18 May 1999
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/fr-cont.html

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

[Congressional Record: May 13, 1999 (House)]
[Page H3112-H3141]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr13my99-42]


          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Wilson). Pursuant to House Resolution
167 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the
bill, H.R. 1555.
  The Chair designates the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. LaTourette) as
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentleman from
Kentucky (Mr. Rogers) to assume the chair temporarily.

                              {time}  1110

                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 1555) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Rogers, Chairman pro tempore, in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to bring to the attention of the
House H.R. 1555, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year
2000, backed by the unanimous bipartisan recommendation of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  I would say that our committee worked diligently to conduct rigorous
oversight of the programs and the activities that fall within our
jurisdiction and, indeed, they are extensive responsibilities. We held
numerous full committee hearings and briefings, backed up by literally
hundreds of staff briefings about specific programs and items in this
budget.
  As Members know, we are required by law to provide an annual
authorization for any intelligence or intelligence-related activity.
That is because of the seriousness with which we take our oversight
responsibility, making sure we understand what is going on in the
intelligence community.
  Because of the sensitivity of the material we deal with within this
bill, and its direct implications for our national security, many of
the specifics of our work and the recommendations we have made must
remain secret. However, as I announced upon the filing of this bill,
the entirety of our work is available to any Member wishing to review
it in the committee's secure facility upstairs. Because of this
arrangement and the reality of Members' schedules, all of us on the
committee recognize the special responsibility that we have assumed and
the trust our colleagues place in us.
  I am pleased to report that we have had Members upstairs pursuing the
opportunity to understand all the details, sensitive as they are, in
this bill.
  We know that we have the added burden of assuring our colleagues and
the public that the programs and projects in this bill are worthwhile,
legitimate, well-designed, properly managed, and critical to our
national security. Our colleagues and our constituents trust us to
conduct our oversight carefully, thoroughly and with a critical eye. I
believe we have done our job, and I hope we have done it well.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a solid bill. It recommends funding for the
Nation's intelligence community at a rate slightly less than 1 percent
higher than what the President requested. This is a very modest
increase and is, frankly, the bare minimum needed to continue our
effort of rebuilding our capabilities started in the 105th, and
ensuring that we are best positioned to meet the diverse challenges
that the century holds for American interests, as varied as they are.
  We have, for the last few years, been on a course toward that goal
and we are making progress, but we have had to reverse a very serious
inherited trend of decline and atrophy in the core programs of some of
our intelligence capabilities; of signals intelligence, of human
intelligence, of imagery intelligence, of analysis and covert action.

                              {time}  1115

  These are areas where we need help. These are disciplines that
require long-term investment and consistent commitment. We cannot
simply turn them on and off like a light switch. We have for too long
taken shortcuts and underfunded and undervalued our intelligence
capabilities, and our entire defense posture, as a matter of fact.
  We see this in stark terms in the world today, currently in Kosovo,
but also in Iraq, North Korea, Iran, China, India, Pakistan, perhaps a
number of places in the African continent, just to mention a string of
other hot spots that have not yet flared up but could at any moment. I
know Members can fill in their own blanks.
  I know that some believe and state that we have no more use for
intelligence, that investment in eyes, ears and brains has become
unnecessary because the world is at peace. I adamantly reject that
point of view. Intelligence is arguably the best investment

[[Page H3113]]

we have to protect ourselves. Because good information, timely and on
point, is a force multiplier and a force protector that can help us
avoid crises altogether.
  Recently Americans have heard about so-called intelligence failures.
Specifically, just last weekend, we saw what happens when information
is wrong, when a missile is directed at the wrong target. Rather than
simply blaming our intelligence entities for a bad call, we on the
committee have to look further and ask, how did this actually happen?
  In part, this is unfortunately a predictable outcome of stretching
our finite resources too thin. We have had to juggle and divert our
limited assets to address the multitude of far-flung foreign policy
initiatives and transnational threats that are the reality of the world
today. And as a result, we have asked our intelligence community to do
with less in more places, for more time, and under more complicated
circumstances.
  It is a formula for mistake. And this is a formula that we have been
trying to rewrite these past 3 years and again in this bill today, and
that is why it is so important that we have Members' support.
  Mr. Chairman, we have emphasized several important themes this year.
In general terms, they include recapitalizing signals intelligence. And
no one should be in any way surprised by this need to spend money given
the rapid advance of technology, correcting the imbalance between
collection on the one hand and processing the information on the other.
This has been a serious problem which we have reversed, but we have a
long way to go to get more analysis involved; innovating paradigms for
imagery, to include commercial resources, a great opportunity for the
intelligence communities; and building a stronger and more extensive
clandestine human intelligence capability worldwide and putting new
tools into our covert action toolbox so that the choices our President
has range more robustly and are not limited to doing nothing or
bombing.
  Although it is true that we may be at less risk in today's world of a
direct all-out nuclear confrontation, we nevertheless face enormously
complex challenges from rogue interests who continue to seek nuclear
capabilities, not to mention the very real threat of chemical or
biological agents that are continuing to proliferate around the world,
the ``cheap nukes'' as they are called.
  We also are increasingly threatened by terrorists, who do not play by
the same ``Marquess of Queensbury'' rules that Americans are used to
and by a whole new generation of narcotraffickers, whose deadly wares
threaten the health and safety of our kids. And, tragically, that is a
war that we are not doing well enough on.
  The only certainty in this uncertain world, as far as I am concerned,
is that the threats are out there and they are getting more dangerous
and more widespread, and that is why most agree that we need to rebuild
our intelligence capability.
  I do not want to think of intelligence as the 9-1-1 of our defenses.
To me we should strive to prevent bad things from happening in the
first place so we do not have to call 9-1-1 at all. That is what good
intelligence should be about. And we have had some successes stopping
bad things from happening to good people. Regrettably, those are the
ones we do not read about in the paper.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, the headlines these past weeks have been
replete with stories about an issue of grave concern and one that we
have addressed in our bill. I am speaking about our counterintelligence
capabilities, our defense, as it were, of our Nation's secrets,
specifically with respect to aggressive efforts by the Chinese and
others to target our crown jewels, the secrets of our nuclear program
housed in our national labs.
  We have addressed that in this bill. We authorized the significant
funding increase to enhance DOE's counterintelligence, CI programs
those would be, specifically cyber security, and to enhance the
Department of Energy's ability to conduct comprehensive intelligence
analysis of foreign nuclear weapons programs and proliferation, which
need to be done.
  We have taken strong steps to better challenge our analysts and to
improve the counterintelligence abilities at FBI, DOD, Department of
Defense so we can better meet the threat of nations like China who, not
surprisingly, seek to steal our secrets.
  In sum, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this bill; and
I thank all members of our committee, especially my ranking member, the
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) for their diligent, applied work,
unquestioned commitment, and great wisdom to help us in our quest to
improve our national security.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by commending the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss) on the efforts he has made to ensure that the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence operates in a bipartisan
manner. While the unanimous vote reporting this legislation is an
indication of the success of his efforts, those of us who serve on the
committee know that on a daily basis, on matters large and small, the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) ensures that the views of the
Democrats are solicited and considered.
  The bill as reported, in the aggregate, is less than one percent more
than requested by the administration. Although the committee recommends
slightly more for certain programs, like those managed by the National
Security Agency, and slightly less for others, like those managed by
the National Reconnaissance Office, the fact remains that the total
authorized for intelligence in this bill is not significantly different
than that sought by the President.
  This result reflects budgetary realities, but it also reflects a
judgment about what the intelligence agencies can effectively and
efficiently spend next year. Investments in the kind of intelligent
capabilities the Nation will need in the years to come requires a
steady commitment over time of resources. This legislation, as has been
the case in the past, should be seen as an installment in that effort,
not as its end.
  H.R. 1555 provides a substantial amount of money for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities. How much, even in the aggregate, is
classified. I believe that no harm to the national security would be
caused by making the aggregate budget request, the aggregate
authorization, or the aggregate appropriations public.
  The arguments for retaining the classification of these amounts,
which focus on the utility of the aggregate information to the average
American are irrelevant to security considerations, and the arguments
which deal with the utility of the information to foreign governments
are, in my judgment, not persuasive. I have in the past supported
amendments to make certain budget information public, and I will do so
again when presented with an opportunity.
  I believe the Director of Central Intelligence was right in October
of 1997 and March of 1998 when he disclosed the appropriated amounts
for intelligence. I hope he will reconsider his current position with
respect to additional annual disclosures.
  Regrettably, publicity about intelligence activities normally centers
on problems rather than successes. Problems, however, need to be
acknowledged and corrected.
  I want to mention my concerns in two areas, although these concerns
do not affect my support for this bill. Both concerns involve the
People's Republic of China. The counterintelligence shortcomings at the
Department of Energy's national laboratories have over the past 20
years or so provided valuable information to the PRC and may, more
recently, have allowed the PRC access to extremely sensitive
information about our nuclear weapons.
  The bill contains significant increases in funding for
counterintelligence activities at the Department of Energy requested by
the President, including additional amounts sought by the President for
computer security. The bill also contains additional, more modest
amounts for analytic activities related to the PRC. There may be more
that needs to be done to make sure that the national labs are secure,
either initiatives recommended by the Cox Committee or other proposals.

[[Page H3114]]

  I believe that we have ample time before we go to conference on this
bill to consider these matters in a deliberative way and endorse those
which make sense and which will not produce unintended consequences of
greater harm than the problems they seek to correct. I do not believe
we know enough today about what more should be done beyond those steps
already taken or proposed by the President and Secretary Richardson.
  The accidental bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade at this point
defies understanding. To be of use to policymakers and military
commanders intelligence needs to be reliable. The intelligence which
confused a military target with the embassy most certainly failed to
meet that essential standard. Explanations which, in some cases, seem
more like excuses have been offered, but it is clear that a serious
mistake was made. We need to be sure we know why and take corrective
action expeditiously.
  The responsibility for congressional oversight of intelligence
extends beyond the drafting of the authorization bill. It must
vigorously review the manner in which the activities authorized each
year are managed. We need to be able to assure the public that a degree
of care commensurate with the importance of, and risks associated with,
these activities is constantly present. Determining the cause of
problems once they are identified is essential to the provision of that
type of assurance. I look forward to working with our chairman, as I
have in the past, to provide this kind of oversight.
  In closing, I want to mention a matter concerning the committee's
access to information. I am disturbed by the fact that the intelligence
agencies that are funded by the national foreign intelligence program
budget pursue a large number of programs and activities requiring
special access which are not systematically reported to the Select
Committee on Intelligence or the Committee on Appropriations. I do not
mean to suggest that the intelligence community refuses to brief the
committee on individual programs or activities. Rather, I mean that
there appear to be many special access programs, and the executive
branch does not rigorously ensure that each of them is routinely
reported to Congress.
  The Committee on Armed Services faced a similar situation in the
Defense Department's handling of special access programs, and years ago
required in law that the Department provide Congress with a written
report on every program that the Secretary of Defense decided was
important and sensitive enough to warrant special handling.
  My impression is that this reporting system works very well and that
we may need similar legislation for the intelligence community. I
intend to examine this matter in more detail in the coming months and
may even decide to pursue it further in the conference committee.
  Mr. Chairman, H.R. 1555 will, in my judgment, enhance the ability of
the intelligence community to respond to the national security
challenges we face now and which we will face in the future. I urge its
adoption by the House.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for his fine statement and
particularly my full support and agreement on the last point he made
with the special access programs.
  Mr. Chairman, let me note that there is a mistake in the printed
committee report concerning the CBO estimate. That is not an
intelligence failure. This is a printing mistake.
  The CBO letter provided to the Select Committee on Intelligence
states that the unclassified portion of the bill ``would not affect
direct spending or receipts, thus pay-as-you-go procedures would not
apply.'' In the process of printing the committee report, the GPO
omitted the final ``not,'' making it appear as if pay-as-you-go
procedures would apply.
  I would like the Record to reflect accurately the CBO estimate and,
therefore, will submit at the appropriate time the CBO letter for
inclusion in the Record.
  Likewise, Mr. Chairman, in our review of the materials in preparation
for floor action today, we also noted the inadvertent inclusion of
language in the committee report that does not accurately reflect the
committee's position in one instance. The offending language is found
at page 15 of the published committee report and concerns the Joint
Airborne's SIGINT program.
  This language also indicates a cut to the program office of $1.6
million. This, too, is not an accurate accounting of the committee's
intent on this program.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to my distinguished ranking member for any
comment he may wish to make on this point.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  As the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Frost) noted in the adoption of the
rule, I felt that we should have had more time before we got to the
floor, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) worked hard to at
least allow us a few more days. Regardless of that, the errors that the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) talked about did occur, and it is
appropriate to correct them. Specifically, with respect to the Joint
Airborne SIGINT Program, the committee's intention is not accurately
reflected in page 15 of the report as printed.
  Mr. Chairman, I insert the following correspondence for the Record:

         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
           Intelligence,
                                      Washington, DC, May 4, 1999.
     Mr. Dan L. Crippen
     Director, Congressional Budget Officer,
     Washington, DC
       Dear Mr. Crippen: In compliance with the Rules of the House
     of Representatives, I am writing to request a cost estimate
     of H.R. 1555, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
     Year 2000,'' pursuant to sections 308 and 403 of the
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974. I have attached a copy of
     the bill as approved by the House Permanent Select Committee
     on Intelligence on April 28, 1999.
       As I hope to bring this legislation to the House floor in
     the very near term, I would very much appreciate an expedited
     response to this request by the CBO's staff. Should you have
     any questions related to this request, please contact Patrick
     B. Murray, the Committee's Chief Counsel, at 225-4121. Thank
     you in advance for your assistance with this request.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Porter J. Goss,
                                                         Chairman.
       Attachment.
                                  ____

                                  Congressional Budget Office,

                                                    U.S. Congress,
                                      Washington, DC, May 5, 1999.
     Hon. Porter J. Goss,
     Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House
         of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
     prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1555, the
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
       If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
     pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Dawn
     Sauter, who can be reached at 226-2840.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Barry B. Anderson
                                   (For Dan L. Crippen, Director).
       Enclosure.
     H.R. 1555--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
         2000
       Summary: H.R. 1555 would authorize appropriations for
     fiscal year 2000 for intelligence activities of the United
     States government, the Community Management Account, and the
     Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
     (CLARDS). The bill would also authorize such sums as may be
     necessary to fund an emergency supplemental appropriation for
     fiscal year 1999.
       This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
     the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that enacting
     H.R. 1555 would result in additional spending of $194 million
     over the 2000-2004 period, assuming appropriation of the
     authorized amounts. CBO has no basis for determining the cost
     of an emergency supplemental appropriation for fiscal year
     1999. The unclassified portion of the bill would not affect
     direct spending or receipts; thus, pay-as-you-go procedures
     would not apply.
       The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) excludes from
     application of that act legislative provisions that are
     necessary for the national security. CBO has determined that
     the unclassified provisions of this bill either fit within
     that exclusion or do not contain intergovernmental or
     private-sector mandates as defined by UMRA.
       Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
     budgetary impact of the unclassified portions of H.R. 1555 is
     shown in the following table. CBO cannot obtain the necessary
     information to estimate the costs for the entire bill because
     parts are

[[Page H3115]]

     classified at a level above clearances held by CBO employees.
     For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R. 1555
     will be enacted by October 1, 1999, and that the authorized
     amounts will be appropriated for fiscal year 2000.

                                    [By fiscal year, in millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   1999    2000    2001    2002    2003    2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                        Spending subject to appropriation

Spending Under Current Law for Intelligence Community Management
    Budget Authority \1\........................................     102       0       0       0       0       0
    Estimated Outlays...........................................     104      39       9       2       0       0
Proposed Changes
    Authorization level.........................................       0     194       0       0       0       0
    Estimated Outlays...........................................       0     120      58      12       4       0
Spending Under H.R. 1555 for Intelligence Community Management
    Authorization level.........................................     102     194       0       0       0       0
    Estimated Outlays...........................................     104     159      67      14       4      0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 1999 level is the account appropriated for that year.

       Outlays are estimated according to historical spending
     patterns. The costs of this legislation fall within budget
     function 050 (national defense).
       The bill would authorize appropriations of $194 million for
     the Intelligence Community Management Account, which funds
     the coordination of programs, budget oversight, and
     management of the intelligence agencies. In addition, the
     bill would authorize $209 million for CIARDS to cover
     retirement costs attributable to military service and various
     unfunded liabilities. The payment to CIARDS is considered
     mandatory, and the authorization under this bill would be the
     same as assumed in the CBO baseline.
       Section 501 of the bill would allow the Director of the
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), in coordination
     with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
     to exempt certain documents from provisions of the Freedom of
     Information Act (FOIA). The bill would allow exemptions for
     files concerning the activities of NIMA that, prior to its
     creation in 1996, were performed by the National Photographic
     Interpretation Center (NPIC) within the CIA and that document
     the means by which foreign intelligence or
     counterintelligence is collected through scientific and
     technical systems. H.R. 1555 would also require a decennial
     review under rules and procedures similar to those governing
     operational files of the CIA.
       CBO believes this section could result in discretionary
     savings from reduced administrative and legal costs the NIMA
     might otherwise incur to respond to FOIA requests. These
     potential savings could be partially offset by any future
     legal costs arising from the limited judicial review that
     H.R. 1555 would permit. (Judicial review would allow legal
     challenges of NIMA's decisions to exempt certain files.) H.R.
     1555 would also require NIMA to review the exempt status of
     operational files every 10 years, but CBO believes that the
     resulting cost would be small, considering the classification
     reviews that occur under current law. CBO cannot estimate the
     budgetary impact of section 501 because we have no
     information about the number of files that this section would
     affect or the unit cost for NIMA to review them.
       Pay-as-you-go considerations: None.
       Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The Unfunded
     Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) excludes from application of the
     act legislative provisions that are necessary for the
     national security. CBO has determined that the unclassified
     provisions of this bill either fit within that exclusion or
     do not contain intergovernmental or private-sector mandates
     as defined by UMRA.
       Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Dawn Sauter. Impact on
     State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Teri Gullo. Impact on
     the Private Sector: Eric Labs.
       Estimate approved by: Robert A. Sunshine, Deputy Assistant
     Director for Budget Analysis.

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) a valued member of the
committee.
  (Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1555,
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
  Mr. Chairman, the chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss),
and the ranking minority member, the gentleman from California (Mr.
Dixon), are to be commended for the outstanding work that they have
done to lead our committee to make the appropriate investments in the
intelligence community in these difficult and demanding times.

                              {time}  1130

  I am now serving in the second term of my service on the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence. Let me clear up a mystery that many
might point to as we deliberate. I have never seen a committee act in a
more responsible manner without regard to partisanship, and I am proud
to serve under the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman
from California (Mr. Dixon). They have the best interest of our Nation
at heart. We work in a truly bipartisan fashion. That does us all
proud.
  Let me focus in particular on one portion of our bill which will fund
a substantial increase in the language training that our intelligence
community will need as it rebuilds its presence around the world and
rebuilds the analytic capability to cover more than just the hot spots
of the day.
  The need for more language skill within the intelligence community,
as my colleagues on the committee are aware, is a subject of special
concern to me. It is critically important that we have our people, our
best talent, our most dedicated officers scattered around the world
working on our behalf. It is also important that they be fluent in the
language in the country in which they find themselves. I think that
there is room for improvement in that area.
  But we have made a step this year. I intend to help ensure that it is
one of a number of steps along the path to the fluency our intelligence
assets need to operate as we approach the next century and as we find
ourselves with a desperate need for a presence all over the globe.
  As a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I have
closely followed the issues that have made unusual demands upon the
intelligence community and the problems that have produced headlines
that we sometimes would rather not see. Much has been said about these
problems. That is to be expected, and I think it certainly is in order.
But let me add a thought.
  Central to every intelligence operation is a balance between risk and
benefit. Within the committee, we are aware of the often unbelievable
benefit our government derives from the operations of our clandestine
service. We are aware as well of risk and, on occasion, the damage that
comes from some of our operations. Given the full picture of the
benefits and of the risks, we come to understand that we will
inevitably hear a news report and see in the headlines the acronym CIA
and sort of wince at what we read or the report on the radio. We will
also appreciate as we hear this news sometimes on occasion, not news we
want to hear, that intelligence officers are overseas scattered around
the world putting oftentimes their very lives at risk to get the
President and our policymakers the intelligence they must have to make
responsible public policy.
  I encourage Members to put the unfortunate headline about the
bombing--and, boy, it was unfortunate--of the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade in that context. I know as well as my colleagues that a
mistake was made that was avoidable. I also know and encourage my
colleagues to consider that hundreds of intelligence officers are
overseas hard at work as we discuss that. We will never read about
them, we will never know much about them, but they are doing something
critically important for all of us each and every day. We should
recognize that.
  This bill is an attempt to give them the resources they need as this
dedicated talent is scattered around the world working around the clock
often under very adverse conditions to assure a safe and secure
America.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, the Washington Times headline said,

[[Page H3116]]

Greenspan's Warning Sends Stocks Reeling. Chairman Greenspan said that
our economic expansion could end badly because of a ballooning trade
deficit. He further said, somewhere in the future, unless reversed, our
growing international imbalances are apt to create significant problems
for America.
  Now, I know that the trade matter is under the jurisdiction of
another committee. But we all realize that there have been nations
buying and spying their way into our trade secrets, our patents, our
technology with a powerful impact and influence on our productivity and
competitiveness. I want to thank the committee for allowing an
amendment to be made in order by me that would require a report
describing the effects of espionage against America conducted by other
nations relative to our trade secrets, our patents, our technology
development and basic competitiveness. It shall also include an
analysis of the effects of such espionage on our trade deficit and on
the employment rate in the United States.
  This bill handles the intelligence community's needs quite well, but
I think that we take a passive role when we do not look at spying and
buying into our economic viability. It is not just the military aspects
that produce a great national security threat. I believe a great
national security threat is also present through our economic activity.
  With that, I want to thank them for allowing the amendment to be made
in order.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield 4 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum), a more than highly
valued member of the committee, chairman of one of our subcommittees, a
member who has led the task force on drug efforts that have been
ongoing these years, a man whose contributions through the Committee on
the Judiciary and his value from that position on the committee is
extraordinary.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. As chairman of the Subcommittee
on Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence, I am very
pleased to report that this bill continues four key investments we must
make in order for our government to be more effective against narcotics
traffickers, terrorists, proliferators and rogue states.
  The first investment we must make is in human intelligence. Mr.
Chairman, the unintentional bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade
underscores what our combat pilots and our diplomats have been telling
us all along. On-the-ground, human intelligence is as essential to the
targeting of our bombs as it is to the drafting of our demarches. To
wage an effective war or to maintain an effective peace, we must deploy
intelligence officers overseas to penetrate the war rooms and the
boardrooms of our adversaries.
  This bill, Mr. Chairman, helps us get there. It will indeed help put
more eyes and ears out into the problem areas of the world to get us
the intelligence that we need to win wars, to keep the peace and to
protect our national interests.
  The second investment we must make is in the all-source analyst.
Intelligence is the enabler of policy. The all-source analyst must
provide our policymakers and our military with finished intelligence
and assessments on matters from Kosovo to the Congo, from Pyongyang to
Papua New Guinea.
  In that light, Mr. Chairman, I am particularly pleased to report that
the authorization bill continues the rebuilding of our analyst cadre.
In the bill we provide for better training of our analysts, for more
competitive analysis and for broader and longer term assessments than
are done at present. Finally, as in past years, we provide more support
for the efforts of our analysts to integrate overt with covert
information and to determine what information must, in fact, be
collected clandestinely.
  The third investment is in counterintelligence. This bill provides
more funding for the counter-intelligence programs of the FBI and the
Department of Defense.
  We are all aware of the serious espionage case involving the
Department of Energy. For some time the committee has urged the
Department of Energy to improve its counterintelligence program. In
this bill we provide for better monitoring of foreign visitors to the
labs, for better support of FBI investigative activities, for better
cyber security and personnel security, and for better analysis of
foreign intelligence threats. Those threats are real, they are growing,
and they will be present with us for a long time to come. We really
need to improve counter- intelligence with whatever support resources
we can.
  This bill takes steps in that direction. We will need to take more in
future years.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, this bill invests in a major way in a matter
of deep and long-standing personal interest to me, the war on
international crime and on narcotics trafficking. In drafting this
bill, we have worked closely with the House Committee on Armed Services
in order to rebuild our intelligence community's capabilities against
the world's most dangerous criminal organizations, from the United Wa
State Army in Burma to the Colombia drug cartels to the Tijuana cartel
in Mexico.
  It strikes me that if we are going to make the efforts we did in
legislation the President signed into law last year in the Western
Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act come to life and be real, we need to
properly support that legislation in our budget and in our funding
programs both in intelligence and in terms of programs for Customs, for
DEA and for the Coast Guard. We need more planes to survey the region.
We need the kind of radar we do not have now. We need to have chase
planes. We need to have more vessels and ships. We need to have
alternative crop programs. We need to interdict drugs as well as, of
course, get at the education side of this.
  Intelligence is a very important part of that. If we do not have the
right intelligence apparatus in place in Central and Latin America in
particular, we will never be able to do what the bill calls for and
that is to reduce the flow of drugs into this country by 80 percent
over a 3-year period of time. I believe that can be done, I believe the
intelligence component of that is in this bill, and it is very
important.
  In sum, this bill supports our eyes and ears overseas, assists our
analysts back home and revitalizes our counterintelligence and counter-
narcotics efforts throughout the intelligence community. The bill is
one part of a coordinated effort against the evils of international
crime.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and congratulate him
on a bill well done.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank our ranking member for yielding me
this time and commend both the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon)
and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for their leadership on our
committee and in conducting the proceedings, in the gentleman from
Florida's case as our chairman, in a very fair and nonpartisan way.
  I as one from the left of the spectrum came to the committee to
subject the budget to the very harshest scrutiny, to declassify as many
documents as was possible in our national interest, and also to
hopefully see more diversity among the people who work in the
community. I think that is important because we should have the
community tap the talents of all the people in our society. I think it
will lead to better intelligence because we will have resources far
beyond those that we have now.
  Today, I wanted to address a couple of issues which are current in my
remarks about the bill, and because we may be called into the
appropriations supplemental conference at any moment, I am going to
talk about some of the amendments in my remarks here today. But on two
issues, Chinese espionage and the mistaken bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade, I wanted to make a couple of observations.
  In terms of the alleged espionage at our labs, I think this is a
very, very serious problem. I believe it is unfortunate that the
safeguards were not in place to protect our critical advantage, our
competitive advantage in terms of national security and the weapons
that are at our disposal. I think that what is happening in Kosovo is a
demonstration that war should be obsolete as an

[[Page H3117]]

option. But that not being the case, we have to protect the investment
we are making in our national defense and we have to, as our chairman
has said, have a force multiplier in the intelligence that we have to
prevent conflict and to equip our President with the best possible
information.
  But in dealing with the espionage issue, I hope that we will be
careful not to impugn the good reputations of the many Asian Americans
who are so excellent in the field of mathematics and science and who
have provided great service to our country, our Asian American
community. We must be very, very careful about how we deal with that
issue in those terms.
  We must also not impede the free flow of scientific information. I am
not talking about our secrets. I am talking about that kind of
information that should flow freely among scientists and it should flow
internationally. I think every person and every country in the world
benefits from that.
  We also must not demoralize all of the scientists at the labs. We
must recognize the service they have all provided to our country and
not investigate any one of them because of their national origin, that
we must have real cause, and it be directed toward programs that they
are working on rather than, as I say, national origin.
  In terms of the air strike, there are accidents that happen in war.
This was not an accident. This was a stupid mistake. I think that the
Chinese government--and I have never been one to pull a punch in my
criticism of the Chinese government as everyone here knows--deserves
the apology which it has received from the President of the United
States. I think the Chinese government deserves an inquiry into how
this happened to allay any suspicions that they may have that it was
anything but a mistake or an accident.
  I also think that our country should make reparations to the families
of those who died and those who were injured in that tragedy.

                              {time}  1145

  I do not think that we should, as some in China and the China
Business News have suggested, hatch some economic favors for the
Chinese to make up for the bombing of the embassy, and I do think that
the Chinese, in respect for all the catering to the Chinese that
President Clinton has done, owed him the courtesy and the respect of
showing his apology to the Chinese people far earlier so as not to
inflame the sentiments of the Chinese people against the United States.
  It is interesting to me to see these young people driven up in buses,
corralled by the Chinese military to the front of our embassy where
they threw pieces of sidewalk over a number of days at our embassy with
our ambassador inside. I did not see anybody being taken away by the
police except to be escorted to safety where young people 10 years ago,
almost to the day, when they demonstrated peacefully in Tiananmen
Square were rolled over by tanks.
  So I would hope that in addition to our apology, our reparations and
our inquiry that the Chinese would also look into the perpetrators of
that demonstration, that violent demonstration, against the American
embassy in China.
  Since I do not have very much time, I am going to go on to the
amendments since I might have to go to committee and I will not be here
to speak on them. I think that most of the amendments offered by our
colleagues should be accepted by the committee, specifically that of
the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr), and the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Engel) relating to the Kosovo Liberation Army. I hope the
committee will be able to accept the amendment of the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Hinchey), which I think is very well founded, about the
investigation of the assassination of President Allende. I understand
the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Ryun) may or may not offer his, but I
hope we can work out the amendment of the gentleman from Vermont (Mr.
Sanders), the gentleman from California (Mr. Stark) and the gentleman
from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio), which I think is a valuable addition to the
bill. I hope that the committee will accept the recommendation of the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Sweeney), and I certainly support the
recommendation of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters), and I
hope that that will be worked out.
  With that I again commend the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for
the way he conducts our meetings and the proud leadership of our
ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New
Mexico (Mrs. Wilson), a new member of our committee, who has already
established her credentials in helping us with the matters in Los
Alamos, which happens to be in her district.
  Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the chairman of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the ranking member and
the staff for their hard work on this authorization bill. I would like
to take a few moments to talk about Chinese espionage directed at the
Department of Energy and at our national laboratories, including Los
Alamos and Sandia, which are in my home State of New Mexico.
  Since the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Dicks) completed their extensive review of this issue
last fall, we have been reviewing the evidence, and listening to
experts and thinking about what we should do. Some facts are clear.
  First, the Chinese have obtained classified information on our
nuclear weapons program that has endangered American national security.
  Second, while public attention has focused on a few individuals and
principally Los Alamos National Lab, this was not a single instance of
a lucky break by the Chinese. It is just one piece in a mosaic of
Chinese espionage activity.
  Likewise, the failure to protect these secrets was not just a failure
of an individual, but of institutions, lousy communication between
agencies, lost files, weak procedures, inadequate resources and just
plain poor judgment show up again and again in the history of this
incident.
  Now it is up to Congress to begin to correct these failures, and let
us be clear from the beginning. There are not going to be any simple
solutions.
  There are several elements of this authorization bill that begin to
address these deficiencies.
  The bill includes additional funds to subject the China-Taiwan Issues
Group at the CIA to rigorous external competitive analysis, to
challenge thinking more aggressively, and to report to the Congress
biannually on this effort.
  Second, the committee is recommending a substantial funding increase
to the Department of Energy for analysis of foreign nuclear weapons
programs. Special emphasis will be on the Chinese and Russian programs
as well as proliferation.
  The bill authorizes substantial increase in funding for the DOE
Office of Counterintelligence, including new counterintelligence
computer information security programs, and we increase funding for the
FBI for counterintelligence and investigative training.
  Finally, the committee has added substantial funding for language
training to correct a serious shortage of linguists in the intelligence
community.
  These efforts are only the beginning of what must be done to improve
our national counterintelligence activity. I believe that we need
further comprehensive legislation to remedy this problem and have been
working in a bipartisan way with my colleagues to begin the drafting of
that legislation. There are at least a dozen recommendations that we
have developed thus far, and I will include those recommendations at
the appropriate point for the Record.
  Mr. Chairman, we will be dealing with the consequences of this
situation for a long time. The bill before us is the beginning of that
process. I look forward to working with my colleagues to that end.
  1. We must create a special set of security requirements for DOE and
DOE contractor employees who have access to nuclear information. Those
who have physical access to sensitive area must all be investigated,
cleared and readily identifiable. As difficult as it is to believe,
there are people with rather superficial background checks that have
physical access to sensitive facilities who are not allowed to have
access to the information in them.
  2. The FBI, no contractors, should handle all Q clearances background
checks.

[[Page H3118]]

  3. Sensitive employees, as a condition of clearance must agree to
take polygraphs, which would then trigger further investigation if the
polygraph indicates deception.
  4. The government must be allowed to monitor e-mail and telephone
traffic into and out of the national laboratories an nuclear weapons
plants.
  5. The FBI must be allowed to search ad monitor computers and
telephones within national laboratories, something we don't allow now,
as incredible as that sounds.
  6. Compel the FBI to inform the DOE office of counter-intelligence
and the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs within fifteen days of
the initiation of an espionage investigation of any DOE or DOE
contractor employee. In one of the Los Alamos cases, no notification
was made for four years.
  7. Require the DOE official responsible for Q clearances to be
informed of all issues that might impact the issuance of a clearance,
even when such issues fail to rise to the level of an indictment.
  8. Improve timely communication of all such matters to the leadership
of Congress and the appropriated committees of jurisdiction.
  9. Set clear conditions and procedures for unclassified and
classified visits to our national laboratories by foreign visitors from
sensitive countries.
  10. Require that DOE develop and maintain a comprehensive
counterintelligence plan which must be reviewed and certified as
adequate annually by the FBI to the President and the relevant
committees of the Congress.
  11. Establish vulnerability assessment group with responsibility or
assessing and evaluating the vulnerability of DOE and the labs to
espionage, including conducting classified operational tests of lab
security. The group will report annually to the relevant Congressional
Committees.
  12. Establish in law a special assistant for counter intelligence
reporting to the Secretary of Energy with responsibility for management
and oversight of the DOE counter-intelligence program. This individual
must have professional experience in intelligence and counter-
intelligence matters. The bill that is before us today is the beginning
of that process.
  Mr. Chairman, we will be dealing with the consequences of this
situation for some time. It is my hope that we can develop a bi-
partisan consensus bill in the House that will provide real protection
of America's secrets.
  We have a serious problem and we need to address it. But, at the same
time, we must be careful. The national laboratories are tremendous
national assets which employ some of the most brilliant scientific
talent in America. In our eagerness to solve a problem, we must make
sure that we do not damage that which we are trying to protect.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues to that end.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Roemer), a very valuable member of our committee.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I want to, first of all, thank my good
friend, the ranking member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon)
and applaud him forever his hard work on the committee and also our
chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for the way that the
majority and the minority parties work together.
  With that preface, Mr. Chairman, I voted for this bill, to send it to
the floor, but I do have a host of hesitations, caveats, concerns and
reservations. I will vote for this bill today, but I hope these
reservations and hesitations and caveats are addressed between now and
the conference report. I will also vote for this bill because I think
it is important for our intelligence community and our intelligence
assets to cooperate with our military at a time that we find ourselves
at war not only in Kosovo but at war in Iraq, and that cooperation is
vital.
  But my concerns are fivefold, Mr. Chairman:
  One, the Chinese embassy bombing. I disagree strongly with Senator
Shelby, who has stated that this is a funding priority concern and we
are not spending enough money. This is an individual mistake, this is a
system mistake, this is a CIA mistake, and not updating the maps I
think is a failure of the CIA to provide some basic information in this
instance, and I am hopeful that the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss)
as our chairman will have not only a hearing on this but an open
hearing followed by possibly a closed hearing.
  Secondly, I am concerned about the string of failures in our missile
launches and our access to space. The gentleman from Delaware (Mr.
Castle) and the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop) have shown their
concern on this issue, and that is something that we are following up
on.
  Thirdly, I am concerned about the security of the national
laboratories, and I hope that this is not a partisan political and
wedge issue that the parties will get into. This again, Mr. Chairman,
is a failure of institutions, it is a failure of administrations, and
it is a failure of systems.
  Fourthly, Mr. Chairman, I am concerned about something that the
chairman is very, very concerned about and trying to address, and that
is the ongoing need for hiring more linguists and analysts, and it is
something he is very devoted to and something we need to continue to
work on.
  And lastly, and our ranking member said this better than I did or I
could, we have concerns about the SAPs, or the special access programs,
are not being systematically reported to the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence. We do need to address this between now and the
conference, and this is something that I think is important to a host
of different members on the committee on both sides. We need more
oversight of the SAPs, we need more reporting of the SAPs, we may even
need a person in charge of this process.
  So those are the five concerns I have, Mr. Chairman, and I hope that
we will address those in the ensuing months with the Senate
Intelligence Committee in conference and again applaud the chairman and
the ranking member for their working relationship.

                      Announcement by the Chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would remind all Members to avoid personal
references to Members of the United States Senate.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Let me assure the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) that all five
of the points he made are very much on my schedule.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Delaware
(Mr. Castle), another subcommittee chairman of our subcommittee system
on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence who has served us
very well and recently addressed one of the points about missiles which
we may hear more about.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida for
yielding this time to me, and, Mr. Chairman, I do rise in very strong
support for this bill, and I really do commend the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss), our chairman of the committee, and the gentleman
from California (Mr. Dixon), our ranking member, for their efforts and
the other members of this committee. They are a pleasure to work with
as well as the staff which works so well together in a truly bipartisan
sense, and I think that today together we have brought to the floor a
good bipartisan bill that continues to work toward rebuilding our
intelligence capabilities, and, Mr. Chairman, these capabilities have
been seriously and dangerously hollowed out. We have been saying this
for 4 years now, and unfortunately there are now stark reminders of the
risks we have taken.
  Mr. Chairman, our chairman has discussed the intelligence issues that
contributed to the errors that related to the bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade. Therefore I do not want to dwell on this except to
say that I also view this issue as a result of past policies and
emphasize collection at the expense of processing and analysis and
emphasize tactical intelligence at the expense of strategic
intelligence, and I emphasize at the expense because there is an issue
of imbalance here. We cannot do one and not the other. If we collect
data but do not have the wherewithal to analyze it expertly, the value
of the collection is diminished regardless of how much users say it is
needed.
  Tactical intelligence gives a pilot the information that tells him or
her when life-threatening missiles may be in the area of operations,
but strategic intelligence gives us the data to know the types of
missiles in the area in the first place and gives the data that
distinguishes an embassy from a storage facility.
  Put simply, we cannot do one without the other and be successful in
protecting our security and reducing the chance of mistakes.
  But there are other issues that are just as important in this debate
that point to the fragility of our intelligence community.

[[Page H3119]]

  As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical
Intelligence, I face some of the most perplexing and costly problems in
front of the committee. I would like to mention two such problems.
First is the issue that I mentioned briefly before relating to that
imbalance between collection on the one side and processing and
analysis on the other. This is an area of great concern to the
committee and one that we specifically highlight in this bill.
  Put simply: We have new imagery collection systems coming down the
pike, and the administration has done virtually nothing by way of
preparing for the processing and analysis of the images taken. There is
supposedly a plan that is under development, but there is no budget for
it. Yet experts have privately indicated that the cost over the next 5
or so years could be in the billions.
  Without this investment in processing and analysis the collected
imagery will be almost useless. Without this investment mistakes will
continue to be made. There will be more misidentified buildings,
especially as we learn from one foreign policy crisis to the next
around the globe. In this bill we have not only sent a warning shot to
the administration but have also begun an investment, although modest,
to try and fix this imbalance between collection and analysis.
  A second area of concern is the recapitalization of our signals
intelligence capabilities. Again put simply, I am afraid that we run
the risk of going deaf to the worldwide explosion of communications
technologies. Obviously, Mr. Chairman, I cannot go into the details in
this area, but suffice it to say that there is a very serious issue
here, and again we address that issue in this bill.
  One last area of concern to me is our ability to launch satellites
into space. The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) mentioned this
moments ago. As many of as my colleagues know from reading recent press
reports, we are having a crisis of confidence in our launch systems
based on a series of failures within the past year. This is an issue
that we are looking into now, and we have had a series of discussions
with various experts on this particular subject already that will
probably go to the hearing stage next.

                              {time}  1200

  This is an issue that we must continue to look into, but it points to
the fact that intelligence resources cannot be taken for granted.
Without the proper care and investment in the infrastructure, we place
our resources at risk.
  Mr. Chairman, the concerns that I have addressed are not the only
ones we need to address. There are many more, some large, some small.
It is clear, however, that a long-term commitment to investment in
intelligence is needed. The administration is not doing it, so we have
to.
  The adds proposed in this bill are fairly modest, especially compared
to the need, but it is a start. It invests in the recapitalization of
our signals intelligence capabilities, it begins the process of
investment for processing and analysis, and it provides the guidance
and support that the Director of Central Intelligence needs but seems
only to be getting from Congress.
  The bill addresses the most urgent needs that get us going in the
process of rebuilding our capabilities. It is a good bill. It works to
both balance and invest in our national security future. It is a must,
and I ask the Members of the House to give it our full support.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank our distinguished ranking member,
the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), for affording me a little
bit of time to clarify my position on the Sweeney amendment, which I
said earlier that I had hoped the committee could accommodate.
  It was more in the spirit of what the amendment says about the
willful identification of U.S. intelligence agents also including such
protections to cover former agents. I think there should be a stern
penalty for those who would be involved in the willful identification.
I do not think that, as the Sweeney amendment says, there should be
minimum mandatory penalties but that should be left up to the judges.
  These people put themselves in harm's way. They deserve our
protection, but the minimum mandatory sentence is not what it should
be.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Bishop), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on
Technical and Tactical Intelligence of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr.
Dixon) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1555, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
  I would note, first of all, that this legislation was approved
unanimously in the committee, a reflection of the efforts of the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman, and ranking Democrat
member, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), to produce a
bipartisan bill.
  This year I became the ranking member of the Subcommittee on
Technical and Tactical Intelligence, and in plain language this
subcommittee is responsible for oversight of the ways in which
intelligence is collected using machines like satellites and airplanes,
rather than human beings.
  The subcommittee is also responsible for intelligence systems and
activities that support our military forces tactically. These systems
are critically important for virtually all of the intelligence
community's missions, from combatting terrorism and narcotics
trafficking to supporting our troops in combat in the Balkans and the
Persian Gulf.
  This bill is very consistent with the request submitted by the
President. In several areas, the committee recommends modest increases
in the amount requested by the President.
  In general, I am very supportive of these decisions. For example,
this bill adds funds to help the National Security Agency reshape
itself to keep pace with the incredible growth in the size and
complexity of the global telecommunications network.
  The committee is concerned that NSA needs some organizational and
management reforms as well as some engineering expertise from industry
to sustain its remarkable record in defense of the Nation.
  The committee also recommends additional funding in selected areas of
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, or NIMA. NIMA faces a very
large shortfall in its capacity to exploit the volume of imagery that
we will be able to collect in the near future for intelligence needs
and for mapmaking. The committee has recommended increased funds for
NIMA to begin this expansion and to increase its productivity.
  The committee has also recommended funds for additional procurement
of pictures and products from the commercial sector.
  On the debit side, the committee recommends a relatively modest
reduction in the budget for the National Reconnaissance Office, or NRO,
which builds, launches and operates the Nation's intelligence
satellites. Included in the committee's recommended actions is a
proposal to defer a decision until conference with the Senate on
whether to continue production of an NRO satellite or to initiate a new
design.
  I believe that this proposal was a reasonable compromise, and I
appreciate the chairman's willingness to accommodate the concerns of
Democrats on it.
  The committee bill also contains recommendations for increases in
several important tactical intelligence missions and systems, including
the RC-135 signals intelligence aircraft, the Predator and Global Hawk
unmanned aerial vehicles, and tactical antisubmarine warfare programs.
  Since the committee marked up this bill, there have been three
successive satellite launch failures to go along with another three
suffered just since last August. The Subcommittee on Technical and
Tactical Intelligence held its first briefing yesterday on this very
disturbing string of failures, and the gentleman from Delaware (Mr.
Castle), the chairman of the subcommittee, along with the gentleman
from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) have pledged to continue the subcommittee's
examination of this potentially serious problem over the coming months.

[[Page H3120]]

  Mr. Chairman, this bill would provide the funds that are needed to
sustain our efforts to combat terrorism, narcotics trafficking and
weapons proliferation and to support our military forces. It is a
responsible and prudent measure, and I am pleased to support this bill,
and I urge my colleagues across the aisle, on both sides of the aisle,
to support it as well.
  Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, there has a flurry of news articles,
exposes and anti-China speeches in recent weeks over the Los Alamos
Labs Espionage Case. But it didn't start with that. For months
politicans have been making fantastic accusations of Chinese smuggling
AK-47s into the port of Los Angeles, PLA owned businesses acquiring
warehouses in Long Beach, California, Chinese bases at either entrance
of the Panama Canal, Chinese campaign donations to the Democratic party
and Chinese theft of dual-use technologies. These are only some of the
more outrageous of stories.
  This takes us to our current crisis, recently stoked by the
accidental and unfortunate bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade
by NATO forces. No doubt the collective sum of our concerns with
Chinese, both true and imagined, have led to the souring of U.S.-China
relations. The Chinese, in all likelihood do indeed spy against the
United States. Just, as I would suspect, many other nations both
friendly and adversarial. We should not be so alarmed, so offended.
This is the reality that nation-states must accept and must employ for
their own security. Accusations of Chinese espionage notwithstanding,
security weaknesses in our weapons labs are a serious concern. However,
these problems can and will be corrected. And they must be corrected
responsibly. Legislation aimed at destroying the free exchange of
scientific knowledge through our foreign visitors program would do more
harm to our national security than good. We can stem the illegal flow
of classified information in other, non-draconian ways. Indeed we are
capable of such feats.
  For the past couple of months now, committees and subcommittees have
held hearings on the Los Alamos case and the allegations of Chinese
espionage. As we discuss today's Intelligence Reauthorization
legislation, we have to ensure that the current rash of stories and the
current state of our relationship with China has no impact upon the
lives and the employment or economic opportunities of individual Asian
Americans around the country. We in Congress have a special
responsibility to make sure that our sentiments about these matters of
espionage, these matters of our relationship with China or any Asian or
Pacific country in clearly separate from any reflection upon the ethnic
communities in our country. As we deal with the Cox Report, as we deal
with the Department of Energy revelations, let us remember that there
is a very deal danger of stereotyping and stigmatizing all members of
our Asian American communities.
  Let us also remember the contributions Asian Pacific Americans have
made to our nation. May is Asian Pacific American Heritage Month, and I
encourage my colleagues to participate in the month-long activities
held in honor of the Asian Pacific Americans in our districts and in
our nation. Especially at this time when allegations of espionage and
relations with countries like China are scrutinized and questioned, as
Members of Congress, we must take measures and assure our Asian Pacific
American communities that their professional advancement and employment
in federal agencies will not be impeded and obstructed, that their
diligence and dedication will not be erased and forgotten in the face
of mere speculation.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this Member rises in support of the rule
for H.R. 1555, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
The distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] Chairman and the
distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Dixon] Ranking member of
the House Intelligence Committee are to be commended for their
leadership and fine work on this bill.
  Intelligence, Mr. Chairman, is an enabler of policy. On occasion,
where its sources and methods take us where diplomacy cannot go,
intelligence is the sole enabler of policy.
  Let me give you an example. Some time ago, in what used to be called
the Third World, a large rebel force invaded and occupied almost a
third of a country with whom we enjoyed good relations. From way back
here, in Washington, it looked as if a rogue state had precipitated
that invasion. Some back here, in fact, were so convinced that the
invasion was the doing of that rogue state that they decried the lack
of proof as an ``intelligence failure'' on the part of CIA. Only later,
after looking at the Agency's reporting, did Washington realize that
the facts in the field did not fit the preconception here at home: The
invasion was fundamentally indigenous in cause and in makeup. This
affected our actions against the rogue state and shaped our policy
toward the friendly nation.
  The better the intelligence, the better the policy. Our ambassadors
around the world, especially those in unstable or underdeveloped
countries, understand that and urge our help in obtaining or retaining
an intelligence presence in their countries. In those countries,
particularly, intelligence can reach beyond the bounds of diplomacy and
provide the ambassador and the Department of State with the
understanding they must have to make sound policy. Secretary Albright
recently visited the CIA at the Bush Center for Intelligence to give
the rank-and-file there this same message.
  As an alumnus of the Intelligence Committee and the Vice Chairman and
subcommittee chairman in the International Relations Committee, this
Member well knows how important intelligence can be to the formation of
policy. H.R. 1555 will help put more intelligence officers out in the
field to collect the intelligence that policymakers must have. The bill
will help hone the skills of the analysts who interpret and asses that
intelligence for our policymakers. In short, H.R. 1555 will continue
the process of rebuilding the capability of our intelligence community
to support the policymaking process. This bill, and the hours of care
and guidance from the Chairman and Ranking Member that produced it in
its present form, deserve your support.
  Finally, after hearing much in recent days about what went wrong over
Belgrade last week, this Member would like to end his remarks with a
recent quote from President Bush during the dedication of the Bush
Center for Intelligence at Langley:
  ``Some people think, `what do we need intelligence for?' My answer to
that is we have plenty of enemies. Plenty of enemies abound.
Unpredictable leaders willing to export instability or to commit crimes
against humanity. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
terrorism, narco-trafficking, people killing each other,
fundamentalists killing each other in the name of God. These and more.
Many more. As your analysts know, as our collectors know--these are our
enemies. To combat them, we need more intelligence, not less.

                           *   *   *   *   *

  ``And when it comes to the mission of CIA and the Intelligence
Community, Director George Tenet has it exactly right. Give the
President and the policymakers the best possible intelligence product
and stay out of the policymaking or policy implementation except as
specifically decreed in the law.''
  President Bush then closed with this:
  ``It has been said that `patriotism is not a frenzied burst of
emotion, but rather the quiet and steady dedication of a lifetime.' To
me, this sums up CIA--Duty, Honor, Country. This timeless creative
service motivates those who serve at Langley and in intelligence across
the world.
  ``It is an honor to stand here and be counted among you.''
  Mr. Chairman, this Member agrees with those words and urges support
for the rule for H.R. 1555.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill
for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule by title, and each
title shall be considered read.
  No amendment to the committee amendment is in order unless printed in
the Congressional Record and pro forma amendments for the purpose of
debate.
  The chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time
during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request
for a recorded vote on any amendment and may reduce to not less than 5
minutes the time for voting by electronic device on any postponed
question that immediately follows another vote by electronic device
without intervening business, provided that the time for voting by
electronic device in the first in any series of questions shall not be
less than 15 minutes.
  The Clerk will designate section 1.
  The text of section 1 is as follows:
       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.

[[Page H3121]]

Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Authorization of emergency supplemental appropriations for
              fiscal year 1999.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on intelligence community contracting.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Two-year extension of CIA central services program.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 501. Protection of operational files of the National Imagery and
              Mapping Agency.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to section 1?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title I.
  The text of title I is as follows:
                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
     year 2000 for the conduct of the intelligence and
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (6) The Department of State.
       (7) The Department of the Treasury.
       (8) The Department of Energy.
       (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2000,
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
     prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1555 of the One Hundred
     Sixth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
     the Executive Branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
     2000 under section 102 when the Director of Central
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
     intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
     Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
     the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by
     this section.

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
     Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal
     year 2000 the sum of $193,572,000. Within such amount, funds
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
     referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and
     Development Committee shall remain available until September
     30, 2001.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
     Community Management Account of the Director of Central
     Intelligence are authorized 348 full-time personnel as of
     September 30, 2000. Personnel serving in such elements may be
     permanent employees of the Community Management Staff or
     personnel detailed from other elements of the United States
     Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community
     Management Account by subsection (a), there are also
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
     Account for fiscal year 2000 such additional amounts as are
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
     referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall
     remain available until September 30, 2001.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
     Community Management Account as of September 30, 2000, there
     are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such
     elements as of that date as are specified in the classified
     Schedule of Authorizations.
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during
     fiscal year 2000, any officer or employee of the United
     States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the
     staff of the Community Management Account from another
     element of the United States Government shall be detailed on
     a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee,
     or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a
     period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
     functions as required by the Director of Central
     Intelligence.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the
     authorization in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000
     shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center.
     Within such amount, funds provided for research, development,
     test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
     September 30, 2001, and funds provided for procurement
     purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2002.
       (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central
     Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the
     United States funds available for the National Drug
     Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General
     shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the
     National Drug Intelligence Center.
       (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
     Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the
     provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
       (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
     the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
     operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

     SEC. 105. AUTHORIZATION OF EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
                   APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999.

       (a) Authorization.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated
     for fiscal year 1999 under section 101 of the Intelligence
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-272)
     for the conduct of the intelligence activities of elements of
     the United States Government listed in such section are
     hereby increased, with respect to any such authorized amount,
     by the amount by which appropriations pursuant to such
     authorization were increased by an emergency supplemental
     appropriation in a supplemental appropriations Act for fiscal
     year 1999 that is enacted after May 1, 1999, for such amounts
     as are designated by Congress as an emergency requirement
     pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C.
     901(b)(2)(A)).
       (b) Ratification.--For purposes of section 504 of the
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any obligation
     or expenditure of those amounts deemed to have been
     specifically authorized by Congress in the Act referred to in
     subsection (a) is hereby ratified and confirmed.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title I?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title II.
  The text of title II is as follows:

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
     year 2000 the sum of $209,100,000.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there any amendments to title II?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title III.
  The text of title III is as follows:
                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
                   CONTRACTING.

       It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central
     Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the
     intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national
     security interests of the United States and consistent with
     operational and security concerns related to the conduct of
     intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should
     competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the
     procurement of products properly designated as having been
     made in the United States.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title III?

                   Amendment Offered by Mr. Traficant

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant:
       At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the
     following new section:

[[Page H3122]]

     SEC. 304. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE ON UNITED
                   STATES TRADE SECRETS.

       By not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment
     of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall
     submit to Congress a report describing the effects of
     espionage against the United States, conducted by or on
     behalf of other nations, on United States trade secrets,
     patents, and technology development. The study shall include
     an analysis of the effects of such espionage on the trade
     deficit of the United States and on the employment rate in
     the United States.

  Mr. TRAFICANT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community, even though
they have made mistakes, is basically not patted on the back and
rewarded for thousands of good things they accomplish; and I want to
commend the chairman, who is a former intelligence agent and has done a
great job educating many of us who have our concerns about the
intelligence community, and the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon)
on the bill.
  While I feel we do a great job looking at the national security
aspects through military activities, we can buoy up and should buoy up
our efforts to look at buying and spying of foreign interests into our
competitive industrial trade scenario. With that, the Traficant
amendment calls for a report from the CIA to describe the effects to
Congress of buying and spying against the United States by other
nations relative to our trade secrets, our patents, our technology
development and our industrial competitiveness.
  It also states that the study shall include an analysis of the
effects of such buying and spying on our trade deficit, which is
approaching one quarter trillion dollars this next year, $250 billion,
with China and Japan now taking $5 billion a month each out of our
economy. Unbelievable. I want to know how much of it is buying and
spying.
  With that, the report shall also give us an analysis of not only the
negative balance of payments in the trade deficit but on the impact on
employment and competitiveness of our Nation.
  With that, I would hope that I would have the support of the
committee. If I do not, I ask that the chairman overrule them on my
behalf.
  In all seriousness, I believe it is necessary. It buoys up a part of
this bill that makes us look at the domestic industrial side, and I
would seek and ask for the support of our chairman and ranking member.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Goss) for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, on this side, we will accept the amendment. I think it
is a good amendment.
  I want to just point out one mistake that the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. Traficant) made, that inadvertently he made, in that there is a
lot of confusion in the terminology as it relates to the intelligence
community. He used the term ``agent.'' I understand the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss) was an employee of the CIA, and his title was a
``case officer.''
  There is confusion about ``agent,'' ``asset,'' and ``case officers.''
In the future, this reference may be made, and I know the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. Traficant) did not understand that. It just goes to show
how easily, even those of us who are involved in Congress, can make a
mistake.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California (Mr.
Dixon), the distinguished ranking member, for making that point. It
actually is a very important one. It may be subtle to some, but it is
extremely important, and I appreciate it.
  Mr. Chairman, I am very much prepared to accept the amendment of the
distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant). I think it is a good
amendment. I think it adds substance to an area that we have already
signalled an interest in, and it gets specific in some areas that, in
fact, we have had some select committees working on as representative
of this institution.
  So I think the gentleman is on target. I am very much supportive of
the amendment and happy to accept it.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?

                Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Sweeney

  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment number 10, which is
printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 10 offered by Mr. Sweeney:
       At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the
     following new section:

     SEC. 304. PROTECTION OF IDENTITY OF RETIRED COVERT AGENTS.

       (a) In General.--Section 606(4)(A) of the National Security
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 426(4)(A)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``an officer or employee'' and inserting
     ``a present or retired officer or employee''; and
       (2) by striking ``a member'' and inserting ``a present or
     retired member''.
       (b) Imposition of Minimum Prison Sentences for
     Violations.--Section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947
     (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``not less than five
     and'' after ``or imprisoned'';
       (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``not less than 30
     months and'' after ``or imprisoned''; and
       (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``not less than 18
     months and'' after ``or imprisoned''.

  (Mr. SWEENEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, before addressing my amendment, allow me
to first express my strong support for the intelligence authorization
bill and commend the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), the ranking member, for their
great work on this important bill.
  Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community is truly our first line of
defense; and we must do everything in our power to ensure that our
counterintelligence operations are as strong as our potential enemies.
The amendment I am offering today is intended to complement this fine
bill on an important national security issue, the protection of our
intelligence agents.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment simply increases the criminal penalty for
individuals who expose covert agents and expands the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act to protect the identities of former agents as
well.
  First and foremost, my amendment establishes a minimum mandatory
penalty for the willful identification of a United States intelligence
agent. The existing criminal penalties against such an offense are
woefully inadequate. While several lesser criminal offenses require
mandatory minimums, few are as consequential to the interests of our
national security as the protection of those who serve our country in
this capacity.
  Secondly, the amendment extends the scope of these protections to
former covert agents as only current agents are now covered by the law.
By increasing the criminal penalties for disclosing identities for
existing agents and by including former agents, my amendment
accomplishes several important national security objectives and
appropriately emphasizes the high priority with which we make national
security. It protects agents and former agents from possible harm as a
result of the disclosure of their true identities and past locations
and activities. It also protects the entire intelligence network that
often remains in place after an individual agent leaves his or her
assignment.

                              {time}  1215

  By protecting retired agents, the amendment protects those active
operatives who may have assumed the former agents' positions.
  Through the Freedom of Information Act people obtain information
relevant to U.S. intelligence operations. Currently no statutory
protection exists to prohibit identification of retired intelligence
agents. This initiative strengthens the penalties against disclosing
the information that identifies covert agents. Penalties in my
amendment are proportional, yet tougher to those which exist under
current law.
  The majority of our current and former intelligence agents serve or

[[Page H3123]]

have served the United States at considerable risk, Mr. Chairman, and
there is absolutely no justification for exposing them to danger.
  Identifying current or former agents warrants serious criminal
liability, and my amendment does just that. Ensure the safety of our
intelligence community and provide adequate penalties to those who
jeopardize America's national security by voting yes on the Sweeney
amendment to H.R. 1555.

   Amendment Offered by Mr. Goss to Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr.
                                Sweeney

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Goss to amendment No. 10 offered
     by Mr. Sweeney:
       Strike subsection (b) of section 304, as proposed to be
     added by the amendment and insert the following:
       (b) Imposition of Minimum Prison Sentences for
     Violations.--Section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947
     (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``shall be fined not
     more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
     both.'' and inserting ``shall be imprisoned not less than
     five years and not more than ten years and fined not more
     than $50,000.''.
       (2) in subsection (b), by striking ``shall be fined not
     more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
     both.'' and inserting ``shall be imprisoned not less than 30
     months and not more than five years and fined not more than
     $25,000.''.
       (3) in subsection (c), by striking ``shall be fined not
     more than $15,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or
     both.'' and inserting ``shall be imprisoned not less than 18
     months and not more than three years and fined not more than
     $15,000.''.

  Mr. GOSS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent
that the amendment to the amendment be considered as read and printed
in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, the perfecting amendment to the Sweeney
amendment that I have offered I am told makes a technical correction.
The amendment filed contained a drafting error, and as a result, would
not impose a true mandatory minimum sentencing requirement, which was
the intent. Whether we agree or not, the intent was to make it
mandatory.
  The amendment clarifies the intent of the amendment to toughen the
sentencing standards and impose mandatory minimums. I understand, in
plain English, it is both a penalty and mandatory time.
  I would ask the gentleman from New York, is my understanding correct?
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. SWEENEY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, that was my intent.
  Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, then, Mr. Chairman, and going to what
that would leave us with on the Sweeney amendment if the secondary
amendment is considered and approved is that we would have an amendment
which would in fact deal with the Agent Identities Protection Act and
put some more teeth into it.
  I would point out that Mr. Solomon, our colleague from New York,
former chairman of the Committee on Rules, offered a similar amendment
in 1981 which I am told passed the House by some 300 votes and then
disappeared in conference, as sometimes happens.
  As Members will recall, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act
penalizes the unauthorized disclosure of identities of covert employees
and assets of the United States. This is willful disclosure, we are
talking about here. We are not talking about an accident or a slip of
the tongue or leaving a document someplace by a mistake. Those are bad
things. We are talking about setting out to deliberately expose
classified information that can result in harm to an individual,
serious harm.
  Mr. Chairman, I understand originally that the act was offered in
1979 by Chairman Boland in response to the disclosure of identities of
CIA officers and assets by Philip Agee, Louis Wolf, and others. The Act
is sharply focused upon present and former cleared employees and upon
those who publish deliberate and repeated disclosures of the type found
in the Covert Action Information Bulletin.
  The Act has been an useful tool for prosecutors and the intelligence
community, although it has not been applied aggressively, as some
prefer, including me. The U.S. government has charged some current and
former employees, and as an apparent consequence of that, the
disclosures have been abated. But it has been a pretty weak tool. It
has not been able to be used as it was originally intended.
  I honestly believe that the amendment of the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Sweeney) does add extra strength, and does it in a reasonable way.
We are not throwing out all the rules of judicial protection or
anything like that. What we are basically doing is putting people on
notice that for willful disclosure of agent identities, there is a
penalty. It is a serious penalty, because it is a serious crime.
  Having said that, I will urge acceptance of the Sweeney amendment, as
perfected by our secondary amendment.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to congratulate the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Sweeney) on his amendment. I will not object to it, but I do
have some concerns with it.
  As I understand the amendment and the perfecting amendment, basically
it does two things. It covers retired agents, but the concern I have is
the decision to make penalties, whether they be incarceration or money
fines, mandatory without hearings. Generally speaking, I am opposed to
mandatory sentences. I have great faith in the Federal judiciary.
  I do not think that we should move this fast without some hearings on
this to find out if this type of activity should be in the class of
mandatory sentences. I would tell the gentleman from New York, I will
not object to it, but I would like to reserve to discuss this further
at the conference.
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DIXON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's remarks. The
gentleman is correct in saying that what the bill essentially does is
extend the protection to retired agents.
  Also, in establishing mandatory minimums, my intent was to raise the
level of Section 601 to the highest levels and the highest priorities,
which I believe our national security interests dictate.
  I will point out that what the mandatory minimum sentences that I
have prescribed in my amendment do is cut in half the mandatory
maximums, so I think proportionately, it is very reasonable.
  Let me also just say that in relationship to Federal mandatory
minimums, there are hundreds, literally hundreds, as I am sure the
gentleman knows, of Federal crimes, including food stamp fraud,
including bribery of meat inspectors, that have mandatory minimum
sentences.
  I think in order for this Congress to send a very strong message
about the protection of agents and former agents, the inclusion of the
mandatory minimum is an essential part.
  Mr. DIXON. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I may ultimately agree
with the gentleman from New York. I just think it is worth more than 5
minutes of time on the floor, and I will reserve to address this issue
in conference.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) to the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Sweeney.)
  The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Sweeney), as amended.
  The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

                 Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Hinchey

  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 4.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Hinchey:

     SEC. 304. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
                   AGENCY IN CHILE.

       (a) In General.--By not later than 120 days after the date
     of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Central
     Intelligence shall

[[Page H3124]]

     submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
     describing all activities of officers, covert agents, and
     employees of all elements in the intelligence community with
     respect to the following events in the Republic of Chile:
       (1) The assassination of President Salvador Allende in
     September 1973.
       (2) The accession of General Augusto Pinochet to the
     Presidency of the Republic of Chile.
       (3) Violations of human rights committed by officers or
     agents of former President Pinochet.
       (b) Documentation.--(1) The report submitted under
     subsection (a) shall include copies of unedited documents in
     the possession of any such element of the intelligence
     community with respect to such events.
       (2) Any provision of law prohibiting the dissemination of
     classified information shall not apply to documents referred
     to in paragraph (1).
       (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
     congressional committees'' means the Permanent Select
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations
     of the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on
     Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the
     Senate.

  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Chairman, because of recent activities by a certain
member of the Spanish judiciary, the attention of the world has once
again been directed at the events which took place in Chile beginning
in September of 1973 with the assassination of the duly-elected
president of that country, Salvador Allende, and the subsequent
ascension to power of General Augusto Pinochet to become the President
of the Republic of Chile.
  In the course of those events, it has been alleged in responsible
venues over and over again in the intervening now more than 25 years
that very inappropriate actions were taken by members of the Chilean
military, assisted by others, including members of the military of the
United States.
  I have an amendment which requires that no later than 120 days after
the date of the enactment of this act, the director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees which are mentioned in the amendment a report describing all
activities of officers, covert agents, and employees of all elements of
the intelligence community with respect to the following events in the
Republic of Chile:
  One, the assassinations of President Salvador Allende in September of
1973;
  Two, the ascension of General Augusto Pinochet to the presidency of
the Republic of Chile; and
  Three, the violations of human rights committed by officers or agents
of former President Pinochet.
  The report submitted under this subsection shall include copies of
unedited documents in the possession of any such element of the
intelligence community with respect to such events.
  Mr. Chairman, I think that after the passage of all of this time, it
is appropriate that the United States Congress and the people of the
United States and the people of the world understand with much greater
clarity than they have been able to up to this moment the specific
events which took place in Chile which led to the assassination of the
duly-elected president and the ascension of power by a military junta.
  It is important for us to understand these events because it is
important for us to take action to ensure that these kinds of illegal
activities do not occur in the future.
  So therefore, I offer this amendment with all respect in the hopes
that the Members of the House and the chairman particularly, the
chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, will see
fit to look upon it favorably.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the intent of the amendment very much, but
I must say, I have some misgivings about the effect and the cost, and I
want to take a minute to explain that.
  First, with regard to the purpose, let me say that our committee is
trying, I think through its mark on the budget and through its
oversight, to help our intelligence community focus on the challenges
we have got today and coming in the next century. They are incredible
challenges of a sort that we are really not organized to deal with, as
we are seeing, unfortunately.
  We are in the process of getting that done, but we understand the
Warsaw Pact is gone, and in its place we have the Osama Bin Ladens, the
Milosevics, the Tijuana cartels, that type of problem.
  This amendment would, I think, have us take a break from the reality
we are faced with today and go back and start sifting through some
history of things that happened at a different time, really under a
different agency that was operating under different rules and certainly
under different oversight.
  That can be beneficial if it is going to yield us some lessons, but I
think we ought to understand that if we are going to do this, it is
going to take energy, effort, and dollars, and we want to make sure
where we are prioritizing those relative to the lessons from history
and whatever else we might glean from this effort.
  I am a little confused with regard to the extensive ongoing effort by
the administration to respond to a request by the Spanish government
under its mutual legal assistance treaty with the U.S. for documents,
roughly in this same period. I presume these searches are related, but
I do not know whether there is any formal coordination and how this
amendment would fit into it.
  Going to the cost factor, legislation directing special searches, as
I have said, is disruptive to the normal course of business, and the
normal course of business in the intelligence communities these days,
it is exceptionally challenging.
  I would also point out that when we have these special searches, that
they sometimes delay requests of our own constituents under the Freedom
of Information Act. I do not say that to say that we should not have
special requests. I think we only need to point out that that sometimes
happens.
  We have had considerable conversation with the head of the community,
the intelligence community, about how we go about dealing with the
classification and declassification process. That is ongoing. There is
very definite bona fide concern about how much dollars and time and
personnel we direct to that effort relative to other things that the
intelligence community is being asked to provide for today's
decisionmakers, to get us through the day. Of course, we have to figure
out, where does the money come from.
  These are not new thoughts. I am only putting these on the record and
getting them out of there because I do not want the gentleman to think
that we are just knee-jerk reacting negatively. There are negative
consequences to this amendment, in part.

                              {time}  1230

  The amendment would provide no new information to the public as far
as I know, the people who are interested in the abuses of the Pinochet
years. I think instead we are going to get lots of boxes going into a
closed committee review, and I am not sure where that is going to lead
us.
  So I am concerned about, if the purpose is to get at the truth and
the history and where we are doing it, I would like to do that in a
reasonable way. I share the desire of the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Hinchey) to do that.
  If the way we can do it passes muster with the community, and the
costs are reasonable, and the expectations are reasonable given the
personnel that we have, then I would possibly be in a position to
accept this amendment with those understandings.
  So I ask to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) to accept a
second-degree amendment which would strike paragraph (2) of the section
304(b) in its entirety. If so, and the House agrees to the amendment
amending the gentleman's amendment in that way, I would accept his
amendment.
  The reason I say that is the amendment I would propose would cure the
constitutional problem that I see in the provision which would have
overridden all the laws authorizing the DCI and the President to
protect sources of national security information from disclosure and
compromise. We just accepted an amendment from the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Sweeney) to strengthen that. So I do not want to now turn
right around and undercut it.
  So with the offending provision omitted, any threat of the veto would
be removed, we would be consistent, and I think I could see my way to
supporting what the gentleman is trying to get done.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey)
for response on my proposal amendment.

[[Page H3125]]

  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
As I understand it, the gentleman is offering an amendment to my
amendment which would strike paragraph (2) of section 304(b) as
proposed to be added by the amendment; is that correct?
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) is
correct.
  Mr. HINCHEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Goss), the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
and I am happy to accept his amendment to my amendment.

Amendment Offered By Mr. Goss to Amendment No. 4 Offered By Mr. Hinchey

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Goss to amendment No. 4 offered by
     Mr. Hinchey:
       Strike paragraph (2) of section 304(b), as proposed to be
     added by the amendment.

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, that is the amendment we have had the
discussion on. I have nothing further.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Hinchey amendment and commend
the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of
our committee, for his accommodation of the Hinchey amendment.
  But I want this amendment to survive the conference because I think
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) has provided some great
leadership to us today in presenting this amendment. That is why I am
very grateful to the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) for his
amendment to accommodate the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey).
  Our distinguished chairman laid out some important considerations in
his observation of this amendment, and they are important. There are
other equities to be balanced, and I am glad that my colleagues have
come to an agreement on the amendment. But, again, I want it to survive
the conference. I want to commend the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Hinchey).
  Our President was in Guatemala a few months ago, or was it weeks? So
much happens so fast around here. I was very proud of the statement
that he made. Latin America had been in turmoil for a couple of
generations, as we all know, some of it, sad to say, and in Guatemala
in particular, with the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency
and other American entities there.
  The President, I think very courageously, recognized what happened
there and, in doing so, I think began to open the door to a better
future for the intelligence community.
  In Central America and in Latin America the expression ``nunca mas''
is so famous, because in Argentina, in Chile, and Central America,
people are revisiting their sad recent past. An important bridge to the
future has been truth commissions which have identified, not to find
revenge, but to seek some level of justice and some level of openness
and admission about what happened to clear a way for the future.
  If we, the United States and specifically the Central Intelligence
Agency, had a role in the death of President Allende, just as if any
Chilean had a role in it, putting it behind us requires facing the
truth about it.
  So I think that, as far as Chile is concerned, this is a very
important amendment, but I think it also will build credibility for us
if we are not in a state of denial about the CIA's involvement but of
acceptance of what the reality was. We will find out what that is as a
result of the amendment of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey).
  I also, though, want to say that, unless we are forthcoming on our
role, it is very hard to see why Latin Americans will be forthcoming
about what their role is. I think that we can lead by example in this
way.
  I also would like to take the occasion to thank the gentleman from
California (Mr. George Miller) for his leadership and activity in
trying to persuade our government in making the documents available for
the Pinochet case to the Spanish government. I hope that this will be a
message to repressive dictators everywhere that a day of reckoning
comes, and that they just cannot commit these atrocities and then say,
well, let us put it all behind us.
  As I say again, this is not about revenge, it is about truth. It is
about justice. It is about opening the way for a better future and
building credibility for what we do.
  I agree with the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss). We should
not jeopardize the safety of our sources and methods. I think that his
amendment is a constructive one. These people risk their lives just the
way our young people do in the military. We are proud of the military.
We are proud of the people who put themselves in harm's way to gather
intelligence for us.
  So while we are not condoning any activities that were not legal, we
cannot proceed with reasonable intelligence gathering if those who are
called upon to do so are in jeopardy because of unintentional
identification.
  This is especially true at a time when we want more women, we want
more minorities, we want more diversity, we want more language skills,
we want more cultural understanding into the Central Intelligence
Agency. We want them to have the same level of protection that others
have had in the past.
  Building that diversity with an openness and an admission of what our
past has been I think will build more support for what we need to have,
which is the best possible intelligence to avoid conflict and to supply
whoever the President of the United States is with the information he
needs to lead.
  With that, again I commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey)
and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), our chairman, and the
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon), our ranking member, for their
leadership on this issue.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey) is
absolutely correct. The minority has no problem with this amendment.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to applaud the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Hinchey) on his amendment. It is no great secret that over the years,
there have been many aspects of American foreign policy which have been
wrong. It is no secret that the United States over the years has been
involved in the overthrow of a number of democratic governments.
  In the case of Chile in 1973, there was a democratic government
elected by the people. The President of that government was Salvador
Allende. His policies antagonized corporate interests in the United
States. A great deal of pressure was brought to bear in seeing him
overthrown.
  I think it is a very positive step as we develop ideas for the
future, as we try to develop a democratic foreign policy that we in
fact know what we did in the past.
  So I think the amendment of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey)
is a very important one. I think we should let the truth come out, and
I strongly support his efforts.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong
support of Mr. Hinchey's amendment to require a report to Congress on
information held by the United States pertaining to human rights
violations in Chile carried out by Gen. Augusto Pinochet and his
forces.
  The 1973 military coup in Chile was a tragic interruption of Chile's
proud democratic history. Thousands of innocent people were killed.
Many more were tortured and imprisoned. American citizens are among the
dead.
  The military coup in Chile also represents a tragic chapter in
American history.
  It is now widely understood that the United States supported the
violent overthrow of a democratically elected government. But the full
details of U.S. support for the coup are still not known.
  We need to know the full details.
  In addition, the full details of U.S. information concerning the
actions of the coup's leader, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, are not fully
known.
  It is widely understood that Gen. Pinochet directed the coup and the
mass killings and torture that occurred during his nearly two decade
long reign. But the American people

[[Page H3126]]

deserve to know and would be better off knowing the full details of
Gen. Pinochet's actions.
  Only the United States at this point has the ability to fully inform
its citizens of this ruthless dictator's actions.
  Along with my colleagues, I have been demanding that the United
States supply information about Gen. Pinochet's murderous actions to a
court in Spain that has brought charges against Gen. Pinochet for
violations of international law, including torture, murder and
kidnapping.
  The United States is believed to house records that would corroborate
the charges against Gen. Pinochet.
  Those records should be reviewed, declassified and turned over to the
court in Spain. Some information has been turned over and after much
delay the United States has established a task force to oversee this
request. It is a slow process and many believe that some in the
Administration would prefer that the information never see the light of
day.
  Without objection, I would like to submit into the Record a series of
letters between myself, my colleague, John Conyers, and other members,
including Mr. Hinchey, and the Administration.
  These letters explain the nature of the information we seek and the
importance of providing the information to the Spanish court.
  The actions in the 1970s of the U.S. intelligence community and the
then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, toward Chile and other
dictators in the southern cone are a disgrace that should never be
forgotten by American citizens who wish to think honorably about their
country and their government.
  A journalist, Lucy Kosimar, recently uncovered a memo that describes
how Secretary of State Kissinger coddled Pinochet after the coup.
  In a recent article, Kosimar wrote:

       The memo describes how Secretary of State Kissinger stroked
     and bolstered Pinochet, how--with hundreds of political
     prisoners still being jailed and tortured--Kissinger told
     Pinochet that the Ford Administration would not hold those
     human rights violations against him. At a time when Pinochet
     was the target of international censure for state-sponsored
     torture, disappearances, and murders, Kissinger assured him
     that he was a victim of communist propaganda and urged him
     not to pay too much attention to American critics.

  This is what Kissinger reportedly told Pinochet in a private meeting
in 1976, according to Lucy Kosimar:

       In the United States, as you know,'' Kissinger told
     Pinochet, ``we are sympathetic with what you are trying to do
     here. I think that the previous government was headed toward
     communism. We wish your government well.
       A little while later, Kissinger added: ``My evaluation is
     that you are a victim of all left wing groups around the
     world, and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a
     government which was going Communist.

  Kissinger decided that the international fight against communism
justified the rape and torture of Chilean women, justified their
mutilation. Justified their execution.
  More than 20 years later new information about the U.S. role in the
coup and U.S. knowledge about human rights violations by Pinochet are
still coming to light. Clearly there is more information that is housed
in the intelligence communities' warehouses and that information should
be made public.
  In 1976, an American citizen, Ronnie Moffitt, was blown up on the
streets of Washington with her Chilean colleague, Orlando Letelier.
Pinochet is widely suspected of having personally ordered their deaths.
  This act of terrorism should never be forgotten, in the hopes that it
will never be repeated. Pinochet is living in London right now,
awaiting the fate of an extradition hearing for trial in Spain.
  Whatever information the United States can provide on the deaths of
Ronnie Moffitt and Orlando Letelier in Washington should be made
available so the truth can be known once and for all and justice can be
rendered in this ugly, ugly chapter of American and Chilean history.

Congressional Letters to the Clinton Administration on the Case Against
                         Gen. Augusto Pinochet

       (1) November 23, 1998 Letter from Rep. George Miller to
     Attorney General Janet Reno.
       (2) October 21, 1998 Letter from 36 Members of Congress to
     President Clinton.
       (3) March 17, 1998 Letter from Reps. George Miller and John
     Conyers to President Clinton, and the President's June 3
     response.
       (4) April 15, 1997 Letter from Reps. Miller and Conyers to
     Attorney General Reno and Mr. John Shattuck, Department of
     State, and the Justice Department's May 23, 1997 response.
                                                November 23, 1998.
     Hon. Janet Reno,
     U.S. Attorney General,
     Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
       Dear Attorney General: I am writing to follow up on our
     telephone conversation on the afternoon of Friday, November
     13 concerning the United States response to the arrest of
     Gen. Augusto Pinochet. I sincerely appreciate your taking the
     time to speak with me about this issue.
       As you may recall, I raised three issues with you during
     our conversation. First, I expressed my belief that the
     United States still has not turned over to the judges in
     Spain all materials in its possession that are relevant to
     the cast against Gen. Pinochet. Second, I expressed my belief
     that the United States should make available to Spain Michael
     Townley for questioning, but that it had not yet done so. And
     finally, I asked if you would grant a request for a meeting
     that I understood was made by the widow and widower of the
     Letelier-Moffitt assassinations, and their attorney.
       With regard to the meeting request for Isabel Letelier,
     Michael Moffitt and their attorney, Sam Buffone, you informed
     me that you were seriously considering such a meeting. I
     sincerely appreciate your efforts in that regard.
       With regard to Michael Townley, you told me that you were
     looking into the status of the request to make him available.
     I wish to again urge that he be made available to the Spanish
     judges for the purposes of questioning him about Gen.
     Pinochet's association to criminal and terrorist activities.
     As you probably know, Michael Townley was formerly in the
     Witness Protection Program and his whereabouts are known to
     the F.B.I. I would also urge you to make available Fernandez
     Larios, a known terrorist who plead guilty to criminal
     charges in the United States and can provide important
     information about Gen. Pinochet. I would hope that the F.B.I.
     and the Department of Justice have kept track of Mr. Larios
     at least to the extent that he can be located for purposes of
     serving a subpoena. It is my understanding that Judge Garzon
     is prepared to come to the United States at any reasonable
     time upon notice that Mr. Larios and/or Mr. Townley are
     available.
       And finally, with regard to the materials requested by
     Spain, you asked me to provide you with information about any
     materials that may not yet already have been provided to
     the judges. I am providing to you in this letter details
     of materials that I believe are of interest to Spain and
     relevant to their investigation of Gen. Pinochet but that
     have not yet been made available.
       As you know, and as we discussed on the phone, the Spanish
     judges conducting the Pinochet investigation have made
     requests of the United States Government, through the Spanish
     Ministry of Justice, for the production of testimony and
     documents pursuant to the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
     Matters Treaty between the Spanish and U.S. Governments. It
     is my understanding that a new request has just been made.
       While you and your staff are already familiar with the
     treaty, I thought it would be important to raise a number of
     points here to help clarify the responsibilities of the
     United States in this area. There are several important
     provisions in the MLAT that bear on the Spanish request for
     cooperation. First, under Article I, Section 3, assistance is
     to be provided without regard to whether the act giving rise
     to the request for assistance is a crime in the requested
     country. Accordingly, so long as the Spanish court has
     confirmed its jurisdiction to investigate the claims against
     Pinochet, it is irrelevant whether or not they would be valid
     claims under U.S. law. The only requirement under the MLAT
     for dual criminality is in cases of claims for forfeiture or
     restitution. Under Article IV, a request for documents
     requires only a generalized description of what is sought for
     production. Under Section 3 of Article IV, additional
     specificity should be provided to the extent necessary and
     where possible. These provisions require specificity
     regarding individuals to be questioned, but do not contain
     any additional requirement of specification as to the
     description of evidence or documents. Article V, Section 6,
     requires that the requested country respond to reasonable
     inquiries concerning the progress towards full compliance
     with the request.
       Confidentiality is governed in part by Article VII which
     would permit the U.S. to require that any information or
     evidence furnished under the Treaty be kept confidential or
     used only under specific terms and conditions by the Spanish
     court. Classification is further covered by Article IX which
     provides for the production of records of government
     agencies. Under Subsection 1, all publicly available
     documents must be provided. Subsection 2 permits the
     requested state to provide copies of any documents in its
     possession which are not publicly available to the same
     extent and under the same condition as copies would be made
     available in Spain to judicial authorities or in the United
     States ``to its own law enforcement and judicial
     authorities.'' The requested state is, however, permitted to
     deny a request pursuant to these provisions entirely or in
     part. Accordingly, while the Treaty does not deal directly
     with classified information, the U.S. is granted broad
     discretion to produce or withhold classification and should
     do so to the same extent that it would provide such
     information to domestic law enforcement or judicial
     authorities. Article XII requires that the U.S. use its best
     efforts to ascertain the location or identity of persons or
     items specified in a request.
       As I said on the phone, there are serious questions raised
     as to whether the U.S. has complied with both the spirit and
     letter of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. Despite

[[Page H3127]]

     the long pendency of several letters of request, it is my
     understanding that the U.S. has not discharged its
     obligations under Article XII to use its best efforts to
     ascertain the location of either persons or documents. The
     U.S. has failed to produce key individuals for testimony and
     has not conducted a complete search of documents in the
     possession of government agencies, including the Central
     Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, and the FBI.
     Further, it is my understanding the U.S. has refused to
     produce classified documents when the letter and spirit of
     Article IX should permit, if not require, production to the
     same extent that documents were provided to the U.S.
     Attorneys Office during the initial Letelier-Moffitt
     investigation.
       The Justice Department, as the convening authority, should
     also reassess the extent and vigor of its effort to locate
     and produce documents. There are certain classes of
     identifiable records that should be searched for and if
     available, immediately produced:
       1. Defense Intelligence Agency Reports, such as
     ``Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) Expands
     Operations and Facilities,'' April 15, 1975 along with
     referenced ``IRs'' and all other cables and reports from the
     U.S. Defense Attache's office in Santiago during the mid-
     1970's that relate to the Chilean Secret police, the chain of
     command, human rights abuses, and international terrorism.
       2. Defense Intelligence Agency Biographic Data, the yearly
     commentary and career summaries on military commanders done
     by the DIA--in this case on General Pinochet and Col. Gen.
     Manual Contreras between 1974-78.
       3. State and NSC Documents identified in ``Disarray in
     Chile Policy,'' July 1, 1975. This document states that ``a
     number of officers in the Embassy at Santiago have written a
     dissent'' cable arguing that all U.S. assistance to Chile be
     cut off ``until the human rights situation improved.'' This
     cable was discussed at a ``pre-IG (Interagency Group)
     meeting--presumably in June 1975. It was supported by the
     Policy Planning Office of the Bureau of Inter-American
     Affairs.
       A specific paper trail can be ascertained, including but
     not limited to:
       a. the ``Dissent'' cable from the U.S. Embassy officers;
       b. minutes/notes/briefing papers for/of the ``pre-IG
     meeting;''
       c. all position papers relating to this discussion prepared
     by the Policy Planning Office at the Bureau of Inter-American
     Affairs.
       4. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
     State, reports, summaries, and briefing papers on the Chilean
     military, DINA, and human rights violations, 1973-80.
       5. The Chile Files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary
     of State for Human Rights, Patricia Derian, 1977-80. These
     files, kept by Ms. Derian's Deputy Marc Schneider, likely
     contain a wealth of information on Chile's human rights
     atrocities, and also on the Letelier case and the issue of
     U.S. extradition of Chilean officials, and sanctions against
     Pinochet's government for lack of cooperation in the case.
       In addition to the above records and document groups
     identified by the Spanish court, U.S. cooperation under MLAT
     should include reviews of other relevant files. These
     include:
       1. A critical document on General Pinochet's role in the
     Letelier bombing, read by Justice Department prosecutor
     Eugene Propper during the federal investigation into the
     crime.
       2. CIA Reports between 1973 and 1979 by the Agency's Office
     of African and Latin American Affairs (A/LA) on Chile's
     military, chain of command, DINA, Operation Condor, General
     Pinochet and human rights violations, assassination of
     General Carlos Prats in September 1975, and Orlando Letelier
     in September 1976.
       3. CIA Directorate of Operations cables and reports on
     Operation Condor--including Chile's attempt to establish an
     Operation Condor office in Miami in 1974; the assassination
     of Carlos Prats, and Orlando Letelier, and other human rights
     abuses.
       4. A review by the Gerald Ford Presidential Library staff
     (Karen Holzhausen) of the still classified Kissinger-
     Scowcroft files relating to Chile, terrorism and human rights
     violations.
       5. A review by the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library staff
     for the still classified Bzrezinski files on Chile, human
     rights violations, and sanctions against Chile for the
     Letelier assassination; and the files of National Security
     Council advisor on Latin America, Robert Pastor, for similar
     documentation.
       6. A search by the CIA-FBI Center for Counter terrorism for
     files, including those of the predecessor to that agency, on
     Chilean involvement in international terrorism.
       7. A re-review of heavily censored NSC and State Department
     documents released during legal discovery in the Letelier-
     Moffitt civil suit.
       A thorough review and collection of relevant U.S. documents
     is critical to the Spanish judges' investigation. But I hope
     you would agree that it is also critical for the United
     States to gather this material to help our own government
     decide whether it too should take legal action against Gen.
     Pincochet.
       As I expressed to you on the phone, I have a long history
     of involvement with Chile, beginning with my participation in
     a congressional investigation in Chile in 1976, prior to the
     assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt. In
     fact, Mr. Letelier had helped to facilitate the congressional
     trip to Chile. Chile has a long and proud history of
     democracy. Gen. Pinochet's military coup was an aberration in
     Chile's history. His rule was marked by extreme violence,
     total disregard for human and civil rights, and by
     international act of terrorism, including the assassination
     on U.S. soil of an American citizen and a Chilean exile.
       Given this Administration's stated commitment to promoting
     human rights and democracy and to curbing global terrorism, I
     consider the legal fate of Gen. Pincochet to be a matter of
     utmost concern for the United States Government.
       Again, I sincerely appreciate your time and attention to
     this matter and I will appreciate being appraised of the
     status of these requests.
           Sincerely,
     George Miller, M.C.
                                  ____

                                                 October 21, 1998.
     Hon. William Jefferson Clinton,
     President,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: The October 17 arrest of General
     Augusto Pinochet in London is a good example of how the goals
     you outlined in your anti-terrorism speech at the United
     Nations can be put into practice. Indeed, when the rule of
     law is applied to combat international lawlessness,
     humanity's agenda gains.
       We are writing to urge you to reinforce your eloquent words
     at the recent United Nations General Assembly session by
     joining with the British government in fully cooperating with
     the precedent-setting case against Chilean General Augusto
     Pinochet in Spain. Specifically, we call upon you to ensure
     that the U.S. government provides Spanish Judge Baltasar
     Garzon material related to Pinochet's role in international
     terrorism--material and testimony that the U.S. government
     has thus far withheld.
       You will recall that on June 3, in response to a
     congressional request, you wrote to assure us that the United
     States would ``continue to respond as fully as we can to the
     request for assistance from the Government of Spain'' for
     information on the case against General Pinochet and other
     Chilean military officials accused of international terrorism
     and crimes against humanity.
       It is our understanding that the United States has
     materials and other critical information that will help link
     Pinochet directly to acts of international terrorism. These
     materials and information were obtained during the U.S.
     investigation of the assassination of Orlando Letelier, a
     Chilean exile, and Ronni Karpen Moffitt, his American
     colleague. They were brutally murdered in Washington, D.C.,
     in 1976 when a bomb exploded under their car while driving
     around Sheridan Circle on their way to work. The
     assassination was determined to be the work of the Chilean
     secret police. It was also alleged, but unproven at the time,
     that Pinochet was directly involved in the killings.
       Unfortunately, we have been informed that the U.S. Justice
     Department has given only public documents to the Spanish
     judge, and has not ordered any classified material to be
     delivered. In addition, the Assistant United States Attorney
     assigned to obtain testimony from key witnesses in the case
     against Pinochet and other former military leaders has not
     elicited key testimony from people convicted in the Letelier-
     Moffitt killings.
       We have also learned that the Spanish judge is planning to
     submit an expanded Rogatory Commission requesting in detail
     the documents and witness testimony the U.S. government
     should provide.
       We urge you to direct the Justice Department and other
     relevant agencies to act with haste in delivering the
     appropriate solicited material. Your involvement now will
     send a clear signal that you plan to take all steps necessary
     to stop international terrorism and bring to justice those
     responsible for heinous crimes against humanity, including
     the killing of an American citizen on American soil.
       We note that the Spanish judge's petitions are based on the
     European Convention on Terrorism that requires signatories to
     cooperate with each other's judicial processes in cases of
     terrorism. Certainly, the United States has a stake in
     becoming part of this process. In addition, the Justice
     Department previously determined that Spain properly
     requested documents from the United States based on the
     Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, signed by Spain and the
     United States.
       We appreciate your commitment to stop international
     terrorism. We strongly believe, however, that without
     concrete actions to back up your commitment, international
     terrorism will continue unabated. The case against Pinochet
     and his allies presents a significant opportunity to work
     with the world community to punish those responsible for
     international crimes in Chile, the United States, and
     elsewhere. We strongly urge you to support Britain and Spain
     by releasing critical information to the Spanish judge as
     quickly as possible. We understand that some of the materials
     in question are of a classified nature. We believe steps can
     be taken to comply with Spain's request without compromising
     U.S. security interests and that these steps must be taken
     immediately. The world is watching closely as you consider
     this request. Absent our firm response, terrorists will
     continue to believe they can act with impunity.
           Sincerely,
         George Miller; John Conyers; Nancy Pelosi; John Olver;
           Maurice D. Hinchey; Alcee L. Hastings; Cynthia A.

[[Page H3128]]

           McKinney; Howard L. Berman; Bob Filner; Anna G. Eshoo;
           Henry A. Waxman; Jim McDermott; George E. Brown, Jr.;
           Neil Abercrombie; Barbara Lee; Sam Gejdenson; Bernard
           Sanders; Lane Evans; John F. Tierney; Martin Olav Sabo;
           Rosa L. DeLauro; Lynn C. Woolsey; Carolyn B. Maloney;
           Barney Frank; Lloyd Doggett; Frank Pallone; Charles B.
           Rangel; David E. Bonior; Nita M. Lowey; Danny K. Davis;
           James P. McGovern; Pete Stark; Jesse L. Jackson, Jr.;
           Lucille Roybal-Allard; Marcy Kaptur; Elijah E.
           Cummings.
                                  ____

                         March 17, 1998, (revised March 19, 1998).
     Hon. William Jefferson, Clinton,
     President of the United States,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President, Late last year, Justice Department
     officials assured us that they would cooperate with a Spanish
     judge investigating charges against General Augusto Pinochet,
     former President and Commander in Chief of Chile, for
     terrorism, genocide and crimes against humanity. Despite the
     assurances of cooperation under the MLTA, it is our
     understanding that the Justice Department effectively
     stonewalled the judge when he visited the United States in
     January, seeking to interview witnesses and retrieve
     documents pursuant to his investigation.
       Instead of producing the witnesses and documents, as called
     for under the MLTA, and despite the desire of the former
     prosecutors (Eugene Propper and Larry Barcella) to
     communicate substantive information which they had but which
     was still classified, we have been informed that the
     Administration prevented Propper and Barcella from reviewing
     their notes and file material before testifying, did not try
     to make confessed murders Michael Townley and Fernando Larios
     available, and handed over virtually no documents. Their
     reasoning, according to people who had talked to officials at
     the State Department and National Security Council, was that
     they were processing materials which were difficult to find
     and were not likely to lead to useable evidence. They would
     formally comply but only when the component agencies
     processed the materials. In private, we are told, they note
     that by not turning over the documents promptly and
     ultimately by not offering much that is useful ``the U.S. had
     nothing to lose.''
       They assess the possible damage to your impending visit to
     Chile next month from not cooperating to be very low.
     Apparently, U.S. Embassy sources believes that the anti-
     Pinochet opposition does not have enough strength to mount
     effective demonstrations to interfere with your visit. They
     also assume that the Chilean press will not ask you tough
     questions about the U.S. refusal to hand over documents and
     produce witnesses. Apparently at the Justice Department and
     the State Department, the belief is that the United States
     can ``get away with'' not cooperating and receive minimum
     public relations damage.
       The motives for not cooperating with the Spanish judge
     included fears that an indictment of Pinochet could put the
     Chilean government in a precarious position on--and we find
     this particularly difficult to believe at this time--that the
     Chilean military might initiate a military coup.
       We also find incomprehensible U.S. non-cooperation in a
     case that involves international terrorism, specifically the
     most horrendous act of extraterritorial violence Washington,
     D.C. has witnessed in the last fifty years--the car-bombing
     of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Karpen Moffitt on September 21,
     1976. As you know, the U.S. government indicted the head of
     Chile's Intelligence and Secret Police agency, who recently
     asserted in Chile what U.S. officials always believed:
     Pinochet gave the order to kill Letelier in Washington.
       It seems to us that the Administration will force Members
     of Congress to consider changing the terms of the NAFTA
     debate. The assumption for admitting Chile to NAFTA
     membership is that she is a functioning democracy. By
     allowing the Chileans to put Pinochet beyond the reach of any
     investigation, even U.S. compliance with a Spanish request,
     the Administration is jeopardizing the integrity of other
     treaty obligations under the anti-terrorism treaties. The
     Administration and Congress should be alarmed at the
     willingness of the Chilean government to ignore the growing
     evidence about Pinochet's involvement in the Letelier
     assassination.
       We will propose to our colleagues that before we debate the
     merits of the new NAFTA and fast track agreements vis a vis
     Chile, we should air the U.S. government's passivity when it
     comes to investigating terrorism on our own soil and crimes
     against humanity elsewhere.
       The U.S. should either work actively to deliver the most
     complete set of declassified documents and witnesses to
     Spanish judge Garcia Castellon, or face a more profound
     debate on NAFTA, one that goes to the democratic nature of
     our partners and the critical responsibilities that must
     accompany any trade agreement.
       We respectfully request that you look seriously and
     expeditiously into this troubling matter.
           Sincerely,
     George Miller, M.C.
     John Conyers, M.C.
                                  ____

                                              The White House,

                                     Washington, DC, June 3, 1998.
       Dear George: Thank you for your letter regarding our
     cooperation with a Spanish judge investigating allegations
     that General Augusto Pinochet and other former Chilean
     officials are responsible for human rights abuses against
     Spanish citizens as well as others.
       As you know, the Spanish judge's request was made under a
     mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) we have with Spain. The
     Department of Justice coordinates the execution of such
     requests with the appropriate U.S. Government agencies.
     Contrary to the information you may have received, the
     Spanish authorities have indicated to the Justice Department
     that they are very pleased with the extent of our cooperation
     in responding to their request. The Department has
     facilitated for Spanish authorities the depositions of
     several individuals in the United States and has itself
     deposed several other witnesses in whom the Spanish indicated
     interest. While certain limits were placed on the testimony
     that could be offered by two of these witnesses, this was due
     to the fact that some of the information known by these
     witnesses remains classified.
       In addition, the Justice Department has requested that the
     relevant agencies conduct a search for documents responding
     to the Spanish court's request. It has already transmitted
     four boxes of materials relating to the prosecutions of those
     responsible for the bombing of Orlando Letelier and Ronni
     Moffitt as well as numerous additional documents from the
     Department of State. Other agencies are continuing to conduct
     their searches for relevant documents and will respond in the
     near future.
       Our cooperation on this case is consistent with the
     extensive efforts the United States Government has undertaken
     to bring to justice those responsible for the Letelier-
     Moffitt murders. As you know, the United States Government
     has successfully prosecuted several individuals responsible
     for these killings and indicted several others. Two of these
     individuals are now serving time in a Chilean prison for this
     crime. I believe that the efforts the United States
     Government has taken on this case show our resolve to deal
     quickly and decisively with acts of terrorism on our soil.
       Finally, I want to assure you that we will continue to
     respond as fully as we can to the request for assistance from
     the Government of Spain.
       Thank you again for writing to me about this important
     matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                        Bill Clinton.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Hinchey
amendment.
  General Augusto Pinochet rose to power in a bloody coup d'etat in
1973 that overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador
Allende. This ushered in seventeen years of military dictatorship
accompanied by the death of thousands of activists, journalists and
ordinary citizens.
  According to the Church Committee Report of December 1975, ``The CIA
attempted, directly, to foment a military coup in Chile.'' Before
Allende was inaugurated, it passed weapons to coup plotters. When that
failed, it undertook a massive effort to undermine the government.
Senator Church found that ``Eight million dollars was spent in the
three years between the 1970 election and the military coup in 1973.
Money was furnished to media organizations, to opposition political
parties and, in limited amounts, to private sector organizations.''
  Much of this is history in the sense that the repression in Chile has
stopped, and that country has made a remarkable transition to democracy
over the last decade. However, many are still forced to live with the
pain of General Pinochet's legacy and there is still far too much
information still being withheld from the public record about the
American role in Chile during those dark years.
  The arrest of Pinochet in England last year was a tremendous step
forward for international law, reconciliation and human rights. Much of
the power to keep justice moving forward lies in the hands of the CIA,
the Department of Justice and other agencies of the U.S. government who
have been asked by the Spanish Judge prosecuting Pinochet, Garcia
Castellon, to provide information about Pinochet's reign of terror.
  Even before the arrest of Pinochet, the Department of Justice assured
Congressman George Miller and I that they were cooperating fully with
Judge Castellon's inquiry. I am inserting into the Record an article
from the New York Times of June 27, 1997 which makes this point clear.
  I am neither satisfied with the Department of Justice's response thus
far nor with the CIA's outright refusal to cooperate with the inquiry.
This is simply inconsistent with the American commitment to the
promotion of human rights.
  This is especially remarkable since along with the Chileans and
Europeans who were murdered by Pinochet's hand were several Americans.
Ronni Moffit, a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, and the
former Chilean ambassador, Orlando Letelier were killed in one of the
worst domestic terrorism incidents ever in Washington, DC. The attack
was carried out by DINA, the Chilean intelligence agency whose director
has stated that

[[Page H3129]]

Pinochet personally ordered the bombing. Even Elliot Abrams, Ronald
Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, has
suggested in the conservative journal Commentary that if Pinochet is
responsible for the Letelier-Moffit bombing he should be extradited to
the United States for trial. Section 304, Paragraph (a)(3) of the
Hinchey Amendment and will help shed much needed light on who is
responsible for this and other brutal murders.
  The American people will never know the truth unless their government
expresses greater enthusiasm for prosecuting the Pinochet case both in
London and in Washington. The Hinchey Amendment is a critical step in
that direction and I urge my colleagues to support it.

                [From the New York Times, June 27, 1999]

      U.S. Will Give Spanish Judge Documents for Pinochet Inquiry

       Madrid, June 26.--The United States has agreed to provide
     Government documents to a Spanish judge investigating
     terrorism and human-rights violations in Chile during the
     right-wing dictatorship of Gen. Augusto Pinochet from 1973 to
     1990.
       It is the first investigation of crimes against humanity in
     the death or disappearance of people during the Pinochet era.
     The judge, who functions as a prosecutor under Spanish law,
     is seeking evidence of genocide against Spanish citizens and
     descendants of Spaniards.
       But the case is even broader, and could delve into abuses
     against at least 3,000 people of various nationalities,
     including Charles Horman, an American whose disappearance in
     Chile was depicted in the film ``Missing,'' said Juan E.
     Garces, a Madrid lawyer representing relatives of the
     victims.
       The Madrid judge, Manuel Garcia Castellon, began the
     criminal investigation last year, and in February requested
     all pertinent documents from United States Government
     agencies. Washington will cooperate ``to the extent permitted
     by law,'' said a letter signed by Assistant Attorney General
     Andrew Fois on May 23.
       The letter, addressed to Representative John Conyers,
     Democrat of Michigan, was also sent to the national security
     adviser, Sandy Berger, the State Department and ranking
     members of the House International Relations Committee.
       Spain stands a good chance of getting useful American
     documents about General Pinochet's Government because the
     request came under a 1990 legal assistance treaty that allows
     a wider sweep in searching for information, said Richard J.
     Wilson, a law professor at American University in Washington.
       The Judge has not yet charged anyone, but might seek the
     extradition to Spain of General Pinochet, who is still
     commander of the Chilean Army, Mr. Garces said.
       Mr. Garces was an assistant to President Salvador Allende
     Gossens of Chile, a Socialist, who died in September 1973
     when General Pinochet led a coup that overthrew the elected
     Marxist Government.
       In a separate action, another Madrid judge is investigating
     human rights abuses against 320 Spaniards under military rule
     in Argentina from 1976 to 1983. The judge, Baltasar Garzon,
     has also requested United States Government documents for his
     inquiry.
       The Chilean Government last month termed Spain's
     investigation a ``political trial'' of Chile's transition to
     democracy that began with elections in 1990. On Wednesday, it
     said the American cooperation with the Spanish judge was
     ``positive'' but ``would not lead anywhere.''
       The Madrid court and the American Embassy said today that
     they had not received official confirmation of Washington's
     agreement to provide documents.

  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) to the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey).
  The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Hinchey), as amended.
  The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

             Amendment No. 2 Offered By Mr. Barr of Georgia

  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Barr of Georgia:
       At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the
     following new section:

     SEC. 304. REPORT ON LEGAL STANDARDS APPLIED FOR ELECTRONIC
                   SURVEILLANCE.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
     enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence,
     the Director of the National Security Agency, and the
     Attorney General shall jointly prepare, and the Director of
     the National Security Agency shall submit to the appropriate
     congressional committees a report in classified and
     unclassified form describing the legal standards employed by
     elements of the intelligence community in conducting signals
     intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance.
       (b) Matters Specifically Addressed.--The report shall
     specifically include a statement of each of the following
     legal standards:
       (1) The legal standards for interception of communications
     when such interception may result in the acquisition of
     information from a communication to or from United States
     persons.
       (2) The legal standards for intentional targeting of the
     communications to or from United States persons.
       (3) The legal standards for receipt from non-United States
     sources of information pertaining to communications to or
     from United States persons.
       (4) The legal standards for dissemination of information
     acquired through the interception of the communications to or
     from United States persons.
       (c) Inclusion of Legal Memoranda and Opinions.--The report
     under subsection (a) shall include a copy of all legal
     memoranda, opinions, and other related documents in
     unclassified, and if necessary, classified form with respect
     to the conduct of signals intelligence activities, including
     electronic surveillance by elements of the intelligence
     community, utilized by the Office of the General Counsel of
     the National Security Agency, by the Office of General
     Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, or by the Office
     of Intelligence Policy Review of the Department of Justice,
     in preparation of the report.
       (d) Definition.--As used in this section:
       (1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning
     given that term under section 3(4) of the National Security
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
       (2) The term ``United States persons'' has the meaning
     given such term under section 101(i) of the Foreign
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(i)).
       (3) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means
     the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
     the Judiciary of the Senate.

  Mr. BARR of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I had the honor of serving this
great land back in the 1970s, including those years in which the
government of our country, in an effort to institutionalize proper
oversight of our intelligence agencies, enacted public laws that
established the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
  In the intervening generation, these committees, including under the
current leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss), have
provided very, very essential oversight of the intelligence activities
of our government.
  Hopefully in so doing, we have avoided any excesses that have given
rise to some of the incidents in the past that have troubled our
intelligence gathering capabilities and hurt the credibility of these
great institutions such as the CIA.
  However, Mr. Chairman, the oversight with which the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss) and many others have worked so diligently to both
implement and then preserve over the last 24 years is under attack
right now, and the survivability of that oversight mechanism is
threatened.
  I speak particularly, Mr. Chairman, of efforts by the intelligence
community to deny proper information for the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence to conduct oversight, meaningful oversight
responsibilities.
  For example, in recent communications between the chairman and the
NSA, the general counsel of the NSA interposed what, by any stretch of
the imagination, is a bogus claim of attorney/client privilege in an
effort to deny the chairman and the committee members proper
information with which to carry out their oversight responsibilities.
  In particular, the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) was seeking
very important information that goes to the standards whereby the
intelligence community and the agencies comprising the intelligence
community gather intelligence and gather information on American
citizens.
  One such project in particular that has recently come to light, Mr.
Chairman, is a project known as Project Echelon, which has been in
place for several years and which, by accounts that we have recently
seen in the media, engages in the intercession of literally millions of
communications involving United States citizens over satellite
transmissions, involving e-mail transmissions, Internet access, as

[[Page H3130]]

well as mobile phone communications and telephone communications.
  This information apparently is shared, at least in part, and
coordinated, at least in part, with intelligence agencies of four other
countries: the UK, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.
  As part of our effort here in the Congress, both on the Select
Committee on Intelligence, which the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss)
chairs, as well as others of us, while not serving on that committee,
are concerned about the privacy rights for American citizens and
whether or not there are constitutional safeguards being circumvented
by the manner in which the intelligence agencies are intercepting and/
or receiving international communications back from foreign nations
that would otherwise be prohibited by the prohibitions and the
limitations on the collection of domestic intelligence.
  We have been trying to get information with regard to Project Echelon
and others. The amendment that I propose today simply would require the
intelligence community, and that is specifically the Department of
Justice, the National Security Agency, and the CIA to provide to the
Congress within 60 days of the enactment this Intelligence
Authorization Act a report setting forth the legal basis and procedures
whereby the intelligence community and the agencies comprising
intelligence community gather intelligence.
  This will enable the intelligence community and the Committee on the
Judiciary of both Houses to properly evaluate whether or not these
procedures are being implemented properly according to proper legal and
constitutional standards.
  It would be very interesting to see, Mr. Chairman, if the
administration or the Senate opposes this very straightforward
amendment, which simply requires a report on the legal basis for such
interceptions to be furnished within 60 days to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of both Houses and to the Committee on the Judiciary of
both Houses.
  I ask Members on both sides of the aisle to support this very
straightforward amendment, which not only will help guarantee the
privacy rights for American citizens, but will protect the oversight
responsibilities of the Congress which are now under assault by these
bogus claims that the intelligence communities are making. I ask for
the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to say I very much appreciate the remarks of the
distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr). He has characterized
an ongoing vigilance of oversight matters that we carry on every day. I
am certainly prepared to accept his amendment. I think it is useful and
indeed helpful to some problems we are having directly now.

                              {time}  1245

  I also think that it is helpful in the area of the very delicate
balancing act that we have to do on HPSCI, and I hope we do it well. I
think we do it well.
  It is, on the one hand, absolutely accepting no compromise on the
rights of American citizens and, on the other hand, not tying the hands
of our law enforcement people who are trying to catch people who are
trying to work mischief against the United States of America. And it is
not always as clear as it might be which it is at the beginning of a
process involving individuals.
  So this is a very difficult judgment area for us. Nobody would want
us, particularly in light of the news coming out of the weapons labs
today, to release or relax our efforts to catch people who are trying
to steal our secrets or penetrate our appropriately applied security
arrangements. On the other hand, it is intolerable to think of the
United States Government, of big brother, or anybody else invading the
privacy of an American citizen without cause.
  I believe that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia
(Mr. Barr) will help in that debate, and I am prepared to accept it. I
know that it is offered in that spirit, and I know that it will also be
helpful to me in my current problems, making sure the intelligence
community understands that penetrating oversight is here to stay. I
think most of them are getting the message.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  The minority will accept this amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Barr).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title III?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title IV.
  The text of title IV is as follows:

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF CIA CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM.

       Section 21(h)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403u(h)(1)) is amended by striking out
     ``March 31, 2000.'' and inserting ``March 31, 2002.''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title IV?
  If not, the Clerk will designate title V.
  The text of title V is as follows:

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 501. PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE NATIONAL
                   IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY.

       (a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 22 of title 10,
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 446. Protection of operational files

       ``(a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files From Search,
     Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) The Director of the
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency, with the coordination of
     the Director of Central Intelligence, may exempt operational
     files of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency from the
     provisions of section 552 of title 5 (Freedom of Information
     Act), which require publication, disclosure, search, or
     review in connection therewith.
       ``(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for the purposes of
     this section, the term `operational files' means files of the
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency (hereinafter in this
     section referred to as `NIMA') concerning the activities of
     NIMA that before the establishment of NIMA were performed by
     the National Photographic Interpretation Center of the
     Central Intelligence Agency (NPIC), that document the means
     by which foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is
     collected through scientific and technical systems.
       ``(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated
     intelligence are not operational files.
       ``(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational
     files shall continue to be subject to search and review for
     information concerning--
       ``(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted
     for permanent residence who have requested information on
     themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 of title
     5, or section 552a of title 5 (Privacy Act of 1974);
       ``(B) any special activity the existence of which is not
     exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of
     title 5; or
       ``(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by
     any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of
     law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the
     conduct of an intelligence activity:
       ``(i) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
     House of Representatives.
       ``(ii) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       ``(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board.
       ``(iv) The Department of Justice.
       ``(v) The Office of General Counsel of NIMA.
       ``(vi) The Office of the Director of NIMA.
       ``(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1)
     which contain information derived or disseminated from
     exempted operational files shall be subject to search and
     review.
       ``(B) The inclusion of information from exempted
     operational files in files that are not exempted under
     paragraph (1) shall not affect the exemption under
     paragraph (1) of the originating operational files from
     search, review publication, or disclosure.
       ``(C) Records from exempted operational files which have
     been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not
     exempted under paragraph (1) and which have been returned to
     exempted operational files for sole retention shall be
     subject to search and review.
       ``(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded
     except by a provision of law which is enacted after the date
     of enactment of this section, and which specifically cites
     and repeals or modifies its provisions.
       ``(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever
     any person who has requested agency records under section 552
     of title 5, alleges that NIMA has withheld records improperly
     because of failure to comply with any provision of this
     section, judicial review shall be available under the terms
     set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5.
       ``(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner
     provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows:
       ``(i) In any case in which information specifically
     authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order
     to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or
     foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court
     by NIMA, such information shall be examined ex parte, in
     camera by the court.
       ``(ii) The court shall, to the fullest extent practicable,
     determine the issues of fact based on sworn written
     submissions of the parties.
       ``(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records
     are improperly withheld because

[[Page H3131]]

     of improper placement solely in exempted operational files,
     the complainant shall support such allegation with a sworn
     written submission based upon personal knowledge or otherwise
     admissible evidence.
       ``(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records
     were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of
     operational files, NIMA shall meet its burden under section
     552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, by demonstrating to the court by
     sworn written submission that exempted operational files
     likely to contain responsible records currently perform the
     functions set forth in paragraph (2).
       ``(II) The court may not order NIMA to review the content
     of any exempted operational file or files in order to make
     the demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the
     complainant disputes NIMA's showing with a sworn written
     submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise
     admissible evidence.
       ``(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the
     parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through
     36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that
     requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and
     36.
       ``(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NIMA
     has improperly withheld requested records because of failure
     to comply with any provision of this subsection, the court
     shall order NIMA to search and review the appropriate
     exempted operational file or files for the requested records
     and make such records, or portions thereof, available in
     accordance with the provisions of section 552 of title 5, and
     such order shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to
     comply with this subsection.
       ``(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint
     pursuant to this paragraph NIMA agrees to search the
     appropriate exempted operational file or files for the
     requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based
     upon such complaint.
       ``(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the
     court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated
     with the Director of Central Intelligence prior to submission
     to the court.
       ``(b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1)
     Not less than once every ten years, the Director of the
     National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the Director of
     Central Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force
     under subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such exemptions
     may be removed from the category of exempted files or any
     portion thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence must
     approve any determination to remove such exemptions.
       ``(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include
     consideration of the historical value or other public
     interest in the subject matter of the particular category of
     files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying
     a significant part of the information contained therein.
       ``(3) A complainant that alleges that NIMA has improperly
     withheld records because of failure to comply with this
     subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of
     the United States of the district in which any of the parties
     reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding,
     the court's review shall be limited to determining the
     following:
       ``(A) Whether NIMA has conducted the review required by
     paragraph (1) before the expiration of the ten-year period
     beginning on the date of the enactment of this section or
     before the expiration of the ten-year period beginning on the
     date of the most recent review.
       ``(B) Whether NIMA, in fact, considered the criteria set
     forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
     beginning of subchapter I of chapter 22 of title 10, United
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following
     new item:

``446. Protection of operational files.''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title V?
  Are there additional amendments to the bill?

                 Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Sanders

  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer amendment No. 8 printed in the May
12, 1999, Congressional Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Sanders:
       At the bill, add the following new title:

                   TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

     SEC. 601. LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE
                   APPROPRIATED.

       (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
     notwithstanding the total amount of the individual
     authorizations of appropriations contained in this Act,
     including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule of
     Authorizations referred to in section 102, there is
     authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2000 to carry
     out this Act not more than the total amount authorized to be
     appropriated by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
     Year 1999.
       (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts
     authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
     Agency Retirement and Disability Fund by Section 201.

     SEC. 602. REPORT ON EFFICACY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
                   AGENCY.

       (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
     enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence
     shall submit to Congress a detailed, comprehensive report in
     unclassified form on the matters described in subsection (b).
       (b) Matters Studied.--Matters studied for the report under
     subsection (a) shall include the following:
       (1) The bombing in March 1991 by the Armed Forces of the
     United States during the Persian Gulf War of a weapons and
     nerve gas storage bunker in Khamisiyah, Iraq, and errors
     committed by the Central Intelligence Agency with respect to
     the location and contents of such bunker and the failure to
     disclose the proper location and contents to the Secretary of
     Defense.
       (2) Errors with respect to maps of the Aviano, Italy, area
     prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and used by
     aviators in the Armed Forces of the United States which may
     have resulted on February 3, 1996, in the accidental severing
     of a cable car device by a United States military aircraft on
     a training mission, which resulted in the deaths of twenty
     civilians.
       (3) Errors with respect to maps prepared by the Central
     Intelligence Agency of the Belgrade, Yugoslavia, area which
     resulted on May 7, 1999, in the accidental bombing of the
     Embassy of the People's Republic of China by forces under the
     command of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the deaths
     of three civilians.
       (c) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall
     contain recommendations for such legislation and
     administrative actions as the Director determines appropriate
     to avoid similar errors by the Central Intelligence Agency.

  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is basically about two
issues. Number one, the issue is about priorities in how we spend our
national wealth; and, secondly, the issue is about accountability and
what we do when an agency is not performing up to the level that we
want it to perform.
  Mr. Chairman, it is no secret that in our great country we are
spending large sums of money where we should not be spending it and we
are not spending money where we should be spending it.
  Today, in the United States, 43 million Americans have no health
insurance, but we do not have the money to help those people. Today, in
the United States, millions of senior citizens cannot afford their
prescription drugs and they suffer and they die because the United
States Government does not do what other countries around the world do
and help seniors with their prescription drugs. Today, in the United
States, at VA hospitals all over this country, veterans who have put
their lives on the line defending this country are not getting the
quality of care they need because the United States Congress is not
adequately funding the Veterans Administration.
  I believe that within that context and the fact that we are
underfunding many other important social needs we should not be
increasing funding for the intelligence agencies. And what this to the
amendment basically says is that we should level fund the intelligence
agencies. That is the first reason.
  The second part of this to the amendment is equally important, and
here we are talking about accountability and responsibility on the part
of our intelligence agencies. I know, and my colleagues know, that
almost by definition much of what the intelligence agencies do is
quiet. I expect they do a lot of good work which we do not hear about,
and I applaud them for what they do which is positive.
  But it is no secret that in area after area there have been major
deficiencies and very, very poorly performed operations, and it is
important that we talk about that and that we demand accountability.
  Let me just give my colleagues a few of the examples that I think
need to be talked about and that we need from the Director of the CIA
an understanding of how these things occurred and an understanding that
they will never occur again.
  Everybody in the Congress and everybody in the United States was
shocked when we heard recently about the bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade. And many of us at first thought, well, it was a mistake;
the pilot aimed for another building, and he hit the Chinese embassy,
and those things happen. It is terrible, but it was a mistake.
  But then we learned that the pilot hit what he was supposed to hit,
and that was altogether shocking.
  We found that the information, which was available virtually on the
worldwide web, which was probably available in the Yugoslavian
telephone directory, that the Chinese embassy was located at that
location was apparently not available to the CIA, and

[[Page H3132]]

their action has caused a major international crisis. We want to know
how that mistake could have taken place.
  Furthermore, as someone who is involved with the issue of the Gulf
War illness, I, and I know all of our Members, are concerned about the
explosion that took place in Kamisiyah, which is where the United
States blew up an Iraqi arms depot which contained chemical weapons.
  Let me quote from the April 12, 1997, New York Times. ``The report
issued this week by the CIA shows that the agency actually had detailed
information, including geographical coordinates, during the war to
suggest that chemical weapons are at Kamisiyah, information that was
not passed on to the soldiers who later blew up the depot and may have
been exposed to nerve gas.''
  In other words, our soldiers were exposed to nerve gas because the
CIA did not communicate the information that it had.
  Thirdly, we are all familiar with the terrible accident that took
place in Italy regarding an American plane that went into lines that
keep the gondolas moving in a ski area. I will quote from News Day.
This is February 1, 1999. ``Although the gondola had been traversing
the ski area for 30 years, there was no hint of it on the Prowler's
crew map. While the horizontal hazard to aviation was clearly marked on
Italian Air Force charts, the Pentagon agency somehow missed it.''
  So our intelligence agencies were not providing our pilots with an
up-to-date map, and so they had a terrible accident which could have
been avoided.
  Mr. Chairman, these are just three examples. The fact of the matter
is, there are many more.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders)
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Sanders was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that in light of these
instances, and many more which I have not gone into, there is no reason
why this body should not pass this conservative, simple amendment.
  We are calling for, as part of this to the amendment, a study of
these three specific events; and we are also requesting recommendations
from the intelligence community as to how these catastrophes could be
avoided in the future.
  So that is what this to the amendment does. It says level fund; and,
second of all, we want some accountability on the part of the
intelligence agency.

   Amendment Offered by Mr. Dixon to Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr.
                                Sanders

  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

  Amendment offered by Mr. Dixon to amendment No. 8 offered by Mr.
Sanders:
       On page 1, line 13 of the amendment, delete ``1999'' and
     insert in lieu thereof ``1998''.

  Mr. DIXON (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent
that the amendment to the amendment be considered as read and printed
in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to make clear what the
situation is here. I admire what the gentleman from Vermont (Mr.
Sanders) is trying to do as it relates to the reports. I have no
problems with that. In fact, many of us have talked today about the
mistake that has been made with the bombing of the embassy. There is no
apparent legitimate excuse for that. The committee is going to get to
the bottom of it.
  As it relates to the other two instances, I think that he is right,
that we should find out exactly what happened.
  However, through an inadvertent, and I stress inadvertent, error, the
amendment before us, as introduced, says that the authorization will be
frozen at the 1999 level. In an effort to have a full debate on this, I
am offering an amendment that substitutes 1998, with the consent of the
author. That is because the 1999 figure is not the appropriate figure.
It would be the 1998 figure, because the 2000 authorization that we are
now talking about is, in fact, lower than the 1999.
  So in an effort to accommodate this debate on these issues that are
very important, I am offering this perfecting amendment, but I want to
make it very clear that I am opposed to the authorization reduction
part of the Sanders amendment.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DIXON. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank my good friend, and I am
happy to accept his amendment for the reasons that he gave, but I think
the situation here tells us about another problem, and that is year
after year the Members of the Congress are forced to debate the
intelligence appropriation without having that concrete information out
on the table.
  I know that year after year Members come up and say, gee, The New
York Times has the information, the Congressional Quarterly has the
information, but the American people do not have it from the Congress.
  So I thank the gentleman for his amendment to my amendment, and I am
prepared to accept it, but I do raise that question again, that the day
should come when we are public and open about how much money there is
in the intelligence budget.
  Mr. DIXON. Reclaiming my time just for a minute, Mr. Chairman, in my
opening statement I indicated that I disagreed with the Director of
Central Intelligence in his reversal of a public position he took two
years ago, and that is to make the aggregate number of the
appropriations public. I have indicated that I support that idea, that
it should be public, and hope that he would reconsider.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  With regard to the situation we have on the floor, I am very happy to
accommodate the ranking member on his secondary to the amendment. I
think that is the right way to perfect the intent of what the gentleman
from Vermont is trying to get done. We wish to cooperate in that
because we think it is an important issue; and I think this is the
right way, in a parliamentary way, to go about it.
  The concern I have about some of the points that the gentleman has
raised, in defense of his amendment, is one of puzzlement, a little
bit. We have invited Members to come upstairs and take a look, and it
is there. The numbers are there, and the staff is there, and the staff
will assist Members.
  I wish to assure the gentleman that the staff will assist him, in
whatever his effort is. The staff will assist Members. They may or may
not agree with a Member; it does not matter. If a Member has a
legitimate thing they wish to accomplish as a Member of Congress to
bring to the other Members, that is why our staff is there. We offer
that invitation, and I want to again extend that invitation to the
gentleman for next year.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.
  Mr. SANDERS. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the
gentleman very much for accepting the amendment of the gentleman from
California (Mr. Dixon) to my amendment. I appreciate that.
  The reason that I personally, and I think a number of other Members,
do not walk into that room, frankly, is that we do not want to be
encumbered upon if we make a statement and somebody says, ``My
goodness, you are revealing a national secret.'' I do know the room is
there, and I am sure that the gentleman's staff will be very helpful. I
have not gone in there for precisely that reason, so that nobody can
say that I am revealing something which, in fact, I have never seen.
  Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I understand. We do not
want anybody to be intimidated, and we can generally make pretty clear
what is classified and what is not. But, in any event, we can certainly
help Members craft an amendment.
  With regard to the three areas the gentleman mentioned, obviously, I
think if the gentleman read the newspapers yesterday, he saw that I
spoke on behalf of the committee in saying that we intend to pursue
further the events of the unpleasant matter of the Chinese embassy.

[[Page H3133]]

  I can tell the gentleman that there have been reports, I think they
have now been made fully public, I think staff tells me on Kamisiyah
and certainly on Aviano. And I would point out that that is not
necessarily a CIA problem, although it is an intelligence community
problem. Actually, I believe the maps were produced by NIMA, as was the
case in Belgrade.
  Now, that is a distinction that does not matter. It is the
intelligence community. But, again, in an abundance of trying to be
helpful with the vernacular and the terminology of the intelligence
community, every time somebody says CIA, it does not necessarily mean
CIA. It is just sort of a handy way to say something we do not know
about and, apparently, it has to do with intelligence.

                              {time}  1300

  The intelligence community is very varied. It has many different
functions. It has a lot of accountability and a lot of responsibility.
And I will tell my colleagues that the reason that I will oppose the
amendment, the underlying amendment for the cut, I believe to just take
an across-the-board cut, which is I believe what the intention of the
gentleman is and what has now been made in order once the perfecting
amendment of the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) is in place,
really undoes all the work that the committee does to go through the
many agency budgets and go line by line, which we have to do, because
we are probably the only committee that operates on the basis of having
to go forward to the floor and our colleagues and say, look, we have
looked at this stuff, we know we cannot talk about it publicly, we have
looked at it and we think we have got it at about the right level and
we are prepared to defend what is in there.
  If we take an across-the-board cut, it seriously disrupts that
process and it hurts things that will have consequences that go well
beyond a small proportionate cut. It is very hard to explain if we have
an across-the-board cut like this, whatever the level is, what the
consequences will be.
  I would prefer to let the committee work its will and try very hard
to let every member of the committee identify what they think is
unnecessary and debate it upstairs. That is the process we go through.
We have many briefings, many hearings, much testimony. And then when we
are all through and we unanimously, in a bipartisan way, pass this out,
we have the material upstairs, and anybody who wants to come upstairs
and second guess us is welcome. That is always the way we have done it.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I am not arguing with the proposition that
my colleague has just put forward. But what he is not dealing with is
the issue of priorities of a Nation as a whole.
  What I am raising the question is whether we need more money for the
intelligence agencies or more money for prescription drugs for our
senior citizens or college education for our middle-class families.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Goss was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, to answer the gentleman, we are within our
budget allocation, within our caps. We are playing by the rules. We are
doing this the way we should be doing it.
  There has been a great debate about reinvesting to rebuild our
intelligence capability in the country. I do not think it has been just
fired by some of the headline events we have seen. I would say that
those are tragedies. Things have happened that we do not want to
happen, bad surprises where people have been killed, embassies blowing
up, nuclear testing in India, which we did not catch. It turns out
probably we could not have done anything about it. Nevertheless, we
should have been on top of it, the things we have been reading about
lately, the penetration of the laboratories.
  It seems to me that the way to deal with that is to look at it
forthrightly and say, there are problems here and we need to fix them.
Now, we do not fix all problems by throwing money at them. But we do
need to have some resources. We need to go out and get the personnel.
We need to spot, identify, train, build, education, get the right
languages.
  We are expected in the intelligence community to be the eyes and the
ears around the world for anything we can read about anytime, anywhere.
That is, basically, what the intelligence community does this day and
that is a huge order. And doing that, we are not going to get there by
cutting money. We have to do a reasonable amount of investing.
  Mr. Chairman, I insert the following for printing in the Record:

                     Declaration of George J. Tenet

                              introduction

       I, George J. Tenet, hereby declare:
       1. I am the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). I was
     appointed DCI on 11 July 1997. As DCI, I serve as head of the
     United States intelligence community, act as the principal
     adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to
     the national security, and serve as head of the Central
     Intelligence Agency (CIA).
       2. Through the exercise of my official duties, I am
     generally familiar with plaintiff's civil action. I make the
     following statements based upon my personal knowledge upon
     information made available to me in my official capacity, and
     upon the advice and counsel of the CIA's Office of General
     Counsel.
       3. I understand that plaintiff has submitted Freedom of
     Information Act (FOIA) requests for ``a copy of documents
     that indicate the amount of the total budget request for
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal
     year 1999'' and ``a copy of documents that indicate the total
     budget appropriation for intelligence and intelligence-
     related activities for fiscal year 1999, updated to reflect
     the recent additional appropriation of `emergency
     supplemental' funding for intelligence.'' I also understand
     that plaintiff alleges that the CIA has improperly withheld
     such documents. I shall refer to the requested information as
     the ``budget request'' and ``the total appropriation,''
     respectively.
       4. As head of the intelligence community, my
     responsibilities include developing and presenting to the
     President an annual budget request for the National Foreign
     Intelligence Program (NFIP), and participating in the
     development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget
     requests for the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP)
     and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). The
     budgets for the NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA jointly comprise the
     budget of the United States for intelligence and
     intelligence-related activities.
       5. The CIA has withheld the budget request and the total
     appropriation on the basis of FOIA Exemption (b)(1) because
     they are currently and properly classified under Executive
     Order 12958, and on the basis of FOIA Exemption (b)(3)
     because they are exempted from disclosure by the National
     Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act
     of 1949. The purpose of this declaration, and the
     accompanying classified declaration, is to describe my bases
     for determining that disclosure of the budget request or the
     total appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause
     damage to the national security and would tend to reveal
     intelligence methods.
       6. I previously executed declarations in this case that
     were filed with the CIA's motion for summary judgment on 11
     December 1998. Those two declarations described my bases for
     withholding the budget request only. Since the CIA filed its
     motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has filed an amended
     complaint seeking release of the total appropriation also.
     For the Court's convenience, the justifications contained in
     my earlier declarations are repeated and supplemented in this
     declaration and the accompanying classified declaration and
     describe my bases for withholding both the budget request and
     the total appropriation for fiscal year 1999.

                             prior releases

       7. In October 1997, I publicly disclosed that the aggregate
     amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related
     activities for fiscal year 1997 was $26.6 billion. At the
     time of this disclosure, I issued a public statement that
     included the following two points:
       ``First, disclosure of future aggregate figures will be
     considered only after determining whether such disclosure
     could cause harm to the national security by showing trends
     over time.
       ``Second, we will continue to protect from disclosure any
     and all subsidiary information concerning the intelligence
     budget: whether the information concerns particular
     intelligence agencies or particular intelligence programs. In
     other words, the Administration intends to draw the line at
     the top-line, aggregate figure. Beyond this figure, there
     will be not other disclosures of currently classified budget
     information because such disclosures could harm national
     security.''
       8. In March 1998, I publicly disclosed that the aggregate
     amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related
     activities for fiscal year 1998 was $26.7 billion. I did so
     only after evaluating whether the 1998 appropriation, when
     compared with the 1997 appropriation, could cause damage to
     the national security by showing trends over time, or
     otherwise tend to reveal intelligence methods. Because the
     1998 appropriation represented approximately a $0.1 billion
     increase--or less

[[Page H3134]]

     than a 0.4 percent change--over the 1997 appropriation, and
     because published reports did not contain information that,
     if coupled with the appropriation, would be likely to allow
     the correlation of specific spending figures with particular
     intelligence programs, I concluded that release of the 1998
     appropriation could not reasonably be expected to
     cause damage to the national security, and so I released
     the 1998 appropriation.
       9. Since the enactment of the intelligence appropriation
     for fiscal year 1998, the budget process has produced: (1)
     the fiscal year 1998 supplemental appropriation; (2) the
     Administration's budget request for fiscal year 1999 (a
     subject of this litigation); (3) the fiscal year 1999 regular
     appropriation (a subject of this litigation); and (4) the
     fiscal year 1999 emergency supplemental appropriation (a
     subject of this litigation). Information about each of these
     figures--some of it accurate, some not--has been reported in
     the media. In evaluating whether to release the
     Administration's budget request or total appropriation for
     fiscal year 1999, I cannot review these possible releases in
     isolation. Instead, I have to consider whether release of the
     requested information could add to the mosaic of other public
     and clandestine information acquired by our adversaries about
     the intelligence budget in a way that could reasonably be
     expected to damage the national security. If release of the
     requested information adds a piece to the intelligence jigsaw
     puzzle--even if it does not complete the picture--such that
     the picture is more identifiable, then damage to the national
     security could reasonably be expected. After conducting such
     a review, I have determined that release of the
     Administration's intelligence budget request or total
     appropriation for fiscal year 1999 reasonably could be
     expected to cause damage to the national security, or
     otherwise tend to reveal intelligence methods. In the
     paragraphs that follow, I will provide a description of some
     of the information that I reviewed and how I reached this
     conclusion. I am unable to describe all of the information I
     reviewed without disclosing classified information.
     Additional information in support of my determination is
     included in my classified declaration.
       10. At the creation of the modern national security
     establishment in 1947, national policymakers had to address a
     paradox of intelligence appropriations: the more they
     publicly disclosed about the amount of appropriations, the
     less they could publicly debate about the object of such
     appropriations without causing damage to the national
     security. They struck the balance in favor of withholding the
     amount of appropriations. For over fifty years, the Congress
     has acted in executive session when approving intelligence
     appropriations to prevent the identification of trends in
     intelligence spending and any correlation between specific
     spending figures with particular intelligence programs. Now
     is an especially critical and turbulent period for the
     intelligence budget, and the continued secrecy of the fiscal
     year 1999 budget request and total appropriation is necessary
     for the protection of vulnerable intelligence capabilities.

                         classified information

     FOIA exemption (b)(1)
       11. The authority to classify information is derived from a
     succession of Executive orders, the most recent of which is
     Executive Order 12958, ``Classified National Security
     Information.'' Section 1.1(c) of the Order defines
     ``classified information'' as ``information that has been
     determined pursuant to this order or any predecessor order to
     require protection against unauthorized disclosure.'' The CIA
     has withheld the budget request and the total appropriation
     as classified information under the criteria established in
     Executive Order 12958.
     Classification authority
       12. Information may be originally classified under the
     Order only if it: (1) is owned by, produced by or for, or is
     under the control of the United States Government; (2) falls
     within one or more of the categories of information set forth
     in section 1.5 of the Order; and (3) is classified by an
     original classification authority who determines that its
     unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to
     result in damage to the national security that the original
     classification authority can identify or describe.\1\ The
     classification of the budget request and the total
     appropriation meet these requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ The severity of the damage to the national security
     affects the level of classification assigned to the
     information: information reasonably expected to cause
     exceptionally grave damage is classified TOP SECRET;
     information reasonably expected to cause serious damage is
     classified SECRET; and information reasonably expected to
     cause damage is classified CONFIDENTIAL.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       13. The Administration's budget request and the total
     appropriation are information clearly owned, produced by and
     under the control of the United States Government.
     Additionally, the budget request and the total appropriation
     fall within the category of information listed at section
     1.5(c) of the Order: ``intelligence activities (including
     special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or
     cryptology.''
       14. Finally, I have made the determination required under
     the Order to classify the budget request and the total
     appropriation. By Presidential Order of 13 October 1995,
     ``National Security Information'', 3 C.F.R. 513 (1996),
     reprinted in 50 U.S.C. Sec. 435 note (Supp. I 1995), and
     pursuant to section 1.4(a)(2) of Executive Order 12958, the
     President designated me as an official authorized to exercise
     original Top Secret classification authority. I have
     determined that the unauthorized disclosure of the budget
     request or the total appropriation reasonably could be
     expected to cause damage to the national security.
     Consequently, I have classified the budget request and the
     total appropriation at the Confidential level. In the
     paragraphs below, I will identify and describe the
     foreseeable damage to national security that reasonably
     could be expected to result from disclosure of the budget
     request or the total appropriation.
     Damage to national security
       15. Disclosure of the budget request or the total
     appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to
     the national security in several ways. First, disclosure of
     the budget request reasonably could be expected to provide
     foreign governments with the United States' own assessment of
     its intelligence capabilities and weaknesses. The difference
     between the appropriation for one year and the
     Administration's budget request for the next provides a
     measure of the Administration's unique, critical assessment
     of its own intelligence programs. A requested budget decrease
     reflects a decision that existing intelligence programs are
     more than adequate to meet the national security needs of the
     United States. A requested budget increase reflects a
     decision that existing intelligence programs are insufficient
     to meet our national security needs. A budget request with no
     change in spending reflects a decision that existing programs
     are just adequate to meet our needs.
       16. Similar insights can be gained by analyzing the
     difference between the total appropriation by Congress for
     one year and the total appropriation for the next year. The
     difference between the appropriation for one year and the
     appropriation for the next year provides a measure of the
     Congress' assessment of the nation's intelligence programs.
     Not only does an increased, decreased, or unchanged
     appropriation reflects a congressional determination that
     existing intelligence programs are less than adequate, more
     than adequate, or just adequate, respectively, to meet the
     national security needs of the United States, but an actual
     figure indicates the degree of change.
       17. Disclosure of the budget request or the total
     appropriation would provide foreign governments with the
     United States' own overall assessment of its intelligence
     weaknesses and priorities and assist them in redirecting
     their own resources to frustrate the United States'
     intelligence collection efforts, with the resulting damage to
     our national security. Because I have determined it to be in
     our national security interest to deny foreign governments
     information that would assist them in assessing the strength
     of United States intelligence capabilities, I have determined
     that disclosure of the budget request or the total
     appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to
     the national security. I am unable to elaborate further on
     the bases for my determination without disclosing classified
     information. Additional information in support of my
     determination is included in my classified declaration.
       18. Second, disclosure of the budget request or the total
     appropriation reasonably could be expected to assist foreign
     governments in correlating specific spending figures with
     particular intelligence programs. Foreign governments are
     keenly interested in the United States' intelligence
     collection priorities. Nowhere are those priorities better
     reflected than in the level of spending on particular
     intelligence activities. That is why foreign intelligence
     services, to varying degrees, devote resources to learning
     the amount and objects of intelligence spending by other
     foreign governments. The CIA's own intelligence analysts
     conduct just such analyses of intelligence spending by
     foreign governments.
       19. However, no intelligence service, U.S. or foreign, ever
     has complete information. They are always revising their
     intelligence estimates based on new information. Moreover,
     the United States does not have complete information about
     how much foreign intelligence services know about U.S.
     intelligence programs and funding. Foreign governments
     collect information about U.S. intelligence activities from
     their human intelligence sources; that is, ``spies.'' While
     the United States will never know exactly how much our
     adversaries know about U.S. intelligence activities, we do
     know that all foreign intelligence services know at least as
     much about U.S. intelligence programs and funding as has been
     disclosed by the Congress or reported by the media.
     Therefore, congressional statements and media reporting of
     the fiscal year 1999 budget cycle provide the minimum
     knowledge that can be attributed to all foreign governments,
     and serve as a baseline for predictive judgments of the
     possible damage to national security that could reasonably be
     expected to result from release of the budget request or the
     total appropriation.
       20. Budget figures provide useful benchmarks that, when
     combined with other public and clandestinely-acquired
     information, assist experienced intelligence analysts in
     reaching accurate estimates of the nature and extent of all
     sorts of foreign intelligence activities, including covert
     operations, scientific and technical research and
     development, and analytic capabilities. I expect foreign
     intelligence services to do no less if

[[Page H3135]]

     armed with the same information. While other sources may
     publish information about the amounts and objects of
     intelligence spending that damages the national security, I
     cannot add to that damage by officially releasing
     information, such as the budget request or the total
     appropriation, that would tend to confirm or deny these
     public accounts. Such intelligence would permit foreign
     governments to learn about United States' intelligence
     collection priorities and redirect their own resources to
     frustrate the United States' intelligence collection
     efforts, with the resulting damage to our national
     security. Therefore, I have determined that disclosure of
     the budget request or the total appropriation reasonably
     could be expected to cause damage to the national
     security. I am unable to elaborate further on the bases
     for my determination without disclosing classified
     information. Additional information in support of my
     determination is included in my classified declaration.
       21. In addition, release of both the budget request and the
     total appropriation would permit one to calculate the exact
     difference between the Administration's request and Congress'
     appropriation. It is during the congressional debate over the
     Administration's budget request that many disclosures of
     specific intelligence programs are reported in the media.
     Release of the budget request and total appropriation
     together would assist our adversaries in correlating the
     added or subtracted intelligence programs with the exact
     amount of spending devoted to them.
       22. And third, disclosure of the budget request or the
     total appropriation reasonably could be expected to free
     foreign governments' limited collection and analysis
     resources for other efforts targeted against the United
     States. No government has unlimited intelligence resources.
     Resources devoted to targeting the nature and extent of the
     United States' intelligence spending are resources that
     cannot be devoted to other efforts targeted against the
     United States. Disclosure of the budget request or the total
     appropriation would free those foreign resources for other
     intelligence collection activities directed against the
     United States, with the resulting damage to our national
     security. Therefore, I have determined that disclosure of the
     budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be
     expected to cause damage to the national security.
       23. In summary, I have determined that disclosure of the
     budget request or the total appropriations reasonably could
     be expected to provide foreign intelligence services with a
     valuable benchmark for identifying and frustrating United
     States' intelligence programs. For all of the above reasons,
     singularly and collectively, I have determined that
     disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation
     for fiscal year 1999 reasonably could be expected to cause
     damage to the national security. Therefore, I have determined
     that the budget request and the total appropriation are
     currently and properly classified Confidential.

                          intelligence methods

     FOIA exemption (b)(3)
       24. Section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947,
     as amended, provides that the DCI, as head of the
     intelligence community, ``shall protect intelligence sources
     and methods from unauthorized disclosure.'' Disclosure of the
     budget request or the total appropriation would jeopardize
     intelligence methods because disclosure would tend to reveal
     how and for what purposes intelligence appropriations are
     secretly transferred to and expended by intelligence
     agencies.
       25. There is no single, separate appropriation for the CIA.
     The appropriations for the CIA and other agencies in the
     intelligence community are hidden in the various annual
     appropriations acts. The specific locations of the
     intelligence appropriations in those acts are not publicly
     identified, both to protect the classified nature of the
     intelligence programs themselves and to protect the
     classified intelligence methods used to transfer funds to and
     between intelligence agencies.
       26. Because there are a finite number of places where
     intelligence funds may be hidden in the federal budget, a
     skilled budget analyst could construct a hypothetical
     intelligence budget by aggregating suspected
     intelligence line items from the publicly-disclosed
     appropriations. Release of the budget request or the total
     appropriation would provide a benchmark to test and refine
     such a hypothesis. Repeated disclosures of either the
     budget request or total appropriation could provide more
     data with which to test and refine the hypothesis. Exhibit
     1 is an example of such a hypothesis. Confirmation of the
     hypothetical budget could disclose the actual locations in
     the appropriations acts where the intelligence funds are
     hidden, which is the intelligence method used to transfer
     funds to and between intelligence agencies.
       27. Sections 5(a) and 8(b) of the CIA Act of 1949
     constitute the legal authorization for the secret transfer
     and spending of intelligence funds. Together, these two
     sections implement Congress' intent that intelligence
     appropriations and expenditures, respectively, be shielded
     from public view. Simply stated, the means of providing money
     to the CIA is itself an intelligence method. Disclosure of
     the budget request or the total appropriation could assist in
     finding the locations of secret intelligence appropriations,
     and thus defeat these congressionally-approved secret funding
     mechanisms. Therefore I have determined that disclosure of
     the budget request or the total appropriation would tend to
     reveal intelligence methods that are protected from
     disclosure. I am unable to elaborate further on the bases for
     my determination without disclosing classified information.
     Additional information in support of my determination is
     included in my classified declaration.

                               CONCLUSION

       28. In fulfillment of my statutory responsibility as head
     of the United States intelligence community, as the principal
     adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to
     the national security, and as head of the CIA, to protect
     classified information and intelligence methods from
     unauthorized disclosure, I have determined for the reasons
     set forth above and in my classified declaration that the
     Administration's intelligence budget request an the total
     appropriation for fiscal year 1999 must be withheld because
     their disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage
     to the national security and would tend to reveal
     intelligence methods.
       I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the
     foregoing is true and correct.
       Executed this 6th day of April, 1999.
                                                  George J. Tenet,
                                 Director of Central Intelligence.

  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
  (Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Sanders amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I think the last speaker was correct when he said we
need to revamp the CIA. I think what the Sanders amendment says is that
revamping should not involve additional money.
  The CIA budget is estimated to be somewhere around $30 billion. We
are only spending about $23 billion on elementary and secondary
education. It is important that it be revamped. And I am not sure that
the intelligence community that exists now is capable of revamping it.
We need an independent commission of some kind to revamp the CIA. It
needs to be improved. It needs to have accountability. The long history
of blunders in the last 10 years are such that it is obviously a
defunct, incompetent, decaying agency. Something needs to happen.
  I am not sure the President is in charge, either. The President's
first choice for CIA Director was not accepted by the intelligence
community. The intelligence community protects this incompetence.
  Our history with respect to Haiti was that the CIA was determined to
get the duly-elected President of Haiti, Jean Bertrand-Aristide. They
did everything they could to smear him. All kinds of false things were
generated out of the CIA. When they were later proven to be untrue,
nobody later apologized, nobody was held accountable.
  In one of the major diplomatic moves made by the envoy to Haiti,
where we had a delegation going in with Canadian police and a number of
other things to start a process of peace in Haiti, there was a big
demonstration on the docks in Haiti which turned all that around and
threatened the U.S. Embassy personnel with gunshots; and it turned out
that that demonstration was financed by the CIA. Emmanuel Constanz, the
head of the organization that staged the violent demonstration was on
the payroll of the CIA.
  We cannot fully get the story of all the things Emmanuel Constanz had
going with the CIA because they refuse to give us the records. They
will not let the nation of Haiti try Emmanuel Constanz for the crimes
that he has committed.
  Then there is the Aldrich Ames affair, where the man in charge of the
Russian spy operation managing our assets was on the payroll of the
Soviet Union. He was on the payroll of the Soviet Union, and he exposed
those assets. At least 10 of the people who were working for this
nation were executed as a result of Aldrich Ames, the guy who was in
charge at the CIA, having sold them out for quite a number of millions
of dollars.
  And now we have the blunder at the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia. It
is not funny at all. It is not humorous at all to me. I heard some
Members in the elevator say, ``Do you want to establish a special map
fund for the CIA?'' I do not think this is funny at all. These people
have life-and-death power over large numbers of people, and to talk
about a mapping error which could have been corrected by a tourist map,
a mapping area that was reinforced by somebody on the ground. They said
they had assets on the ground. Was the asset on the ground drunk? What
kind of operation is this?

[[Page H3136]]

  And when are we, as American people first of all, going to get to see
what the budget is? But more important than that, an independent
commission to revamp it? And before that happens, there should not be a
single additional penny spent. Throwing money at the CIA is certainly
not going to solve the problem. And money is not the problem. They have
far more than they need right now.
  My colleagues will recall several years ago that the CIA accountants
lost $4 billion in their budget. They could not find out where $4
billion had gone. They just could not. We know it was not spent. They
lost it and kept applying for, of course, new funds every year. And we
never got a full explanation as to what happened to lose $4 billion in
the budget of the CIA.
  So we very much need to have a better accounting of this life-and-
death powerful agency. The incompetence is deadly. The incompetence of
the CIA is deadly. The incompetence of the CIA is such that it destroys
the foreign policies of the United States.
  My constituents were all in favor of supporting the President on the
actions taken against Slobodan Milosevic. But now, the war has been
conducted in such a sloppy manner. And with the Chinese Embassy
bombing, there seems to be a turnaround in public opinion in my area
because they do not want to be a part of anything that is as sloppy as
this, a life-and-death operation, that tells us that they bombed an
embassy that has been existing for several years because the maps were
not correct.
  The CIA should be revamped, and we should start with all new people
in the intelligence community. If intelligence community means members
of the committee, then maybe members of the committee ought to take a
hard look at themselves and say, we need some fresher voices. If the
committees in the House and the Senate are going to be advocates for
the CIA, we need an objective committee that will be an oversight
committee to really look at the CIA and revamp the CIA. But, certainly,
do not spend an additional dime on the CIA until that happens.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, not only the United States, but I truly believe this is
a very, very dangerous world. I believe, from my experience, that it is
even more so than during the Cold War.
  Sandy Berger, with the CIA, told me that their assets around the
world are spread very, very thin. I think one of our biggest threats is
terrorist threats, not only in the United States but abroad. And he
said their assets are not adequate to do that. Whether it is gaining
information to protect our embassies, whether it is terrorist
movements, whether it is just gathering intelligence on China or
Russia, or whatever, those assets are spread very thin.
  Sandy Berger also told us that, with Kosovo, with those assets so
thin, that they are having to draw those intelligence assets to Kosovo,
which leaves us very, very vulnerable. And, in his words he said, an
attack from Osama bin Laden was imminent. To me, that means fairly
quick.
  It grieves me that we are in the situation that we are in right now
in Kosovo. But the last thing we need to do is cut our intelligence. It
means life and death, not only for the people here in the United
States.
  Let me give my colleagues a good example. In Vietnam, we had
intelligence in a place just south of Hanoi that said there were no
surface-to-air missiles there. We lost four airplanes because of faulty
intelligence.
  And when my colleague talked about the maps, I agree with him. But I
went and looked at the map that they are using. Do my colleagues know
what is in the map where the Chinese Embassy was? A vacant lot. And we
cannot lie to the American people. We cannot spin things to make
ourselves look good, either. That is wrong.
  I would ask my colleagues to go over and look at the maps that they
were using where the Chinese Embassy was. It was a vacant lot. So this
is the kind of information we need, not to destroy. We have a military
force and we have a foreign policy and we have the protection of the
United States, the national security of this country. They are all tied
together.
  The intelligence we get enables us to direct our foreign policy, our
foreign policy, using the vehicle of the military and enables us to
stay safe and it enables our military to stay safe. And I feel from the
bottom of my heart, with my experience, that to cut the intelligence
budget is cutting the lifeline of the American people in our military.
That is why I would oppose the amendment of the gentleman.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding.
  Let me ask my colleague a question: Does he believe that it is a
question of funding that our intelligence people did not know where the
Chinese Embassy was? Is this a question of putting billions of dollars
more into the CIA? Or is this gross mismanagement of the process?
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I think probably
both.
  I would say to the gentleman from Vermont, when we have people that
are spread so thin, it is like many of us in our offices where they
give us more to do and we cannot keep up with all that we have got to
do, there are things that slip through the crack. When we have limited
assets and we are trying to do things in an ad hoc way which, in my
opinion, and I agree with the gentleman, it has not been planned well,
and when we are doing these ad hoc and we are making these decisions
and we have got people picking these targets to do that and the
oversight was disastrous.
  So, yes, it is because of a lack of personnel, which was also caused
by a lack of budget to hire people. That would be my answer to the
gentleman. And I feel strongly. I am not being partisan with this. I
believe it with all my heart.
  And please, look at what our military is going through right now, I
mean we are running them into the ground, and the assets of the
intelligence agency, both the service intelligence, the CIA, and the
FBI. Although, I believe that in many cases it is defunct in certain
areas. But please do not cut those assets, because it is a lifeline for
us here in the United States and our military, as well.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
  Mr. Chairman, this is what the public knows about the total aggregate
budget of our intelligence agencies. We are told somehow this figure
needs to be kept secret.
  What solace would U.S. enemies or potential enemies abroad take from
knowing that we lavish more money on our intelligence agencies than the
entire gross national product of their countries and many of our other
enemies combined around the world? None. They would probably be scared
to death to think of the amount of money we are spending. It is kept
secret for a reason. It is kept secret because of the extraordinary
waste and incompetence.
  We had some discussion just now about the lack of human intelligence.
They are right. They are lavishing so many billions on geegaws and
satellites and things that bring down so much data that is never, ever
to be analyzed because there are not humans there to analyze it. They
do not have people. They do not have agents.
  They are wasting tens of millions, hundreds of millions, billions of
dollars annually on these things instead of investing in agents and
intelligence.

                              {time}  1315

  A much smaller, more effective post-cold war, post-gadgetry type
intelligence service could serve our Nation well.
  The failings have been well documented, but I want to go into this
most extraordinary recent failing for a moment. These are maps which I
obtained through the Congressional Research Service, whose budget for
an annual basis is equivalent to about one day's spending of our
intelligence services. They were able to provide the maps. They
provided two maps, in fact, where the Chinese embassy used to be and
where the Chinese embassy is now. It is about four miles apart.
  The gentleman before me really puzzled me because he said we targeted
an empty lot. We have already admitted we targeted a building and blew
it up. We did not target an empty lot. And it

[[Page H3137]]

just happened to be the Chinese embassy. Maybe they did not have access
to the same database as CRS even though CRS has a budget a tiny
fraction of theirs, but they certainly did have a map.
  They could have accessed the Yugoslav web site. Maybe they thought it
was disinformation, but they have a web site for tourists, and on the
web site they have the new address of the Chinese embassy which my
staff pulled down from the World Wide Web. Certainly, they have 486
computers and modems at these intelligence agencies. Or maybe we do not
allow them to have those because we have wasted so much money on these
extraordinary spy systems flying around up there in space that provide
very little benefit to us.
  The funny thing to me is, my colleagues on the other side of the
aisle, as soon as we have an extraordinary failing of our intelligence
agencies, say this proves the case for more money. Many of the same
people stand up in the floor of this House and say the education system
of the United States is failing our children. Do they say that needs
more money? I think it needs more money for smaller class size. No,
they say it needs to be reformed, dismantled, reorganized, vouchered,
everything but more money for education. But when it comes to the
failings of our intelligence services, the only answer, the answer
every time is more money, more money, more money, more billions.
  Why? Why not apply that same critical viewpoint, that same scrutiny
to these agencies? Why not reveal the budget to the light of day? There
is nothing in the Constitution that provides for hiding this budget. It
is not a national security issue. It is a national waste and
incompetence issue that is being kept from the American people. It is
being kept from Members of Congress.
  Yes, I could go upstairs and read all that stuff. That is great. But
the minute I came to the floor of the House I could not talk about it.
I would be crippled to talk about the waste. If I actually had facts
about the waste, I could not use them. If I had the actual aggregate
number, I could not use it.
  So we have to come here and have this absurd debate every year
because we are covering up an incompetent number of bureaucracies and
disasters, and we have a bunch of people who are on a little committee
who go into a room and exert some light degree of scrutiny and are even
stonewalled at times by the agencies.
  It is time for a major overhaul of these intelligence services
because of the major failings, from the most recent failings here at
the Chinese embassy back to being unable to predict the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the invasion of Kuwait, the explosion of nuclear weapons
by India, failing after failing after failing. There is no other part
of the government where Congress would take it, lay down and say,
``Here is more money. Waste it.''
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Sanders-Stark-
DeFazio amendment to freeze the Intelligence Budget at the 1998 level
of spending.
  Without openness regarding the level of intelligence spending, there
is no accountability.
  Without full accountability, I am not prepared to increase funds for
intelligence.
  On Saturday, May 8, the U.S. bombed the Beijing embassy in Belgrade.
The blame is being placed on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for
using an outdated map. Now, China is breaking off diplomatic ties with
the U.S. on human rights and arms control.
  Many of my colleagues will attribute this fatal error--killing three
Chinese journalists and wounding twenty other people--to shortfalls in
intelligence spending on maps. However, in truth, this mistake was made
by human error and the bombing should not be used as an excuse to spend
more.
  There is no reason for the Intelligence Budget to be classified
information. How can we justify a multi-billion blank check every year
without disclosure of that amount to the American taxpayer?
  If this Congress is serious about saving Social Security and
Medicare, we should not throw money into an unaccountable hole. Since
almost all of the intelligence spending is hidden within the defense
budget, we are misled about the real amount of intelligence spending
through false line items in the defense budget. We must have budget
integrity.
  The media, without compromising national security, routinely
estimates the intelligence budget. When the government keeps this open
secret clandestinely hidden, the American public grows increasingly
cynical about their government.
  The Cold War is over. The specter of Communism no longer lurks on the
horizon. While we face new challenges in this new age, the Intelligence
community must share in the burden of fiscal accountability and
discipline. I support the Sanders-Stark-DeFazio Amendment to freeze the
Intelligence Authorization spending at the Fiscal Year 1998 level.
  Reports show that the U.S. spends more than twice the combined
Intelligence budgets of our supposed hostile nations--North Korea,
Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and Cuba. It is also more than the
Intelligence budgets of the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany and
Canada combined.
  Where has all of this secrecy gotten us?
  We bombed a Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three and wounding
others.
  We flew into a gondola in Italy, killing 20 unsuspecting civilians.
  And we destroyed a weapons and nerve facility in Iraq causing Gulf
War illness in our military personnel serving in the Persian Gulf.
  The American taxpayer deserves to know what mistakes the CIA made and
how they will be corrected. The Sanders-Stark-DeFazio Amendment calls
for a CIA report on the accidents that have occurred over the past
decade.
  I cannot, in good conscience, allow any type of spending increase
when mistakes in U.S. Intelligence occur far too often and endanger
innocent lives.
  For these tragedies, I urge my colleagues to support the Sanders-
Stark-DeFazio amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) to the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders).
  The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Vermont (Mr. Sanders), as amended.
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 167, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders),
as amended, will be postponed.
  Are there further amendments to the bill?

                 Amendment No. 13 Offered by Ms. Waters

  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 13 offered by Ms. Waters:
       At the end, add the following new title:

     TITLE VI--PROHIBITION ON DRUG TRAFFICKING BY EMPLOYEES OF THE
                         INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

     SEC. 601. PROHIBITION ON DRUG TRAFFICKING BY EMPLOYEES OF THE
                   INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       (a) Purposes.--It is the purpose of this section--
       (1) to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency and other
     intelligence agencies and their employees and agents from
     participating in drug trafficking activities, including the
     manufacture, purchase, sale, transport, or distribution of
     illegal drugs; conspiracy to traffic in illegal drugs; and
     arrangements to transport illegal drugs; and
       (2) to require the employees and agents of the Central
     Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies to report
     known or suspected drug trafficking activities to the
     appropriate authorities.
       (b) Prohibition on Drug Trafficking.--No element of the
     intelligence community, or any employee of such an element,
     may knowingly encourage or participate in drug trafficking
     activities.
       (c) Mandate to Report.--Any employee of an element of the
     intelligence community having knowledge of facts or
     circumstances that reasonably indicate that any employee of
     such element is involved with any drug trafficking
     activities, or other violations of United States drug laws,
     shall report such knowledge or facts to the appropriate
     official.
       (d) Definitions.--As used in this section:
       (1) Drug trafficking activities.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``drug trafficking activities''
     means the possession, distribution, manufacture, cultivation,
     sale, transfer, or the attempt or conspiracy to possess,
     distribute, manufacture, cultivate, sell or transfer illegal
     drugs (as those terms are applied under section 404(c) of the
     Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 844(c)).
       (B) Inclusions.--Such term includes arrangements to allow
     the use of federally owned or leased vehicles, or other means
     of transportation, for the transport of illegal drugs.
       (2) Illegal drugs.--The term ``illegal drugs'' means
     controlled substances (as that term is defined section 102(6)
     of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)) included
     in schedule I or II under part B of title II of such Act.

[[Page H3138]]

       (3) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means an individual
     employed by an element of the intelligence community, and
     includes the following individuals:
       (A) Employees under a contract with such an element.
       (B) Covert agents, as that term is defined in paragraph (4)
     of section 606 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
     U.S.C. 426).
       (C) An individual acting on behalf, or with the approval,
     of an element of the intelligence community.
       (4) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
     community'' has the meaning given that term under paragraph
     (4) of section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
     U.S.C. 401a).
       (5) Appropriate official.--The term ``appropriate
     official'' means the Attorney General, the Inspector General
     of the element of the intelligence community (if any), or the
     head of such element.

  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of my amendment to H.R.
1555, the Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2000.
  My amendment prohibits the employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the CIA, and other intelligence agencies, from participating in
drug trafficking activities. My amendment clearly defines drug
trafficking activities to include the manufacture, the purchase, the
sale, the transport or distribution of illegal drugs and conspiracy to
traffic in illegal drugs. My amendment also requires CIA employees and
covert agents to report known or suspected drug trafficking activities
to the appropriate authorities.
  Most Americans would assume that the CIA would never traffic in
illegal drugs and would take all necessary actions to prosecute known
drug traffickers. History, however, has proven that this is not the
case. For 13 years, the CIA and the Department of Justice followed a
memorandum of understanding that explicitly exempted the CIA from
requirements to report drug trafficking by CIA assets, agents and
contractors to Federal law enforcement agencies. This allowed some of
the biggest drug lords in the world to operate without fear that their
activities would be reported to the Drug Enforcement Agency or other
law enforcement authorities. This remarkable and secret agreement was
in force from February of 1982 until August of 1995.
  I have been investigating the allegations of drug trafficking by the
Nicaraguan Contras during the 1980s. My investigation has led me to the
conclusion that the United States intelligence agencies knew full well
about drug trafficking by the Contras in south central Los Angeles and
throughout the United States and chose to continue to support the
Contras without taking any action to stop the drug trafficking.
  Last year, the CIA Inspector General released a report of
investigation on drug trafficking by the Contras which confirms
allegations of CIA knowledge of and support for drug trafficking in the
United States by the Contras. The report provides extensive details of
the evidence available to the CIA regarding drug trafficking by Contra
rebels and their supporters.
  Even more remarkable is the fact that there is evidence that the CIA
was actually participating in drug trafficking activities. In the late
1980s, the CIA began to develop intelligence on Colombian drug cartels.
To infiltrate the cartels, the CIA arranged an undercover drug
smuggling operation with the Venezuelan National Guard. More than 1.5
tons of cocaine were smuggled from Colombia to Venezuela and then
stored in a CIA-financed Counternarcotics Intelligence Center in
Venezuela. The Center's commander and the CIA's agent in Venezuela was
General Ramon Guillen, who was also the head of the anti-drug unit of
the Venezuelan National Guard.
  Now we know that, in certain circumstances, the Drug Enforcement
Agency arranges controlled shipments of illegal drugs in which the
drugs are allowed to enter the United States, then tracked to their
destination and seized. However, the CIA was more interested in keeping
the drug lords happy than confiscating the drugs and prosecuting the
traffickers.
  The CIA asked the DEA for permission to let the dope walk, that is,
allow the drugs to be sold on our Nation's streets. The DEA refused
them, turned them down flat. But the CIA ushered this shipment of drugs
into the United States, and it got lost on the streets of New York and
south central Los Angeles and in our neighborhoods and our communities.
The CIA let the drugs walk into our communities.
  On November 19, 1990, part of that shipment, 800 pounds of cocaine,
was seized by the U.S. Customs Service at the Miami International
Airport. Customs traced the cocaine right back to the Venezuelan
National Guard and General Guillen and the CIA. General Guillen's top
civilian aide, Adolfo Romero Gomez, was convicted of conspiracy to
possess and distribute cocaine in September of 1997.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Waters) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Ms. Waters was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, on December 10, 1997, he was sentenced to
almost 20 years in prison. Federal prosecutors have also charged
General Guillen with a broad conspiracy to smuggle up to 22 tons of
cocaine through Venezuela to the United States and Europe while he was
head of the anti-drug unit of the Venezuelan National Guard between
1988 and 1992. Since Venezuela does not extradite its citizens, General
Guillen is still at large.
  We may never know precisely how much cocaine entered the United
States through the CIA's pipeline or how much eventually reached our
Nation's streets. No one at the CIA was ever charged.
  The CIA should not be allowed to bring cocaine or other illegal drugs
into our country. Intelligence agencies should be working to stop the
harmful trafficking in illegal drugs that is destroying our
communities. They should not be assisting the drug traffickers.
  I urge my colleagues to support this very reasonable amendment to
stop the drugs that are used in covert operations from seeing their way
into our cities and our towns. I ask for an ``aye'' vote on my
amendment.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  As I understand the gentlewoman's amendment, it would prohibit the
engagement in any illegal drug activity by employees, agents or other
sources of the CIA. Is that essentially correct?
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. WATERS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I obviously support wholeheartedly the spirit
of that. I think that, in fact, it is already a fact, that it is
against the law for employees, agents or sources of the CIA to break
the law, as it should be.
  The only problem I have with the gentlewoman's amendment is one I
think we can resolve very easily, and that is the definition of what an
employee is, whether or not it perhaps is so broad that in some
unanticipated or unintended way it actually could limit the
intelligence community's efforts to wage war on those involved in
illegal narcotic trafficking and illegal drug activity. I know that the
gentlewoman would not want that.
  With that one simple reservation, I would be simply in a position to
accept the amendment, certainly in the spirit it is offered, and join
the gentlewoman in saying very obviously we would not tolerate in any
way any incidents, and we will seek out, as the gentlewoman has
suggested, any reports we have about wrongdoing in the areas of illegal
drug activity by not just the CIA but anybody in the intelligence
community over which we have oversight authority.
  Having said that, I would also point out that actually some progress
has been made by the committee since last year we had this
conversation, and we do have some reporting, and we will soon have some
more on some of these matters of interest to the gentlewoman.
  I will accept the amendment subject to those remarks.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment and in particular
section 2 which says it requires the employees and agents of the
Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies to report
known or suspected drug traffickers' activities to the appropriate
authorities. Clearly, in the past and based on the CIA Inspector
General's public report on this matter there has been a mixed record as
it relates to the reporting of suspected drug

[[Page H3139]]

activities. I think that this amendment perhaps would go a long way
toward clearing up that ambiguity, although the CIA has taken effective
steps to correct past problems in this area.
  I agree with the chairman of the committee as it relates to the
definition of ``employees,'' and we accept the amendment on the
minority side.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Waters).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the bill?

                  Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Engel

  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman referring to amendment No. 3?
  Mr. ENGEL. Yes.
  The CHAIRMAN. Title III was closed. The gentleman will need to
proceed with unanimous consent to designate the amendment.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that we proceed with
the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
New York?
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, and I will not
object, I wish to explain why I will not object.
  I respect the gentleman from New York. He has worked hard and means
well to bring forward a meaningful amendment. It is an amendment in
fact which I think I am prepared to accept if I understand it properly.

                              {time}  1330

  Mr. Chairman, given the technicalities of this particular rule for
this particular subject for this particular permanent select committee,
I think that there is a little extra work involved for our members, and
we try and bend over backwards to accommodate our members, and it is in
that spirit that I am not going to object.
  Equally, I am very mindful that this year the gentleman from
California (Mr. Dixon) specifically asked if we could have as much time
as possible so every member would be able to be fully lined up, and as
a courtesy to my ranking member, I am prepared not to object.
  Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
New York?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) may offer
amendment No. 3.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Engel:
       At the end of title III (page 10, after line 2), insert the
     following new section:

     SEC. 304. REPORT ON KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
     enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
     report (in both classified and unclassified form) on the
     organized resistance in Kosovo known as Kosovo Liberation
     Army. The report shall include the following:
       (1) A summary of the history of the Kosovo Liberation Army.
       (2) As of the date of the enactment of this Act--
       (A) the number of individuals currently participating in or
     supporting combat operations of the Kosovo Liberation Army
     (fielded forces), and the number of individuals in training
     for such service (recruits);
       (B) the types, and quantity of each type, of weapon
     employed by the Kosovo Liberation Army, the training afforded
     to such fielded forces in the use of such weapons, and the
     sufficiency of such training to conduct effective military
     operations; and
       (C) minimum additional weaponry and training required to
     improve substantially the efficacy of such military
     operations.
       (3) An estimate of the percentage of funding (if any) of
     the Kosovo Liberation Army that is attributable to profits
     from the sale of illicit narcotics.
       (4) a description of the involvement (if any) of the Kosovo
     Liberation Army in terrorist activities.
       (5) A description of the number of killings of noncombatant
     civilians (if any) carried out by the Kosovo Liberation Army
     since its formation.
       (6) A description of the leadership of the Kosovo
     Liberation Army, including an analysis of--
       (A) the political philosophy and program of the leadership;
     and
       (B) the sentiment of the leadership toward the United
     States.
       (b) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--As used in this
     section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
     means the Committee on International Relations and the
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
     Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations and
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, first of all I want to thank the chairman of
the committee, my classmate, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss); we
came to Congress the same year together; and the ranking member, the
gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) for their kindness, and I rise to
offer this amendment which is very, very simple.
  I was at a speech that the President gave this morning on the current
hostilities in Yugoslavia, and the President said that he feels very
strongly that we must stay the course and must put an end to the ethnic
cleansing and the atrocities being committed. I concur wholeheartedly.
I think it is very important that we do that.
  Mr. Chairman, I have a bill which I am sponsoring along with my
colleague, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Sanford) which
provides money to arm and train the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army. It
is identical to the McConnell-Lieberman bill which is in the Senate,
and I believe very strongly about it because I think that in order for
the bombing to be successful we need to have a counterbalance on the
ground, and the Kosovo Liberation Army is right now the only
counterbalance to the Serb atrocities on the ground, and I think that
in Bosnia, when we had the bombing, we had the Croatian Army on the
ground to help, and I think it would be helpful for us to arm and trade
and aid the Kosovo Liberation Army.
  There have been a series of reports in papers talking about the
Kosovo Liberation Army, and they have unidentified sources, I think, of
dubious veracity saying all kinds of negative things about the Kosovo
Liberation Army. In my discussions with people, with the intelligence
community and others, there seems to be no substantiation whatsoever
about negatives being put forward trying to, I believe, smear the
Kosovo Liberation Army.
  So I think it would be very helpful, and what my amendment does is it
says that not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this act the director of the CIA shall submit to Congress, to the
appropriate congressional committees, both in classified and
unclassified form, everything it knows on the organized resistance in
Kosovo known as the Kosovo Liberation Army. The report shall include a
summary of the history of the KLA, the number of individuals currently
participating in or supporting combat operations of the KLA, the types
and quantity of each type of weapons that they have, minimum additional
weaponry and training required to improve substantially the efficacy of
such military operations.
  Talking about the smears, and I believe they are smears and there is
no substantiation to them, but I want to know that somehow or other
there are members participating in terrorist activities or illicit
narcotics. Again, there seems to be no scintilla of evidence, but I
think it is important that we know a description of their leadership,
their political philosophy, and the sentiment of their leadership
towards the United States and other things that are relative. I think
that that would go a long way in helping this Congress to understand
what the KLA is, and who they are and whether or not it will help us to
decide whether or not to help them.
  Again, Mr. Chairman, I think that they are a force on the ground in
opposition to the Serb atrocities of ethnic cleansing, and I believe we
should aid them, and that is simply what my amendment does.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend the gentleman from New York
(Mr. Engel) for his efforts in this area. Obviously this is a pathway
the oversight committee has already started down, and I believe the
amendment is supportive to interests that we all have. The purpose of
the intelligence community is to provide the best possible factual
information we can get on

[[Page H3140]]

a timely basis for our decision makers. We have to make some very tough
decisions involving this part of the world these days, and I cannot see
anything but good coming out of having the right information at the
right time.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe this amendment takes us that way, and I wish
I knew more about all of the things that the gentleman is speaking
about, I think we all wish that, but I think that trying to get that
information is exactly the right thing for us to be doing.
  Mr. Chairman, I will be supporting the gentleman's amendment.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, we have no problem with the amendment on the
minority side. Be glad to accept it also.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the bill?

           Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Sanders, As Amended

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders),
as amended, on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 68,
noes 343, not voting 22, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 129]

                                AYES--68

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Brown (OH)
     Capuano
     Chenoweth
     Clay
     Conyers
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Duncan
     Evans
     Farr
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Gejdenson
     Hilliard
     Holt
     Hooley
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kucinich
     Lee
     Luther
     Markey
     McCarthy (MO)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meeks (NY)
     Minge
     Mink
     Nadler
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Owens
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Peterson (MN)
     Ramstad
     Rivers
     Rohrabacher
     Sanders
     Schakowsky
     Serrano
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stupak
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Woolsey
     Wu

                               NOES--343

     Ackerman
     Aderholt
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baird
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Bliley
     Blunt
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Borski
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (FL)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cannon
     Capps
     Carson
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Condit
     Cook
     Cooksey
     Costello
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crowley
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeGette
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fattah
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fossella
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (TX)
     Green (WI)
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (IN)
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoeffel
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Largent
     Larson
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     Mascara
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (KS)
     Murtha
     Myrick
     Napolitano
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Obey
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pease
     Pelosi
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Regula
     Reyes
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rothman
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanchez
     Sandlin
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaffer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherman
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tauscher
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Turner
     Udall (CO)
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--22

     Becerra
     Brown (CA)
     Cardin
     Coyne
     Doggett
     Gephardt
     Greenwood
     Jefferson
     Kleczka
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Matsui
     McDermott
     Miller, George
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Neal
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Slaughter
     Tanner
     Thurman

                              {time}  1357

  Messrs. GANSKE, BAIRD and WATT of North Carolina, Ms. PRYCE of Ohio,
Mrs. KELLY, and Mrs. MEEK of Florida changed their vote from ``aye'' to
``no.''
  Mr. ROHRABACHER and Ms. STABENOW changed their vote from ``no'' to
``aye.''
  So the amendment, as amended, was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated against:
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I was unavoidably detained and could not be
here to vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Vermont
(Mr. Sanders) to the Intelligence Authorization Appropriation. If I had
been present, I would have voted no.
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Chairman, I missed the vote today (rollcall No.
129) on the Sanders amendment to freeze all Intelligence spending at
the FY 1999 level because I was in a meeting with the President. If I
had been here, I would have voted against it.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there other amendments to the bill?
  If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended,
was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

                              {time}  1400

  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Camp) having assumed the chair, Mr. LaTourette, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1555) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to
House Resolution 167, he reported the bill back to the House with an
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.

[[Page H3141]]

  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read
the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.

                          ____________________
