5 May 1997

Revised to add links to domestic terrorism statements of the Department

of Defense and the FBI, annual reports on Global Terrorism, the Chemical

Weapons Convention and ATF reports at end of this report.



14 March 1997

Revised to add links to related WMD documents at end of this report.



------------------------------------------------------------------------



[Congressional Record: February 26, 1997 (Senate)]

[Page S1658]

From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

[DOCID:cr26fe97-127]







 

 REPORT ON THE RESPONSE TO THREATS OF TERRORIST USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS 

             DESTRUCTION--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT--PM 17



  The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message 

from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying 

report; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services.



To the Congress of the United States:

  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public 

Law 104-201), title XIV, section 1411 requires the President to 

transmit a report to the Congress that assesses the capabilities of the 

Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents 

involving weapons of mass destruction and to support State and local 

prevention and response efforts. In accordance with this provision, I 

transmit the attached report on the subject issue.

                                                  William J. Clinton.  

  The White House, February 26, 1997.



                          ____________________







[Congressional Record: February 26, 1997 (House)]

[Page H651-H660]

From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

[DOCID:cr26fe97-98]





  REPORT ON GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS

 INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF

                           THE UNITED STATES



  The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message

from the President of the United States; which was read and, together

with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the

Committee on National Security:

To the Congress of the United States:

  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public

Law 104-201), title XIV, section 1411 requires the President to

transmit a report to the Congress that assesses the capabilities of the

Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents

involving weapons of mass destruction and to support State and local

prevention and response efforts. In accordance with this provision, I

transmit the attached report on the subject issue.

                                                  William J. Clinton.

  The White House, February 26, 1997.



 Report to Congress on Response to Threats of Terrorist Use of Weapons

                 of Mass Destruction, January 31, 1997



                           executive summary



       As the result of recent events, significant threats over

     the past few years, and the increased availability and

     proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)

     materials, there is an increasing concern for the potential

     of terrorist incidents occurring in the United States

     involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

       Under Presidential and Congressional direction, the Federal

     Government has made a concerted effort to better respond to

     domestic terrorist incidents involving WMD. These efforts

     include assessing current capabilities, identifying

     shortfalls, and taking steps to remedy them. The Federal

     Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as the lead agency for crisis

     management in response to a domestic terrorist threat or

     incident, has undertaken several initiatives to prevent,

     mitigate, and respond to the domestic terrorism threat. The

     Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with the

     responsibility for consequence management in response to a

     terrorist incident, has undertaken several initiatives to

     identify and enhance the Federal capability to respond to the

     consequences of a terrorist incident. Several departments and

     agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD),

     Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Health and Human

     Services (HHS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

     are involved in enhancing overall terrorism response

     capabilities, with others in the Federal response planning

     community actively supporting this effort.

       Local response to a terrorist event is critical to the

     success of the overall response. Even with a timely Federal

     response, local first responders have the immediate

     requirement to deal with the incident and care for victims.

     FEMA has been working with local and State governments to

     assess their response capabilities, identify shortfalls and

     take measures to remedy them. These activities include

     surveying State terrorism response capabilities, convening a

     focus group to discuss capabilities and needs of local

     government for NBC response, sponsoring a conference for fire

     chiefs from major metropolitan fire departments to discuss

     lessons learned from recent international terrorism

     incidents, conducting training activities, and developing

     exercises featuring terrorism scenarios to test various

     aspects of crisis and consequence management activities.

       In continuation of these efforts, the Federal Government

     has developed a program of activities in Fiscal Year (FY)

     1997 encompassing training, some equipment and capability

     enhancements, planning, exercises, and other activities

     involving Federal, State, and local governments to improve

     the current levels of preparedness and response. The initial

     focus for training and capability enhancement is to target FY

     1997 funding on cities and selected jurisdictions based on

     population, risk and geographic distribution. The FY 1997

     activities will form the basis for further training,

     planning, and capability building efforts in FY 1998 and

     beyond for a broader base of jurisdictions, depending on

     budget constraints and resource availability.



                              introduction



     Background

       Recent trends indicate growing prospects for terrorist

     incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In

     1993, a bomb rocked the World Trade Center in New York City,

     NY; in 1995, Japanese extremists successfully conducted a

     chemical attack in the Tokyo subway system and a bomb

     destroyed



[[Page H652]]



     the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK. The chance

     of a significant WMD incident occurring in the United States

     is heightened by several factors, including:

       Inexpensive production and availability of chemical/

     biological (C/B) agents;

       Easily obtainable chemical precursors and biological

     production processes;

       Portability of small amounts of C/B agents especially

     useful for clandestine purposes;

       Potential for large-scale public impact based on limited

     ability to quickly identify and/or contain the effects of

     such substances;

       Increased WMD stockpiles, with the potential for theft or

     acquisition of the weapons by terrorists groups;

       Capability of inflicting mass casualties; and,

       Increased media coverage of the use of WMD.

     Scope of the Report

       This report responds to the requirement in the Defense

     Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Title XIV,

     Section 1411 of Public Law 104-201 (also referred to as the

     Nunn-Lugar amendment), for the President to transmit a Report

     to Congress that assesses the capabilities of the Federal

     Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents

     involving WMD and to support State and local prevention and

     response efforts. Also, the report highlights results and

     insights gained from earlier Fiscal Year (FY) 1996

     initiatives and describes what is planned or under way in FY

     1997 to improve Federal, State, and local capabilities.

     Finally, it addresses measures to improve capabilities in

     future years, including funding requirements, legislative

     improvements, and research and development.

     Lead Agency Responsibilities

       The Department of Justice (DOJ), through the Federal Bureau

     of Investigation (FBI), has been assigned the lead

     responsibility for management of the U.S. Government (USG)

     response to terrorist incidents. The FBI derives its

     fundamental legal jurisdiction to deter terrorist incidents

     from an assortment of Federal statutes and Executive Branch

     directives.

       The FBI has the lead agency role in crisis management which

     entails the process of identifying, acquiring, and planning

     the use of resources needed to prevent and/or respond to a

     potential or actual terrorist incident. The crisis management

     response incorporates and emphasizes prevention, crisis

     mitigation efforts, and criminal prosecution of terrorists.

     Crisis management activities include proactive measures for

     prevention, immediate incident response, and post-incident

     response, including command of the operational response as

     the on-scene manager for an incident, in coordination with

     other Federal agencies and local and State authorities.

       FEMA has the responsibility for consequence management

     which entails preparedness and response for dealing with the

     consequences of a terrorist incident. Consequence management

     activities include measures to alleviate damage, loss of

     life, hardship, or suffering caused by the incident;

     protection of public health and safety; restoration of

     essential government services; and provision of emergency

     assistance. FEMA will act in support of the FBI in

     implementing consequence management response activities.

       The overall goal of Administration policy is to ensure that

     the United States is prepared to combat domestic and

     international terrorism in all its forms. Measures undertaken

     under this policy to deal with the terrorism threat include:

       Reducing vulnerabilities--To reduce vulnerabilities to

     terrorism both at home and abroad, all Federal department

     heads have been directed to ensure that their personnel and

     facilities are fully protected against terrorism. This

     activity includes reviewing the vulnerability of Government

     facilities and the critical national infrastructure; reducing

     vulnerabilities affecting civilian personnel and facilities

     abroad, military personnel and facilities, U.S. airports, and

     other transportation modes; and undertaking counterterrorism

     measures to reduce both the domestic and international

     terrorist threat.

       Deterring terrorist acts--To deter terrorism, the USG has

     made it clear that its policies will not be affected by

     terrorist acts and it will vigorously deal with terrorists

     and their sponsors to reduce terrorist capabilities and

     support. In this regard, the pursuit, arrest, and prosecution

     of terrorists are of the highest priority. Goals include the

     disruption of terrorist-sponsored activity including

     termination of financial support, arrest and punishment of

     terrorists as criminals, application of U.S. laws and new

     legislation to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the

     United States, and application of extraterritorial statutes

     to counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside

     the United States. Return of terrorists from overseas who are

     wanted for violation of U.S. law is of the highest priority

     and a central issue in bilateral relations with any country

     that harbors or assists them.

       Responding to terrorist acts--To respond to acts of

     terrorism, there must be a rapid and decisive capability to

     protect U.S. citizens, defeat or arrest terrorists, respond

     against terrorist sponsors, and provide relief to the

     victims. The goal during the immediate response phase of an

     incident is to terminate terrorist attacks so that the

     terrorists do not accomplish their objectives or maintain

     their freedom, while authorities seek to minimize damage and

     loss of life and provide emergency assistance to the affected

     area. In responding to a terrorist incident, the Federal

     Government is working to rapidly deploy the needed Federal

     capabilities to the scene, including specialized elements for

     dealing with specific types of incidents resulting from WMD

     threats.

     Recent Initiatives

       While the primary Federal focus historically has been on

     developing crisis management capabilities, recent events have

     necessitated placing an increased emphasis on building

     consequence management capabilities as well. Thus, guidance

     provided by USG policy has resulted in a number of

     initiatives being undertaken in FY 1996 to continue to build

     crisis management capabilities and to enhance consequence

     management capabilities by assessing Federal, State, and

     local capabilities to respond to the consequences of a

     nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) WMD terrorist event.

     Ongoing activities through FY 1997 build upon these

     initiatives and respond to new legislation. Some recent

     initiatives include:

       Development by the FBI of operational guidelines entitled

     Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment and Employment of

     U.S. Government Elements in Response to a Domestic Terrorist

     Threat or Incident.

       The formulation of the FBI Domestic Emergency Support Team

     (DEST) and the first deployment of the DEST in support of the

     1996 Democratic National Convention.

       Pilot test of a Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST) for

     the Washington, DC, area and in Atlanta, GA, at the 1996

     Summer Olympic Games, to provide immediate on-site medical

     support in response to a terrorist incident involving WMD.

       Multi-agency assessment of the capability of the Federal

     Response Plan (FRP) to respond to a WMD terrorist event.

       Exercises using terrorism scenarios that address various

     aspects of crisis management and consequence management.

       Planning, training, and exercises focusing on the terrorism

     threat conducted in preparation for the 1996 Summer Olympic

     Games, national political conventions, and the 1997

     Presidential Inauguration.

       Survey of State terrorism response capabilities conducted

     in conjunction with the National Governors Association (NGA).

       Focus group discussions with management and emergency

     responders from four major metropolitan areas on the

     capabilities and needs of local government to respond to NBC

     WMD terrorist incidents.

       Conference for fire chiefs of major metropolitan fire

     departments conducted in conjunction with the International

     Association of Fire Chiefs featuring lessons learned from

     recent international terrorism incidents.

       Conferences and exercises on health and medical

     requirements needed in response to chemical/biological (C/B)

     terrorism sponsored by the Department of Health and Human

     Services--Public Health Service (HHS-PHS).

       Numerous training activities sponsored by FEMA and the

     States to improve responder awareness of the terrorism threat

     and to begin to build the knowledge and skills required for

     response to such an incident.

       Development of the Terrorism Incident Annex to the FRP.

       Enhancement of 175 FBI Special Agents to work on WMD

     issues.

       Establishment of the Hazardous Materials Response Unit

     (HMRU) to provide scientific and technical expertise to

     enhance FBI forensic and evidence capabilities.



assessment of federal capabilities to prevent and respond to the use of

                                  wmd



     Crisis Management/Prevention Capabilities

       Lead Agency Role

       The FBI has been designated as the lead agency for the

     management of the Federal response to terrorist incidents

     (hereafter referred to as crisis management). As the lead for

     crisis management, the FBI has the responsibility for

     proactive measures involving prevention, immediate incident

     response, and post-incident response, including functioning

     as the commander of the on-scene operational response.

       The FBI On-Scene Commander (OSC) is responsible at the

     incident site for all decisions to resolve the terrorist

     incident, unless the lead agency responsibility is

     transferred by the Attorney General (AG) to FEMA, as

     warranted. In support of the FBI OSC, or as the designated

     lead agency after transfer of the responsibility by the AG,

     FEMA coordinates all Federal assistance in support of

     consequence management needs resulting from the incident with

     the affected State and local governments.

       Operational guidelines (entitled Guidelines for the

     Mobilization, Deployment and Employment of U.S. Government

     Elements in Response to a Domestic Terrorist Threat or

     Incident) have been developed by the FBI and are awaiting

     final approval by the AG and the National Security Council

     (NSC). The Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), an

     interagency support component, has been developed and is

     managed by the FBI.

       During a significant terrorist threat or event including a

     WMD incident, the FBI may deploy a tailored DEST enhanced

     with specialized interagency components capable of responding

     to situations involving chemical/biological (C/B) or nuclear/

     radiological weapons or agents. The FBI-led response will be

     activated to provide a graduated, tailored response based on

     the type of incident, in accordance with the FBI's Nuclear or

     C/B Incident Contingency Plans.



[[Page H653]]



       The FBI OSC, as lead agency official, retains the authority

     to take appropriate crisis management actions at all times

     during the crisis management response. On-scene decisions

     with interagency consultation are made with the Command Group

     at a Joint Operations Center (JOC), which includes the OSC,

     on-scene principals of the DEST agencies, other Federal

     agency representatives, and local and State representatives.

       The DEST Team Leader (DTL) is designated by the Director,

     FBI. The DTL is primarily responsible for providing the FBI

     OSC advice and guidance concerning other Federal capabilities

     available for use in resolving a WMD terrorist incident. This

     includes crisis management and consequence management

     assistance, technical or scientific advice, and contingency

     planning assistance. Upon arrival at a crisis location, the

     DEST conducts an initial situation assessment, develops

     appropriate Courses of Action (COAs), makes a consequence

     assessment, and provides the OSC with recommendations. The

     DTL coordinates this process and thereafter facilitates the

     implementation of the OSC's selected COA through specific

     taskings. The DTL ensures continuous coordination within the

     various DEST components and with the FBI command post

     elements, resolves issues within the DEST, ensures effective

     communications among response elements, and implements

     required changes within the DEST to achieve the most

     efficient and effective team possible.

       When determined appropriate by the OSC, the FBI command

     post will be modified to function as a JOC. The JOC

     configuration includes representatives of the primary

     participating agencies and Command, Operations, Consequence

     Management, and Support Groups as described below:

       Command Group--Comprised of senior officials of the FBI,

     DOE, DOD, HHS-PHS, FEMA, and other Federal and State

     agencies, as appropriate, to provide the OSC with a means to

     quickly coordinate and reach decisions on interagency matters

     that affect the resolution of the incident.

       Operations Group--Contains representatives of the

     organizations directly involved in actions in and around the

     crisis site and whose actions are deemed critical to the

     successful resolution of the crisis.

       Consequence Management Group--Contains decisionmaking and

     liaison representatives of consequence management

     organizations to provide advice on decisions that may have

     implications for consequence management, and to provide

     continuity in leadership should a consequence management

     response become necessary. If consequences become imminent or

     actually occur, State and local organizations will initiate

     their consequence management actions, with FEMA expediting

     the provision of Federal consequence management response

     support. The Group is coordinated by FEMA with an FBI liaison

     from the OSC.

       Support Group--Contains representatives of organizations

     whose primary task is to support members of the Operations

     Group. Depending on the nature of the crisis, organizations

     represented in the Operations Group will be asked to provide

     staff for various support components, including Logistics,

     Legal, Administrative, Liaison, and Media components. The

     Media component serves as the single point of contact for the

     coordination and release of public information to the media

     from the incident site. DOJ/FBI, in coordination with

     participating DEST agencies, will develop a strategy and

     procedures for responding to media inquiries. The overall

     intent will be for the Federal Government to speak clearly

     with one voice regarding any response to a terrorist

     incident.

       Lead Agency Initiatives

       As a result of recent terrorist incidents, and in

     recognition of the emerging threat of WMD, the FBI has

     enhanced and modified its capabilities. Some of the changes

     include:

       Establishment of a separate Domestic Terrorism/

     Counterterrorism Planning Section. This growing section

     includes separate units formed specifically to more

     effectively address Domestic Terrorism Operations, WMD,

     Special Events Management, and Domestic Terrorism Analysis.

     It is anticipated that during Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 the WMD

     Unit will divide into two separate units, one handling NBC

     proliferation matters, threats, and incidents and the other

     managing exercise and response components (such as the DEST)

     and implementing the first responder training initiative.

       Establishment of the Hazardous Materials Response Unit

     (HRMU) within the Laboratory Division. This unit is designed

     to lead and augment the Federal science and technology

     response capability to terrorist threats/incidents involving

     WMD and provide a law enforcement representative in evidence

     issues to enhance later prosecutive effectiveness and

     efficiency.

       Establishment of the Critical Incident Response Group

     (CIRG) at Quantico, VA. The CIRG is recognized as an FBI

     entity that provides coordinated support to the FBI OSC. The

     Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), which has been trained to operate

     in a HAZMAT environment, is part of the CIRG. To assist the

     HRT in protracted terrorist or other criminal incidents,

     regional FBI Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams have

     been enhanced to provide additional tactical support;

     however, at this time only the HRT has equipment and trains

     in a HAZMAT environment. The CIRG provides additional

     operations support in the areas of negotiation, behavioral

     profiling and assessment, and crisis management support.

       Interagency Capabilities

       To successfully resolve a WMD incident, closely coordinated

     efforts with appropriate Federal, State, and local law

     enforcement agencies and other authorities having emergency

     capabilities to respond to and mitigate the consequences of

     such an incident will be utilized by the FBI. Appropriate

     Federal agencies will support the FBI by providing personnel

     and equipment that will be rapidly deployed and made

     available for advice and assistance, as warranted by the

     situation and at the request of the OSC at the incident site.

     In order to develop close working relationships among Federal

     agencies concerned with a potential WMD incident, many

     interagency working groups (IWGs) have been established, some

     of which are:

       Various Coordinating Sub-Groups, including a Sub-IWG on

     Exercises co-chaired by the FBI, and a Sub-IWG on Nuclear

     Trafficking;

       Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) for research and

     development, science, and technology devoted to

     counterterrorism;

       Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT),

     Chemical/Biological/Radiological (CBR) Subcommittee;

       SHIELD Group dealing with C/B proliferation, chaired by the

     Department of State (DOS);

       Nuclear Export Violation Working Group (NEVWG);

       Missile Trade Analysis Group (MTAG); and

       Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEC).

       Interagency Roles and Responsibilities

       The primary agencies participating in the response to a WMD

     incident include DOJ, DOD, DOE, HHS, EPA, and FEMA. Depending

     on the specific details of an incident, the FBI may also

     request specialized assistance from other agencies, including

     the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of

     Agriculture (USDA), the Department of the Treasury, the

     Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DOS, and the U.S.

     Intelligence Community (IC). The participating agencies will

     be incorporated into the existing onscene FBI crisis

     management structure, which is designed to provide the FBI

     OSC with a graduated and flexible response capability. For a

     WMD incident, the DEST will include a specially configured

     nuclear or C/B response component with staffing and equipment

     from appropriate Federal agencies, including DOD, DOE, HHS,

     EPA, and FEMA. Other agencies may be tasked to support the

     FBI on a case-by-case basis in an effort to prevent,

     mitigate, and/or manage a WMD incident or threat. Department

     and agency responsibilities include the following:

       The Secretary of Defense has responsibility for:

       Providing military units that can assist in both the crisis

     management and consequence management aspects of a WMD

     incident;

       Designating the supporting equipment and those technical

     personnel who possess the required expertise to deploy with

     the DEST;

       Designating pertinent assets for technical response, such

     as the identification of on-site contaminants, sample

     collection and analysis, limited decontamination

     capabilities, air monitoring, medical diagnosis and treatment

     of casualties, and render-safe procedures for WMD material;

       Providing for the custody, transportation, and disposal of

     a C/B WMD when beyond the capability of an otherwise

     cognizant agency and after consultation with DOJ/FBI and EPA,

     or of nuclear and/or radiological material when beyond the

     capability of an otherwise cognizant agency (e.g., DOE or

     EPA) and after consultation with DOJ/FBI and DOE; and

       Providing other support to the OSC through the use of

     military assets.

       The Secretary of Energy has responsibility for:

       Analyzing threat messages, through the Communicated Threat

     Credibility Assessment Program, for technical content,

     nuclear design feasibility, and general credibility, and for

     providing such analyses to the FBI;

       Designating those technical personnel and supporting

     equipment to deploy with the DEST as the Nuclear/Radiological

     Advisory Team (NRAT). The NRAT will normally include a DOE

     Senior Official who will coordinate the overall DOE response

     at the scene and liaise with other agencies on matters of

     mutual concern. The responsibilities of the NRAT are to: Make

     a scientific and technical assessment of the situation,

     provide scientific and technical advice to the designated

     OSC, provide scientific and technical recommendations,

     including risk/consequence information and requirements for

     follow-on assets, support tactical operations as directed by

     the FBI OSC, and perform limited technical measurements and

     conduct liaison with appropriate DOE response assets.

       Designating those specialized personnel, along with

     specialized instrumentation and equipment, to assist Federal

     agencies in locating nuclear weapons or special nuclear

     material that may be lost, stolen, or associated with bomb

     threats using the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). The

     responsibilities of the NEST are to provide for: Search of

     nuclear materials, identification of nuclear materials,

     diagnostics and assessment of suspected nuclear devices, and

     disablement and containment programs.

       Providing scientific and technical assistance and support

     to the FBI, DOD, and FEMA in the areas of threat assessment

     and



[[Page H654]]



     search operations, access operations, diagnostic and device

     assessment, disablement and render-safe operations, hazards

     assessment, containment, relocation and storage of special

     nuclear material evidence, and in post-incident cleanup;

       Acquiring, maintaining, and making available any special

     equipment and capabilities required to provide the necessary

     scientific and technical assistance; and,

       Providing tactical/operational advice and assistance in

     supporting the FBI for incidents on a DOE facility or

     involving weapons or material in DOE custody.

       The Secretary of Health and Human Services has

     responsibility for:

       Designating those technical personnel and supporting

     equipment to deploy with the DEST;

       Providing technical advice and assistance, such as threat

     assessment, identification of contaminants, sample collection

     and analysis, on-site safety and protection activities,

     medical management plans, and the provision of health and

     medical care;

       To support this effort, pertinent assets capable of

     representing the following resources will be made available

     to the FBI in response to a WMD incident or threat: Office of

     Emergency Preparedness/Office of Public Health Service (OEP/

     OPHS), Federal Interagency C/B Rapid Deployment Team (CBRDT),

     Medical Management Support Unit (MSU), Medical Response Teams

     and Specialty Teams, and Agency Support, Centers for Disease

     Control and Prevention (CDC); Food and Drug Administration

     (FDA); Agency For Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

     (ATSDR); National Institutes of Health (NIH); Substance Abuse

     and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA); Health

     Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).

       The Administrator of the EPA has responsibility for:

       Designating technical personnel and supporting equipment to

     deploy with the DEST;

       Providing technical advice and assistance, such as

     monitoring, identification of contaminants, sample collection

     and analysis, and on-site safety, prevention, and

     decontamination activities;

       Issuing any permits required for the custody,

     transportation, and disposition of chemical material; and

       Making appropriate assets from the following resources

     available to the FBI in response to a domestic WMD threat or

     incident: Office of the Emergency Coordinator, EPA,

     Environmental Response Team, Edison, NJ, Federal On-Scene

     Coordinators (FOSCs), located in all EPA Regional Offices,

     supported by technical assistance contractors to operate in

     contaminated environments; sample, monitor, cleanup, etc.,

     National Response Team (NRT), the 16-agency team chaired by

     EPA, Regional Response Teams (RRTs), 13 teams co-chaired by

     EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) that support the FOSCs,

     Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORJA)/Center for Risk

     Modeling and Emergency Response (CRMER), Radiological

     Emergency Response Team, National Enforcement Investigations

     Center (NEIC), and laboratory support, including: Regional

     Environmental Services Division and contract labs, Office of

     Water-Technical Support Division, Cincinnati, OH, National

     Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory (NAREL),

     Montgomery, AL, and Office of Radiation Programs, Las Vegas,

     NV.

       The Director of FEMA has responsibility for:

       Designating appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to

     deploy with the DEST; and

       Coordinating on-site consequence management activities with

     State, local, and appropriate Federal agencies.

     Consequence Management/Response Capabilities

       Lead Agency Role

       FEMA is responsible for the coordination of Federal

     emergency response activities in support of State and local

     governments. FEMA coordinates these activities using the

     concept of operations described in the interagency Federal

     Response Plan (FRP) and supports other Federal emergency

     response plans, as described below.

       A WMD terrorist incident may occur without warning and

     immediately impact large numbers of people. The incident may

     affect a local jurisdiction, several jurisdictions within a

     State, or several States. The existing emergency response

     system may be severely stressed in providing a timely and

     effective response to the consequences of the incident. Local

     resources are likely to be quickly exhausted or unavailable

     to meet the complex requirements of such an event, including

     immediate needs for lifesaving resources, resulting in a

     requirement for Federal assistance to augment State and local

     resources. Due to the potentially devastating impact,

     coordination at all levels of Government is critical to

     ensuring that response needs are met. In responding to the

     consequences of a terrorist incident, the primary objective

     of the Federal response is to assist State and local

     governments in carrying out their responsibilities to prevent

     or minimize the loss of life and property.

       Over the years, a significant base of capability has been

     developed at the local, State, and Federal levels of

     government for responding to natural disasters and

     technological emergencies, including incidents involving

     nuclear and chemical materials.

       The current response framework includes an array of

     emergency plans, capabilities, and resources of local, State,

     and Federal governments, and of private and voluntary

     organizations. At the Federal level, emergency plans deriving

     from statutory authorities. Executive orders, national

     security guidance, and other guidance are used by departments

     and agencies to carry out their emergency response missions.

     Under this response framework, Federal resources and

     capabilities are provided to augment those of State and local

     responders, including private and voluntary organizations.

     Existing Federal plans are also being adapted for response to

     the consequences of a terrorist incident. Current interagency

     plans include:

       The Federal Response Plan, supported by 29 departments and

     agencies, is used by FEMA for responding to any incident or

     situation requiring or potentially requiring Federal

     emergency or disaster assistance. The FRP implements the

     authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and

     Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) to provide

     Federal assistance to save lives, protect property, ensure

     public health and safety, and recover from the impact of the

     incident or event.

       The Stafford Act provides FEMA with the authority to assign

     missions to any Federal department or agency in support of a

     disaster or emergency declared by the President.

       The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP),

     supported by 17 Federal departments and agencies, is used to

     coordinate the Federal radiological response to an incident

     involving nuclear materials. Radiological response activities

     under the FRERP include monitoring and assessing the

     situation, developing and recommending protective action

     recommendations for the affected population, and serving as

     the primary Federal source of technical and public

     information regarding the radiological incident.

       The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution

     Contingency Plan, or National Contingency Plan (NCP),

     supported by 15 Federal departments and agencies, is used to

     coordinate the Federal environmental response to an incident

     involving HAZMAT, including chemical agents. Environmental

     response activities include monitoring, decontamination, and

     long-term restoration.

       As a supplement to the FRP, HHS has recently developed a

     Health and Medical Services Support Plan for the Federal

     Response to Acts of C/B Terrorism to coordinate the Federal

     public health and medical care response to an incident

     involving C/B materials, including biological agents. Public

     health and medical care response activities include

     assessment, triage, treatment, transportation,

     hospitalization, and followup of victims of a C/B incident.

       Assessment of Response Capabilities

       FEMA has been tasked by the NSC to review the adequacy of

     the FRP to respond to nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)

     WMD terrorism incidents and to identify and remedy any

     shortfalls in stockpiles, capabilities, or training that

     would affect our ability to respond. Scenarios describing NBC

     WMD incidents were used to help Federal, State, and local

     responders focus on the capabilities that would be required

     and to assess the adequacy of current capabilities to meet

     response requirements. The Federal effort included a review

     of the coordination of consequence management activities with

     crisis management activities, an examination of the

     relationships among existing Federal interagency emergency

     plans, an assessment of the capabilities of the FRP to

     respond to an NBC WMD incident, the availability of medical

     capabilities for terrorism response, and procedures for

     military support of medical facilities and decontamination

     activities.

       The assessment of the FRP and Federal capabilities focused

     on identifying shortfalls in stockpiles, capabilities, and

     training that would affect the Federal Government's ability

     to respond. In conducting the review and subsequent

     assessment, FEMA sought input from the 29 departments and

     agencies supporting the FRP. Comprehensive scenario-specific

     information was provided by key responding agencies including

     DOD, DOE, HHS, and EPA. Major findings from the assessment

     are grouped under the following categories:

       Planning and Coordination

       Need for baseline information on capability to respond at

     all levels.--Emergency planners at all levels lack adequate

     information on how local, State, and Federal responders are

     organized, equipped, and trained to respond to a terrorist

     incident. There is a need for a carefully structured national

     inventory of local, State, and Federal capability to respond

     to NBC WMD terrorist incidents.

       Need for better Federal interface with State and local

     authorities in planning for and developing a mutually

     supportive NBC WMD response capability.--A comprehensive

     system is required to provide effective coordination across

     political jurisdictions for organizing, training, exercising,

     and responding to a credible NBC WMD terrorist threat or

     actual terrorist incident, including a strategy for

     developing and sustaining fully interoperable capability,

     coordinating training, exercises and evaluation procedures,

     and supporting mutual operations needs.

       Need for a tailored and timely Federal response to support

     or augment local and State first responders.--Emergency

     response actions taken during the initial minutes and hours

     after an NBC WMD terrorist incident are critical. The

     capability of local and State first responders, augmented by

     the use of supplemental Federal resources, needs to be

     effectively understood and coordinated.



[[Page H655]]



     Initial response options may be severely limited until

     reliable assessments are made of the NBC WMD consequences at

     the incident site; therefore, the enhancement of rapid

     assessment capabilities, including specialized information

     sharing systems for rapid identification of NBC WMD agents,

     needs to be a high priority.

       Need to finalize the FRP Terrorism Incident Annex.--The

     draft FRP Terrorism Incident Annex responds to NSC guidance

     by linking existing Federal authorities, plans, and

     capabilities that would be implemented in response to a

     terrorist incident. The Annex was used to help structure

     preparedness measures for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games and

     other special events.

       Need to prioritize the use of the transportation

     infrastructure to ensure rapid movement of critical, time-

     sensitive response resources.--Disaster response requires

     time-urgent actions by a large number of participants from

     the Federal, State, and local response communities. Unless

     prior planning and prioritization of critical lifesaving

     response resources are in place and appropriate discipline is

     maintained, critical elements of the coordinated Federal

     response in support of State and local authorities will not

     be available when needed. Plans for the response to an NBC

     WMD terrorist incident must include a prioritized listing of

     critical response assets and the assurance of the timely

     transportation, deployment, and support of time-sensitive

     critical resources.

       Need to deal with a large number of victims impacted by an

     NBC WMD terrorist incident.--Planning needs to address the

     management of large number of potentially contaminated

     victims and/or the disposition of human remains resulting

     from an NBC WMD incident. Adequate means must be developed

     for identifying and tracking victims who may suffer immediate

     or longer-term consequences from exposure to NBC WMD

     materials, and who experience psychological trauma from

     actual or perceived injury or contamination. Appropriate

     implementing procedures, including public information and

     other preparedness measures, should be included in all

     training and orientation efforts.

       Need to manage the stringent public safety measures in

     response to an NBC WMD terrorist incident.--Actions required

     to establish and maintain positive control of a potentially

     contaminated area involved in a terrorist incident will

     require aggressive and, at times, forceful action which is in

     sharp contrast to conventional disaster response operations.

     Immediate, assertive, and time-sensitive public safety

     actions might not be fully understood or accepted by local

     officials and the public. Therefore, public safety

     requirements need to be fully addressed in emergency and

     disaster planning in order to deal with the unique and

     demanding requirements of response to an NBC WMD terrorist

     incident in coordination with State and local authorities.

       Need for fully coordinated, timely, and accurate emergency

     public information.--With different emergency organizations

     responding, assessing, and reporting through a variety of

     Federal plans and programs (with many having no prior

     experience operating together in an NBC WMD environment),

     critical information may not be fully coordinated.

     Technically accurate, complete, and time-sensitive

     information will be urgently required by the OSCs, national

     authorities, and the public. Procedures should be established

     that mandate the establishment and coordinated use of a

     single Joint Information Center (JIC) that serves the

     combined response community. Sources of technically accurate

     information need to be identified, and where appropriate,

     comprehensive and time-sensitive information on NBC WMD

     protective measures should be developed and prepositioned to

     ensure immediate availability. Procedures need to ensure that

     the JIC is responsive to the particular threat and changing

     requirements of each phase of the disaster response.

       Need for an electronic information management and

     communications capability to facilitate response

     coordination.--There is no dedicated system for the

     electronic transfer of information among headquarters

     elements and other emergency operations centers at the

     national level. This lack of capability extends to State and

     local entities. Also, there is no national system of priority

     cellular access by emergency response personnel that ensures

     cellular access and allows coordination of critical assets

     within the disaster area. There is a need to continue

     development of an interagency electronic transfer mechanism

     that provides a dedicated forum for the electronic exchange

     of critical emergency response information among Federal

     departments and agencies.

       Equipment and Training

       Need for specialized equipment and coordinated training for

     response to an NBC WMD terrorist incident.--Local, State, and

     Federal organizations and personnel, and private industry

     supporting critical infrastructures need to be adequately

     equipped and trained to respond to an NBC WMD terrorist

     incident. there is a lack of specialized equipment and

     training, as well as standardization and interoperability

     necessary to fully respond in a safe, timely, and effective

     manner. A national program is needed to provide standards and

     resources for the organizing, equipping, and training of

     emergency personnel responding to NBC WMD acts of terrorism.

     This approach should build upon existing national programs

     and capabilities wherever possible and also identify

     opportunities for mutual support and cost savings in the

     procurement of equipment, delivery of specialized training,

     conduct of exercises, and operational evaluations.

       Need to adequately protect all responders.--Safety

     considerations for first responders and augmentees from all

     sources in the initial phases of consequence management need

     to be a major factor in planning and preparedness.

       Stockpiles

       Need for adequate medical supplies and pharmaceuticals to

     be available or stockpiled to respond to an NBC WMD terrorist

     incident in a timely manner.--HHS has noted that adequate

     medical supplies and pharmaceuticals are not prepositioned

     and readily available for timely use in response to NBC WMD

     incidents. Mitigating and antidote medications need to be

     stockpiled at multiple locations throughout the United

     States. These stockpiled medications should include specialty

     medicines, antidotes, diagnostic devices, and general

     medications for anticipated conditions resulting from a

     terrorist incident. The Department of Veterans Affairs

     hospital centers will serve as feasible stockpile locations

     in view of the multiple sites in the United States and

     distribution channels already in place. Discussion should

     also be initiated with specialty medicinal manufacturers

     regarding internal stockpiles of medications for immediate

     distribution to an incident site.

     Assessment Summary

       An NBC WMD terrorist incident may occur as a local event

     with potentially profound national implications. In

     responding to an NBC WMD incident, first responders must be

     able to provide critical resources within minutes to mitigate

     the effects of NBC materials. As the capability of the local

     government to deal with the immediate effects of an incident

     is essential to the success of any NBC WMD response,

     enhancing or building and maintaining the local capability

     with trained and adequately equipped responders are key

     components of a viable national terrorist response

     capability.

       While the assessment of the FRP and Federal capabilities

     found some deficiencies in overall capability, it also

     identified several current capabilities being built upon or

     expanded to ensure a more viable national NBC WMD responder

     capability. Current initiatives for supplementing existing

     plans, enhancing operations response capabilities, and

     increasing the availability of training are described in the

     Requirements for Improvements in Capabilities section of this

     report.



     assessment of federal capabilities to support state and local

                    prevention and response efforts



     Crisis Management/Support Activities

       Many law enforcement, public safety, and emergency response

     agencies in the United States are well trained and equipped

     to handle the events surrounding many natural and

     technological emergency situations, such as improvised

     explosive devices (IEDs) or HAZMAT spills, without the

     involvement of the Federal Government. However, it is

     anticipated that the threatened or actual use of WMD will

     rapidly overwhelm local and State capabilities and require

     Federal assistance. In addition to advanced technological

     assistance available from Federal departments and agencies

     for the disablement, transport, disposal, and decontamination

     of such weapons and their effects, the primary jurisdiction

     for the resolution of a terrorist or criminal incident

     involving WMD also rests with the Federal Government;

     therefore, a Federal response deployment will be needed to

     augment the initial local response.

       As the actions taken and notifications made within the

     first minutes of a response are critical to the ultimate

     resolution of the incident, first responders to a WMD

     incident need specialized training and equipment to ensure

     that their activities in response to the discovery or use of

     WMD are done in a manner that facilitates transition to

     Federal response operations. The FBI engages in a number of

     activities with State and local agencies to prevent and

     respond to acts of WMD terrorism, including planning,

     training, exercises, task forces, and intelligence sharing.

       Planning

       The FBI has been involved throughout the United States in

     developing plans to respond at a local level to a WMD event.

     Numerous FBI field offices have worked with State and local

     law enforcement and other emergency response agencies in

     planning the response to an event that incorporates the wide

     variety of resources that would be brought to bear on such an

     event. These plans are updated through continuous

     coordination and tested through various exercises.

       Police, fire, and emergency medical personnel need to

     better understand the FBI's role in coordinating the response

     to a WMD threat or incident. To that end, the FBI is in the

     process of coordinating and disseminating national and local-

     level plans for a WMD event relevant to the activities of

     First responders. This effort is further described in the

     section on Requirements for Improvements in Capabilities. As

     discussed below, the FBI also has dedicated significant

     resources for planning the design and content of a first

     responder training initiative.

       Training and Exercises

       This past year, the FBI tasked all 56 of its field offices

     to conduct C/B WMD terrorism exercises in each of their

     regions in accordance with guidelines set forth in the FBI's



[[Page H656]]



     C/B Incident Contingency Plan. This includes coordination and

     participation by other public safety agencies that would be

     involved in a C/B WMD incident, including first responders,

     regional offices of supporting Federal agencies, and State

     emergency management agencies involved in consequence

     management. Each of the 56 field offices has taken action in

     response to this tasking, and all are in the process of

     planning and conducting C/B WMD exercises.

       The FBI is actively engaged with FEMA and other Federal

     agencies in developing WMD training for State and local

     emergency First responders. In training First responders

     throughout the country, this program will incorporate

     material from all aspects of the response to WMD terrorism,

     including both local crisis and consequence management

     activities. The approach to training and equipping Federal,

     State, and local officials for managing a crisis involving a

     use or threatened use of a WMD, including the consequences of

     the use of such a weapon, necessarily requires an

     understanding of the training mechanisms and delivery systems

     already in place that address target audiences on related

     matters and, which, with some adaptation, could accommodate

     the WMD subject matter. Thereafter, an assessment of the

     audiences and curricula that remain unaddressed can then be

     made. Many excellent training courses are currently available

     across the nation from Federal agencies including FEMA, DOD,

     DOE, EPA, and various State agencies. The FBI is working to

     incorporate law enforcement concerns into such training,

     including evidence protection and preservation.

       Another successful training initiative has been the DOE

     Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), which supports the FBI

     as lead Federal agency in various threats involving nuclear

     material. Through an ongoing cooperative FBI/DOE program,

     nuclear-related briefings are provided by NEST personnel at

     FBI field offices throughout the country. As part of this

     program, the field offices invite State and local law

     enforcement agencies, as well as first responders, to these

     briefings. Through these briefings, participants are made

     aware of the resources available and are provided with an

     overview of how the Federal Government investigates, manages,

     and responds to nuclear-related events. To date, 40 FBI field

     offices, including the largest metropolitan divisions, have

     received NEST briefings, and additional field offices are

     being briefed each month.

       In preparation for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, the FBI

     conducted a series of NBC-related counterterrorism exercises,

     including tabletop, command post, and full-field exercises.

     These exercises included participation by FEMA, EPA, HHS-PHS,

     DOD, and DOE; Georgia and Alabama State public safety and

     emergency management agencies; as well as city and county

     public safety and emergency management agencies. In addition,

     the FBI actively participated in several exercises hosted by

     other Federal agencies in preparation for the Olympics that

     focused on possible terrorist incidents, including WMD

     scenarios.

       The FBI actively runs the Awareness of National Security

     Issues and Response (ANSIR) program. The ANSIR program

     disseminates information to industry and the public in

     general concerning national security matters, particularly

     key issues dealing with terrorism, espionage, proliferation,

     economic espionage, targeting of the national information

     infrastructure, targeting of the U.S. Government, perception

     management, and foreign intelligence activities.

       Task Force/Intelligence Sharing

       The most effective response to any potential or actual WMD

     incident is a well-integrated effort across local, State, and

     Federal agencies. The FBI has been involved in a number of

     actions related to recent events within the United States.

     For example:

       Federal and local components of the FBI participated in the

     1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta, GA, including pre-event

     WMD training scenarios previously discussed, various

     interagency task forces involved with event management and

     intelligence activities, and other activities in support of

     the event.

       Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) components deployed

     in support of the 1996 Democratic National Convention in

     Chicago, IL. This deployment was the first of its kind under

     the DEST concept.

       The FBI is participating in the development of the

     Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams (MMSTs), organized by HHS

     to respond to incident health and medical services

     requirements.

       The FBI manages 12 standing law enforcement task forces

     throughout the country. These task forces include both local

     entities such as sheriffs and State police, as well as local

     representatives of Federal agencies such as the Immigration

     and Naturalization Service (INS), Secret Service, and the

     U.S. Marshals Service. These task forces are prevention-

     oriented groups that allow the exchange and coordination of

     intelligence and activities across the law enforcement

     community.

     Consequence Management/Support Activities

       Any assessment of Federal capabilities to support State and

     local response efforts must address the abilities of State

     and local governments to respond to an incident and their

     expectations related to Federal response and support.

     Obviously there is great variation in response capabilities

     between jurisdictions at both the State and local levels of

     government. Local and State capabilities to respond to the

     consequences of such an event also vary with the particular

     agent used and whether it involves NBC material. For example,

     States and communities in proximity to nuclear power

     plants have better developed capabilities for responding

     to nuclear incidents than those that are not. Similarly,

     States and communities in proximity to chemical weapon

     disposal sites will have expanded capabilities for

     responding to a terrorist event involving a chemical

     weapon. Finally, States and communities that have hosted

     special events that might pose a target for terrorism,

     such as the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, national political

     conventions, or high-visibility national conferences and

     gatherings, are likely to have more complete terrorism

     response plans than those that have not planned for such

     events.

       FEMA has been working closely with State and local

     governments to determine the extent to which their response

     capabilities are adequate to meet the challenges of

     responding to a WMD incident. Results from a National

     Governors Association (NGA) survey, a training focus group

     involving metropolitan area jurisdictions, and discussions

     with fire and emergency management constituencies provide

     good feedback on general State and local capabilities and

     support requirements. The scenarios describing WMD terrorist

     events involving NBC agents used in the Federal assessment

     also were used to help State and local responders focus on

     the capabilities that would be required and to assess the

     adequacy of their current consequence management

     capabilities. While the formats used for assessing the

     capabilities differed, the findings from the local and State

     efforts were surprisingly similar to the Federal findings.

       The following summarizes the findings regarding

     capabilities and deficiencies obtained from the NGA State

     survey and the metropolitan area training focus group under

     the categories of planning and guidance, response resources,

     and training and exercises. Included is an assessment of

     Federal support capabilities required in each area.

       Planning and Guidance

       The majority of the 22 States responding to the NGA survey

     and all 4 of the cities participating in the terrorism focus

     group indicated that their plans address or include response

     to a terrorist incident; however, the responses also

     indicated that current planning is not adequate. Many

     participants in the metropolitan area focus group had limited

     understanding of the provisions of the Stafford Act (which

     authorizes and funds support for Federally declared

     disasters) and the assistance available under the Federal

     Response Plan. The metropolitan areas in general did not have

     a good understanding of the resources and support which the

     Federal Government could provide and how they would go about

     accessing those resources. The need to continue to stress the

     importance of communication and coordination between those

     responsible for crisis management and consequence management

     at all levels of government was noted by both State and local

     officials.

       Other planning-related requirements included a need for a

     more thorough assessment and inventory of local response

     capabilities and expertise, expanded public awareness of the

     terrorism threat, additional planning for medical treatment

     and decontamination procedures (including management of mass

     fatalities), and legal guidance on the liabilities and

     authorities for governmental jurisdictions associated with

     response to NBC incidents. Many of these planning-related

     requirements parallel deficiencies noted in the State survey

     and the previously noted Federal assessment.

       Significant progress has been made in defining the

     responsibilities of various Federal agencies in a terrorist

     event through planning initiatives, exercises, and

     Administration guidance. While Federal agencies are assisting

     their various counterparts at the State and local levels in

     terrorism planning to the extent that their resources allow,

     continuing integration of Federal planning with State and

     local planning is needed to ensure interoperability between

     plans at the various levels of government.

       Response Resources

       Resource requirements identified by both State and local

     governments include detection equipment, personal protective

     equipment (PPE), decontamination equipment and techniques,

     medical supplies, and access to technical information and

     additional trained response personnel. Most Sates and

     communities have some resources and capabilities in each of

     the above areas, but given the possible magnitude of the

     incident and the involvement of unfamiliar and potentially

     lethal agents, most local responders felt that their existing

     capabilities were either inadequate (for certain C/B agents)

     or would be rapidly overwhelmed.

       While the Federal Government, especially DOD, DOE, HHS, and

     EPA, has relevant expertise and possesses some specialized

     equipment and supplies, the adequacy of the necessary

     equipment, supplies, and personnel to meet potential

     requirements and the Federal ability to get them to the

     incident site vary with both the particular resource required

     and the geographic location of the incident. Delays

     associated with getting the required equipment and technical

     expertise to the site where they are needed will likely

     result in increased fatalities; however, costs associated

     with providing appropriate equipment



[[Page H657]]



     and supplies to all localities nationwide are extremely high.

       Training and Exercises

       Most States and major metropolitan areas have personnel

     trained in emergency response and disaster management with

     training delivery systems. In terms of nuclear and chemical

     WMD, many of the principles of HAZMAT and radiological

     incident response (e.g., scene management, decontamination,

     etc.) will apply with some modifications or enhancements.

     Training developed by FEMA and the DOD Chemical Stockpile

     Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) has direct

     applicability to terrorist events using chemical agents;

     however, relatively little training exists on management of

     incidents involving a biological agent. This is an area of

     concern for both State and local responders.

       Most requirements noted by both the States surveyed and the

     metropolitan focus groups addressed the unique

     characteristics of C/B WMD agents and the associated

     protective measures for response personnel, incident

     management skills to deal with potentially large numbers of

     casualties, and the political and public affairs challenges

     associated with a terrorist incident. Specifically, they

     noted a need for (1) additional training for first responders

     on response actions for incidents (where the hazard is known

     versus unknown) and use of the appropriate PPE for the

     various agents; (2) training on how to use the media

     effectively, coordinate media messages, and minimize public

     panic; (3) training on how to plan for and manage victim and

     family assistance in a mass casualty event; (4) training and

     assistance on medical management issues including triage and

     decontamination procedures, using available medical

     resources, and how to deal with immediate and long-term

     treatment issues; and (5) multi-agency and multi-

     jurisdictional training and exercising to clarify roles and

     responsibilities and improve interoperability of plans and

     procedures.

       With the possible exception of biological terrorism, there

     is considerable technical expertise and many existing

     training materials within the Federal community to address

     most of the requirements cited above; however, the size and

     diversity of the target audience compared with the resources

     available to deliver the training and to exercise plans

     limits the Federal Government's capability to provide the

     required support immediately, thus making this a multi-year

     effort.



             REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN CAPABILITIES



       Assessments of Federal, State, and local capabilities to

     respond to WMD terrorist incidents have identified several

     areas where improvements are required. FY 1997 funds have

     been allocated to several agencies for WMD-related

     activities. The FBI has received $133.9 million for

     Counterterrorism (CT) enhancements. These funds include

     increased staffing to conduct CT field investigations

     regarding WMD threats, infrastructure vulnerability, key

     assets, and international terrorism; resources for improving

     forensic and crisis management capabilities including

     specialized equipment, deployable laboratories and teams,

     training, and forensic database development; and other

     staffing and resources for improving WMD prevention and

     response.

       Some $15 million has been allocated to FEMA for consequence

     management planning and coordination, assessment and

     training, personnel and protective measures, and grants for

     specialized training and equipment for firefighters. Besides

     the above, additional funds have been allocated to DOD, HHS,

     DOT, and other Federal agencies for terrorism-related

     activities.

       Several activities and initiatives are already under way to

     address requirements to improve capabilities for responding

     to the threat or occurrence of a WMD incident, focusing on

     training, equipment and capability enhancements, planning,

     exercises, new initiatives, and research and development to

     improve the overall local, State, and Federal response

     capability. All of these activities are being closely

     coordinated with those of local and State governments to

     ensure optimal sharing of knowledge and expertise in WMD,

     while deriving maximum benefit from available resources.

     Training

       This area involves training for individuals involved in all

     areas of WMD prevention and response. It includes developing

     and implementing an interagency strategy for meeting priority

     training requirements efficiently. Several facets of current

     training activities are described below.

       The FBI is pursuing significant efforts to prevent a WMD

     incident from occurring through continued proactive and

     interactive training, planning, exercising, intelligence

     gathering, and technology applications involving crisis

     management and consequence management agencies.

       The FBI continues with WMD-related interagency training

     involving nuclear and C/B incident contingency planning for

     FBI Headquarters personnel and field office managers. The FBI

     continues to coordinate with DOD and other government

     agencies to determine the best equipment, protective gear,

     and training available. Ongoing training related to

     successfully operating in a hostile WMD environment will be

     required for the FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and other FBI

     tactical personnel. Equipping and training of selected FBI

     field office Evidence Response Teams (ERTs) to augment the

     Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) in the forensic

     exploitation of potentially contaminated crime scenes will

     also be an ongoing activity.

       DOD, in coordination with DOE, FEMA, and other Federal

     agencies, including the FBI, is providing WMD training to

     State and local first responders, including local and State

     police, and fire and emergency medical personnel who would

     most likely represent the initial response at the site of a

     WMD incident.

       Since first responders will be required to establish

     preliminary perimeters, provide triage to victims, and

     conduct initial interviews, among other actions, their value

     to the ultimate success of the Federal Government in managing

     a WMD incident cannot be overestimated. Presently, most first

     responders have little, if any, specialized training in the

     WMD area, and as such, would become casualties at the

     incident scene.

       FEMA, DOE, DOD, HHS, EPA, and the FBI support training to

     develop a strong State and local first responder

     infrastructure. Some generic training is already being recast

     to address WMD requirements. For instance, FEMA and DOD

     currently have in place a training program for first

     responders in areas near chemical weapon storage sites under

     the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

     (CSEPP). A training program based on CSEPP and tailored for

     police/fire/rescue personnel in all jurisdictions is in the

     initial stages of coordination with FEMA, FBI, and DOD. FEMA

     is also building on its training for first responders

     conducted through its National Fire Academy and Emergency

     Management Institute. In addition, other agencies, such as

     DOE, DOT, and EPA provide training through their normal

     programs that are applicable to terrorism response.

       Funding targeted for training in WMD response is being

     provided through several different sources, as listed below

     by amount and agency:

       $51 million from DOD to the Nunn-Lugar;

       $5.3 million from FEMA in training grants, including

     firefighter training and equipment, to the States; and

       $5 million from the Department of Justice (DOJ) for

     responder training and equipment.

       Federal resources must be used effectively in meeting

     priority training needs of responders to the consequences of

     a WMD incident.

       Federal resources will not meet all of the anticipated

     requests for dealing with the terrorist threat, especially in

     the area of training. To ensure a coordinated training

     approach, FEMA convened a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) on

     consequence management to provide policy-level guidance in

     the development of a Governmentwide terrorism training

     strategy, as well as to address other issues related to

     consequence management. In support of the SIG, an interagency

     Training Task Group (TTG) was established to identify

     training audiences and performance requirements, suggest

     training design (including delivery methodology), define the

     relationship to existing and ongoing training and

     capabilities, and set training priorities and plans for

     short-term and long-term activities. The SICG will continue

     to monitor results from the TTG and other task groups and

     provide additional guidance for implementation of an

     interagency training strategy, which includes the following

     elements:

       Prioritize training under Nunn-Lugar.--In response to DOD's

     request for guidance from FEMA and the interagency community

     on the most appropriate way to allocate training resources to

     meet training requirements specified in Nunn-Lugar, Section

     1412, Emergency Response Assistance Program, the interagency

     strategy calls for allocation of Nunn-Lugar resources

     (including those provided to HHS for the development of the

     MMSTs in FY 1997) to target these resources to the 20 largest

     cities, plus any cities identified by the FBI as being at

     particularly high risk. Participating cities will be asked to

     complete an initial training needs assessment and Federal

     resources and expertise will be applied to meeting those

     needs, using existing training resources to the extent

     possible. This focus of Nunn-Lugar resources on the 20

     largest cities will in no way preclude other target audiences

     (States, communities, etc.) from eligibility for other

     training available from FEMA and other Federal agencies or

     for training resources that may become available in the

     future.

       Continue to analyze training needs on the basis of

     performance requirements.--Using the training requirements

     identified during the FY 1996 assessment initiatives as a

     base, a list of performance goals for communities in

     preparing to respond to WMD incidents will be developed to

     serve as a basis for a community's own needs assessment

     efforts; however, needs assessment must be an ongoing

     process, since training needs will evolve over time as new

     equipment is fielded and experience gained.

       Compile a compendium of existing training.--As noted

     earlier, many courses and training materials already exist

     that, with minor modifications, can begin to meet immediate

     training requirements. FEMA will serve as the repository for

     information on existing training courses and materials.

       Share courses and delivery systems among agencies.--The

     previously noted compendium of training resources maintained

     by FEMA will facilitate sharing of courses and expertise

     among agencies, thus reducing duplication of efforts.

       Deliver existing or modified training in non-traditional

     ways.--Alternative delivery



[[Page H658]]



     strategies will be needed to reach more people than are

     currently reached with classroom, instructor-based training.

     Use of independent study, computer-based training, satellite

     broadcasts, etc., will be considered in the overall delivery

     strategy.

       Develop new training for unmet needs.--It is anticipated

     that FY 1997 will be used for assessment and delivery of

     existing training and that development of new training will

     begin in earnest during FY 1998.

       Enhance interface with States and cities.--To increase the

     success of the Federal interagency effort, full partnering

     with the States and communities and constituencies will help

     ensure that limited resources are applied most effectively.

     Equipment and Capability Enhancements

       This area involves identifying equipment and capabilities

     needed for a WMD response. It includes stockpiling

     specialized equipment, enhancing the medical response system

     to include developing specialized teams and managing mass

     casualties for a WMD incident, developing a master inventory

     list of equipment and assets that can be accessed by local

     and State responders, and undertaking other initiatives to

     improve operational procedures, including rapid deployment of

     resources to the incident site and improving communications

     access.

       The FBI is addressing the need for additional equipment for

     specialized teams operating in a WMD environment.--While the

     FBI relies on the support of other Federal agencies

     possessing specific technical expertise and equipment to

     respond to an NBC incident, those agencies do not have the

     law enforcement authority or expertise to collect and

     preserve evidence at a crime scene, nor to testify in court

     proceedings. In addition to the critical issue of evidence

     collection, the FBI may be faced with an incident that

     requires a tactical response in an environment contaminated

     with NBC material. The FBI currently possesses a limited

     capability to operate in such an environment; recent

     acquisition of funds will allow the for the purchase of

     HAZMAT protective suits and equipment for HRT and all field

     Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams. This acquisition

     followed by training will allow the FBI to enhance its

     capabilities to operate in a WMD environment.

       HHS is enhancing the capabilities of the medical response

     system to address WMD requirements.--The requirement for

     immediate and significant medical response to save and

     protect lives in incidents involving C/B WMD agents has led

     to several HHS initiatives to enhance the capabilities of the

     existing medical response system. The enhanced system would

     include trained and equipped local first responders, MMSTs,

     specialized medical teams for use in areas without MMSTs,

     Chemical/Biological Rapid Deployment Teams (CBRDTs), enhanced

     Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), patient evacuation

     and definitive care capabilities of the National Disaster

     Medical System (NDMS), pharmaceutical caches, and a

     nationwide network of facilities with specially trained staff

     equipped to treat WMD victims. Some of these activities are

     described below:

       HHS continues work on developing MMSTs composed of

     technical and medical resources for responding to C/B

     incidents. The MMSTs provide a mechanism for immediate

     medical response while additional Federal resources are being

     mobilized and deployed. Each MMST operates as a specially

     organized, trained, and equipped team and includes

     capabilities for agent detection and identification, patient

     decontamination, triage and medical treatment, patient

     transportation to hospitals, and coordination with local law

     enforcement activities. After testing the concept in the

     Washington, DC, metropolitan area and at the 1996 Summer

     Olympic Games, the Washington, DC, MMST established its

     initial operational capability in January 1997, and was

     available to support the 1997 Presidential Inauguration. The

     goal is to establish a total of 100 MMSTs in the next 5

     years.

       HHS is developing three specialized national response

     teams, dispersed geographically throughout the nation, to

     augment local capabilities in areas without MMSTs.

       The CBRDT is another capability developed by HHS providing

     a highly specialized, Federal, multi-agency C/B terrorist

     incident response, medical and health care, and technical

     assistance that supports the OSC for both crisis management

     and consequence management response.

       HHS is enhancing 21 of the highest readiness level NDMS

     DMATs with specialized equipment and training to provide

     further response augmentation.

       In concert with activities to enhance the medical response

     system, HHS is addressing the need to develop local response

     systems for the care of WMD victims. HHS is developing

     procedures for the handling of mass casualties that may

     result from an WMD incident to ensure that Federal resources

     will be available to augment local and State resources for

     dealing with a health problem of a large scale; however, a

     timely Federal response can only argument existing local

     capability and may not meet the needs of all of these

     victims.

       Federal logistics support capabilities are being enhanced

     for WMD response.--FEMA is working with DOD, DOT and the

     General Services Administration (GSA) to enhance basic

     logistics support capabilities by developing a disaster

     transportation management system. The system will include a

     Time-Phased Force Deployment Data and List (TPFDDL) to pre-

     identify logistics requirements for specialized teams,

     equipment, and supplies needed to respond to an NBC incident

     and to then optimize their movement to an incident site on a

     priority basis. A Movement Coordination Center (MCC) is also

     being developed to coordinate the transportation and movement

     activities of the critical resources to the affected area.

       FEMA is developing and implementing a Rapid Response

     Information System.--FEMA is developing guidance and format

     with data requirements for each FRP department and agency to

     use in compiling an inventory of its equipment and assets

     that could be made available to aid State and local officials

     in responding to a WMD incident. FEMA is working to ensure

     that FRP departments and agencies develop, maintain, and

     provide to FEMA their inventory lists for inclusion in a

     comprehensive Master Inventory, to be initially published by

     December 31, 1997, with annual updates. FEMA also will

     develop guidance on accessing and using the physical

     equipment and assets on the Master Inventory List, including

     a system to give Federal, State, and local officials

     controlled access. In coordination with DOD, FEMA will also

     prepare a database on C/B agents and munitions

     characteristics and safety precautions for civilian use.

     The initial design and compilation of this database is to

     be completed not later than December 31, 1997.

     Planning

       This area involves enhancing Federal contingency plans as

     well as national and regional response plans to better

     address the WMD threat. It also includes the development of

     guidance for local and State responders.

       Each FBI office is developing contingency plans for

     response to WMD incidents.--Each FBI field office has been

     requested to furnish an updated plan yearly with points of

     contact and area facilities that could pose a threat of a WMD

     incident, or could supply the agents needed for a WMD

     incident and resources that can be utilized to respond to the

     incident. Additionally all field offices have been tasked to

     maintain contingency plans that identify points of contact

     with regional emergency response agencies and to engage with

     local authorities in planned WMD exercises, review nuclear

     facility response plans, and proceed with other proactive

     initiatives to counter the threat of a WMD incident.

       All FBI field offices with DOE or NRC facilities within

     their territory maintain site-specific nuclear contingency

     plans that are updated annually. These plans ensure that the

     FBI possesses all necessary information regarding each DOE or

     NRC site to enable an effective FBI response to an incident

     at any of these sites. Classified and unclassified Nuclear

     and C/B Incident Contingency Plans have been updated,

     revised, and disseminated to all FBI Offices and OSCs. This

     year, all FBI field offices were tasked to provide

     unclassified versions of these plans to management levels of

     first responders, i.e., police, fire, and emergency medical

     personnel, to ensure their understanding and coordination

     during a unified Federal response.

       Federal emergency response plans are being refined to

     address WMD consequences.--The PDD-39 assessment validated

     the need to amend the FRP with incident-specific annexes to

     better address the unique aspects of the response to a

     terrorist event. The FRP Terrorism Incident Annex describes

     the concept of operations for a terrorism response involving

     the crisis management response, led by the FBI, and the

     consequence management response, led by FEMA. The Federal

     interagency community has concurred on the annex and it is

     scheduled for publication in early 1997.

       FEMA is also developing planning guidance on terrorism

     response for use by FEMA Regional Offices to incorporate into

     their interagency Regional Response Plans that describe how

     the FRP is implemented at the regional level.

       A draft FRP Radiological Incident Annex has been developed

     that describes the relationship of the FRP to the FRERP,

     which is used to coordinate Federal monitoring, assessment,

     and other technical resources in response to a radiological

     incident, including a WMD involving nuclear materials. The

     draft annex is being validated in several radiological

     incident exercises this year and is expected to be published

     in 1997.

       State and local governments are being supported in

     improving plans for responding to the consequences of a WMD

     incident.--States and localities face new planning challenges

     in preparing for response to a terrorist event using WMD.

     FEMA's experience in Oklahoma City and the feedback from the

     metropolitan area focus groups indicate a need for additional

     guidance by States and local governments for responding to a

     terrorist incident, including notification procedures,

     interface with law enforcement personnel, and access to

     unique Federal capabilities and resources. This is especially

     true for major metropolitan areas, where direct interface

     with Federal response personnel and unique Federal resources

     is more likely in a terrorist event than in a typical natural

     disaster; therefore, a terrorism supplement to the recently

     published Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning

     is a priority for FY 1997. In addition to operational

     planning guidance, there is a need to ensure that Governors

     and other State senior policy officials are familiar with the

     challenges they may face in responding to a terrorist event.

     To



[[Page H659]]



     meet this need, a popular NGA handbook, A Governor's Guide to

     Emergency Management, will be updated to address terrorism-

     specific issues.

     Exercises

       Improved plans and access to technical information,

     equipment, and supplies will do little to improve terrorism

     response capabilities without trained personnel who have had

     the opportunity to test plans and procedures and assume their

     roles and responsibilities in exercises. Therefore, while one

     goal for FY 1997 addresses the development of an interagency

     strategy for the delivery of training to State and local

     responders, a related goal focuses on a coordinated approach

     to exercising plans and procedures.

       Agencies must test and evaluate plans, procedures, and

     coordination mechanisms for responding to a WMD incident.--

     Interagency WMD terrorism exercises are expensive and require

     extensive planning to ensure that all participating agencies

     most effectively test and evaluate their plans, procedures,

     and coordination mechanisms for responding to a WMD incident

     as part of the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST).

     Interagency participation in these exercises is vital to

     familiarize all members of the crisis management community

     with the command structures and functions of the various

     components.

       Despite the high costs, continuous efforts must be made to

     exercise for possible WMD contingencies. The FBI is co-chair

     and an active member of an interagency planning group for

     exercises, which includes all Federal agencies with a role in

     response to terrorism as members. WMD scenarios have been the

     focus of most of the recent exercises and continue to be

     highlighted in future exercise planning. The FBI Crisis

     Incident Response Group (CIRG) plays a critical and essential

     role in all exercise planning deployments and response to

     credible incidents.

       The FBI exercises with other Federal agencies extensively

     and anticipates participating in up to eight federally

     coordinated exercises and numerous State/local exercises

     annually. A full-field exercise should be scheduled and

     completed within the next two fiscal years.

       Exercises will be used to test and improve consequence

     management response capabilities.--This effort addresses the

     need for improved understanding of and interoperability

     between response plans at various levels of government and

     responds to the previously noted requirement for multi-agency

     and multi-jurisdictional training and exercising to clarify

     roles and responsibilities and improve interoperability of

     plans and procedures. FEMA's interagency National Exercise

     Schedule provides a mechanism for documenting and

     disseminating information on planned unclassified terrorism

     WMD exercises involving multiple agencies and/or levels of

     government.

       Recognizing that terrorism consequence management plans and

     procedures are either under development or just being

     finalized, the FY 1997 Federal emphasis will be on tabletop

     exercises in each FEMA Region to familiarize regional and

     State responders with the new FRP Terrorism Incident Annex

     and associated roles and responsibilities. This will

     culminate in a functional consequence management exercise,

     ILL WIND, which is scheduled for late FY 1997 in the

     Washington, DC, area. In addition, FEMA and some States and

     localities will be involved in exercises sponsored by other

     agencies that will likely address both crisis and consequence

     management issues.

       DOD recommends a multi-agency series of field exercises

     covering a wide range of C/B scenarios in order to build a

     solid understanding of potential C/B terrorism, and to

     systematically evaluate improved countermeasures to prevent

     and respond to such incidents.

       Finally, the SIG has expressed interest in reviewing a

     coordinated terrorism exercise strategy similar to that

     developed for training. In interfacing with State and local

     governments, given the very limited resources available,

     Federal coordination on planned exercises and priorities for

     addressing deficiencies is essential. This Federal

     coordination will occur in the Interagency Working Group-

     Counterterrorism (IWG-CT) Exercise Subcommittee.

     New Initiatives

       Stemming from the FY 1995 National Defense Authorization

     Act is a joint FBI and DOD initiative, in coordination with

     the State Department, DOE, the U.S. Customs Service, the

     Department of Commerce (DOC), and the Intelligence Community

     (IC) to provide law enforcement officials, judges, and

     prosecutors from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern

     Europe with training in countering nuclear/radiological

     smuggling/trafficking and C/B proliferation.

       This 3-year initiative, which includes the training of

     officials from 3 to 12 FSU/Southern Tier countries at the

     International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest,

     Hungary, or at the DOD facilities in Garmisch, Germany, is

     now under way. The initiative will also provide WMD detection

     equipment and training to law enforcement officials in their

     respective countries and undertake a review of each country's

     laws to recommend statutory changes to complement enforcement

     and training, as warranted.

       The FBI Laboratory Division has developed the Hazardous

     Materials Response Unit (HMRU) to resolve scientific and

     technical aspects of illegal acts involving NBC and

     environmental incidents. The Laboratory Division has also

     coordinated with DOD and the Commonwealth of Virginia for

     training of FBI first responders and the Evidence Response

     Teams (ERTs) on how to function in tandem with the military

     in the hostile environment of a WMD incident. In this manner,

     a sworn FBI evidence expert will direct the collection and

     preservation of evidence, while at the same time, rely on

     military advice and assets in order to mitigate a C/B agent

     and for transport of C/B agents for examination purposes. To

     date, more than 50 ERT members from 6 major metropolitan

     field offices have been trained and equipped with HAZMAT

     protective suits.

     Research and Development

       The FBI is currently pursuing a number of research and

     development (R&D) efforts to enhance detection capabilities,

     disablement tools, advanced render-safe techniques, and new

     forensic tools for identifying terrorist bombings. R&D

     projects include development of explosive detectors, research

     on explosives residues, and development of a portable device

     for the analysis of explosives, drugs, and chemical warfare

     agents using Raman Spectroscopy. Other R&D projects aimed at

     providing first responders with the technical capabilities to

     safely and effectively contain a WMD incident include

     development of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)

     countermeasures for large vehicle bombs, development of an

     affordable miniaturized robotics vehicle capable of

     delivering explosive disablement tools, identification of

     render-safe procedures for improvised C/B devices, enhanced

     explosive detection capabilities for civilian bomb

     technicians, and the development of methods to identify

     forensically and capture residues left by improvised

     explosive charges used by terrorists.

       A number of agencies throughout the counterterrorism

     community participate in the Technical Support Working Group

     (TSWG), a subgroup of the NSC Interagency Working Group on

     Counterterrorism. The TSWG has the specific mission of

     conducting rapid research, development, and prototyping of

     counterterrorism technologies. Several different subgroups

     exist beneath the TSWG focusing on various aspects of

     counterterrorism. Continued funding of the TSWG and other

     research and development programs is critical to developing

     field-deployable technologies to deter, detect, prevent, and

     resolve potential WMD terrorist threats and incidents.



                    MEASURES TO ACHIEVE IMPROVEMENTS



       Building upon current activities, the following describes

     the requirements for continued funding, legislative

     improvements, authorities, and research and development (R&D)

     initiatives to enhance current weapons of mass destruction

     (WMD) prevention and response capabilities.

     Funding

       FY 1997 funding is supporting a variety of activities

     deriving from existing NSC guidance, Nunn-Lugar initiatives,

     and other programs to determine requirements, assess and

     remedy shortfalls, and enhance capabilities for WMD

     prevention and response. To maintain and enhance

     capabilities, continued funding in FY 1998 and beyond is

     required to support training, equipment and capability

     building, planning, and exercises. This requirement for

     continued funding assumes that State and local governments

     are also willing to share some of the costs of the capability

     building.

       In FR 1997, the coordinated interagency training strategy

     proposes to target the largest 20 cities to receive the

     majority of training and assistance provided via Nunn-Lugar,

     with the remaining resources spread among the many other

     jurisdictions and response groups. In FY 1998, additional

     jurisdictions are being added to increase the overall

     preparedness level of local governments to deal with WMD

     requirements. In support of this effort, training materials

     will need to be updated as plans and procedures are refined

     and responder needs are better defined.

       Specialized equipment and protective gear for personnel

     operating in a WMD environment are required by the FBI and

     other agencies. The Rapid Response Information System will

     require annual updating to ensure that the resource and

     capability information being accessed by local and State

     response agencies is accurate and complete.

       Continued interagency planning will be required to ensure

     close coordination among Federal departments and agencies and

     State and local emergency management agencies in dealing with

     WMD requirements.

       Finally, most of the exercises planned for FY 1997 are

     Federal/State tabletop exercises that are relatively

     inexpensive to plan and deliver. In subsequent years,

     functional and full-scale exercises involving all levels of

     government will need to be developed and implemented to

     ensure full capability.

     Legislation

       On April 24, 1996, the President signed into law the

     Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. This

     legislation, which was initially proposed by the President in

     the State of the Union Address in January 1995, represents

     the most significant and comprehensive antiterrorism

     legislative package ever enacted in the United States.

     Legislative proposals that remain relate to items that

     Congress dropped from the 1995 Administration proposal, or

     highly focused issues that have arisen in the course of

     administering existing law. Within this context, it is

     anticipated that DOJ will propose several items of

     legislation designed to enhance the Government's ability to

     combat terrorism.



[[Page H660]]



       The first priority for additional legislation remains

     Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

     The CWC is the best means to ensure the nonproliferation of

     chemical weapons and their eventual destruction by all

     nations. This Convention makes it illegal to develop,

     produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer, use, own, or

     possess any chemical weapon, or to knowingly assist,

     encourage, or induce any person to do so, or attempt or

     conspire to do so. U.S. compliance with the CWC will require

     that changes be made to the existing criminal statutes

     relating to use of chemical weapons, 18 U.S.C. Section 2332c,

     and use of WMD, 18 U.S.C. Section 2332a. These legislative

     amendments have been drafted within DOJ and are currently

     undergoing review. Submission of such a legislative proposal

     would have to be closely coordinated with the

     Administration's efforts to achieve ratification of the CWC.

       Although the CWC was not designed to prevent chemical

     terrorism, certain aspects of the Convention, including its

     implementing legislation and nonproliferation provisions,

     will augment existing law enforcement efforts to fight

     chemical terrorism. Implementing legislation required by the

     CWC will strengthen legal authority to investigate and

     prosecute violations of the treaty and raise the level of

     public alertness to the threat and illegality of chemical

     weapons. For example, the proposed U.S. implementing

     legislation contains the clearest, most comprehensive, and

     internationally recognized definition of a chemical weapon

     available, far more precise than the term ``poison gas''

     contained in Title 18 of the Criminal Code. The definition

     contained in the implementing legislation will enable an

     investigator to request a search warrant on the basis of

     suspicion of illegal chemical weapons activity (such as

     production of a chemical weapon agent), rather than suspicion

     of conspiracy to commit terrorism, as exists under current

     U.S. law. By providing investigators and prosecutors a more

     precise legal basis for pursuing the development, production,

     transfer, or acquisition of chemical weapons, CWC

     implementing legislation improves prospects for detection,

     early intervention, and possibly even prevention of chemical

     terrorism in the United States.

     Research and Development

       New or enhanced technical capabilities needed to counter

     increasingly sophisticated terrorist organizations include

     the ability to intercept advanced telecommunications, with a

     primary focus on wireless and satellite-based systems;

     improved tracking and physical surveillance technologies for

     weapons, explosives, etc.; automatic language translation and

     text/key word recognition; and technology to support

     surreptitious entry.

       Current research and development funding is not adequate.

     Additional funding is needed to continue work on an indepth

     chemical characterization of foreign explosives and for

     continued development of contraband detection technology.

     Additional funding would accelerate development in a number

     of key technologies, particularly communications

     interception, tracking, covert communications, and

     surreptitious access. These technologies are critical to the

     support of counterterrorism investigations, especially WMD-

     related threats.

                                                                    ____



                                ACRONYMS



     AG--Attorney General

     ANSIR--Awareness of National Security Issues and Response

     ATSDR--Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

     C/B--Chemical/Biological

     CBR--Chemical/Biological/Radiological

     CBRDT--Chemical/Biological Rapid Deployment Team

     CDC--Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

     CIRG--Crisis Incident Response Group

     COA--Course of Action

     CRMER--Center for Risk Modeling and Emergency Response

     CSEPP--Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

     CT--Counterterrorism

     CWC--Chemical Weapons Convention

     DEST--Domestic Emergency Support Team

     DMAT--Disaster Medical Assistance Team

     DOC--Department of Commerce

     DOD--Department of Defense

     DOE--Department of Energy

     DOJ--Department of Justice

     DOS--Department of State

     DOT--Department of Transportation

     DTL--DEST Team Leader

     EMS--Emergency Medical Services

     EOD--Explosive Ordnance Disposal

     EPA--Environmental Protection Agency

     ERT--Evidence Response Team

     ESF--Emergency Support Function

     FBI--Federal Bureau of Investigation

     FDA--Food and Drug Administration

     FEMA--Federal Emergency Management Agency

     FOSC--Federal On-Scene Coordinator

     FRERP--Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan

     FRMAC--Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center

     FRP--Federal Response Plan

     FSU--Former Soviet Union

     FY--Fiscal Year

     GSA--General Services Administration

     HAZMAT--Hazardous Materials

     HHS--Department of Health and Human Services

     HMRU--Hazardous Materials Response Unit

     HQ--Headquarters

     HRSA--Health Resources and Services Administration

     HRT--Hostage Rescue Team

     IC--Intelligence Community

     IED--Improvised explosive device

     IICT--Interagency Intelligency Committee on Terrorism

     ILEA--International Law Enforcement Academy

     INS--Immigration and Naturalization Service

     IWG--Interagency Working Group

     IWG-CT--Interagency Working Group-Counterterrorism

     JABC--Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

     JIC--Joint Information Center

     JOC--Joint Operations Center

     MCC--Movement Coordination Center

     MMST--Metropolitan Medical Strike Team

     MSU--Medical Management Support Unit

     MTAG--Missile Trade Analysis Group

     NAREL--National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory

     NBC--Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical

     NCP--National Contingency Plan

     NDMS--National Disaster Medical System

     NEIC--National Enforcement Investigations Center

     NEST--Nuclear Emergency Search Team

     NEVWG--Nuclear Export Violation Working Group

     NGA--National Governors Association

     NIH--National Institutes of Health

     NRAT--Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team

     NRC--Nuclear Regulatory Commission

     NRT--National Response Team

     NSC--National Security Council

     OEP/OPHS--Office of Emergency Preparedness/Office of Public

         Health and Science

     ORIA--Office of Radiation and Indoor Air

     OSC--On-Scene Commander

     PDD--Presidential Decision Directive

     PHS--Public Health Service

     PPE--Personal Protective Equipment

     R&D--Research and Development

     RRT--Regional Response Team

     SAC--Special Agent-in-Charge

     SAMHSA--Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services

         Administration

     SIG--Senior Interagency Groups

     SWAT--Special Weapons and Tactics

     TEU--Technical Escort Unit

     TPFDDL--Time-Phased Force Deployment Data and List

     TSWG--Technical Support Working Group

     TTG--Training Task Group

     U.S.--United States

     USCG--U.S. Coast Guard

     USDA--United States Department of Agriculture

     USG--United States Government

     WMD--Weapons of Mass Destruction



                          ____________________



---------------------------------------------------------------



[End]



14 March 1997



See related documents:



"The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997":



   http://jya.com/ndatoc.htm  (70K toc; 1.5M full act)



"The Antiterrorism Act of 1996":



   http://jya.com/pl104-132.txt  (358K)



Senate "Intelligence Committee Report 1995-96":



   http://jya.com/sr105-1.htm  (135K)



"Intelligence Authorization Act for 1997":



   http://jya.com/pl104-293.txt  (85K)



"Executive Order 13010--Critical Infrastructure Protection":



   http://jya.com/eo13010.txt  (20K)



"Implementation of Section 104 of the Communications Assistance 

for Law Enforcement Act":



   http://jya.com/fbi011497.txt  (71K)



And several presidental orders and congressional reports on 

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:



   http://jya.com/wmd022797.txt  (19K)

   http://jya.com/no111496.txt   (36K)

   http://jya.com/wmd092796.txt  (76K)

   http://jya.com/wmd092995.txt  (25K)

   http://jya.com/wmd060995.txt  (108K)

   http://jya.com/wmd100694.txt  (61K)



5 May 1997



Domestic terrorism measures by DoD and FBI:



   http://jya.com/dod041697.htm

   http://jya.com/fbi041797.htm



Annual State Department reports on Patterns of Global Terrorism:



   http://jya.com/pgt1996.htm (note .htm)

   http://jya.com/pgt1995.txt

   http://jya.com/pgt1994.txt

   http://jya.com/pgt1993.txt



Senate and White House on the Chemical Weapons Convention:



   http://jya.com/s495.htm

   http://jya.com/cwc042597.txt



ATF on explosive materials and bomb threats:



   http://jya.com/atf042597.txt

   http://jya.com/bomb.htm





