19 August 1997
Source: E-mail direct.

    Return-Path: <gap@accessone.com>
    Date: Mon, 18 Aug 1997 13:17:09 -0700
    To: gap@whistleblower.org
    From: Tom Carpenter <gap@accessone.com>
    Subject: Hanford Nuke Waste

    PRESS RELEASE

    GAP Releases White Paper on Hanford Tank Fiasco

    DOE Ignores Scientists' Safety Concerns, Endangers Workers and Public

    	The Government Accountability Project (GAP) recently published the
    findings of its investigation into Hanford's ill-fated implementation of a
    dangerous exhauster system designed to blow untreated toxic vapors from an
    underground, high-level nuclear waste tank into the environment.  The
    investigation disclosed that managers at the Department of Energy (DOE)'s
    Richland office intimidated and silenced its own in-house technical
    experts, who warned that the system could increase the cancer-causing
    chemicals in the air, endangering workers as well as the public breathing
    the air downwind of the tank.  Although managers at the Tank Farms -- where
    67 million gallons of nuclear waste are stored in 177 underground tanks,
    many of which have leaked -- were aware of the scientists' documented
    concerns, they, along with the contractors being paid for the project,
    installed the system anyway to meet a mandated Milestone of June 30, 1995.

    	At the time of this decision, DOE managers were aware that the system
    could violate the Clean Air Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery
    Act, and other laws forbidding the knowing endangerment of employees and
    the release of high levels of radionuclides into the air.  However,
    concerned Hanford employees who disclosed the wrongdoing to GAP, as well as
    internal DOE documents, confirmed that a decision was made at senior levels
    to push the project forward to avoid the negative "optics" of failing to
    meet a Milestone -- despite the potential danger to workers and the public.

    	In March, 1997, the scientists' and engineers' concerns were proven
    well-founded when a draft of an independent study by the Pacific Northwest
    National Laboratory confirmed the dangers of inhalation exposure to the
    vapors being blown out of Tank C-103.  The draft analysis, obtained by GAP,
    contained alarming findings, including:

    · The greatest risks are "generally beyond the security fence," since toxic
    vapors are blown downwind.  As a result, workers on the site and the
    general public downwind of the tank could inhale the vapors without even
    knowing it.

    · The study found severe risks to workers of contracting cancer.  The
    cancer risk for an exposed tank worker is one in sixteen for a deflected
    stack configuration, and one in 1,400 for a straight stack.  The threshold
    of regulatory concern, called the "action level," is one in 1,000,000.

    · The study found severe risks to workers of nonchronic toxicological
    effects as well: 21.3 for a deflected stack and 0.2 for a straight stack,
    with an action level of 1.

    	In March, 1997, the Washington State Department of Ecology informed the
    DOE that the system had failed to satisfy the cleanup Milestone -- a
    concern the scientists and engineers had raised nearly two years earlier.
    Furthermore, the system was shut down a few months after startup because
    the air filters kept getting clogged -- another problem anticipated by the
    DOE scientists and engineers.  Besides endangering workers and the public,
    silencing its own scientific reviewers, and most likely violating safety
    and environmental regulations, the DOE also failed to fulfill its cleanup
    mandate -- all at a cost to the taxpayer of hundreds of thousands of dollars.

    	"The actions of DOE management in this case are a direct betrayal of the
    public trust, and they knowingly exposed Hanford workers to deadly
    hazardous vapors.  They ignored their own technical experts and, acting in
    their own interests instead of in the interest of the public, literally
    blew off safety at Tank C-103.  We are calling on the Department of Justice
    and the State Department of Ecology to investigate and prosecute the
    managers responsible for this outrage," said Tom Carpenter, Director of the
    West Coast Office of the Government Accountability Project.

    	Copies of the GAP White Paper on this incident are available at the GAP
    Website:

    http://www.whistleblower.org/gap.

    GAP is a nonprofit, public interest organization that promotes government
    accountability and provides advocacy for workers who disclose dangerous,
    illegal, or environmentally unsound practices on the job.