14 March 1997
Source: http://library.whitehouse.gov/?request=ExecutiveOrder

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                                  THE WHITE HOUSE

                           Office of the Press Secretary

         ________________________________________________________________
         For Immediate Release                         November 14, 1994

                                  EXECUTIVE ORDER
                                      #12938
                                   - - - - - - -

                    PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

                By the authority vested in me as President by the
         Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
         including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
         (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
         1601 et seq.), the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (22 U.S.C.
         2751 et seq.), Executive Orders Nos. 12851 and 12924, and
         section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

                I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of
         America, find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological,
         and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass destruction") and of
         the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual
         and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy,
         and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national
         emergency to deal with that threat.

                Accordingly, I hereby order:

                Section 1.  International Negotiations.  It is the policy of
         the United States to lead and seek multilaterally coordinated
         efforts with other countries to control the proliferation of
         weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering such
         weapons.  Accordingly, the Secretary of State shall cooperate
         in and lead multilateral efforts to stop the proliferation of
         weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

                Sec. 2.  Imposition of Controls.  As provided herein, the
         Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall use their
         respective authorities, including the Arms Export Control Act and
         the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to controlany
         exports, to the extent they are not already controlled by the
         Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,that
         either Secretary determines would assist a country in acquiring
         the capability to develop, produce, stockpile, deliver, or use
         weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery.  The
         Secretary of State shall pursue early negotiations with foreign
         governments to adopt effective measures comparable to those
         imposed under this order.

                Sec. 3.  Department of Commerce Controls.  (a)  The
         Secretary of Commerce shall prohibit the export of any goods,
         technology, or services subject to the Secretary's export
         jurisdiction that the Secretary of Commerce determines, in
         consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
         Defense, and other appropriate officials, would assist a
         foreign country in acquiring the capability to develop, produce,
         stockpile, deliver, or use weapons of mass destruction or their
         means of delivery.  The Secretary of State shall pursue early
         negotiations with foreign governments to adopt effective measures
         comparable to those imposed under this section.

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                (b)  Subsection (a) of this section will not apply to
         exports relating to a particular category of weapons of mass
         destruction (i.e., nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons)
         if their destination is a country with whose government the
         United States has entered into a bilateral or multilateral
         arrangement for the control of that category of weapons of
         mass destruction-related goods (including delivery systems)
         and technology, or maintains domestic export controls comparable
         to controls that are imposed by the United States with respect to
         that category of goods and technology, or that are otherwise
         deemed adequate by the Secretary of State.

                (c)  The Secretary of Commerce shall require validated
         licenses to implement this order and shall coordinate any license
         applications with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
         Defense.

                (d)  The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the
         Secretary of State, shall take such actions, including the
         promulgation of rules, regulations, and amendments thereto,as may
         be necessary to continue to regulate the activities of
         United States persons in order to prevent their participation
         in activities that could contribute to the proliferation of
         weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery, as
         provided in the Export Administration Regulations, set forth
         in Title 15, Chapter VII, Subchapter C, of the Code of Federal
         Regulations, Parts 768 to 799 inclusive.

                Sec. 4.  Sanctions Against Foreign Persons.  (a)  In
         addition to the sanctions imposed on foreign persons as provided
         in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 and
         the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
         Elimination Act of 1991, sanctions also shall be imposed ona
         foreign person with respect to chemical and biological weapons
         proliferation if the Secretary of State determines that the
         foreign person on or after the effective date of this orderor its
         predecessor, Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990,
         knowingly and materially contributed to the efforts of any foreign
         country, project, or entity to use, develop, produce, stockpile,
         or otherwise acquire chemical or biological weapons.

                (b)  No department or agency of the United States Government
         may procure, or enter into any contract for the procurementof,
         any goods or services from any foreign person described in
         subsection (a) of this section.  The Secretary of the Treasury
         shall prohibit the importation into the United States of products
         produced by that foreign person.

                (c)  Sanctions pursuant to this section may be terminated
         or not imposed against foreign persons if the Secretary of
         State determines that there is reliable evidence that the foreign
         person concerned has ceased all activities referred to in
         subsection (a).

                (d)  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the
         Treasury may provide appropriate exemptions for procurement
         contracts necessary to meet U.S. operational military requirements
         or requirements under defense production
         agreements, sole source suppliers, spare parts, components,
         routine servicing and maintenance of products, and medical and
         humanitarian items.  They may provide exemptions for contracts in
         existence on the date of this order under appropriate
         circumstances.

                Sec. 5.  Sanctions Against Foreign Countries.  (a)  In
         addition to the sanctions imposed on foreign countries as provided
         in the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and


                                         3

         Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, sanctions also shall be imposed
         on a foreign country as specified in subsection (b) of this
         section, if the Secretary of State determines that the foreign
         country has, on or after the effective date of this order or its
         predecessor, Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990,
         (1) used chemical or biological weapons in violation of
         international law; (2) made substantial preparations to use
         chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law;
         or (3) developed, produced, stockpiled, or otherwise acquired
         chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law.

                (b)  The following sanctions shall be imposed on any foreign
         country identified in subsection (a)(1) of this section unless the
         Secretary of State determines, on grounds of significant foreign
         policy or national security, that any individual sanction should
         not be applied.  The sanctions specified in this section may be
         made applicable to the countries identified in subsections (a)(2)
         or (a)(3) when the Secretary of State determines that such action
         will further the objectives of this order pertaining to
         proliferation.  The sanctions specified in subsection (b)(2) below
         shall be imposed with the concurrence of the Secretary of the
         Treasury.

                (1)  Foreign Assistance.  No assistance shall be provided to
         that country under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or
         any successor act, or the Arms Export Control Act, other than
         assistance that is intended to benefit the people of that country
         directly and that is not channeled through governmental agencies
         or entities of that country.

                (2)  Multilateral Development Bank Assistance.  The
         United States shall oppose any loan or financial or technical
         assistance to that country by international financial institutions
         in accordance with section 701 of the International Financial
         Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d).

                (3)  Denial of Credit or Other Financial Assistance.  The
         United States shall deny to that country any credit or financial
         assistance by any department, agency, or instrumentality ofthe
         United States Government.

                (4)  Prohibition of Arms Sales.  The United States
         Government shall not, under the Arms Export Control Act, sell
         to that country any defense articles or defense services orissue
         any license for the export of items on the United States Munitions
         List.

                (5)  Exports of National Security-Sensitive Goods and
         Technology.  No exports shall be permitted of any goods or
         technologies controlled for national security reasons under
         the Export Administration Regulations.

                (6)  Further Export Restrictions.  The Secretary of Commerce
         shall prohibit or otherwise substantially restrict exports to that
         country of goods, technology, and services (excluding agricultural
         commodities and products otherwise subject to control).

                (7)  Import Restrictions.  Restrictions shall be imposed on
         the importation into the United States of articles (that may
         include petroleum or any petroleum product) that are the growth,
         product, or manufacture of that country.

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                (8)  Landing Rights.  At the earliest practicable date, the
         Secretary of State shall terminate, in a manner consistent with
         international law, the authority of any air carrier that is
         controlled in fact by the government of that country to engage in
         air transportation (as defined in section 101(10) of the Federal
         Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. App. 1301(10)).

                Sec. 6.  Duration.  Any sanctions imposed pursuant to
         sections 4 or 5 of this order shall remain in force until
         the Secretary of State determines that lifting any sanctionis in
         the foreign policy or national security interests of
         the United States or, as to sanctions under section 4 of
         this order, until the Secretary has made the determination under
         section 4(c).

                Sec. 7.  Implementation.  The Secretary of State, the
         Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce are
         hereby authorized and directed to take such actions, including the
         promulgation of rules and regulations, as may be necessary to
         carry out the purposes of this order.  These actions, and in
         particular those in sections 4 and 5 of this order, shall be made
         in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and, as appropriate,
         other agency heads and shall be implemented in accordance with
         procedures established pursuant to Executive Order No. 12851.  The
         Secretary concerned may redelegate any of these functions to other
         officers in agencies of the Federal Government.  All heads of
         departments and agencies of the United States Government are
         directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority
         to carry out the provisions of this order, including the
         suspension or termination of licenses or other authorizations.

                Sec. 8.  Preservation of Authorities.  Nothing in this order
         is intended to affect the continued effectiveness of any rules,
         regulations, orders, licenses, or other forms of administrative
         action issued, taken, or continued in effect heretofore or
         hereafter under the authority of the International Economic
         Emergency Powers Act, the Export Administration Act, the Arms
         Export Control Act, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, Executive
         Order No. 12730 of September 30, 1990, Executive Order No. 12735
         of November 16, 1990, Executive Order No. 12924 of August 18,
         1994, and Executive Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994.

                Sec. 9.  Judicial Review.  This order is not intended to
         create, nor does it create, any right or benefit, substantive
         or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the
         United States, its agencies, officers, or any other person.

                Sec. 10.  Revocation of Executive Orders Nos. 12735 and
         12930.  Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, and
         Executive Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994, are hereby
         revoked.

                Sec. 11.  Effective Date.  This order is effective
         immediately.

                This order shall be transmitted to the Congress and
         published in the Federal Register.

                                                WILLIAM J. CLINTON

         THE WHITE HOUSE,
             November 14, 1994.

                                       # # #

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  Executive Order 12938 
         Signed: Nov. 14, 1994 
         Fed. Register page and date: 59 FR 59099; Nov. 16, 1994 
 
         Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
 
         Revokes: EO 12735, Nov. 16, 1990; EO 12930, Sept. 29, 1994 
 
         See Notice of Nov. 8, 1995; Notice of Nov. 12, 1996 
 
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From the House Documents Online via GPO Access
[wais.access.gpo.gov]



105th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - -  House Document 105-10


CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO WEAPONS OF MASS
                              DESTRUCTION

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

     NOTIFICATION THAT THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE
 PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (``WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION''--(WMD)) AND THE MEANS OF DELIVERING SUCH WEAPONS
  IS TO CONTINUE IN EFFECT BEYOND NOVEMBER 14, 1996--RECEIVED IN THE
 UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NOVEMBER 12, 1996, PURSUANT TO
                           50 U.S.C. 1622(d)

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

January 7, 1997.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations
                       and ordered to be printed

                                           The White House,
                                     Washington, November 12, 1996.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: On November 14, 1994, in light of the
dangers of the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons (``weapons of mass destruction''--(WMD)) and
of the means of delivery such weapons, I issued Executive Order
12938, and declared a national emergency under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the
anniversary date of its declaration, unless I publish in the
Federal Register and transmit to the Congress a notice of its
continuation.
    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues
to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.
Therefore, I am hereby advising the Congress that the national
emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on
November 14, 1995, must continue in effect beyond November 14,
1996. Accordingly, I have extended the national emergency
declared in Executive Order 12938 and have sent the attached
notice of extension to the Federal Register for publication.
    The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703)
and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1641(c)), regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant
to the emergency declaration. Additional information on
nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW)
nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent annual
Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation
Report,'' and the most recent annual report provided to the
Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law
102-182).
    During the last 6 months, the three export control
regulations issued under the Enhanced Proliferation Control
Initiative (EPCI) remained fully in force and continue to be
applied in order to control the export of items with potential
use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery
systems for weapons of mass destruction.
    The threat of chemical weapons is one of the most pressing
security challenges of the post-Cold War era. With bipartisan
support from the Congress, the United States has long been a
leader in the international fight against the spread of
chemical weapons. Democrats and Republicans have worked hard
together to strengthen our security by concluding the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC).
    The CWC bans an entire class of weapons of mass
destruction. It is both an arms control and a nonproliferation
treaty that requires total elimination of chemical weapons
stocks, prohibits chemical weapons-related activities, bans
assistance for such activities and bars trade with non-Parties
in certain relevant chemicals. This treaty denies us no option
we would otherwise wish to exercise and is a critical
instrument in our global fight against the spread of chemical
weapons.
    The CWC provides concrete measures that will raise the
costs and risks of engaging in chemical weapons-related
activities. The CWC's declaration and inspection requirements
will improve our knowledge of possible chemical weapons
activities, whether conducted by countries or terrorists. The
treaty's provisions constitute the most comprehensive and
intrusive verification regime ever negotiated, covering
virtually every aspect of a chemical weapons program, from
development through production and stockpiling. These
provisions provide for access to declared and undeclared
facilities and locations, thus making clandestine chemical
weapons production and stockpiling more difficult, more risky
and more expensive.
    Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically
isolated and banned from trading with States Parties in certain
key chemicals. Indeed, major chemical industry groups have
testified before the Senate that our companies stand to lose
millions of dollars in international sales if the United States
is not a State Party when the treaty enters into force.
    That could happen if we fail to ratify the CWC promptly. It
is nearly four years since the Bush Administration signed the
Convention and three years since this Administration submitted
the CWC to the Senate for its advice and consent. All our major
NATO allies have deposited their instruments of ratification,
as have all other G-7 members. The CWC will enter into force
180 days after it has been ratified by 65 countries. By mid-
October 1996, 64 of the 160 signatory countries had done so. It
therefore seems likely the CWC will enter into force as early
as April 1997.
    Further delay in securing U.S. ratification of this vital
treaty serves only the interests of proliferators and
terrorists. Delay may well also endanger the international
competitiveness of the chemical industry, one of our largest
exporters. In the interim, pressures are increasing in unstable
regions to acquire and use chemical weapons. We need to ratify
this convention urgently to strengthen our own security, affirm
our leadership in nonproliferation and to protect our chemical
industry. Ratification must be a top priority of the new
Congress in early 1997.
    During the reporting period, the United States continued to
be active in the work of the CWC Preparatory Commission
(PrepCom) in The Hague. The Prepcom is developing the vital
technical and administrative procedures for implementation of
the CWC through a strong organization to ensure compliance when
the convention enters into force.
    The United States is working hard with the international
community to end the threat from another terrible category of
weapons of mass destruction--biological weapons. We are an
active member of the Ad Hoc Group striving to create a legally
binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve
the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (The
Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). The Ad Hoc Group was
mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The
Group held meetings in July and September with the goal of
preparing for the late November 1996 Fourth BWC Review
Conference. Concluding a new BWC protocol is high on our list
of nonproliferation goals. We should aim to complete such a
protocol by 1998.
    The United States continues to be a leader in the Australia
Group (AG) chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation
regime. The United States supported the entry of the Republic
of Korea (South Korea)--a country with an important chemical
industry--into the AG. The ROK became the group's 30th member
in late Sepgember--a tribute to the continuing international
recognition of the importance of the Group's effort in
nonproliferation and to the commitment of the ROK to that goal.
    The United States attended the AG's annual plenary session
from October 14-17, 1996, during which the Group continued to
focus on strengthening AG export controls and sharing
information to address the threat of CBW terrorism. At the
behest of the United States, the AG first began in-depth
discussion of terrorism during the 1995 plenary session
following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack earlier that year.
    The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief
that full adherence to the CWC and the BWC will be the best way
to achieve permanent global elimination of CBW, and that all
states adhering to these Conventions have an obligation to
ensure that their national activities support this goal.
    Australia Group participants continue to ensure that all
relevant national measures promote the object and purposes of
the BWC, and CWC, and will be fully consistent with the CWC
upon its entry into force. The AG believes that national export
licensing policies on chemical weapons-related items fulfill
the obligation established under Article I of the CWC that
States Parties never assist, in any way, the acquisition of
chemical weapons. Inasmuch as these measures are focused solely
on preventing activities banned under the CWC, they are
consistent with the undertaking in Article XI of the CWC to
facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemical materials
and related information for purposes not prohibited by the CWC.
    The AG also agreed to continue its active program of
briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional
consultations on export controls and nonproliferation to
further awareness and understanding of national policies in
these areas.
    During the last year, the United States imposed chemical
weapons proliferation sanctions on one individual. On November
17, 1995, sanctions were imposed under the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991
on Russian citizen Anatoliy Kuntsevich for knowingly providing
material assistance to a foreign chemical weapons program.
    The United States carefully controlled exports that could
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction, exercising restraint in considering all such
proposed transfers consistent with the Guyidelines of the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In May 1996, the
United States imposed missile technology proliferation
sanctions against two entities in Iran and one entity in North
Korea for transfers involving Category II MTCR Annex items.
    MTCR Partners continued to share information about
proliferation problems with each other and with other potential
supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also
emphasized the need for implementing effective export control
systems. This cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of
missile-related materials intended for use in missile programs
of concern.
    The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination
with its MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to
encourage non-members to export responsibly and to adhere to
the MTCR Guidelines. Since my last report, we have continued
our missile nonproliferation dialogue with the Republic of
Korea and Ukraine. In the course of normal diplomatic
relations, we also have pursued such discussions with other
countries in Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
    In June 1996, the United States was an active participant
in discussions at the MTCR's Reinforced Point of Contact
Meeting on Regional Missile Proliferation Issues. This meeting
resulted in an in-depth discussion of regional missile
proliferation concerns and actions the Partners could take,
individually and collectively, to address the specific concerns
raised by missile proliferation in regions of tension.
    In July 1996, the MTCR held a Seminar on Transshipment
Issues. The Seminar was held in Washington and hosted by the
United States on behalf of the Regime. It brought together
foreign policy makers and experts from twelve MTCR Partner
countries and seven non-MTCR countries for the first joint
discussion of ways to address the proliferation threat posed by
transshipment. The seminar was successful in focusing attention
on the transshipment problem and fostered a productive exchange
of ideas on how to impede proliferators' misuse of
transshipment. Seminar participants also identified several
areas for possible follow-up, which the United States pursued
at the 1996 Edinburgh MTCR Plenary.
    The MTCR held its Eleventh Plenary Meeting at Edinburgh,
Scotland, October 7-11. At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners
reaffirmed their commitment to controlling exports to prevent
proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction. They also reiterated their readiness for
international cooperation in peaceful space activities that
could not contribute to WMD delivery systems.
    The MTCR Partners also were supportive of U.S. initiatives
to follow up on the success of the June 1996 Reinforced Point
of Contact Meeting on the regional aspects of missile
proliferation and the July 1996 Seminar on transshipment
issues. The Partners undertook to be proactive in encouraging
key non-Partner transshippers to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines
and Annex, and in providing them with practical assistance in
implementing transshipment controls on missile technology. The
Partners also agreed on steps they could take to enhance the
MTCR's effectiveness in impeding missile proliferation in South
Asia and the Persian Gulf. Finally, the MTCR Partners agreed to
increase the transparency of Regime aims and activities, and to
continue their efforts to develop a dialogue with countries
outside the Regime to encourage voluntary adherence to the MTCR
Guidelines and heightened awareness of missile proliferation
risks.
    We also continued vigorous pursuit of our nuclear
nonproliferation goals. In May 1995, Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreed at the
NPT Review and Extension Conference to extend the NPT
indefinitely and without conditions. Since the conference, more
nations have acceded to the treaty. There now are more than 180
parties, making the NPT nearly universal.
    In a truly historic landmark in our efforts to curb the
spread of nuclear weapons, the 50th UN General Assembly on
September 10, 1996, adopted and called for signature of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiated over
the past two and a half years in the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva. The overwhelming passage of this UN resolution (158-
3-5) demonstrates the CTBT's strong international support and
marks a major success for United States foreign policy. On
September 24, I and other national leaders signed the CTBT in
New York.
    The United States played a leading role in promoting the
negotiation of this agreement by declaring a moratorium on
nuclear testing in 1992 and calling on all the other declared
nuclear weapons states to enact their own moratoria, and by
announcing in August of 1995 our support for a complete ban on
all tests no matter how small their nuclear yield--a so-called
``zero-yield'' CTBT. The United States also insisted on an
effective verification regime to ensure that the treaty
enhances rather than reduces the security of its adherents.
    The CTBT will serve several United States national security
interests in banning all nuclear explosions. It will constrain
the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons;
end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons;
contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the
process of nuclear disarmament; and strengthen international
peace and security. The CTBT marks an historic milestone in our
drive to reduce the nuclear threat and to build a safer world.
    The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continues efforts to
upgrade control lists and export control procedures. By October
1996, NSG members confirmed their agreement to clarifications
to the nuclear trigger list to accord with trigger list changes
agreed to by the members of the NPT Exporters (Zangger)
Committee. The NSG also is actively pursuing steps to enhance
the transparency of the export regime in accordance with the
call in Principles 16 and 17 of the 1995 NPT Review and
Extension Conference. The NSG is also continuing efforts to
enhance information sharing among members regarding the nuclear
programs of proliferant countries.
    NSG membership increased to 34 with acceptance of Brazil,
the Republic of Korea and Ukraine at the 1996 Buenos Aires
Plenary. Members continued contacts with Belarus, China,
Kazakhstan and Lithuania regarding NSG activities and
guidelines. The ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the
agreement of all suppliers, including nations not members of
the regime, to control nuclear and nuclear-related exports in
accordance with the NSG guidelines.
    Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses
directly attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred
by the declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order
12938 during the period from May 14, 1996, through November 14,
1996.
            Sincerely,
                                                William J. Clinton.

                                 Notice

                              ----------

    Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction

    On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, I declared
a national emergency with respect to the unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy,
and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass
destruction'') and the means of delivering such weapons.
Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy,
and economy of the United States, the national emergency
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14,
1995, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1996.
Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the
national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and
transmitted to the Congress.

                                                William J. Clinton.
    The White House, November 12, 1996.

                                <greek-d>
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