| Cryptome DVDs. Donate $25 for two DVDs of the Cryptome collection of 47,000 files from June 1996 to January 2009 (~6.9 GB). Click Paypal or mail check/MO made out to John Young, 251 West 89th Street, New York, NY 10024. The collection includes all files of cryptome.org, cryptome.info, jya.com, cartome.org, eyeball-series.org and iraq-kill-maim.org, and 23,100 (updated) pages of counter-intelligence dossiers declassified by the US Army Information and Security Command, dating from 1945 to 1985.The DVDs will be sent anywhere worldwide without extra cost.

20 July 1998

    See Senators Daschle's and Levin's responses:

       http://jya.com/dasch071798.htm

    15 July 1998
    Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html

    -------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [Congressional Record: July 14, 1998 (Senate)]
    [Page S8088-S8090]
    From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
    [DOCID:cr14jy98-136]

              SATELLITE EXPORTS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

      Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am going to provide an update on the
    investigations that have been proceeding by four of our committees into
    this U.S. policy toward satellite exports. We have not reached any
    final determinations. I want to emphasize that. The good counsel is
    that we have made some progress. We are learning some things, but there
    is a good deal more work that needs to be done. I believe the
    Intelligence Committee has an open hearing scheduled tomorrow. Senator
    Cochran's subcommittee has hearings scheduled I believe next week. So
    we will continue this. We are going to be thorough and we are going to
    be cautious. We should not jump to conclusions.
      In this connection, I recently came across the following statement
    from 1989 concerning the Bush administration's decision to allow export
    licenses for three United States satellites: ``Allowing these launches
    is not in the best interests of our country or of our relationship with
    China. It casts a long shadow that distorts beyond recognition what the
    United States ought to represent to our own people and to the people
    fighting for democracy in China.'' This statement was made by then-
    Senator Al Gore. He obviously has changed his position.
      What we have to examine is whether the policy of allowing the export
    of U.S. satellites as implemented by the Clinton-Gore administration
    adequately protects American national interests.
      Let me start with the bottom line. Senate investigations have only
    begun. Lack of cooperation from the Administration has hampered our
    efforts. Thirteen hearings with 32 witnesses have been held by four
    committees. I have met with the committee chairmen and other members of
    our informal task force on China. At this point, five major interim
    judgments can be made based on what we already know.
      First, the Clinton administration's export controls for satellites
    are wholly inadequate. They have not protected sensitive U.S.
    technology. National security concerns are regularly downplayed and
    even ignored.
      Second, in violation of stated United States policy, sensitive
    technology related to satellite exports has been transferred to China.
    We know what the case is.
      Third, China has received military benefit from United States
    satellite exports.
      Every day, there continues to be additional information that comes
    out in this area.
      In fact, in today's Washington Times, there is a news article that
    says ``U.S. Technology Builds `Bridge' for China Missile.''
      Fourth, the administration has ignored overwhelming information
    regarding Chinese proliferation, and has embarked on a de facto policy
    designed to protect China and U.S. satellite companies from sanctions
    under U.S. proliferation law. We have a statement from White House
    official to that effect.
      Finally, new information has come to light about China's efforts to
    influence the American political process. This new information should
    remove all resistance to naming an independent counsel to investigate
    the evidence and the allegations.
      The administration has failed to fully cooperate with the Senate
    investigation, even though they have indicated that they would, and
    there is still time for that. But on May 22, 1998, along committee
    chairmen of jurisdiction, I sent letters requesting administration
    documents from the White House, the Departments of State, Commerce,
    Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. On June 1, 1998,
    a letter was sent to the Department of Justice requesting documents. On
    June 2, 1998, a letter was sent requesting documents from the Customs
    Service. On June 12, 1998, Senators Shelby and Kerrey sent letters
    requesting information from eight Governmental agencies and the White
    House as part of the Select Committee on Intelligence investigation.
      The letters I joined in sending requested documents in three areas:
    First, all issues associated with the export of satellites to China,
    including waivers of U.S. law governing such exports and the decision
    to transfer control of satellite exports from the Department of State
    to the Department of Commerce; second, issues associated with China's
    proposed membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR; and
    third, information on Chinese proliferation activities which indicate
    possible violations of U.S. laws.
      A significant amount of documents have been provided concerning some
    areas of satellite exports--particularly from the White House and
    particularly on the presidential waivers allowing satellite exports.
    But virtually no information has been provided concerning the transfer
    of export controls from State to Commerce--from the White House or any
    other agency. And virtually no information has been provided on Chinese
    membership in the MTCR, or on Chinese proliferation activities in
    violation of U.S. law.
      A review of executive branch compliance with our document requests
    demonstrates how limited the cooperation really has been.
      Until Friday of last week, the Department of Commerce only provided
    an initial limited set of documents. More has been promised, but the
    response has again glacial and incomplete. The documents they have
    provided contain redactions that limit their utility, quite frankly.
      The Department of Justice has provided nothing to the Committee on
    Governmental Affairs, and has insisted on reviewing virtually all
    documents provided by any other Government agencies--significantly
    slowing down the process in this area.
      The Department of State has provided also virtually nothing.
    Classified documents, according to a July 2, 1998, letter, would not be
    provided to the Congress. Instead, documents could be read only at the
    Department of State. Given that far more sensitive information is
    routinely provided for the use of the Senate in Senate spaces, this can
    only be seen as bureaucratic obstruction.
      The White House has not responded to the Intelligence Committee.
    Neither has ACDA, Customs, or State. Defense and Commerce have only
    provided limited information.
      The White House initially declassified some documents concerning
    waiver decisions in June, but has provided nothing since then.
      The Department of Defense has provided only a very limited number of
    documents.
      The Customs Service has provided nothing other than a June 23, 1998,
    letter stating that they would not meet our June 15, 1998, deadline,
    but we haven't gotten that information as of yet.
      After a review of the Clinton administration's compliance with our
    requests for information, it is hard to escape the conclusion that
    delay has become the standard operating procedure. Once again, it is
    going to make it difficult for us to get the information we need so we
    can make a clear determination about the damage that has been done with
    this technology transfer. After an initial show of good faith by the
    administration, we have not had a lot more cooperation since then.
      We will be forced to consider other measures to compel enforcement. I
    don't plan to move nominees of these non-cooperative agencies until our
    legitimate oversight requests are honored. We are actively examining
    the possibility of subpoena options. It is becoming increasingly
    difficult to continue with the very productive hearings that we have
    had without this cooperation.

      Now, I would like to address the five points I raised earlier in some
    greater detail. Again, these are preliminary conclusions and we are
    seeking additional information.
      First, the Clinton administration's export controls for satellites
    are simply inadequate. There has not been adequate protection of
    sensitive U.S. technology. National security concerns are regularly
    downplayed and even ignored. Hearings before several committees have
    detailed the shortcomings in the development and implementation of
    export controls of satellites.
      For example, a senior official of the Defense Trade and Security
    Administration testified before the Committee

    [[Page S8089]]

    on Governmental Affairs on June 25, 1998, that ``over the past six
    years, the formal process to control dual-use items has failed in its
    stated mission--to safeguard the national security of the United
    States.''
      Transferring the control of satellite exports from the State
    Department to the Commerce Department in 1996 really resulted in
    dramatic changes. According to the General Accounting Office testimony
    before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on June 10, 1998,
    the transfer reduced the influence of the Defense Department. It
    eliminated Congressional notification. It exempted satellite exports
    from certain sanctions. Technical information is not as clearly
    controlled, leading to uncertainty on the part of aerospace companies
    and to more technology transfer than previously allowed.
      Testimony on July 8, 1998, before the Governmental Affairs
    Subcommittee on International Security, has established that the
    Department of Defense monitors are not required to be present at
    satellite launches. This is directly contrary to previous
    administration claims. No statute, policy, or regulation requires U.S.
    Government monitors.
      At least three U.S. satellites have been launched in China with no
    U.S. monitors present. No one in the U.S. Government knows what
    transpired at these launches or if U.S. laws and policies on technology
    transfer were followed. No one in our Government is even attempting to
    examine what occurred at these unmonitored satellite launches. Looking
    at these unmonitored launches, I think, would be a critical element of
    the next phase of our investigation.
      Today's satellite export control system relies on the good will of
    the Commerce Department, a department which has repeatedly demonstrated
    its willingness to ignore national security concerns on satellite
    exports. This is an area where we need to take a close look at how we
    are going to proceed in the future and what is going to be expected of
    the Commerce Department.
      For example, Commerce has unilaterally removed items subject to
    interagency license review without notice to other affected agencies.
    Commerce has also refused to send approved licenses to Defense so
    officials there can evaluate the final product. When it involves
    satellites and technology, clearly the Defense Department should be a
    part of this process.
      Second, sensitive technology related to satellite exports has been
    transferred to China. In at least two cases, U.S. companies analyzed
    Chinese launch failures and communicated with Chinese officials. In
    1995, Hughes analyzed the ``APSTAR 2'' launch failure. Commerce now
    concedes that this analysis should have been subject to State and
    Defense Department reviews before a Commerce official gave it to the
    Chinese. Commerce only provided the report, concluded in 1995, 2 hours
    before a Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International
    Proliferation hearing on July 8 of this year.
      The 1996 Loral launch failure is the subject of a Justice Department
    review for possible illegal transfer of technology. Compliance with the
    law is the province of the Justice Department. So we are looking into
    the impact on American national securities. It is very important that
    the Justice Department complete that work.
      I agree with three assessments by three elements of the State and
    Defense Departments that China derived significant benefits from their
    technical exchanges with U.S. companies after the Long March crash in
    1996, exchanges which are likely to lead to improvements in the
    reliability of their ballistic missile, and especially their guidance
    systems. So we have to be concerned very much about this transfer.
      Third, China has received military benefit from U.S. satellite
    exports. There is a division within the executive branch agencies over
    how much China has benefited. But there seems to be agreement that
    certainly some benefit was derived.
      The New York Times has reported that U.S. satellites are being used
    by the Chinese military for its internal coded communications.
    Administration officials concede that China is using American-made and
    exported satellites for their military communications. This is a clear
    and uncontested military benefit for China. The New York Times also
    reports that an additional satellite export that could enhance the
    Chinese military's ability to eavesdrop on phone conversations is under
    review by the Clinton administration.
      The administration has ignored overwhelming information regarding
    Chinese proliferation and has embarked on what appears to be a de facto
    policy to protect China and U.S. satellite companies from sanctions
    under our U.S. proliferation law. For instance, on June 11, 1998, the
    Committee on Foreign Relations heard testimony from the former director
    of the Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency. The
    Clinton administration has used ``almost any measure'' to block
    intelligence judgments that China had transferred missiles to
    Pakistan--a clear violation of U.S. law that requires the imposition of
    sanctions. Intelligence analyses ``were summarily dismissed by the
    policy community.''

      According to the testimony, the intelligence community is ``virtually
    certain that this transfer had taken place . . .'' I am convinced,
    after a personal investigation, that it did take place, and it was a
    very dangerous for Pakistan to be receiving these missiles. Why has
    that been the case, and why hasn't the administration been willing to
    take actions providing sanctions where clearly that information has
    been provided?
      Finally, new information has come to light about China's efforts to
    influence the American political process. This new information should
    remove any doubt about the need for an independent counsel in this
    area.
      It has already been reported that FBI Director Freeh has indicated
    his view that an independent counsel should be appointed. It is time to
    renew attention on the Attorney General. It is time for an outside,
    impartial investigation by an independent counsel into the serious and
    credible charges of direct Chinese Government financing or involvement
    in the 1996 elections. We have very good committees that are working
    together in a bipartisan way and looking into these very important
    questions. I urge them to continue to do so, and to do it in a calm and
    methodical way. It is essential that we get cooperation from the
    administration to provide the additional information that we requested,
    the additional evidence. And we will carry out our constitutional
    responsibilities. Nothing less should be expected of us.
      In view of the inquiries we had about how these are proceeding, what
    information we have been getting, what is outstanding, and also what is
    our plan, as far as future hearings, I thought it was important that I
    give some review of what has transpired.
      Mr. President, I yield the floor.
      Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
      The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader is recognized.
      Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, in light of the statements that have just
    been made and the time consumed by the majority leader, I ask unanimous
    consent that each side have 10 minutes to debate the pending amendment.
      The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
      Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I will have the opportunity to discuss,
    in greater detail, the remarks just made by the distinguished majority
    leader. Let me just say that our interest, too, is to have a bipartisan
    review of the actions taken with regard to the technology transfer in
    China. But I do hope that it will be bipartisan. The majority leader
    gave what I would view to be a pretty partisan report this morning with
    regard to the allegations pending on this particular matter, and I will
    have a very thorough response to the majority leader at some point
    today. I do believe that the issue warrants our review. As he said,
    this is a constitutional responsibility, but it also warrants
    objectivity and very thoughtful and careful consideration of the facts.
    Many of the reports the distinguished majority leader cited were
    allegations that have yet to be proven, allegations reported--he
    mentioned the New York Times on a number of occasions--allegations
    reported, citing unidentified sources, and what I would consider to be
    very questionable sources with regard to the information reported in
    some cases. So we are going to have to be very careful about the
    distinction between allegation and fact, the distinction between what
    has actually occurred and what is reported or what is

    [[Page S8090]]

    alleged to have occurred. So I hope that we can do that, as he noted,
    in a bipartisan way, thoroughly and very carefully examining the facts
    and coming to some conclusion prior to the time we issue any reports.

                              ____________________