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8 April 2000
Source: Hardcopy from anonymous.

Note: Missing text appears cropped by xerox.

[33 pages, all marked "Unclassified."]

## PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
FOR NSA/CSS SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES

[July 1979]

____________________________

### C O N T E N T S

SECTION

> A. SCOPE

> B. GENERAL

> C. DEFINITIONS

> D. PERIMETER CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS

> E. VAULT SPECIFICATIONS

> F. SECURE AREA SPECIFICATIONS

> G. SOUND ATTENUATION CLASSIFICATIONS

> H. SECURITY ALARM SYSTEMS

> I. BARRED WINDOW SPECIFICATIONS

> J. TELEPHONE SECURITY

> K. INTERCOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

> L. ELECTRICAL/ELECTROMECHANICAL PROCESSING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

> M. AUDIO SECURITY

> N. TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURE SURVEY

> O. CONTROL OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION FACILITY

7/79

###

PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
FOR NSA/CSS SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES

### A. SCOPE

[About two lines of text missing] in NSA/CSS contractor facilities. By reference in the Contract Security Classification Specification, DD Form 254, these requirements become contract security requirements and shall be applicable also to prospective contractor activities during a proposal effort. These requirements supplement the Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information, DoD 5220.22M (ISM) and are issued pursuant to the authority contained in Section IX of the ISM.

### B. GENERAL

The contractor shall establish, maintain, and control a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) in accordance with requirements set forth herein. All activities involving SCI, including discussions, material handling and storage, will be conducted within the SCIF. Formal accreditation in writing by NSA, Industrial Field Security, M52 is required before the facility may be used for SCI activities. To obtain accreditation the contractor will be required to submit to NSA/CSS, Industrial Field Security, M52 a written request enclosing a profile of the facility describing the security measures established which satisfy the requirements set forth herein.

### C. DEFINITIONS

1. Alarm Systems - Those alarm devices, or families of alarms designed to deter the penetration of a defined space. Different alarms may be employed for this purpose, such as, volumetric alarms, and door alarms.

2. Alarm Transmission Line Supervision - The sending of a continuous signal through an alarm line circuit such that any tampering with the alarm line will cause the circuit characteristics to exceed a specified tolerance and cause an alarm. Class A and AB supervision systems use digital and tone type modulation over transmission lines with an interrogation and reply scheme. The signal technique used for the interrogation is different than the reply. Class A and AB systems cannot be compromised by the use of resistance, voltage or current substitution techniques.

3. Balance Magnetic Door Switch - A magnetic switch so designed and installed that opening the door will initiate an alarm. The switch operates using a balanced magnetic field in such a manner as to resist defeat with an external magnet. It signals an alarm when it detects either an increase or decrease in the magnetic field strength.

4. Break-wire - A wire intended to be used in fabricating screens and open wiring, and grooved stripping in various configurations necessary to detect surreptitious and forcible penetrations of movable openings, floors, walls, ceilings, and skylights.

5. Capacitance Alarm - An alarm in which a protected object is electrically connected as a capacitance sensor. The approach of an intruder causes sufficient change in capacitance to upset the balance of the alarm and initiate a signal. Also called a proximity alarm.

6. Class - A GSA term which designates a category of security file cabinet.

7. Closed Storage - The storage of Sensitive Compartmented Information in properly secured GSA approved security containers within an accredited facility while the facility is unoccupied.

8. Continuous Operation - This condition exists when a facility [line missing] personnel who have continuous capability of detecting unauthorized entry into the facility.

9. Fail Safe - A feature of a system or device that sets off an alarm or trouble signal when the system or device malfunctions or loses power.

10. Federal Supply Schedule - A listing of logistical items prepared and published by the General Services Administration.

11. Forced Entry - An unauthorized entry into a facility or storage container in such a manner that evidence of the entry is normally discernible by guard patrols, or occupants of the area.

12. Guard - A properly trained and equipped individual whose duties include the protection of a Sensitive Compartmented Information facility.

13. Group 1 - The classification, assigned by GSA, of a lock which is suitable for security purposes.

14. Group 1R- Same as Group 1 but with the addition of a radiological protection feature.

15. Heat Detectors - A sensor which responds to either a temperature above a selected value or a temperature increase which is at a rate of increase greater than a pre-selected rate.

16. Lacing - A network of fine wires surrounding or covering an area to be protected, such as a vault, glass panel or door. The network of wires is concealed by a shield such as paneling in such a manner that an attempt to break through the shield breaks the wire and initiates an alarm.

17. Open Storage - The storage of Sensitive Compartmented Information material on shelves, in locked or unlocked containers, but not in GSA approved security containers, within an accredited facility while such facility is unoccupied by authorized personnel.

18. Secure Working Area - An accredited facility which is used for handling, discussing and/or processing Sensitive Compartmented Information, but where such information is not stored.

19. Sensitive Compartmented Information - All information and materials bearing special controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. The term does not include restricted data as defined in Section II, Public Law 83-703, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

20. Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility - A defined space, i.e., a room, group of rooms, building, or other installation which has been accredited in accordance with applicable NSA/CSS directives for the storage, use, processing, or discussion of Sensitive Compartmented Information.

21. Surreptitious Entry - The unauthorized entry of a facility or security container in such a manner that evidence of the entry is not discernible by guard patrols or occupants of the area.

22. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Survey - A physical and electronic examination of a SCIF to detect, locate and neutralize clandestine listening devices and/or technical security hazards. Technical security hazards are insecure conditions which could permit the technical penetration of an area wherein sensitive information might be compromised.

23. Vibration Alarm - An alarm which responds to vibration of the surface on which it is mounted. It has a normally closed switch which will momentarily open when it is subjected to a vibration of sufficiently large amplitude.

24. Volumetric Alarm - An alarm designed and employed to detect an unauthorized person in a confined space when the space is normally unoccupied. Such alarms would include ultrasonic, microwave, and infrared sensors.

### D. PERIMETER CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS

1. General - The construction of and the physical protection for a SCIF must either prevent or detect forced or surreptitious entry of the facility. Further, a means must exist for the apprehension of any intruder before he can gain access to classified material. The criteria for the construction of perimeters is governed by whether the facility is in the United States or not, and whether it is located at ground level or above/below ground level according to the following situations: Open Storage, Closed Storage, Continuous Operation, and Secure Working Area.

2. Common Criteria - Certain criteria, however, are common to every facility and apply to all locations and situations. These are set forth as follows:

> a. Air Vents and Ducts - All air vents, ducts and similar openings that breach a facility's perimeter will be protected and equipped as prescribed below:

> > (1) All openings with one dimension six inches or less will be sound baffled where appropriate to meet the requirements of Sound Transmission Class (STC) 45 or better.

> > (2) All other openings will be protected at the perimeter with the following, installed in the order listed, progressing inward from the outer face of the perimeter:

> > > (a) Hardened steel bars one-half inch in diameter, meeting a 600 or 650 Brinell rating, mounted six inches on center vertically and horizontally and welded at all the intersections.

> > > (b) An approved alarm device.

> > > (c) Sound baffling where appropriate to meet the requirements of STC 45 or better.

> > (3) In addition, all vents and ducts greater than 36 square inches will have hinged access ports to facilitate the inspection of installed security devices and to permit examination of the interior of the vent and duct runs for the presence of unauthorized objects. Whenever possible these access ports should be within the secure perimeter of the facility. However, if necessity dictates that the port be outside the facility's perimeter, the following must be accomplished:

> > > (a) All hinges, hinge pins, and hasps will be secured against unauthorized removal by, for example, spot welding, peening of mounted bolts, etc.

> > > (b) Access ports will be secured by an approved [line missing].

> b. Sound Attenuation - All facilities regardless of location or situation must meet the specifications for sound attenuation as set forth in paragraph G below.

> c. Alarm Requirements - All facilities except those used for Continuous Operations or Secure Work Areas as defined in paragraph C above, must meet the requirements for security alarms as set forth in paragraph H below. Facilities used for Continuous Operations or Secure Work Areas must meet the alarm requirements only if there exists the possibility of surreptitious entry of the facility. That determination will be made by NSA/CSS Industrial and Field Security, M52.

> d. Doors

> > (1) Normally there will be a singled controlled entrance to a facility. When safety considerations require more than one door, only one of the doors will be used as the entrance access control point. The other door(s) will be secondary exits containing no frontal hardware and secured from the inside with bars and brackets, sliding dead bolts, or panic hardware.

> > (2) Door requirements for Vaults and Secure Areas will be as stated in paragraphs E and F respectively.

> > (3) Door(s) for all other areas will be metal, metal clad, or solid wooden (one and three-quarter inch minimum thickness). The entrance access control door will be equipped with a permanently mounted GSA approved Group 1 combination lock and have an inside escape mechanism such as the Safemasters Model 50 Lock Extension. The entrance door will also be equipped with either a cypher lock or a keyed knoblock as the convenience locking device during working hours. Secondary exit door(s) if required will be of equal construction as the entrance door containing no frontal hardware and locked as described in paragraph d.1 above. Door hinges located on the door exterior will require welding or peening the hinge pins to preclude removal.

3. Facilities in the United States at Ground Level - Facilities at ground level or with windows, doors, vents, etc., readily accessible from the ground must meet the construction criteria set forth herein as they apply to the following situations:

> a. Open Storage

> > (1) The facility must meet the specifications for vaults set forth in paragraph E below. These requirements can be waived, however, if the facility is located in a building that has:

> > > (a) continuous personnel access control, and

> > > (b) a 24-hour guard force capable of responding to an alarm within three minutes or less, and

> > > (c) a reserve guard force available to assist the responding guard in an emergency.

> > (2) Windowless facilities meeting the above criteria may be constructed of typical drywall or similar material. The walls must be installed from floor to true ceiling solidly and permanently. However, if any part of the perimeter wall, floor, or ceiling is also part of the building perimeter, such a wall, floor, or ceiling must be constructed to the specifications for Secure Areas, set forth in paragraph F below.

> b. Closed Storage

> > (1) SCI must be stored in GSA approved containers having a resistance to surreptitious entry equal to or exceeding that of a Class 6 container.

> > (2) No special construction of the facility is required so long as floors, walls, and ceilings are constructed to substantial, permanent material which provides protection from surreptitious entry and which will offer visual evidence of surreptitious or forced entry. Walls will be attached to floors and true ceilings solidly and permanently. Windows readily accessible from the ground will be protected against forced entry by equipping them with steel bars or with alarms, or with both, (see paragraphs H and I below). If the facility is located in a high crime--risk area, or in one that is subject to civil disorders, steel bars should be used on windows instead of, or into addition to, the alarms -- depending on the degree of risk in the area. Visual access will be prevented by any one of the means described in paragraph F below.

> c. Continuous Operations

> > (1) No alarm or special construction is required other than that to meet the sound attenuation requirements et forth in paragraph G below. However, if any part of the perimeter wall, floor, or ceiling of the facility is also part of the building perimeter, all windows and doors in such part will be protected against forced entry by the use of bars and alarms as appropriate. Also the floor, wall, or ceiling in such part of the facility must be constructed of substantial material that provides protection against forced entry. If there is a possibility of surreptitious entry, alarms will be used to detect or prevent it.

> > (2) And adequate security force must be available to respond to the facility on a timely basis in an emergency.

> > (3) Also, in an emergency, all SCI must be stored in containers secured with GSA approved combination locks. If, however, the bulk or volume of the material precludes this, then there must be an adequate, tested plan to protect, evacuate, or destroy the material.

> d. Secure Working Areas - The construction of, and the physical security protection for, a secure working area must provide for the detection of forced or surreptitious entry of the facility, including those areas above false ceilings. Perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings may be constructed without regard to the thickness or type of material so long as they will show evidence of attempted forced entry and provide sound attenuation of STC 45 or better. However, if there is a possibility of surreptitious entry, alarms and or barriers must be used to prevent such entry.

4. Facilities in the United States Above or Completely Below Ground Level - Facilities above or completely below ground level with no ready access to exterior openings must meet the construction specifications set forth herein as they apply to the following situations:

> a. Open Storage

> > (1) The facility must be constructed to Secure Area specifications set forth in Section 5 below. These requirements, however, may be waived if the facility is located in a building that has:

> > > (a) continuous personnel access control, and

> > > (b) a 24-hour guard force capable of responding to an alarm within three minutes or less, and

> > > (c) a reserve guard force available to assist the responding guard in an emergency.

> > (2) Facilities meeting the above criteria may be constructed of typical dry wall or similar material. The walls must be installed from the floor to the true ceiling, solidly and permanently, and all windows must be secured and made inoperable.

> b. Closed Storage

> > (1) SCI must be stored in GSA approved containers having a resistance to surreptitious entry equal to or exceeding that of a Class 6 container.

> > (2) No special construction of the facility is required so long as floors, walls, and ceilings are constructed to substantial, permanent type materials which provide protection from surreptitious entry and which will offer visual evidence of surreptitious or forced entry. Walls will be attached to floors and true ceilings solidly and permanently.

> c. Continuous Operation

> > (1) No alarm or special construction is required other than to meet sound attenuation requirements set forth in paragraph G below. If there is the possibility of surreptitious entry, however, then alarms and/or barriers must be used to prevent such penetration.

> > (2) In an emergency, all SCI must be stored in containers secured with GSA approved combination locks. If, however, the bulk or volume of the material precludes this, then there must be an adequate, tested plan to protect, evacuate, or destroy the material.

> d. Secure Working Area - The construction of, and the physical security protection for, a secure working area must provide for the detection of forced or surreptitious entry of the facility, including those areas above false ceilings. Perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings may be constructed without regard to the thickness or type of material so long as they will show evidence of attempted forced entry and provide sound attenuation of STC 45 or better. However, if there is a possibility of surreptitious entry, alarms and/or barriers must be used to prevent such entry.

5. Facilities Outside the United States - The construction criteria for facilities outside the United States are the same as those for facilities within the United States except as follows:

> a. Open Storage

> > (1) No waiver will be granted for the vault construction requirement of a facility approved for open storage, which is located on ground level with openings readily accessible from the ground.

> > (2) No waiver will be granted for the secure area construction requirement of a facility approved for open storage which is located above ground or completely below ground with exterior openings not readily accessible from the ground.

> > (3) Open storage of SCI will be permitted only when the material is of a size or configuration that precludes its being stored in the largest GSA approved security container available.

> b. Closed Storage

> All SCI will be stored in GSA approved security containers having a rating for both forced and surreptitious entry equal to or exceeding that afforded by Class 5 containers (vice the Class 6 requirement for facilities in the U.S.). If the material is stored in an approved container having a rating less than Class 5, then the facility must meet the Secure Area specifications and alarm requirements set forth in paragraph H, below.

> c. Continuous Operations

> All SCI must be either located in GSA approved security containers that can be secured in an emergency, or there must be an adequate, tested plan to protect, evacuate or destroy such information in an emergency.

> d. Secure Working Area

> The construction of, and the physical security protection for, a Secure Working Area must provide for the detection of forced or surreptitious entry of the facility, including those areas above false ceilings. Perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings may be constructed without regard to the thickness or type of material so long as they will show evidence of attempted forced entry and provide sound attenuation of STC 45 or better. However, if there is a possibility of surreptitious entry, alarms and/or barriers must be used to prevent such penetration.

### E. VAULT SPECIFICATIONS

1. Concept - The design, materials, specifications, and the criteria for the construction of a vault must be such as to make it relatively impenetrable to forced or surreptitious entry.

2. Minimum Specifications - Use of materials having thickness and diameters larger than those specified is optional. The phrase "anchored to or imbedded in the floor or ceiling" applies to the affixing of supporting members and reinforcing to the true floor or ceiling, or the most solid existing surface. Subfloors or false ceilings are not to be used for this purpose.

3. Reinforced Concrete Construction - For new construction and for construction at ground level or below, the walls, floors and ceilings will be a minimum thickness of eight inches of reinforced concrete. The concrete mixture will have a minimum compressive strength of at least 3000 p.s.i. Reinforcing will be accomplished with reinforcing bars a minimum of 5/8 inches in diameter positioned centrally in the concrete pour and space horizontally and vertically six inches on center. The bars will be tied together in the contiguous walls and firmly anchored to and/or imbedded in the floor and ceiling.

4. Steel Lined Construction - For above ground construction and in existing structures, construction will be of steel plate a minimum of 1/4 inch thick. The steel plates are to be continuously welded to supporting steel members of a minimum thickness equal to that of the plate. If the supporting steel members are being placed in a contiguous floor and ceiling of reinforced concrete, they must be firmly anchored to and/or imbedded in the floor and ceiling.

5. Openings

> a. A vault will be equipped with an approved vault door of the type presently listed on the Federal Supply Schedule. The Class 5 door will be used with reinforced concrete vaults. Where weight or construction is a factor and a steel lined vault is used, the lighter Class 6 door is recommended.

> b. Normally, a vault should have only one entrance. When a vault exceeds 1,000 square feet of floor space or has more than eight occupants, it should have a minimum of two access points, one of which will be the safety exit. When more than one entrance is required, each shall be equipped with the approved door; but only one will be used for normal access. Doors without exterior hardware will be used as secondary doors.

> c. The use of a vault door for controlling daytime access to a facility is not authorized, as continuous use will create undue wear on the door and eventually weaken the locking mechanism causing malfunctioning. Therefore, a vestibule with an access door which meets the sound attenuation requirement of STC 45 or better should be constructed at the entrance. Such an access door will meet the specified fire rating required by applicable building and safety codes.

> d. There will be no windows in a vault.

6. Additional Specifications - Vault area will be equipped with one of the following:

> a. An emergency escape which meets applicable building and safety codes. The escape device will be designed and installed so that it will not be activated by the exterior locking device nor actuated by drilling or rapping on the door from the outside.

> b. A decal containing procedures to be followed in an emergency and for operating the escape device will be permanently affixed to the inside of the door.

> c. Communications facilities and an alarm system or other signaling device which will permit a person in the vault area to communicate with someone on the outside to obtain release.

> d. An emergency light.

> e. At least one approved fire extinguisher installed near the door.

### F. SECURE AREA SPECIFICATIONS

1. General- The construction of a Secure Area will be such that it presents a formidable barrier against unauthorized physical penetration. Whenever practical, Secure Areas will be located within buildings, facilities, installations, or compounds which are subject to special access restrictions and controls.

2. Walls

> a. The walls will be of either reinforced concrete in excess of four inches thick or solid masonry (stone or brick) in excess of eight inches thick.

> b. Walls not meeting the above criterion will be reinforced on the inside with steel plate not less than 1/8 inch thick. The plates at every vertical joint are to be affixed to vertical steel members of a thickness no less than that of the plate. The vertical members will be firmly anchored to the floor and ceiling. The plates will be spot welded to the vertical members by applying a one inch long weld every twelve inches. Meetings of the plates in the horizontal plane will be continuously welded.

> c. Walls of hollow masonry (blocks and tiles) are not considered adequate and must be reinforced.

3. Floors and Ceilings

> a. The floor and ceiling selected for a Secure Area will be at least a four inch thickness of concrete.

> b. Floors and ceilings not meeting this criterion must be reinforced with steel plate 1/8 inch thick. Floor and ceiling reinforcement must be securely affixed to the walls with steel angles welded or bolted into place.

4. Entrances

> a. A Secure Area will be equipped with a GSA Class 6 vault door.

> b. Normally, a Secure Area should have only one entrance. When a Secure Area exceeds 1,000 square feet of floor space or has more than eight occupants, it should have a minimum of two access points one of which will be the safety exit. When more than one entrance/exit is required, each must be equipped with the approved door; but only one door will be used for normal access. Doors without exterior hardware will be used as secondary doors.

> c. The use of a vault door for controlling daytime access to a facility is not authorized, as this continued use will create undue wear on the door and eventually weaken the locking mechanism causing malfunction. Therefore a vestibule should be constructed at the entrance with an access door which meets the sound attenuation requirement of STC 45 or better. Where applicable building and safety codes require that the entrance meet a specified fire rating, the access door must be of that rating.

5. Windows

> a. It is preferable that Secure Area be windowless. However, where windows do exist, they must be secured to prevent their being used for the removal of classified material, unauthorized entry, visual access from the outside, and eavesdropping.

> b. Accessible windows, where required, will be secured with bars, installed as specified in Section 9 below.

> c. When visual access is a factor, the windows will be translucent or made opaque by appropriate means such as the application of paint to both sides of the glass or by sealing off with sheet metal, masonite, or hardboard. Devices to include window shades, venetian blinds or drapes may be used to restrict visual access through the window, depending on the nature of the activities being protected, relative location of the windows, and environmental factors.

> d. If adequate air conditioning is available, windows will be sealed closed permanently. Movable windows must be closed and securely fastened when the area is not occupied by authorized persons.

### G. SOUND ATTENUATION CLASSIFICATIONS

1. General - This section provides acoustic isolation criteria (voice range only) for SCIF construction.

2. Sound Transmission Classes - The term "Sound Transmission Class" (STC), is used in the discussion of architectural acoustics to describe the transmission attenuation afforded by various wall materials and other building components. The following STC's satisfy the normal security requirements of facilities used for SCI activities:

> a. STC of 30 or better: loud speech can be understood fairly well; normal speech cannot be easily understood.

> b. STC of 40 or better: loud speech can be heard, but is hardly intelligible; normal speech can be heard only faintly, if at all.

> c. STC of 45 or better: loud speech can be faintly heard but not understood; normal speech is inaudible.

> d. STC of 50 or better: very loud sounds, such as singing, brass musical instruments, or a radio at full volume, can be heard only faintly or not at all.

3. Application - The above STC's are used in the listing that follows to simplify the application of acoustic requirements of secure facilities for various functions:

> a. |  | Building Areas and Functions |  | STC
> |  | Office Space |  |

> > Executive Suite

> 45+

> > Private Offices

> 40+

> > Open Workspace

> 45+

> > "Lab"

> 40+
> |  | Conference Rooms |  |

> > Briefing or Conference Rooms

> 45+

> > Training.Plans Room

> 45+

> > Conference Rooms with movable partition
> > (including the partition)

> 45+
> |  | Auditoriums |  |

> > Auditoriums with sound reinforcement
> > (no speakers on the wall)

> 50+

> > Auditoriums without sound reinforcement

> 45+
> |  | Projection Rooms |  | 45+

4. Testing Procedures

> a. Procedures for measuring the sound attenuation levels of a completed structure can be found in, "Tentative Recommended Practices for Measurement of Airborne Sound Insulation in Buildings," Publication No. E-336-67T, American Society of Testing and Materials.

> b. Another acceptable procedure is found in the DCI Security Committee memorandum, "Sound Attenuation Test for Secure Conference Rooms," dated 7 Feb 78.

### H. SECURITY ALARM SYSTEMS

1. Purpose - This section establishes standards for security alarm systems and provides guidelines for the selection and purchase of security alarm system components for SCIFs.

2. General - The requirement for a security alarm system is dependent upon a number of variables. The physical location of the facility, number and type of guards, hours of operation, type of construction, and the degree of threat, must all be considered in determining the extent of application of alarms to a facility.

3. Concept - Whenever doors, and windows, or other openings into an area where SCI is processed or stored are not under the direct and constant control of authorized occupants, and are susceptible to forced or surreptitious entry without prompt detection, a protective alarm system must be provided.

4. Security Alarm Components Criteria - A security alarm system or alarm component which is to be used to protect SCI materials must have been tested against, and passed, the revised Interim Federal Specification W-A-00450A (GSA-F88), dated 16 February 1963, as subsequently amended.

5. Security Alarm Requirements

> a. When determined that a facility will be protected by alarms the following will be required:

> > (1) All perimeter doors will be equipped with high security balanced magnetic door switches.

> > (2) Vault doors will be equipped with heat detectors and balanced magnetic switches.

> > (3) The interior of all spaces not continually occupied by authorized personnel will be protected by motion detection alarms.

> > (4) Areas above false ceilings will be alarmed in facilities which have been approved for open storage of SCI. Areas above false ceilings in other facilities will be alarmed in there is a possibility of surreptitious entry into the area above the false ceiling.

> > (5) All vents and ducts which penetrate a facility's perimeter, and other openings with both dimensions over six inches will be alarmed.

> > (6) Windows less than 18 feet from ground level, or otherwise accessible from the roof, trees, or by other convenient methods, will be alarmed to prevent entry without detection.

> b. Exemptions - Mobile facilities, including those located on aircraft, in vans and other type vehicles are exempt from the provisions of this section. SCI is not permitted unattended in these facilities, unless appropriate security safeguards are employed and prior approval has been granted by NSA Industrial Security.

6. Annunciator Panel Supervision and Alarm Response Time Criteria

> a. Personnel must be available at the alarm panel to monitor the panel and either respond to an alarm from the protected facility or have the capability of directing a response at any given time. Personnel used for panel duty may not be used for additional duties that would require them to leave the annunciator panel unattended.

> b. A log shall be maintained by personnel supervising the communicator panel which will reflect the status of the alarm system of the protected facility at all times. The log shall record the time of each opening and securing the area. In addition, each alarm annunciation shall [several words missing] to be physically present at the protected facility once the alarm has been sounded at the annunciator panel. Maximum acceptable response times for personnel responding to an alarm at the protected facility are as follows:

> > (1) Open storage: Not more than three minutes.

> > (2) Closed storage: Not more than five minutes.

> > (3) Secure Working Area: Not more than five minutes.

7. Alarm Transmission Line Supervision Criteria

> a. When alarm transmission lines do not leave the perimeter of the protected facility, electronic line supervision is not required.

> b. When alarm transmission lines do not leave the perimeter of the building housing the protected facility, transmission lines may be either routed in electric metal tubing (EMT, joints epoxy sealed) and equipped with a standard electronic line supervision system or, as an alternative, the transmission lines may be protected by a Class A or Class AB high security electronic line supervision system not in tubing.

> c. Transmission lines routed in an environment not covered above must be protected with either a Class A or Class AB high security electronic line supervision system or routed in continuously welded or epoxy sealed threaded steel conduit (not EMT).

8. Alarm System Installation Criteria - The following criteria are applicable to the installation of all alarm systems:

> a. All alarm control units, day/night switches, and the protected area end of line supervision controls must be physically located within the secured perimeter of the area which the alarms are protecting and equipped with tamper switches.

> b. A minimum of four hours standby power is required on all systems, except when a system is connected to a local uninterrupted emergency power source.

> c. Alarm equipment that is installed on perimeter walls, ceilings, vents/ducts, windows, emergency doors, etc., should remain in the "on" or "secure" mode at all times, even when the area is occupied.

> d. If all intrusion detection alarm equipment is installed on the same system (a single transmission line pair), it will be wired so that only the entrance door and interior alarm equipment (i.e., motion detection) is shunted out of the system when the access/secure (on/off) switch is placed in the "off" or "access" mode. Tamper switches must remain active at all times.

9. Testing and Maintenance of Alarm Systems

> a. All alarm systems must be adjusted and maintained at the highest attainable sensitivity and/or tolerance that will provide optimum performance and reliability without false or nuisance alarms. Optimum performance will be determined from the manufacturer's stated specifications and by testing the equipment upon installation and at least monthly thereafter. A record of the monthly test will be maintained and will reflect the date of test and any action taken in the event of malfunctions. Sample test procedures are as follows:

> > (1) Motion Detection - Overt body motion walking through the protected areas at the rate of one step per second for four seconds, in areas protected by ultrasonic, microwave, and other motion detection devices.

> > (2) Door Switches - Actual opening of doors (or windows or other openings using door switches) which are protected by balanced magnetic door switches.

> > (3) Capacitance Alarm - Attempts to push hands, arm, or legs through the protected area (air ducts or vents); to touch an item being protected (door, window, wall, etc.); or to move protected objects (security containers).

> > (4) Tamper Switches - Removal of the covers for sensors, alarm control units, day/night switches, and end of the line supervision control units should cause an alarm regardless of the status of the overall system. Covers will be removed and tested individually.

> > (5) Vibration Detection - Hammering with a one-pound hammer or weight on walls, floors, or ceilings protected by vibration detection equipment. Preferably this should be done midway between detectors. Damage to surface finished with wallboard, plaster, wood paneling, etc., (which are considered fragile surfaces) may be avoided by placing a piece of heave scrap wood, about two feet long, against the point where the blows are struck. Three to six blows should cause an alarm.

> > (6) Other - Alarm system consisting of lacing or break-wire sensors will be tested only by qualified alarm technicians with appropriate electronic equipment. Alarm equipment which is used and test daily (i.e., door switches, motion detection, etc.) needs no monthly testing.

> b. In addition to the above, periodic unannounced openings of a facility should be performed to test alarm response time and the ability of the guard to implement alerting procedures associated with the alarm annunciations during security hours. The tests should be conducted in the spirit of assisting the guards in bettering their performance, thus increasing the security provided the facility, but should not be so frequent as to be considered a nuisance to guard personnel. Testing will be coordinated with the guard supervisor who monitors the alarm systems.

### I. BARRED WINDOW SPECIFICATIONS

1. Purpose - This section provides specifications for the installation of steel bars on windows of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.

2. Types of Installation - The three techniques approved for the installation of steel bars on facility windows are as follows:

> a. Type A Installation - Requires a steel frame with steel bars welded on it to be bolted to the inside of the facility window frame. Figure 1 gives detailed specifications for this type of installation.

> TYPE A a. Steel Frame - Minimum of 3/8" thick by 3" wide. b. Steel Bars - Minimum of 1/2" in diameter and placed not more than 6" apart vertically. c. Horizontal Steel Supports - Minimum of 1/4" thick by 1 1/2" wide and placed not more than 18" apart. The horizontal supports are to be drilled so that the vertical bars can be passed through them and be spot welded in place prior to installation.

> d. All joinings of frame, bars, supports, at top, bottom and sides must be welding.

> e. Frame must be held in the masonry opening by using expanding masonry anchors and steel screws that are not less than 3/8" in diameter by 3" long, with screw heads welded to the frame.

> f. Screws and expanding anchors are to be located in the center of the frame width and placed every 12" around the entire frame; top, sides and bottom.

> (Figure 1)

> b. Type B Installation - Requires imbedding the ends of steel bars in the masonry window frame of the facility. Figure 2 gives detailed specifications for this type of installation.

> TYPE B a. Steel Bars - Minimum of 1/2" diameter and placed not more than 5" apart vertically. b. Horizontal Steel Supports - Minimum of 1/4" thick by 1 1/2" wide and vertical nor more than 18" apart. The horizontal supports are to be drilled so that vertical bars can be passed through them and be spot welded in place prior to installation.

> c. The ends of each vertical bar will be imbedded in the masonry a minimum depth of 3".

> d. The entire bar work will be located back in the masonry opening at least 4".

> (Figure 2)

> c. Type C Installation - Requires a grillwork of steel bars to be imbedded in the masonry walls immediately adjacent to the facility window frame. Figure 3 gives detailed specifications for this type of installation.

> TYPE C a. One-half inch diameter steel bars are used to form a grillwork that is to be imbedded into the masonry wall around the window opening. Vertically the bars must be no more than 6" apart; horizontally, nor more than 18" apart. Horizontally the bars must be welded to each vertical bar. The point where the bar ends, both vertically and horizontally, and enters the masonry must be a minimum of 4" from the edge of the opening. The angled bar ends extend into the masonry a minimum of 4" with the bent end being a minimum of 3".

> (Figure 3)

### J. TELEPHONE SECURITY

To prevent telephone lines and telephone instruments that service a SCIF from being used as clandestine listening devices, the following controls will be required:

1. All incoming telephone cables and wires which penetrate a facility's perimeter will enter the facility through one opening and be placed under control at the interior face of the perimeter by the following:

> a. All active incoming lines will be accounted for by the number of pairs in use, by telephone and extension number, and the number of excess/unused pairs in existence. The accounting will be updated whenever the status of a pair of wires is changed.

> b. All excess/unused incoming wires will be either removed or disconnected and grounded in a manner which prevents their unauthorized use.

2. The number of telephone instruments servicing a SCIF will be limited to those operationally necessary. All telephone instruments will be equipped with a nonresonating ringer, a positive disconnect either automatic or manual plug and jack, and, in certain installations a line filter. Specially designed, for U.S. Government use, telephone instruments and associated security devices are available from telephone companies in the Bell system. When planning the telephone system for a SCIF, advance consultation with NSA/CSS, Industrial Field Security, M52 is encouraged to obtain advice regarding recommended telephone instruments, associated security devices, installation design, and the required "certification of need" to obtain specially designed instruments and devices.

### K. INTERCOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

Normally the installation of intercommunications equipment within a SCIF is not authorized. If in the judgment of the contractor an overriding operational requirement for intercommunications equipment exists, a request for approval shall be submitted to NSA/CSS, Industrial Field Security, M52. In the event the contractor's request is approved, guidance will be provided to the contractor concerning the acceptable equipment, method of installation, and testing requirements.

### L. ELECTRICAL/ELECTROMECHANICAL PROCESSING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Classified information shall not be processed by electrical, electronic, or electromechanical means until appropriate measures have been taken to assess the risk of compromising emanations and precautions implemented as appropriate. Contractors having a requirement to process classified information by such means shall identify to NSA/CSS, Industrial Field Security, M52 the requirement, the classification level of the information involved, the equipment to be used, and a description of the physical environment where processing will occur. Upon receipt of this information a determination will be made as to the potential risk of compromising emanations and what protective measures are to be taken.

### M. AUDIO SECURITY

In establishing physical security protection for a SCIF, sound attenuation aspects, as well as the possibility of technical penetration must be considered. Countermeasures can be effected by installation of proper equipment and suitable construction, and enhanced by restrictions on classified conversation where required. Privately-owned photographic equipment, radios, television sets and tape recorders will not be permitted within the SCIF. Government or contractor-owned mission essential electronic equipment may be permitted within the SCIF; however, this electronic equipment must be subjected to technical tests for clandestine surveillance devices and technical security hazards. If these equipments are used to process SCI, the shall meet national standards for TEMPEST.

### N. TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURE SURVEYS

1. NSA/CSS, Industrial Field Security, M52 will arrange for a Technical Surveillance Countermeasure (TSCM) Survey to be conducted of contractor SCIFs as follows:

> a. As soon as possible after security control has ben established and prior to commencement of SCI activities.

> b. As soon as possible after major remodeling or expansion of an existing facility, or a lapse in normal physical security protection.

> c. On a recurring periodic basis as determined by NSA/CSS, Industrial Security, M52.

2. The contractor will closely monitor the progress of any new construction, remodeling, or expansion of SCIFs to permit as much advance notification as possible to NSA/CSS, Industrial and Field Security, M52 as to the completion date for the purpose of scheduling the TSCM Survey.

3. The contractor will ensure that there is no discussion within the affected facility concerning pending or ongoing TSCM Survey. The knowledge of a pending or ongoing TSCM Survey is classified and will only be disseminated to those with proper clearance and need-to-know.

### O. CONTROL OF THE SCIF

The contractor shall establish appropriate procedural security control measures as follows:

1. Access to the SCIF shall be limited to:

> a. Contractor personnel who possess appropriate SCI access authorization(s) and have been specifically authorized access by NSA/CSS, Clearance, M55 to the NSA/CSS contract(s) performed within. An access list of such personnel shall be maintained in a current status and posted immediately inside the entrance of the SCIF.

> b. Official visitors who have been certified by NSA/CSS in writing as possessing the appropriate SCI access authorization(s) and authorized access to the contract(s) involved. A visitor register will be maintained to record visits by name of visitor, employer, citizenship, clearance, date and time of visit, purpose of visit and person(s) visited.

2. Essential access to the SCIF by custodial, maintenance, or other uncleared persons shall be strictly controlled. Such person will be closely escorted within the SCIF by individuals who possess the appropriate access authorization(s). Prior to admittance of uncleared people, all occupants of the SCIF will be specifically advised of the presence of uncleared persons and all classified activities are to be suspended and classified material stored during the period uncleared persons are present.

3. The SCIF shall be fully secure (all classified material properly stored and perimeter door(s) locked and alarmed) during all periods whenever the area is not occupied by authorized personnel.

4. SCIF entrance door locking devices will be as specified in paragraph D.2.d., above. Access to the combination of the built-in combination security lock will be limited to the minimum number of individuals required to open the area. Access to the combination of the convenience cypher lock or keys to the knoblock will be limited to individuals assigned to the area. All combinations will be changed every six months or whenever someone who had access no longer requires access or whenever it is suspected the combination has been compromised. The lock cylinder will be rekeyed whenever a key has been lost.

5. Where feasible, areas adjacent to the SCIF shall be kept clear of obstructions to facilitate visual inspection of the exterior surfaces of the SCIF.

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