30 January 1998
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html

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[Federal Register: January 30, 1998 (Volume 63, Number 20)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 4572-4580]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr30ja98-10]

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

32 CFR Part 147

RIN 0790-AG54


Personnel Security Policies for Granting Access to Classified
Information

AGENCY: Department of Defense.

ACTION: Interim final rule.

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SUMMARY: This rule is published to streamline security practices
throughout the government, uniform adjudicative guidelines,
investigative standards and guidelines for temporary access are being
established. This initiative will simplify security processing and
allow the deserving public to obtain a security clearance in a faster,
more efficient manner.

DATES: This rule is effective March 24, 1997. Comments must be received
by March 31, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Forward comments to the Security Policy Board Staff, 1215
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1101, Arlington, VA 22202.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mr. T. Thompson, 703-602-9969.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review

    It has been determined that this interim rule (32 CFR part 147) is
not a significant regulatory action. The rule does not:
    (1) Have an annual effect to the economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the economy; a section of the
economy; productivity; competition; jobs; the environment; public
health or safety; or State, local, or tribal governments or
communities;
    (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an
action taken or planned by another Agency;
    (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants,
user fees, or loan programs, or the rights and obligations of
recipients thereof; or

[[Page 4573]]

    (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in
this Executive Order.

Public Law 96-354, Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601)

    It has been certified that this rule is not subject to the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601) because it would not, if
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities. This part will streamline personnel security
clearance procedures and make the process more efficient.

Public Law 96-511, Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35)

    It has been certified that this part does not impose any reporting
or recordkeeping requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995.

List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 147

    Classified information, Investigations, Security measures.

    Accordingly, Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter
I, subchapter C is amended to add part 147 to read as follows:
PART 147--ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR
ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Subpart A--Adjudicative Guidelines

Sec.
147.1  Introduction.
147.2  Adjudicative process.
147.3  Guideline A--Allegiance to the United States.
147.4  Guideline B--Foreign influence.
147.5  Guideline C--Foreign preference.
147.6  Guideline D--Sexual behavior.
147.7  Guideline E--Personal conduct.
147.8  Guideline F--Financial considerations.
147.9  Guideline G--Alcohol consumption.
147.10  Guideline H--Drug involvement.
147.11  Guideline I--Emotional, mental, and personality disorders.
147.12  Guideline J--Criminal conduct.
147.13  Guideline K--Security violations.
147.14  Guideline L--Outside activities.
147.15  Guideline M--Misuse of information technology systems.

Subpart B--Investigative Standards

147.18  Introduction.
147.19  The three standards.
147.20  Exception to periods of coverage.
147.21  Expanding investigations.
147.22  Transferability.
147.23  Breaks in service.
147.24  The national agency check.

Subpart C--Guidelines for Temporary Access

147.28  Introduction.
147.29  Temporary eligibility for access.
147.30  Temporary eligibility for access at the CONFIDENTIAL AND
SECRET levels and temporary eligibility for ``L'' access
authorization.
147.31  Temporary eligibility for access at the TOP SECRET levels
and temporary eligibility for ``Q'' access authorization. For
someone who is the subject of a favorable investigation not meeting
the investigative standards for access at those levels.
147.32  Temporary eligibility for access at the TOP SECRET and SCI
levels and temporary eligibility for ``Q'' access authorization: For
someone who is not the subject of a current, favorable personnel or
personnel-security investigation of any kind.
147.33  Additional requirements by agencies.

    Authority: E.O. 12968 (60 FR 40245, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p 391).

Subpart A--Adjudication

Sec. 147.1  Introduction.

    The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all
United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants,
contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders
or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require
access to classified information. They apply to persons being
considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to
classified information, to include sensitive compartmented information
and special access programs and are to be used by government
departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.

Sec. 147.2  Adjudicative process.

    (a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient
period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the
person is eligible for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to
classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these
personnel security guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful
weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person concept.
Available, reliable information about the person, past and present,
favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a
determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct,
the adjudicator should consider the following actors:
    (1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
    (2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation;
    (3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;
    (4) The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
    (5) The voluntariness of participation;
    (6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent
behavioral changes;
    (7) The motivation for the conduct;
    (8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress;
    (9) The likelihood of continuation of recurrence.
    (b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final
determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or
agency. Any doubt as to whether access to classified information is
clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of
the national security.
    (c) The ultimate determination of whether the granting or
continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly
consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall
common sense determination based upon careful consideration of the
following, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole
person, as explained further below:
    (1) Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States.
    (2) Guideline B: Foreign influence.
    (3) Guideline C: Foreign preference.
    (4) Guideline D: Sexual behavior.
    (5) Guideline E: Personal conduct.
    (6) Guideline F: Financial considerations.
    (7) Guideline G: Alcohol consumption.
    (8) Guideline H: Drug involvement.
    (9) Guideline I: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders.
    (10) Guideline J: Criminal conduct.
    (11) Guideline K: Security violations.
    (12) Guideline L: Outside activities.
    (13) Guideline M: Misuse of Information Technology Systems.
    (d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may
not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may
be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring
pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally
unstable behavior. Notwithstanding, the whole person concept, pursuit
of further investigations may be terminated by an appropriate
adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant,
disqualifying, adverse information.
    (e) When information of security concern becomes known about an
individual who is currently eligible for access to classified
information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person:
    (1) Voluntarily reported the information;
    (2) Was truthful and complete in responding to questions;

[[Page 4574]]

    (3) Sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where
appropriate;
    (4) Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security
concern;
    (5) Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;
    (6) Should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending
final adjudication of the information.
    (f) If after evaluating information of security concern, the
adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to
warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security
clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning
that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of
access.

Sec. 147.3  Guideline A--Allegiance to the United States.

    (a) The concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance
to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified
information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an
individual's allegiance to the Untied States.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include: (1) Involvement in any act of sabotage,
espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition, or other act whose aim is to
overthrow the Government of the United States or alter the form of
government by unconstitutional means;
    (2) Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to
commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
    (3) Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that
advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or
subdivision, by force or violence or by other unconstitutional means;
    (4) Involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice
the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from
exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United
States or of any state.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1)
The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or
organization and severed ties upon learning of these;
    (2) The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or
humanitarian aspects of such an organization;
    (3) Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short
period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;
    (4) The person has had no recent involvement or association with
such activities.

Sec. 147.4   Guideline B--Foreign influence.

    (a) The concern. A security risk may exist when an individual's
immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or
she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not
citizens of the Untied States or may be subject to duress. These
situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could
result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with
citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries
are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual
potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include: (1) An immediate family member, or a person to
whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a
citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;
    (2) Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign
influence or duress exists;
    (3) Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with
any foreign government;
    (4) Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign
nationals;
    (5) Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator
or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
    (6) Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion,
exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;
    (7) Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign
country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to
possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure;
    (8) A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any
foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual
vulnerable to foreign influence.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) A
determination that the immediate family member(s) (spouse, father,
mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or
associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a
position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force
the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and
the United States;
    (2) Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official
United States Government business;
    (3) Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and
infrequent;
    (4) The individual has promptly complied with existing agency
requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats
from persons or organizations from a foreign country;
    (5) Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to
affect the individual's security responsibilities.

Sec. 147.5  Guideline C--Foreign preference.

    (a) The concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to
indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States,
then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions
that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
    (1) The exercise of dual citizenship;
    (2) Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;
    (3) Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign
country;
    (4) Accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as
retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country;
    (5) Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship
requirements;
    (6) Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business
interests in another country;
    (7) Seeking or holding political office in the foreign country;
    (8) Voting in foreign elections;
    (9) Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise
acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in
preference to the interests of the United States.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1)
Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a
foreign country;
    (2) Indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign
military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship;
    (3) Activity is sanctioned by the United States;
    (4) Individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual
citizenship.

Sec. 147.6  Guidance D--Sexual behavior.

    (a) The concern. Sexual behavior is a security concern if it
involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional
disorder, may subject the individual to coercion, exploitation, or
duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion.\1\ Sexual
orientation or

[[Page 4575]]

preference may not be used as a basis for or a disqualifying factor in
determining a person's eligibility for a security clearance.
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    \1\ The adjudicator should also consider guidelines pertaining
to criminal conduct (Guideline J) and emotional, mental and
personality disorders (Guideline I) in determining how to resolve
the security concerns raised by sexual behavior.
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    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include: (1) Sexual behavior of a criminal nature,
whether or not the individual has been prosecuted;
    (2) Compulsive or addictive sexual behavior when the person is
unable to stop a pattern or self-destructive or high-risk behavior or
that which is symptomatic of a personally disorder;
    (3) Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to
coercion, exploitation, or duress;
    (4) Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that which reflects
lack of discretion or judgment.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1)
The behavior occurred during or prior to adolescence and there is no
evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
    (2) The behavior was not recent and there is no evidence of
subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
    (3) There is no other evidence of questionable judgment,
irresponsibility, or emotional instability;
    (4) The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion,
exploitation, or duress.

Sec. 147.7  Guideline E--Personal conduct.

    (a) The concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that
the person may not properly safeguard classified information. The
following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or
administrative termination of further processing for clearance
eligibility:
    (1) Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security
processing, including medical and psychological testing;
    (2) Refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or
provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of
investigators, security officials or other representatives in
connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying also include: (1) Reliable, unfavorable information
provided by associates, employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other
acquaintances;
    (2) The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of
relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire,
personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct
investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or
status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or
award fiduciary responsibilities;
    (3) Deliberately providing false or misleading information
concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security
official, competent medical authority, or other representative in
connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination;
    (4) Personal conduct or concealment of information that may
increase an individual's vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or
duties, such as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the
person's personal, professional, or community standing or render the
person susceptible to blackmail;
    (5) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation
of any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and
the agency;
    (6) Association with persons involved in criminal activity.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1)
The information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination
of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;
    (2) The falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and
the individual has subsequently provided correct information
voluntarily;
    (3) The individual made prompt, good faith efforts to correct the
falsification before being confronted with the facts;
    (4) Omission of material facts was caused or significantly
contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized
personnel, and the previously omitted information was promptly and
fully provided;
    (5) The individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce
or eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
    (6) A refusal to cooperate was based on advice from legal counsel
or other officials that the individual was not required to comply with
security processing requirements and, upon being made aware of the
requirement, fully and truthfully provided the requested information;
    (7) Association with persons involved in criminal activities has
ceased.

Sec. 147.8  Guideline F--Financial considerations.

    (a) The concern. An individual who is financially overextended is
at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds.
Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially
profitable criminal acts.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include: (1) A history of not meeting financial
obligations;
    (2) Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement,
employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud,
filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial
breaches of trust;
    (3) Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
    (4) Unexplained affluence;
    (5) Financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse,
alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1)
The behavior was not recent;
    (2) It was an isolated incident;
    (3) The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely
beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business
downtrun, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or
separation);
    (4) The person has received or is receiving counseling for the
problem and there are clear indications that the problem is being
resolved or is under control;
    (5) The affluence resulted from a legal source;
    (6) The individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue
creditors or otherwise resolve debts.

Sec. 147.9  Guideline G--Alcohol consumption.

    (a) The concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the
exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control
impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of
classified information due to carelessness.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include: (1) Alcohol-related incidents away from work,
such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse
abuse, or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use;
    (2) Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work
or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the
job;
    (3) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g.,
physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or
alcohol dependence;
    (4) Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed
clinical social worker who is a staff

[[Page 4576]]

member of a recognized alcohol treatment program;
    (5) Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of
impaired judgment;
    (6) Consumption of alcohol, subsequent to a diagnosis of alcoholism
by a credentialed medical professional and following completion of an
alcohol rehabilitation program.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1)
The alcohol related incidents do not indicate a pattern;
    (2) The problem occurred a number of years ago and there is no
indication of a recent problem;
    (3) Positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety;
    (4) Following diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the
individual has successfully completed impatient or outpatient
rehabilitation along with aftercare requirements, participates
frequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar
organization, has abstained from alcohol for a period of at least 12
months, and received a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical
professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member
of a recognized alcohol treatment program.

Sec. 174.10  Guideline H--Drug involvement.

    (a) The concern. (1) Improper or illegal involvement with drugs
raises questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to
protect classified information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair
social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an
unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
    (2) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and
include:
    (i) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and
listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g.,
marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and
hallucinogens),
    (ii) Inhalants and other similar substances.
    (3) Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug
in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include: (1) Any drug abuse (see above definition);
    (2) Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing,
manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution;
    (3) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g.,
physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or
drug dependence;
    (4) Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed
clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug
treatment program;
    (5) Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program
prescribed by a credentialed medical professional. Recent drug
involvement, especially following the granting of a security clearance,
or an expressed intent not to discontinue use, will almost invariably
result in an unfavorable determination.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1)
The drug involvement was not recent;
    (2) The drug involvement was an isolated or aberration event;
    (3) A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future;
    (4) Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program,
including rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence
of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical
professional.

Sec. 147.11   Guideline I--Emotional, mental, and personality
disorders.

    (a) The concern: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can
cause a significant deficit in an individual's psychological, social
and occupation functioning. These disorders are of security concern
because they may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or
stability. A credentialed mental health professional (e.g., clinical
psychologist or psychiatrist), employed by, acceptable to or approved
by the government, should be utilized in evaluating potentially
disqualifying and mitigating information fully and properly, and
particularly for consultation with the individual's mental health care
provider.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include: (1) An opinion by a credentialed mental health
professional that the individual has a condition or treatment that may
indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability;
    (2) Information that suggests that an individual has failed to
follow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a condition,
e.g., failure to take prescribed medication;
    (3) A pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social
or emotionally unstable behavior;
    (4) Information that suggests that the individual's current
behavior indicates a defect in his or her judgment or reliability.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1)
There is no indication of a current problem;
    (2) Recent opinion by a credentialed mental health professional
that an individual's previous emotional, mental, or personality
disorder is cured, under control or in remission and has a low
probability of recurrence or exacerbation;
    (3) The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g.,
one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has
been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.

Sec. 147.12  Guideline J--Criminal conduct.

    (a) The concern. A history or pattern of criminal activity creates
doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include: (1) Allegations or admissions of criminal
conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged;
    (2) A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1)
The criminal behavior was not recent;
    (2) The crime was an isolated incident;
    (3) The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and
those pressures are no longer present in that person's life;
    (4) The person did not voluntarily commit the act and/or the
factors leading to the violation are not likely to recur;
    (5) Acquittal;
    (6) There is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.

Sec. 147.13  Guideline K--Security violations.

    (a) The concern. Noncompliance with security regulations raises
doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability
to safeguard classified information.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include. (1) Unauthorized disclosure of classified
information;
    (2) Violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to
negligence.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include
actions that: (1) Were inadvertent;
    (2) Were isolated or infrequent;
    (3) Were due to improper or inadequate training;
    (4) Demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of
security responsibilities.

Sec. 147.14  Guideline L--Outside activities.

    (a) The concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment
or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an
individual's

[[Page 4577]]

security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of
unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or
employment with: (1) A foreign country;
    (2) Any foreign national;
    (3) A representative of any foreign interest;
    (4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person
engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on
intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1)
Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it does
not pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities;
    (2) The individual terminates the employment or discontinues the
activity upon being notified that it is in conflict with his or her
security responsibilities.

Sec. 147.15  Guideline M--Misuse of Information technology systems.

    (a) The concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines,
or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise
security concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness,
and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and
information. Information Technology Systems include all related
equipment used for the communication, transmission, processing,
manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.
    (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include: (1) Illegal or unauthorized entry into any
information technology system;
    (2) Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation
or denial of access to information residing on an information
technology system;
    (3) Removal (or use) of hardware, software, or media from any
information technology system without authorization, when specifically
prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;
    (4) Introduction of hardware, software, or media into any
information technology system without authorization, when specifically
prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations.
    (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1)
The misuse was not recent or significant;
    (2) The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent;
    (3) The introduction or removal of media was authorized;
    (4) The misuse was an isolated event;
    (5) The misuse was followed by a prompt, good faith effort to
correct the situation.

Subpart B--Investigative Standards

Sec. 147.18  Introduction.

    The following investigative standards are established for all
United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants,
contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders
or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require
access to classified information, to include Sensitive Compartmented
Information and Special Access Programs, and are to be used by
government departments and agencies as the investigative basis for
final clearance determinations. However, nothing in these standards
prohibits an agency from using any lawful investigative procedures in
addition to these requirements in order to resolve any issue identified
in the course of a background investigation or reinvestigation.

Sec. 147.19  The three standards.

    There are three standards (Attachment D to this subpart part
summarizes when to use each one):
    (a) The investigation and reinvestigation standards for ``L''
access authorizations and for access to confidential and secret
(including all secret-level Special Access Programs not specifically
approved for enhanced investigative requirements by an official
authorized to establish Special Access Programs by section in 4.4 of
Executive Order 12958) (60 FR 19825, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p. 33);
    (b) The investigation standard for``Q'' access authorizations and
for access to top secret (including top secret Special Access Programs)
and Sensitive Compartmented Information;
    (c) The reinvestigation standard for continued access to the levels
listed in paragraph (b) of this section.

Sec. 147.20  Exception to periods of coverage.

    Some elements of standards specify a period of coverage (e.g. seven
years). Where appropriate, such coverage may be shortened to the period
from the subject's eighteenth birthday to the present or to two years,
whichever is longer.

Sec. 147.21  Expanding investigations.

    Investigations and reinvestigations may be expanded under the
provisions of Executive Order 12968 (60 FR 40245, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p.
391) and other applicable statutes and Executive Orders.

Sec. 147.22  Transferability.

    Investigations that satisfy the requirements of a given standard
and are current meet the investigative requirements for all levels
specified for the standard. They shall be mutually and reciprocally
accepted by all agencies.

Sec. 147.23  Breaks in service.

    If a person who requires access has been retired or separated from
U.S. government employment for less than two years and is the subject
of an investigation that is otherwise current, the agency regranting
the access will, as a minimum, review an updated Standard Form 86 and
applicable records. A reinvestigation is not required unless the review
indicates the person may no longer satisfy the standards of Executive
Order 12968 (60 FR 40245, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p. 391); (Attachment D to
this subpart, Table 2).

Sec. 147.24  The national agency check.

    The National Agency Check is a part of all investigations and
reinvestigations. It consists of a review of;
    (a) Investigative and criminal history files of the FBI, including
a technical fingerprint search;
    (b) OPM's Security/Suitability Investigations Index;
    (c) DoD's Defense Clearance and Investigations Index;
    (d) Such other national agencies (e.g., CIA, INS) as appropriate to
the individual's background.

Attachment A to Subpart B--Standard A--National Agency Check With Local
Agency Checks and Credit Check (NACLC)

    (a) Applicability. Standard A applies to investigations and
reinvestigations for;
    (1) Access to CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET (including all SECRET-
level Special Access Programs not specifically approved for enhanced
investigative requirements by an official authorized to establish
Special Access Programs by sect. 4.4 of Executive Order 12958) (60
FR 19825, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p. 333);
    (2) ``L'' access authorizations.
    (b) For Reinvestigation: When to Reinvestigate. The
reinvestigation may be initiated at any time following completion
of, but not later than ten years (fifteen years for CONFIDENTIAL)
from the date of, the previous investigation or reinvestigation.
(Attachment D to this subpart, Table 2, reflects the specific
requirements for when to request a reinvestigation, including when
there has been a break in service.)
    (c) Investigative Requirements. Investigative requirements are
as follows:

[[Page 4578]]

    (1) Completion of Forms: Completion of Standard Form 86,
including applicable releases and supporting documentation.
    (2) National Agency Check: Completion of a National Agency
Check.
    (3) Financial Review: Verification of the subject's financial
status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where
the subject has resided, been employed, or attended school for six
months or more for the past seven years.
    (4) Date and Place of Birth: Corroboration of date and place of
birth through a check of appropriate documentation, if not completed
in any previous investigation; a check of Bureau of Vital Statistics
records when any discrepancy is found to exist.
    (5) Local Agency Checks: As a minimum, all investigations will
include checks of law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction where
the subject has lived, worked, and/or attended school within the
last five years, and, if applicable, of the appropriate agency for
any identified arrests.
    (d) Expanding the Investigation: The investigation may be
expanded if necessary to determine if access is clearly consistent
with the national security.

Attachment B to Subpart B--Standard B--Single Scope Background
Investigation (SSBI)

    (a) Applicability. Standard B applies to initial investigations
for;
    (1) Access to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET Special Access
Programs) and Sensitive Compartment Information;
    (2) ``Q'' access authorizations.
    (b) Investigative Requirements. Investigative requirements are
as follows:
    (1) Completion of Forms: Completion of Standard Form 86,
including applicable releases and supporting documentation.
    (2) National Agency Check: Completion of a National Agency
Check.
    (3) National Agency Check for the Spouse or Cohabitant (if
applicable): Completion of a National Agency Check, without
fingerprint cards, for the spouse or cohabitant.
    (4) Date and Place of Birth: Corroboration of date and place of
birth through a check of appropriate documentation; a check of
Bureau of Vital Statistics records when any discrepancy is found to
exist.
    (5) Citizenship: For individuals born outside the United States,
verification of US citizenship directly from the appropriate
registration authority; verification of US citizenship or legal
status of foreign-born immediate family members (spouse, cohabitant,
father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters).
    (6) Education: Corroboration of most recent or most significant
claimed attendance, degree, or diploma. Interviews of appropriate
educational sources if education is a primary activity of the
subject during the most recent three years.
    (7) Employment: Verification of all employments for the past
seven years; personal interviews of sources (supervisors, coworkers,
or both) for each employment of six months or more; corroboration
through records or sources of all periods of unemployment exceeding
sixty days; verification of all prior federal and military service,
including discharge type. For military members, all service within
one branch of the armed forces will be considered as one employment,
regardless of assignments.
    (8) References: Four references, of whom at least two are
developed; to the extent practicable, all should have social
knowledge of the subject and collectively span at least the last
seven years.
    (9) Former Spouse: An interview of any former spouse divorced
within the last ten years.
    (10) Neighborhoods: Confirmation of all residences for the last
three years through appropriate interviews with neighbors and
through records reviews.
    (11) Financial Review: Verification of the subject's financial
status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where
subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended school for six
months or more for the last seven years.
    (12) Local Agency Checks: A check of appropriate criminal
history records covering all locations where, for the last ten
years, the subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended
school for six months or more, including current residence
regardless of duration.

    Note: If no residence, employment, or education exceeds six
months, local agency checks should be performed as deemed
appropriate.

    (13) Public Records: Verification of divorces, bankruptcies, and
other court actions, whether civil or criminal, involving the
subject.
    (14) Subject Interview: A subject interview, conducted by
trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel.
During the investigation, additional subject interviews may be
conducted to collect relevant information, to resolve significant
inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements and unsworn declarations
may be taken whenever appropriate.
    (15) Polygraph (only in agencies with approved personnel
security polygraph programs): In departments or agencies with
policies sanctioning the use of the polygraph for personnel security
purposes, the investigation may include a polygraph examination,
conducted by a qualified polygraph examiner.
    (c) Expanding the Investigation. The investigation may be
expanded as necessary. As appropriate, interviews with anyone able
to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not
limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists,
other medical professionals, and law enforcement professionals may
be conducted.

Attachment C to Subpart B--Standard C--Single Scope Background
Investigation Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR)

    (a) Applicability. Standard C applies to reinvestigation for;
    (1) Access to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET Special Access
Programs) and Sensitive Compartmented Information;
    (2) ``Q'' access authorizations.
    (b) When to Reinvestigate. The reinvestigation may be initiated
at any time following completion of, but not later than five years
from the date of, the previous investigation (see Attachment D to
this subpart, Table 2).
    (c) Reinvestigative Requirements. Reinvestigative requirements
are as follows:
    (1) Completion of Forms: Completion of Standard Form 86,
including applicable releases and supporting documentation.
    (2) National Agency Check: Completion of a National Agency Check
(fingerprint cards are required only if there has not been a
previous valid technical check of the FBI).
    (3) National Agency Check for the Spouse or Cohabitant (if
applicable): Completion of a National Agency Check, without
fingerprint cards, for the spouse or cohabitant. The National Agency
Check for the spouse or cohabitant is not required if already
completed in conjunction with a previous investigation or
reinvestigation.
    (4) Employment: Verification of all employments since the last
investigation. Attempts to interview a sufficient number of sources
(supervisors, coworkers, or both) at all employments of six months
or more. For military members, all services within one branch of the
armed forces will be considered as one employment, regardless of
assignments.
    (5) References: Interviews with two character references who are
knowledgeable of the subject; at least one will be a developed
reference. To the extent practical, both should have social
knowledge of the subject and collectively span the entire period of
the reinvestigation. As appropriate, additional interviews may be
conducted, including with cohabitants and relatives.
    (6) Neighborhoods: Interviews of two neighbors in the vicinity
of the subject's most recent residence of six months or more.
Confirmation of current residence regardless of length.
    (7) Financial Review:--Financial Status: Verification of the
subject's financial status, including credit bureau checks covering
all locations where subject has resided, been employed, and/or
attended school for six months or more for the period covered by the
reinvestigation;
    (ii) Check of Treasury's Financial Data Base: Agencies may
request the Department of the Treasury, under terms and conditions
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, to search automated
data bases consisting of reports of currency transactions by
financial institutions, international transportation of currency or
monetary instruments, foreign bank and financial accounts, and
transactions under $10,000 that are reported as possible money
laundering violations.
    (8) Local Agency Checks: A check of appropriate criminal history
records covering all locations where, during the period covered by
the reinvestigation, the subject has resided, been employed, and/or
attended school for six months or more, including current residence
regardless of duration. (Note: If no residence, employment, or
education exceeds six months, local agency checks should be
performed as deemed appropriate.)
    (9) Former Spouse: An interview with any former spouse unless
the divorce took place before the date of the last investigation or
reinvestigation.

[[Page 4579]]

    (10) Public Records: Verification of divorces, bankruptcies, and
other court actions, whether civil or criminal, involving the
subject since the date of the last investigation.
    (11) Subject Interview: A subject interview, conducted by
trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel.
During the reinvestigation, additional subject interviews may be
conducted to collect relevant information, to resolve significant
inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements and unsworn declarations
may be taken whenever appropriate.
    (d) Expanding the Reinvestigation: The reinvestigation may be
expanded as necessary. As appropriate, interviews with anyone able
to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not
limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists,
other medical professionals, and law enforcement professionals may
be conducted.

Attachment D to Subpart B--Decision Tables

                                    Table 1.--Which Investigation to Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    And the person      Based on this    Then the investigation
   If the requirement is for       has this access      investigation          required is        Using standard
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Confidental Secret; ``L''......  None..............  None..............  NACLC.................  A
                                                     Out of date NACLC
                                                      or SSBI.
                                 Conf, Sec; ``L''
Top Secret, SCI; ``Q''.........  None..............  None..............  SSBI..................  B
                                 None; Conf, Sec;    Current or out of
                                  ``L''.              date NACLC
                                                     Out of date SSBI
                                 TS, SCI; ``Q''....                      SSBI-PR...............  C
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     Table 2.--Reinvestigation Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     Type required if there has been a break in
                                           And the age of the                        service of
      If the requirement is for             investigation is       ---------------------------------------------
                                                                          0-23 months         24 month's or more
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Confidential........................  0 to 14 years. 11 mos.......  None (note 1)..........  NACLC
                                      15 yrs. or more.............  NACLC..................
Secret; ``L''.......................  0 to 9 yrs 11 mos...........  None (note 1)..........
                                      10 yrs. or more.............  NACLC
Top Secret, SCI; ``Q''..............  0 to 4 yrs. 11 mos..........  None (note 1)..........  SSBI
                                      5 yrs or more...............  SSBI-PR................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: As a minimum, review an updated Standard Form 84 and applicable records. A reinvestigation (NACLC or SSBI-
  PR) is not required unless the review indicates the person may no longer satisfy the standards of Executive
  Order 12968.

Subpart C--Guidelines for Temporary Access

Sec. 147.28   Introduction.

    The following minimum investigative standards, implementing section
3.3 of Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information, are
established for all United States Government and military personnel,
consultants, contractors, subcontractors, employees of contractors,
licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and
other individuals who require access to classified information before
the appropriate investigation can be completed and a final
determination made.

Sec. 147.29   Temporary eligibility for access.

    Based on a justified need meeting the requirements of section 3.3
of Executive Order 12968, temporary eligibility for access may be
granted before investigations are complete and favorably adjudicated,
where official functions must be performed prior to completion of the
investigation and adjudication process. The temporary eligibility will
be valid until completion of the investigation and adjudication;
however, the agency granting it may revoke it at any time based on
unfavorable information identified in the course of the investigation.

Sec. 147.30   Temporary eligibility for access at the confidential and
secret levels and temporary eligibility for ``L'' access authorization.

    As a minimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the
Standard Form 86, including any applicable supporting documentation,
favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority,
and submission of a request for an expedited National Agency Check with
Local Agency Checks and Credit (NACLC).

Sec. 147.31   Temporary eligibility for access at the top secret levels
and temporary eligibility for ``Q'' access authorization: For someone
who is the subject of a favorable investigation not meeting the
investigative standards for access at those levels.

    As a minimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the
Standard Form 86, including any applicable supporting documentation,
favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority,
and expedited submission of a request for a Single Scope Background
Investigation (SSBI).

Sec. 147.32   Temporary eligibility for access at the top secret and
SCI levels and temporary eligibility for ``Q'' access authorization:
For someone who is not the subject of a current, favorable personnel or
personnel-security investigation of any kind.

    As a minimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the
Standard Form 86, including any applicable supporting documentation,
favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority,

[[Page 4580]]

immediate submission of a request for an expedited Single Scope
Background Investigation (SSBI), and completion and favorable review by
the appropriate adjudicating authority of relevant criminal history and
investigative records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of
information in the Security/Suitability Investigations Index (SII) and
the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII).

Sec. 147.33   Additional requirements by agencies.

    Temporary eligibility for access must satisfy these minimum
investigative standards, but agency heads may establish additional
requirements based on the sensitivity of the particular, identified
categories of classified information necessary to perform the lawful
and authorized functions that are the basis for granting temporary
eligibility for access. However, no additional requirements shall
exceed the common standards for background investigations developed
under section 3.2(b) of Executive Order 12968. Temporary eligibility
for access is valid only at the agency granting it and at other
agencies who expressly agree to accept it and acknowledge understanding
of its investigative basis. It is further subject to limitations
specified in sections 2.4(d) and 3.3 of Executive Order 12968, Access
to Classified Information.

    Dated: January 22, 1998.
L.M. Bynum,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 98-1955 Filed 1-29-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5000-04-M
