE
called the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship.
  The Agency will be headed by an Under Secretary who ``shall report
solely and directly to the Secretary and shall be subject to the
supervision and direction of the Secretary.''
  Let me digress for a moment to make this point.
  There are some who would put additional layers of bureaucracy between
the Secretary and this Agency for Nuclear Stewardship. That would be a
grave mistake. As the Rudman report itself notes, the point is to
streamline this agency's responsibility, starting with the Secretary at
the top and everyone else reporting to the Deputy Secretary who reports
strictly to the Secretary of Energy. If you insert other management
layers, you are only getting back to the same kind of problem that the
Rudman report has criticized in the past.
   The Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship will have authority over
all programs at DOE related to ``nuclear weapons, non-proliferation and
fissile material disposition.''
   The agency's semi-autonomy (as recommended by the Rudman report) is
created by making all employees of the agency accountable to the
Secretary and Under Secretary of Energy but not to other officials at
DOE outside the Agency.
  The language reads:

       All personnel of the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship, in
     carrying out any function of the Agency, shall be responsible
     to, and subject to the supervision and direction of, the
     Secretary and the Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship or
     his designee within the Agency, and shall not be responsible
     to, or subject to the supervision or direction of, any other
     officer, employee, or agent of any other part of the
     Department.

   The Secretary, however, ``may direct other officials of the
Department who are not within the Agency for Nuclear Stewardship to
review the Agency's programs and to make recommendations to the
Secretary regarding the administration of such programs, including
consistency with other similar programs and activities in the
Department.''
  There is another proposed amendment which we will get to later which
suggests that all of the programs and activities of this special new
autonomous agency are to act in ways consistent with all other
departmental rules and regulations promulgated for all of the other
departments within the Department of Energy.
  That would be a big mistake and get right back to the problem that
the Rudman commission noted; that is, that this is a special, unique
entity, and that you cannot have everybody else within the Department
of Energy controlling what goes on within this particular group.
  The Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship will have 3 Deputy
Directors, who will manage programs in the following areas:
  No. 1. Defense Programs. The national lab directors and heads of
weapons production and test sites will report directly to this person,
who will be responsible for managing the programs necessary to maintain
the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile.
  No. 2. Nonproliferation and fissile materials disposition. This
person would manage the Energy Department's efforts to help Russia and
other states of the former Soviet Union secure their nuclear weapons
and fissile material, as well as plan for how to dispose of dozens of
tons of excess plutonium in the United States and Russia; and
  No. 3. Naval Reactors. This highly successful program which designs,
constructs, operates, and disposes of the nuclear reactors used in the
U.S. Navy's fleet will continue to operate as it does today, except the
Admiral in charge will now report to the Under Secretary for Nuclear
Stewardship as well as the Secretary of Energy.
  As recommended by the Rudman panel, under our amendment, the Under
Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship will appoint Chiefs of
Counterintelligence, Security, and Intelligence.
  The Chief of Counterintelligence will develop and implement the
Agency's

[[Page S8860]]

programs to prevent the disclosure of loss of classified information
and be responsible for personnel assurance programs, like background
checks.
  The Chief of Security will be responsible for the development and
implementation of programs for the protection, control, and accounting
of fissile material, and for the physical and cyber-security of all
sites in the Agency.
  And the Chief of Intelligence will manage the Agency's programs for
the analysis of foreign nuclear weapons programs.
  These 3 chiefs will report to the Under Secretary and shall have
statutorily provided ``direct access to the Secretary and all other
senior officials of the Department and its contractors'' concerning
these matters.
  The amendment calls on the Under Secretary for Nuclear Stewardship to
report annually through the Secretary to Congress regarding:
  No. 1. The adequacy of DOE procedures and policies for protecting
national security information.
  No. 2. Whether each DOE national laboratory and nuclear weapons
production and test site is in full compliance with all Departmental
security requirements, and if not what measures are being taken to
bring a lab into compliance; and
  No. 3. A description of the number and type of violations of security
and counterintelligence laws and requirements at DOE nuclear weapons
facilities.
  Furthermore, the amendment calls for the Under Secretary to keep the
Secretary and the Congress fully and currently informed about any
potentially significant threat to, or loss of, national security
information.
  The amendment would require every employee of DOE, the national labs,
or associated contractors to alert the Under Secretary whenever they
believe there is a problem, abuse or violation of the law relating to
the management of national security information.
  And, in order to address concerns that DOE officials were blocked
from notifying Congress of security and counterintelligence breaches,
the amendment contains a provision stating that ``no officer or
employee of the Department of Energy or any other Federal agency or
department may delay, deny, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with the
preparation'' of these reports to Congress.
  Mr. President, the Senate should act with urgency to correct the
serious problems that exist at our nuclear facilities to halt the flow
of our precious nuclear secrets to countries like China.
  Our amendment is a sound approach to rectifying the systematic
problems that have been identified and that exist today, and I am
disappointed that Secretary Richardson has not yet embraced the
proposal we have submitted. Since as recently as April of 1999, the
Secretary of Energy's own Management Review Report stated:

       Significant problems exist [in DOE] in that roles and
     responsibilities are unclear; lines of authority and
     accountability are not well understood or followed; the
     distinction between headquarters, line and staff functions is
     unclear, and each is operating with autonomy.

  Statistics support this view. According to the GAO, from 1980 to
1996, DOE terminated 9 of 18 major defense program projects after
spending $1.9 billion and completed only two projects: One behind
schedule and overbudget, with the other behind schedule and
underbudget. Schedule slippages and cost overruns occurred on many of
the remaining seven projects ongoing in 1996.
  Finally, I note that management problems cannot be divorced from
security concerns. As the GAO noted in testimony to the House,
continuing management problems at DOE were ``key factors contributing
to security problems at the laboratories'' and a ``major reason why DOE
has been unable to develop long-term solutions to recurring problems
reported by the advisory groups.''
  The amendment we offer enjoys broad bipartisan support. In addition
to Senator Domenici who chairs the Energy and Water Appropriations
Subcommittee, and Senator Murkowski who chairs the Energy Committee, it
is cosponsored by the chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, Senators Shelby and Kerrey; the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee and its Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senators
Warner and Smith; chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee,
Senator Thompson; chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator
Helms; former chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Specter;
as well as Senator Feinstein, Senator Hutchinson, Senator Gregg,
Senator Bunning, Senator Fitzgerald, and the distinguished majority
leader, Senator Lott.
  We cannot delay the implementation of important security and
counterintelligence upgrades at our nuclear labs and facilities. Great
harm to our Nation's security has already been done, and if we want to
prevent further damage, we must act to reform the way we manage our
nuclear weapons programs and facilities to create accountability and
responsibility. Our most fundamental duty as Senators is to protect the
security and the safety of the American people. They deserve no less
than our best in this regard. I urge my colleagues to act now to halt
the hemorrhage of America's nuclear secrets and to support the adoption
of this important amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Arizona. He is persistent with this legislation. I appreciate very much
his interest in the beginning in trying to do something about, as he
knows, what many people have previously said needs to be done.
  The distinguished Senator from Virginia finally succeeded in getting
a provision accepted by the administration in the national defense
authorization bill having to do with an oversight committee appointed
by the leadership, which I think will add a lot of value to our effort
to make these labs produce good science and the best security as well.

  I was asked the question, I say to my friend from Arizona, not long
after our caucuses, which the Senator from Arizona might be interested
in: Do you think the Republicans want an issue or do they want to get
something done?
  My view is, Senator Kyl of Arizona, Senator Murkowski of Alaska, and
Senator Domenici of New Mexico want to get something done. It has been
probably 20 years people have been calling to our attention the need to
change the structure of this organization. It is basically a hodgepodge
of various agencies that were combined in, I believe, 1978 or 1979--in
the 1970's. Various agencies were combined into the Department of
Energy. It is very important we seize this opportunity.
  Senator Rudman said he did not know what happened exactly, but all of
a sudden the focus is on it. A series of things have occurred that
present us with an opportunity to change this law. The law needs to be
changed. The law needs to be changed to restructure this agency to make
it more likely that the United States of America and our interests are
going to be safe and secure, and that we will continue to produce the
high-quality science these laboratories are known throughout the world
for producing.
  I have very high praise for the Senator from Arizona. I appreciate
very much his perseverance in this matter and his willingness to change
his own bill to accommodate former Senator Rudman, the PFIAB's
recommendations, and accommodate some of the concerns I had as well.
  We are trying to write a law. I know Senator Levin and Senator
Bingaman, Senator Reid, and others, are going to offer some amendments.
I say to my colleagues on the Democratic side, I believe, and I believe
so strongly, that the Republicans do not desire an issue. They want to
make real change.
  It would have been real easy, in fact, to say: OK, we got 10 or 11
things on the defense authorization bill. You can say that is a
success; why fight that battle. We have encryption to do. We have lots
of other issues--all of us do--to take care of.
  I am very impressed with the fact there is a determination to get a
good piece of legislation that will improve the security of the United
States of America and will enable us to stay in the high-quality
science direction these laboratories produce. I hope the debate, which
I am not sure is going to occur tonight--I understand we may not have
any amendments offered to this bill until tomorrow. I hope I am wrong.
It will be nice to have people

[[Page S8861]]

offer these amendments and get them out of the way so we can move on to
other business.
  I hope the debate is engaged in the same high-level manner that we
have negotiated the changes in this legislation. By high level, I mean,
as I referenced earlier in praise of Chairman Shelby, the only test
that is important is: Does it make the United States of America more
secure?
  I believe the amendment of the Senator from Arizona does. I am
pleased to be a cosponsor of it. I intend to vote for it, and I hope
some of the changes being suggested can be accommodated, but most
important, I hope we end this year changing the law and are able to
look into the future 10 years from now and say the laboratories are
producing the finest science and the highest level of security as well.
  Mr. KYL. I ask the indulgence of the chairman for just a moment. I
know he wants to proceed and make a brief comment or two. I want to
comment on a couple of things the Senator from Nebraska just said.

  First of all, I compliment him. He is vice chairman of the
Intelligence Committee and probably one of the most productive members
of the committee in doing the hard work of protecting our Nation's
security, which most people will never know about.
  For his constituents and others in America who are concerned about
these things, they need to know it is the day-in-and-day-out work of
the chairman of the committee, Senator Shelby, and Senator Kerrey from
Nebraska who make this effort work.
  Second, I compliment Senator Kerrey for working on this legislation
and agreeing to support it at a time when his party's administration
was not yet supportive. Secretary Richardson did not agree to the
concept of a semiautonomous agency until relatively recently. But
Senator Kerrey agreed this was the best approach to take, I think even
before Senator Rudman came out with his report.
  Coming out early and saying it is important to reorganize and to pay
attention to the national security concerns at the Department of Energy
was something he was willing to do early on in a bipartisan way. His
conduct throughout this whole matter is exemplary and should offer
guidance to all of us on any issue we face. Party aside, when there is
a problem to be addressed, we get in and try to address it.
  I assure Senator Kerrey and others on the Democratic side this is not
something the Republicans look to as an issue but rather as something
to get done. I hope before we finish with the amendments, we can
continue to work on them and try to get as much of a bipartisan
coalition in support of the legislation as is possible because there is
nothing partisan about national security and there is nothing partisan
when it comes to espionage at our National Laboratories.
  I thank the Senator from Nebraska for the comments he made, and I
compliment both Senator Kerrey and Senator Shelby for the great job
they have done.
  Senator Warner is on the floor. He has been stalwart in his support
of our efforts, each day asking: What is new; we will stick with you;
we know this has to be done. That kind of support is encouraging.
  We can get this done. If we get it done quickly, it is good for the
American people.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague for his
comments. I have worked along with the team, the principals. They were
going to put the amendment on the armed services authorization bill. I
thought at that point in time that an insufficient number of Senators
had had an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the seriousness of
this issue and that we should wait for the bill of our distinguished
colleagues from Alabama and Nebraska. A number of Senators have now
acquainted themselves with those provisions. We have an impressive
number of cosponsors, and I am privileged to be one.
  I don't view this as any retribution against the President or the
Secretary of Energy. It is something that simply has to be done with
these institutions that are enormously valuable to the Nation and our
national security. I use the word ``enormously'' because I can't think
of another word that connotes a greater degree of importance to our
country.
  I went out a week ago yesterday and spent several hours at Los Alamos
and then went on to the other laboratory. I must say, the impression I
gained from talking with a fairly significant number of individuals,
both at Sandia and Los Alamos, was that they are willing to work with
this proposition as laid out in the Senator's amendment and make it
work.
  I have listened to those who have some questions. As a matter of
fact, I made myself available to work with Senator Levin. We worked
together on the Armed Services Committee. It is still not clear in my
mind exactly what he hopes to achieve. It is my expectation we will
address it tomorrow when the amendments come forward.
  I know it is the right thing to be done in the interests of the
country. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence
Committee. Indeed, his committee has held 11 hearings. The Senate Armed
Services Committee also has had several. One broke a record; it was 7
continuous hours of hearing. It convinced our membership we are behind
it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I also support the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski
amendment that is the pending business in the Senate.
  I take just a minute to commend the Senator from Arizona, Senator
Kyl, and Senator Domenici and Senator Murkowski for working together on
this very important amendment. It is important for the restructuring of
our labs following the Rudman recommendation and others.
  Most Members know the horror stories that have been going on for
years and years. This won't solve everything, but it will be a positive
step in the right direction.
  I also note my colleague from Nebraska, the vice chairman of the
committee, Senator Kerrey, and I both support this. That is unusual. We
believe this is not a partisan issue. This is important for the Nation
as far as national security is concerned. It is a step in the right
direction. It is above politics, above party.
  I mention again, as I did yesterday, the Rudman report, which was
requested by the President of the United States, Bill Clinton,
concluded that purely administrative reorganizational changes at the
Department of Energy labs are inadequate, totally inadequate to the
challenge at hand. He said:

       To ensure its long-term success, this new agency must be
     established by statute.

  That is exactly what the amendment of Senators Kyl, Domenici, and
Murkowski does.
  As an indication of how badly the Department of Energy is broken, I
only have to remind my colleagues it took over 100 studies of
counterintelligence, security and management practices by the FBI,
other intelligence agencies, the General Accounting Office, the
Department of Energy itself and others, plus one enormous espionage
scandal to create the impetus for change that is before the Senate this
evening.
  I think it is time for the Senate to act. I believe this is a good
amendment. It is positive. It has been worked. I believe we will pass
it.
  Mr. President, I support the Kyl-Domenici-Murkowski amendment to
restructure the Department of Energy.
  I am a cosponsor of that amendment, as is the distinguished vice
chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Senator Kerrey.
  By now, my colleagues are familiar with the findings of the Rudman
report, entitled ``Science at its Best; Security at its Worst: A Report
on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy.'' But I think
certain key conclusions are worth restating, because they underline the
need for action.
  The Rudman report found that:

       At the birth of DOE, the brilliant scientific breakthroughs
     of the nuclear weapons laboratories came with a troubling
     record of security administration. Twenty years later,
     virtually every one of its original problems persists. . . .
     Multiple chains of command and standards of performance
     negated accountability, resulting in pervasive inefficiency,
     confusion, and mistrust. . . .
       In response to these problems, the Department has been the
     subject of a nearly unbroken history of dire warnings and
     attempted but aborted reforms.

  Building on the conclusions of the 1997 Institute for Defense
Analyses report and the 1999 Chiles Commission, the Rudman panel
concluded that:

[[Page S8862]]

       The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy
     that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself. . . .
     Reorganization is clearly warranted to resolve the many
     specific problems . . . in the weapons laboratories, but also
     to address the lack of accountability that has become endemic
     throughout the entire Department.
       The panel is convinced that real and lasting security and
     counterintelligence reform at the weapons labs is simply
     unworkable within DOE's current structure and culture. . . .
     To achieve the kind of protection that these sensitive labs
     must have, they and their functions must have their own
     autonomous operational structure free of all the other
     obligations imposed by DOE management.

  To provide ``deep and lasting structural change that will give the
weapons laboratories the accountability, clear lines of authority, and
priority they deserve,'' the Rudman Report endorsed two possible
solutions:
  Creation of a wholly independent agency such as NASA to perform
weapons research and nuclear stockpile management functions; or
  Placing weapons research and nuclear stockpile management functions
in a ``new semi-autonomous agency within DOE that has a clear mission,
streamlined bureaucracy, and drastically simplified lines of authority
and accountability.''
  The latter option is the approach contained in the Kyl-Domenici-
Murkowski amendment. The new semi-autonomous agency, the Agency for
Nuclear Stewardship, will be a single agency, within the DOE, with
responsibility for all activities of our nuclear weapons complex,
including the National Laboratories--nuclear weapons, nonproliferation,
and disposition of fissile materials.
  This agency will be led by an Undersecretary. The Undersecretary will
be in charge of and responsible for all aspects of the agency's work,
will report--directly and solely--to the Secretary of Energy, and will
be subject to the supervision and direction of the Secretary. The
Secretary of Energy will retail full authority over all activities of
this agency. Thus, for the first time, this critical function of our
national government will have the clear chain of command that it
requires.
  As recommended by the Rudman report, the new agency will have its own
senior officials responsible for counterintelligence and security
matters within the agency. These officials will carry out the
counterintelligence and security policies established by the Secretary
and will report to the Undersecretary and have direct access to the
Secretary. The Agency will have a Senior official responsible for the
analysis and assessment of intelligence, who will also report to the
Undersecretary and have direct access to the Secretary.
  The Rudman report concluded that purely administrative re-
organizational changes are inadequate to the challenge at hand: ``To
ensure its long-term success, this new agency must be established by
statute.''
  For if the history of attempts to reform DOE underscores one thing,
it is the ability of the DOE and the labs to hunker down and outwait
and outlast Secretaries and other would-be agents of change--even
Presidents.
  For example, as documented by Senator Rudman and his colleagues,
``even after President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive
61 ordering that the Department make fundamental changes in security
procedures, compliance by Department bureaucrats was grudging and
belated.''
  At the same time, we in the Senate should recognize that our work
will not be done even after this amendment is adopted and enacted into
law. As the Rudman report warned,

       DOE cannot be fixed by a single legislative act: management
     must follow mandate. . . . Thus, both Congress and the
     Executive branch . . . should be prepared to monitor the
     progress of the Department's reforms for years to come.

  Mr. President, it is an indication of how badly the Department of
Energy is broken that it took over one hundred studies of
counterintelligence, security and management practices--by the FBI and
other intelligence agencies, the GAO, the DOE itself, and others, plus
one enormous espionage scandal--to create the impetus for change.
  Now is the time for the Senate to act.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I will use some leader time allocated to me today to
talk about another matter.

                          ____________________
