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20 March 1997

Bruce Schneier rebuttal of CTIA

Press release by CTIA

NSA response to cellphone code crack

News of cellphone code crack

The cracking cryptographers' report

1 February 1997

    Here's more on the controlled documents for cellular encryption
    from TIA/EIA described below on 26 January:

    Sharon Vargish of TIA (1-703-907-7702) sent the documents after
    I signed and returned the NDA:

       TR45.0.A
       Common Cryptographic Algorithms, Revision B
       June 21, 1995, 72 pp. (With ITAR notice on every page)

       TR45.0.A
       Interface Specification for Common Cryptographic Algorithms,
       Revision B, August 6, 1996, 15 pp. (No ITAR notice, but
       "sensitive information should be protected from general
       distribution.")

       TR45
       Appendix A to PN-3474 (IS-36)
       October 16, 1995, 10 pp. (ITAR notice on every page.)

       TR45
       Appendix-A to TIA/EIA 627
       December 23, 1996, 7 pp. (No ITAR, but "sensitive"notice)

    "Common Cryptographic Algorithms" (CCA) supercedes the 1992
    CAVE document, but is considerbly longer -- 72 pp. for the
    latest compared to 25 pp. for the 1992 version.

    Here're the CCA's TOC and Introduction:

    Table of Contents

    1. Introduction

       1.1. Notations

       1.2. Definitions

    2. Procedures

       2.1. Authentication Key (A-Key) Procedures
            2.1.1. A-Key Checksum calculation
            2.1.2. A-Key Verification

       2.2. SSD Generation and Update
            2.2.1. SSD Generation Procedure
            2.2.2. SSD Update Procedure

       2.3. Authentication Signature Calculation Procedure

       2.4. Encryption Key and VPM Generation Procedure
            2.4.1. CMEA key Generation
            2.4.2. Voice Privacy Mask Generation

       2.5. CMEA Encryption/Decryption Procedure

       2.6. Wireless Residential Extension Procedures
            2.6.1. WIKEY Generation
            2.6.2. WIKEY Update Procedure
            2.6.3. Wireline Interface Authentication Signature
                   Calculation Procedure
            2.6.4. Wireless Residential Extension Authentication
                   Signature Calculation Procedure

       2.7. Cellular Data Encryption
            2.7.1. Data Encryption Key Generation Procedure
            2.7.2. Data Encryption Mask Generation Procedure

    3. TEST VECTORS

       3.1. CAVE Test Vectors
            3.1.1. Vector 1
            3.1.2. Vector 2
            3.1.3. Test Program

       3.2. Wireless Residential Extension Test Vectors
            3.2.1. Input data
            3.2.2. Test program
            3.2.3. Test Program Output

       3.3. Data Encryption Test Vector
            3.3.1. Input data
            3.3.2. Test Program
            3.3.3. Test Program Output

    1. Introduction

    This document describes detailed cryptographic procedures for
    cellular system applications. These procedures are used to
    perform the security services of mobile station authentication,
    subscriber message encryption, and encryption key and subscriber
    voice privacy key generation within cellular equipment.

    This document is organized as follows:

    §2 describes the Cellular Authentication, Voice Privacy and
    Encryption (CAVE) algorithm used for authentication for mobile
    subscriber equipment and for generation of cryptovariables to
    be used in other procedures.

    §2.1 describes the procedure to verify the manual entry of the
    subscriber authentication key (A-key).

    §2.2 describes the generation of intermediate subscriber
    cryptovariablcs, Shared Secret Data (SSD), from the unique and
    private subscriber A-key.

    §2.3 describes the procedure to calculate an authentication
    signature used by cellular base station equipment for verifying
    the authenticity of a mobile station.

    §2.4 describes the procedures used for generating cryptographic
    keys. These keys include the Voice Privacy Mask (VPM) and the
    Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm (CMEA) key. The VPM is used
    to provide forward link and reverse link voice confidentiality
    over the air interface. Thc CMEA key is used with the CMEA
    algorithm for protection of digital data exchanged between the
    mobile station and the base station.

    §2.5 describes the Cellular Message Encryption Algorithm (CMEA)
    used for enciphering and deciphering subscriber data exchanged
    between the mobile station and the base station.

    §2.6 describes the procedures for key and authentication signature
    generation for wireless residential extension  applications.

    §2.7 describes the ORYX algorithm and procedures for key and mask
    generation for encryption and decryption in cellular data services.

    §3 provides test data (vectors) that may be employed to verify the
    correct operation of the cryptographic algorithms described in
    this document. ...

    [End CCA Introduction]

    The related CCA Interface Specification "describes the interfaces
    to cryptographic procedures for cellular system applications"
    described in the CCA. Its purpose "is to describe the cryptographic
    functions without revealing the technical details that are subject
    to" ITAR.

    The two Appendices A to IS-136 and 627 "contain requirements for
    message encryption and voice privacy for cellular systems"
    supplemental to those described in the main documents, the CCA and
    the CCA Interface Specs.

    -----

    Thanks to TIA/EIA for prompt and courteous reply to our requests.
    Maybe they welcome help persuading USG/NSA to allow stronger crypto
    and boost the market for cellular systems.

26 January 1997.

    Thanks to David Wagner and Steve Schear, we've learned about the
    latest documents on cellular encryption which supercede the
    1992 CAVE document, Appendix A to IS-54, which contained the CAVE
    algorithm. Here are the latest, followed by ordering information.

      TIA/EIA/IS-136.1-A -- TDMA Cellular/PCS - Radio Interface -
      Mobile Station - Base Station Compatibility - Digital Control
      Panel, October, 1996, 372 pp. $350.00.

      Addendum No. 1 to IS-136.1-A, November, 1996, 40 pp. Free.

      TIA/EIA/IS-136.2-A -- TDMA Cellular/PCS - Radio Interface -
      Mobile Station - Base Station Compatibility - Traffic Channels
      and FSK Control Channel, October, 1996, 378 pp. $310.00.

      TIA/EIA-627 -- 800 MHZ Cellular System, TDMA Radio Interface,
      Dual-Mode Mobile Station - Base Station Compatibility
      Standard, June, 1996, 258 pp. $120.00.

    These documents can be ordered from:

      Global Engineering Documents
      15 Inverness Way East
      Englewood, Colorado 80112
      Telephone: 1-800-854-7179

    However, each of the documents lists the following related
    supplements which contain "sensitive information" and may be
    obtained by US/CA citizens from TIA by signing a Non-Disclosure
    Agreement and acceptance of export restrictions:

      Appendix A to IS-136.

      Appendix A to 627.

      Common Cryptographic Algorithms.

      Interface Specification for Common Cryptographic Algorithms.

    These controlled documents can be requested by calling Ms. Sharon
    Vargish at 1-703-907-7702, who will fax an NDA, and upon receipt of
    the completed form, will send the controlled documents at no cost.

    Here's the NDA:

             AGREEMENT ON CONTROL AND NONDISCLOSURE OF
                  COMMON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS
              REVISION A TO IS-54, IS-95, AND IS-136
          [Note: 627 supercedes IS-54; IS-95 is for CDMA]

    "I, _________________________, an employee/consultant/affiliate
           (typed name)

    of __________________________, hereafter, "the company,"
          (Company name)

    _____________________________
          (Company address)

    _____________________________

    and a United States or Canadian citizen, acknowledge and understand
    that the subject documents, to which I will have access contain
    information [which] is subject to export control under the
    International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (Title 22, Code
    of Federal Regulations, Part 120-130). I also understand that the
    subject documents represent valuable, proprietary and confidential
    business information of TIA and its members. I hereby certify that
    this information will be controlled and will only be further
    disclosed, exported, or transferred according to the terms of the
    ITAR.

    ______________________________       _____________________________
    Signature                            Date

    ______________________________       _____________________________
    Printed Name                         Witness

    ______________________________       _____________________________
    Title                                Printed Name of Witness

    [End NDA]

January 2, 1997

TR45.3 is the number of the cellular telephone standards committee of the joint Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) and Electronic Industries Association (EIA).

A part of these general standards is encryption standards, one of which is termed CAVE, Caller Authentication and Voice Encryption. The CAVE algorithm has been confidential to the industries, and was developed under the auspices of the NSA (see Barlow and Gilmore below).

A document, TR45.3, Appendix A to IS-54, Rev. B, February, 1992, which describes implementation of the CAVE algorithm, was sent anonymously to JYA and posted at this site until removed at the request of TIA (see letter below).

To obtain the latest edition of the standards by TR45.3, contact the Telecommunications Industry Association.

Posted by jya.com December 3, 1996:

> Fax header: Dec 03 '96 03:57PM D'Ancona &Pflaum

> D'Ancona & Pflaum
> Suite 2900
> 30 North LaSalle Street
> Chicago, Illinois.
> Telephone (312) 580-2000.
> Fax (312) 580-0923

> By Certified Mail
> Return Receipt Requested
> and by Fax (212) 799-4003

> Mr. John Young
> 251 West 89th Street Suite 6E
> New York, New York 10024

> Dear Mr. Young:

> I am writing to you as general counsel of Telecommunications Industry Association ("TIA") which, as you may know, is engaged in the formulation and publication of standards in the communications field. At the request of our client, on November 26, 1996, I accessed your WEB site and both viewed and printed out a list of links to documents dealing with encryption. Among them were documents described as a CAVE Report, CAVE Table and a CAVE Algorithm dated November 20 and November 21, 1996.

> In this fashion I was also able to view and print out the algorithm document of TIA's Committee TR45.3, with a clear statement that the information in the document may be subject to the export juristiction of the U. S. Department of State under the applicable regulations.

> The posting on the WEB site of these documents is, in our opinion, a violation of the copyright of TIA and unlawful. Furthermore, the posting of the algorithm may constitute a violation of applicable export regulations. It seems in any event that it will be a violation under regulations to be drafted pursuant to the President's Executive Order of November 15, 1996 which was also accessed by me on your WEB site.

> I returned to the site last Friday and yesterday, December 2 and noticed that these documents are no longer there. I commend you removing them, but ask for your assurances that they will not be posted again. In addition, it is important that we know how you received this documentation which is strictly restricted in its circulation.

> I would appreciate hearing from you at your very earliest convenience.

> Sincerely,

> Paul H. Vishny

> Copy to: Susan Hoyler [TIA] by fax (703) 907-7727

> Copy to: Eric Schimmel, c/o Wyndham Bristol Hotel - Dallas, by fax (214) 761-7520

JYA comment:

Mr. Vishny and I spoke about his fax. I said that the CAVE-related documents would not be reposted on my Web site, and that TR45.3 had come by anonymous mail, as have others we've published. Mr. Vishny said TIA intended to take no action on this matter but its members must abide NDA.

Don't know what the Feds will do with (TIA's) Susan Hoyler's notification to them about TR45.3 at this site. Along with several telcomm biggies, some Ft. Meade servers siphoned TR45.3 and most other files on the site -- several times. Well, well!

Added December 30, 1996

For provocative commentary on the CAVE algorithm and its sponsoring TR45.3 committee, see John Perry Barlow's 1992 article and John Gilmore's recent message:

> To: jya@pipeline.com
> Subject: TR45 and lawyers and governments, oh my!
> Date: Mon, 09 Dec 1996 01:18:53 -0800
> From: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>

> I just noticed the thread on TR45.3 in cypherpunks.

> If the government comes calling, tell them to stuff it. That document is not subject to ITAR. Textual descriptions of encryption algorithms, including pseudo-code and diagrams and all the rest, are not embargoed. At least, that's what the State Department tells Judge Patel. They included numerous copies of papers from the literature to demonstrate how common and robust the open publication of such information is in the US.

> If they threaten you, tell them you'll blow the lid off the whole story of how NSA lied to the standards committee about the export control laws, in order to get them to deploy an insecure algorithm without revealing to the public how insecure it is.

> I've talked with a number of people who were AT those committee meetings and saw and heard it all.

> You might also ask the head of the TIA how they can remain an accredited standards organization if they don't allow public participation in their standards process, and if they make their so-called standards available to the public. They locked foreigners out of the authentication subcommittee (relying on the NSA lie) and now will not make copies of the standard available to the public.

> And are now using their copyright to prevent people from finding out how insecure their "encryption" really is.

> John

For access to the TR45.3 1992 version (not the 1996 latest) of the CAVE algorithm:

http://www.zedz.net/mirror/cave/index.html

Or, send E-mail to John Young <jya@pipeline.com> with the subject: CAVE.

If you prefer PGP-encrypted mail:

Fingerprint: 04 AE 89 77 4D 22 D3 76 41 FC E5 F3 55 92 B1 78

Public key:

`-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2`

`mQCNAy6rxQQAAAEEANW657bMcILCSaEYHV46DQWojtHDv6UQ2qGz+6wG5g5Q7KMz QkQjM+fYNScW4fDUYH02wLG5x/E5hYwSaYal0k0b6G9m921QKqhVYj2+QzfiMqce N45t4GjSNBdwmNywZEyz5RKXbAWm78DmAt9Ro3M8AGvG1XrsU4Sb9hQ07hCVAAUR tB1Kb2huIFlvdW5nIDxqeWFAcGlwZWxpbmUuY29tPg==
=F0Xj
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----`