24 September 1998
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Congressional Record: September 22, 1998 (House)]
[Page H8148-H8198]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr22se98-24]
 
[[pp. H8148-H8198]] CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 3616
                    [National Defense Authorization Act for 1999]

[Snip]

   TITLE XV--MATTERS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL, EXPORT CONTROLS, AND 
                         COUNTER- PROLIFERATION

                    Subtitle A--Arms Control Matters

Sec. 1501. One-year extension of limitation on retirement or 
              dismantlement of strategic nuclear delivery systems.
Sec. 1502. Transmission of executive branch reports providing Congress 
              with classified summaries of arms control developments.
Sec. 1503. Report on adequacy of emergency communications capabilities 
              between United States and Russia.
Sec. 1504. Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

                 Subtitle B--Satellite Export Controls

Sec. 1511. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 1512. Certification of exports of missile equipment or technology 
              to China.
Sec. 1513. Satellite controls under the United States Munitions List.
Sec. 1514. National security controls on satellite export licensing.
Sec. 1515. Report on export of satellites for launch by People's 
              Republic of China.
Sec. 1516. Related items defined.

                Subtitle C--Other Export Control Matters

Sec. 1521. Authority for export control activities of the Department of 
              Defense.
Sec. 1522. Release of export information by Department of Commerce to 
              other agencies for purpose of national security 
              assessment.
Sec. 1523. Nuclear export reporting requirement.
Sec. 1524. Execution of objection authority within the Department of 
              Defense.

                Subtitle D--Counterproliferation Matters

Sec. 1531. One-year extension of counterproliferation authorities for 
              support of United Nations Special Commission on Iraq.
Sec. 1532. Sense of Congress on nuclear tests in South Asia.
Sec. 1533. Report on requirements for response to increased missile 
              threat in Asia-Pacific region.

                    Subtitle A--Arms Control Matters

     SEC. 1501. ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT OR 
                   DISMANTLEMENT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY 
                   SYSTEMS.

       Section 1302 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1948) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsections (a), (b), and (c)(2), by striking out 
     ``during fiscal year 1998'' and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``during the strategic delivery systems retirement limitation 
     period'' ;
       (2) in subsection (c)(1), by striking out ``during fiscal 
     year 1998'';
       (3) in subsection (d)(1)--
       (A) by striking out ``for fiscal year 1998''; and
       (B) by striking out ``during fiscal year 1998''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(g) Strategic Delivery Systems Retirement Limitation 
     Period.--For purposes of this section, the term ``strategic 
     delivery systems retirement limitation period'' means the 
     period of fiscal years 1998 and 1999.''.

     SEC. 1502. TRANSMISSION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH REPORTS PROVIDING 
                   CONGRESS WITH CLASSIFIED SUMMARIES OF ARMS 
                   CONTROL DEVELOPMENTS.

       (a) Reporting Requirement.--The Director of the Arms 
     Control and Disarmament Agency (or the Secretary of State, if 
     the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency becomes an element of 
     the Department of State) shall transmit to the Committee on 
     National Security of the House of Representatives on a 
     periodic basis reports containing classified summaries of 
     arms control developments.
       (b) Contents of Reports.--The reports required by 
     subsection (a) shall include information reflecting the 
     activities of forums established to consider issues relating 
     to treaty implementation and treaty compliance.

     SEC. 1503. REPORT ON ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS 
                   CAPABILITIES BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.

       Not later than three months after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
     Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee 
     on National Security of the House of Representatives a report 
     on the status and adequacy of current direct communications 
     capabilities between the governments of the United States and 
     Russia. The report shall identify each existing direct 
     communications link between those governments and each such 
     link that is designed to be used, or is available to be used, 
     in an emergency situation. The Secretary shall describe in 
     the report any shortcomings with the existing 
     communications capabilities and shall include such 
     proposals as the Secretary considers appropriate to 
     improve those capabilities. In considering improvements to 
     propose, the Secretary shall assess the feasibility and 
     desirability of establishing a direct communications link 
     between the commanders of appropriate United States 
     unified and specified commands, including the United 
     States Space Command and the United States Strategic 
     Command, and their Russian counterparts.

     SEC. 1504. RUSSIAN NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The 7,000 to 12,000 or more nonstrategic (or 
     ``tactical'') nuclear weapons estimated by the United States 
     Strategic Command to be in the Russian arsenal may present 
     the greatest threat of sale or theft of a nuclear warhead in 
     the world today.
       (2) As the number of deployed strategic warheads in the 
     Russian and United States arsenals declines to just a few 
     thousand under the START accords, Russia's vast superiority 
     in tactical nuclear warheads--many of which have yields 
     equivalent to strategic nuclear weapons--could become 
     strategically destabilizing.
       (3) While the United States has unilaterally reduced its 
     inventory of tactical nuclear weapons by nearly 90 percent 
     since the end of the Cold War, Russia is behind schedule in 
     implementing the steep tactical nuclear arms reductions 
     pledged by former Soviet President Gorbachev in 1991 and 
     Russian President Yeltsin in 1992, perpetuating the dangers 
     from Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should call on Russia to expedite reduction of 
     its tactical nuclear arsenal in accordance with the promises 
     made in 1991 and 1992.
       (c) Report.--Not later than March 15, 1999, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     nonstrategic nuclear weapons of Russia. The report shall 
     include--
       (1) estimates regarding the current numbers, types, yields, 
     viability, and locations of those weapons;
       (2) an assessment of the strategic implications of Russia's 
     nonstrategic arsenal, including the potential use of those 
     weapons in a strategic role or the use of their components in 
     strategic nuclear systems and the potential of Russian 
     superiority in tactical nuclear weapons to destabilize the 
     overall nuclear balance as strategic nuclear weapons are 
     sharply reduced under the START accords;
       (3) an assessment of the extent of the current threat of 
     theft, sale, or unauthorized use of the warheads of those 
     weapons, including an analysis of Russian command and control 
     as it concerns the use of tactical nuclear weapons;
       (4) a summary of past, current, and planned efforts to work 
     cooperatively with Russia to account for, secure, and reduce 
     Russia's stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and associated 
     fissile material;
       (5) a summary of how the United States would prevent, or 
     plans to cope militarily with, scenarios in which a 
     deterioration in relations with Moscow causes Russia to 
     redeploy tactical nuclear weapons or in which Russia 
     threatens to employ, or actually employs, tactical nuclear 
     weapons in a local or regional conflict involving the United 
     States or allies of the United States; and

[[Page H8169]]

       (6) an assessment of the steps that could be taken by the 
     United States to enhance military preparedness in order (A) 
     to deter any potential attempt by Russia to possibly exploit 
     its advantage in tactical nuclear weapons through coercive 
     ``nuclear diplomacy'' or on the battlefield, or (B) to 
     counter Russia if Russia should make such an attempt to 
     exploit its advantage in tactical nuclear weapons.
       (d) Views.--The Secretary of Defense shall include in the 
     report under subsection (c) the views of the Director of 
     Central Intelligence and of the commander of the United 
     States Strategic Command.

                 Subtitle B--Satellite Export Controls

     SEC. 1511. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) United States business interests must not be placed 
     above United States national security interests;
       (2) United States foreign policy and the policies of the 
     United States regarding commercial relations with other 
     countries should affirm the importance of observing and 
     adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR);
       (3) the United States should encourage universal observance 
     of the Guidelines to the Missile Technology Control Regime;
       (4) the exportation or transfer of advanced communication 
     satellites and related technologies from United States 
     sources to foreign recipients should not increase the risks 
     to the national security of the United States;
       (5) due to the military sensitivity of the technologies 
     involved, it is in the national security interests of the 
     United States that United States satellites and related items 
     be subject to the same export controls that apply under 
     United States law and practices to munitions;
       (6) the United States should not issue any blanket waiver 
     of the suspensions contained in section 902 of the Foreign 
     Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 
     (Public Law 101-246), regarding the export of satellites of 
     United States origin intended for launch from a launch 
     vehicle owned by the People's Republic of China;
       (7) the United States should pursue policies that protect 
     and enhance the United States space launch industry; and
       (8) the United States should not export to the People's 
     Republic of China missile equipment or technology that would 
     improve the missile or space launch capabilities of the 
     People's Republic of China.

     SEC. 1512. CERTIFICATION OF EXPORTS OF MISSILE EQUIPMENT OR 
                   TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA.

       The President shall certify to the Congress at least 15 
     days in advance of any export to the People's Republic of 
     China of missile equipment or technology (as defined in 
     section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c)) 
     that--
       (1) such export is not detrimental to the United States 
     space launch industry; and
       (2) the missile equipment or technology, including any 
     indirect technical benefit that could be derived from such 
     export, will not measurably improve the missile or space 
     launch capabilities of the People's Republic of China.

     SEC. 1513. SATELLITE CONTROLS UNDER THE UNITED STATES 
                   MUNITIONS LIST.

       (a) Control of Satellites on the United States Munitions 
     List.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all 
     satellites and related items that are on the Commerce Control 
     List of dual-use items in the Export Administration 
     Regulations (15 C.F.R. Part 730 et seq.) on the date of the 
     enactment of this Act shall be transferred to the United 
     States Munitions List and controlled under section 38 of the 
     Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778).
       (b) Defense Trade Controls Registration Fees.--Section 45 
     of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 
     U.S.C. 2717) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking out ``$700,000'' and inserting in lieu 
     thereof ``100 percent''; and
       (B) by striking out ``(a) Defense Trade Controls 
     Registration Fees.--''; and
       (2) by striking out subsection (b).
       (c) Effective Date.--(1) Subsection (a) shall take effect 
     on March 15, 1999, and shall not apply to any export license 
     issued before such effective date or to any export 
     license application made under the Export Administration 
     Regulations before such effective date.
       (2) The amendments made by subsection (b) shall be 
     effective as of October 1, 1998.
       (d) Report.--Not later than January 1, 1999, the Secretary 
     of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and 
     the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to Congress a report 
     containing--
       (1) a detailed description of the plans of the Department 
     of State to implement the requirements of this section, 
     including any organizational changes that are required and 
     any Executive orders or regulations that may be required;
       (2) an identification and explanation of any steps that 
     should be taken to improve the license review process for 
     exports of the satellites and related items described in 
     subsection (a), including measures to shorten the timelines 
     for license application reviews, and any measures relating to 
     the transparency of the license review process and dispute 
     resolution procedures;
       (3) an evaluation of the adequacy of resources available to 
     the Department of State, including fiscal and personnel 
     resources, to carry out the additional activities required by 
     this section; and
       (4) any recommendations for additional actions, including 
     possible legislation, to improve the export licensing process 
     under the Arms Export Control Act for the satellites and 
     related items described in subsection (a).

     SEC. 1514. NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON SATELLITE EXPORT 
                   LICENSING.

       (a) Actions by the President.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the President shall take such actions as 
     are necessary to implement the following requirements for 
     improving national security controls in the export licensing 
     of satellites and related items:
       (1) Mandatory technology control plans.--All export 
     licenses shall require a technology transfer control plan 
     approved by the Secretary of Defense and an encryption 
     technology transfer control plan approved by the Director of 
     the National Security Agency.
       (2) Mandatory monitors and reimbursement.--
       (A) Monitoring of Proposed Foreign Launch of Satellites.--
     In any case in which a license is approved for the export of 
     a satellite or related items for launch in a foreign country, 
     the Secretary of Defense shall monitor all aspects of the 
     launch in order to ensure that no unauthorized transfer of 
     technology occurs, including technical assistance and 
     technical data. The costs of such monitoring services shall 
     be fully reimbursed to the Department of Defense by the 
     person or entity receiving such services. All reimbursements 
     received under this subparagraph shall be credited to current 
     appropriations available for the payment of the costs 
     incurred in providing such services.
       (B) Contents of monitoring.--The monitoring under 
     subparagraph (A) shall cover, but not be limited to--
       (i) technical discussions and activities, including the 
     design, development, operation, maintenance, modification, 
     and repair of satellites, satellite components, missiles, 
     other equipment, launch facilities, and launch vehicles;
       (ii) satellite processing and launch activities, including 
     launch preparation, satellite transportation, integration of 
     the satellite with the launch vehicle, testing and checkout 
     prior to launch, satellite launch, and return of equipment to 
     the United States;
       (iii) activities relating to launch failure, delay, or 
     cancellation, including post-launch failure investigations; 
     and
       (iv) all other aspects of the launch.
       (3) Mandatory licenses for crash-investigations.--In the 
     event of the failure of a launch from a foreign country of a 
     satellite of United States origin--
       (A) the activities of United States persons or entities in 
     connection with any subsequent investigation of the failure 
     are subject to the controls established under section 38 of 
     the Arms Export Control Act, including requirements for 
     licenses issued by the Secretary of State for participation 
     in that investigation;
       (B) officials of the Department of Defense shall monitor 
     all activities associated with the investigation to insure 
     against unauthorized transfer of technical data or services; 
     and
       (C) the Secretary of Defense shall establish and implement 
     a technology transfer control plan for the conduct of the 
     investigation to prevent the transfer of information that 
     could be used by the foreign country to improve its missile 
     or space launch capabilities.
       (4) Mandatory notification and certification.--All 
     technology transfer control plans for satellites or related 
     items shall require any United States person or entity 
     involved in the export of a satellite of United States origin 
     or related items to notify the Department of Defense in 
     advance of all meetings and interactions with any foreign 
     person or entity providing launch services and require the 
     United States person or entity to certify after the launch 
     that it has complied with this notification requirement.
       (5) Mandatory intelligence community review.--The Secretary 
     of Commerce and the Secretary of State shall provide to the 
     Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence 
     copies of all export license applications and technical 
     assistance agreements submitted for approval in connection 
     with launches in foreign countries of satellites to verify 
     the legitimacy of the stated end-user or end-users.
       (6) Mandatory sharing of approved licenses and 
     agreements.--The Secretary of State shall provide copies of 
     all approved export licenses and technical assistance 
     agreements associated with launches in foreign countries of 
     satellites to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the 
     Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
       (7) Mandatory notification to congress on licenses.--Upon 
     issuing a license for the export of a satellite or related 
     items for launch in a foreign country, the head of the 
     department or agency issuing the license shall so notify 
     Congress.
       (8) Mandatory reporting on monitoring activities.--The 
     Secretary of Defense shall provide to Congress an annual 
     report on the monitoring of all launches in foreign countries 
     of satellites of United States origin.
       (9) Establishing safeguards program.--The Secretary of 
     Defense shall establish a program for recruiting, training, 
     and maintaining a staff dedicated to monitoring launches in 
     foreign countries of satellites and related items of United 
     States origin.
       (b) Exception.--This section shall not apply to the export 
     of a satellite or related items for launch in, or by 
     nationals of, a country that is a member of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization or that is a major non-NATO ally 
     of the United States.
       (c) Effective Date.--The President shall take the actions 
     required by subsection (a) not later than 45 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 1515. REPORT ON EXPORT OF SATELLITES FOR LAUNCH BY 
                   PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

       (a) Requirement for Report.--Each report to Congress 
     submitted pursuant to subsection (b) of section 902 of the 
     Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 
     1991 (22

[[Page H8170]]

     U.S.C. 2151 note; Public Law 101-246) to waive the 
     restrictions contained in subsection (a) of that section on 
     the export to the People's Republic of China of any satellite 
     of United States origin or related items shall be accompanied 
     by a detailed justification setting forth the following:
       (1) A detailed description of all militarily sensitive 
     characteristics integrated within, or associated with, the 
     satellite.
       (2) An estimate of the number of United States civilian 
     contract personnel expected to be needed in country to carry 
     out the proposed satellite launch.
       (3)(A) A detailed description of the United States 
     Government's plan to monitor the proposed satellite launch to 
     ensure that no unauthorized transfer of technology occurs, 
     together with an estimate of the number of officers and 
     employees of the United States that are expected to be needed 
     in country to carry out monitoring of the proposed satellite 
     launch; and
       (B) the estimated cost to the Department of Defense of 
     monitoring the proposed satellite launch and the amount of 
     such cost that is to be reimbursed to the department.
       (4) The reasons why the proposed satellite launch is in the 
     national security interest of the United States.
       (5) The impact of the proposed export on employment in the 
     United States, including the number of new jobs created in 
     the United States, on a State-by-State basis, as a direct 
     result of the proposed export.
       (6) The number of existing jobs in the United States that 
     would be lost, on a State-by-State basis, as a direct result 
     of the proposed export not being licensed.
       (7) The impact of the proposed export on the balance of 
     trade between the United States and the People's Republic of 
     China and on reducing the current United States trade deficit 
     with the People's Republic of China.
       (8) The impact of the proposed export on the transition of 
     the People's Republic of China from a nonmarket economy to a 
     market economy and the long-term economic benefit to the 
     United States.
       (9) The impact of the proposed export on opening new 
     markets to United States-made products through the purchase 
     by the People's Republic of China of United States-made goods 
     and services not directly related to the proposed export.
       (10) The impact of the proposed export on reducing acts, 
     policies, and practices that constitute significant trade 
     barriers to United States exports or foreign direct 
     investment in the People's Republic of China by United States 
     nationals.
       (11) The increase that will result from the proposed export 
     in the overall market share of the United States for goods 
     and services in comparison to Japan, France, Germany, the 
     United Kingdom, and Russia.
       (12) The impact of the proposed export on the willingness 
     of the People's Republic of China to modify its commercial 
     and trade laws, practices, and regulations to make United 
     States-made goods and services more accessible to that 
     market.
       (13) The impact of the proposed export on the willingness 
     of the People's Republic of China to reduce formal and 
     informal trade barriers and tariffs, duties, and other fees 
     on United States-made goods and services entering that 
     country.
       (b) Militarily Sensitive Characteristics Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``militarily sensitive characteristics'' 
     includes antijamming capability, antennas, crosslinks, 
     baseband processing, encryption devices, radiation-hardened 
     devices, propulsion systems, pointing accuracy, kick motors, 
     and other such characteristics as are specified by the 
     Secretary of Defense.

     SEC. 1516. RELATED ITEMS DEFINED.

       In this subtitle, the term ``related items'' means the 
     satellite fuel, ground support equipment, test equipment, 
     payload adapter or interface hardware, replacement parts, and 
     non-embedded solid propellant orbit transfer engines 
     described in the report submitted to Congress by the 
     Department of State on February 6, 1998, pursuant to section 
     38(f) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(f)).

                Subtitle C--Other Export Control Matters

     SEC. 1521. AUTHORITY FOR EXPORT CONTROL ACTIVITIES OF THE 
                   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       (a) Functions of the Under Secretary for Policy.--Section 
     134(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding 
     at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of 
     the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary shall have 
     responsibility for supervising and directing activities of 
     the Department of Defense relating to export controls.''.
       (b) Establishment of Deputy Under Secretary for Technology 
     Security Policy.--(1) Chapter 4 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 134a the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 134b. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology 
       Security Policy

       ``(a) There is in the Office of the Under Secretary of 
     Defense for Policy a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
     Technology Security Policy.
       ``(b) The Deputy Under Secretary serves as the Director of 
     the Defense Technology Security Administration (or any 
     successor organization charged with similar 
     responsibilities).
       ``(c) The principal duties of the Deputy Under Secretary 
     are--
       ``(1) assisting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
     in supervising and directing the activities of the Department 
     of Defense relating to export controls; and
       ``(2) assisting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
     in developing policies and positions regarding the 
     appropriate export control policies and procedures that are 
     necessary to protect the national security interests of the 
     United States.
       ``(d) The Deputy Under Secretary shall perform such 
     additional duties and exercise such authority as the 
     Secretary of Defense may prescribe.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
     134a the following new item:
``134b. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security 
              Policy.''.
       (c) Time for Implementation.--The Secretary of Defense 
     shall complete the actions necessary to implement the 
     amendment made by subsection (a) and to establish the office 
     of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security 
     Policy in accordance with section 134b of title 10, United 
     States Code, as added by subsection (b), not later than 60 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (d) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
     to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
     Committee on National Security of the House of 
     Representatives a report on the plans of the Secretary for 
     implementing the amendments made by subsections (a) and (b). 
     The report shall include the following:
       (1) A description of any organizational changes that are to 
     be made within the Department of Defense to implement those 
     amendments.
       (2) A description of the role of the Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff in the export control activities of the 
     Department of Defense after those subsections are 
     implemented, together with a discussion of how that role 
     compares to the Chairman's role in those activities before 
     the implementation of those subsections.

     SEC. 1522. RELEASE OF EXPORT INFORMATION BY DEPARTMENT OF 
                   COMMERCE TO OTHER AGENCIES FOR PURPOSE OF 
                   NATIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT.

       (a) Release of Export Information.--The Secretary of 
     Commerce shall, upon the written request of an official 
     specified in subsection (c), transmit to that official any 
     information relating to exports that is held by the 
     Department of Commerce and is requested by that official for 
     the purpose of assessing national security risks. The 
     Secretary shall transmit such information within 10 
     business days after receiving such a request.
       (b) Nature of Information.--The information referred to in 
     subsection (a) includes information concerning--
       (1) export licenses issued by the Department of Commerce;
       (2) exports that were carried out under an export license 
     issued by the Department of Commerce; and
       (3) exports from the United States that were carried out 
     without an export license.
       (c) Requesting Officials.--The officials referred to in 
     subsection (a) are the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
     Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of Central 
     Intelligence. Each of those officials may delegate to any 
     other official within their respective departments and agency 
     the authority to request information under subsection (a).

     SEC. 1523. NUCLEAR EXPORT REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

       (a) Notification of Congress.--The President shall notify 
     Congress upon the granting of a license by the Nuclear 
     Regulatory Commission for the export or reexport of any 
     nuclear-related technology or equipment, including source 
     material, special nuclear material, or equipment or material 
     especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or 
     production of special nuclear material.
       (b) Applicability.--The requirements of this section shall 
     apply only to an export or reexport to a country that--
       (1) the President has determined is a country that has 
     detonated a nuclear explosive device; and
       (2) is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization.

     SEC. 1524. EXECUTION OF OBJECTION AUTHORITY WITHIN THE 
                   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       Section 1211 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85; 111 Stat. 1932) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(g) Delegation of Objection Authority Within the 
     Department of Defense.--For the purposes of the Department of 
     Defense, the authority to issue an objection referred to in 
     subsection (a) shall be executed for the Secretary of Defense 
     by an official at the Assistant Secretary level within the 
     office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In 
     implementing subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall 
     ensure that Department of Defense procedures maximize the 
     ability of the Department of Defense to be able to issue an 
     objection within the 10-day period specified in subsection 
     (c).''.

                Subtitle D--Counterproliferation Matters

     SEC. 1531. ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION 
                   AUTHORITIES FOR SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS 
                   SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ.

       (a) Amount Authorized for Fiscal Year 1999.--The total 
     amount of assistance for fiscal year 1999 provided by the 
     Secretary of Defense under section 1505 of the Weapons of 
     Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5859a) that 
     is provided for activities of the Department of Defense in 
     support of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, may 
     not exceed $15,000,000.
       (b) Extension of Authority To Provide Assistance.--
     Subsection (f) of section 1505 of the Weapons of Mass 
     Destruction Control Act of

[[Page H8171]]

     1992 (22 U.S.C. 5859a) is amended by striking out ``1998'' 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``1999''.

     SEC. 1532. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NUCLEAR TESTS IN SOUTH ASIA.

       The Congress--
       (1) strongly condemns the decisions by the Governments of 
     India and Pakistan to conduct nuclear tests in May 1998;
       (2) calls for the Governments of India and Pakistan to 
     commit not to conduct any additional nuclear tests;
       (3) urges the Governments of India and Pakistan to take 
     immediate steps to reduce tensions between the two countries;
       (4) urges India and Pakistan to engage in high-level 
     dialogue aimed at reducing the likelihood of armed conflict, 
     enacting confidence and security building measures, and 
     resolving areas of dispute;
       (5) commends all nations to take steps which will reduce 
     tensions in South Asia, including appropriate measures to 
     prevent the transfer of technology that could further 
     exacerbate the arms race in South Asia, and thus avoid 
     further deterioration of security there;
       (6) calls upon the President, leaders of all nations, and 
     the United Nations to encourage a diplomatic, negotiated 
     solution between the governments of India and Pakistan to 
     promote peace and stability in South Asia and resolve the 
     current impasse;
       (7) encourages United States diplomatic leadership in 
     assisting the governments of India and Pakistan to seek a 
     negotiated resolution of their 50-year conflict over the 
     disputed territory in Kashmir;
       (8) urges India and Pakistan to take immediate, binding, 
     and verifiable steps to roll back their nuclear programs and 
     come into compliance with internationally accepted norms 
     regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 
     and
       (9) urges the United States to reevaluate its bilateral 
     relationship with India and Pakistan, in light of the new 
     regional security realities in South Asia, with the goal of 
     preventing further nuclear and ballistic missile 
     proliferation, diffusing long-standing regional rivalries 
     between India and Pakistan, and securing commitments from 
     India and Pakistan which, if carried out, could result in a 
     calibrated lifting of United States sanctions imposed under 
     the Arms Export Control Act and the Nuclear Proliferation 
     Prevention Act of 1994.

     SEC. 1533. REPORT ON REQUIREMENTS FOR RESPONSE TO INCREASED 
                   MISSILE THREAT IN ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

       (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall carry out a 
     study of the architecture requirements for the establishment 
     and operation of a theater ballistic missile defense system 
     in the Asia-Pacific region that would have the capability to 
     protect key regional allies of the United States.
       (b) Report.--(1) Not later than January 1, 1999, the 
     Secretary shall submit to the Committee on National Security 
     of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Armed 
     Services of the Senate a report containing--
       (A) the results of the study conducted under subsection 
     (a);
       (B) the factors used to obtain such results; and
       (C) a description of any United States missile defense 
     system currently deployed or under development that could be 
     transferred to key allies of the United States in the Asia-
     Pacific region to provide for their self-defense against 
     limited ballistic missile attacks.
       (2) The report shall be submitted in both classified and 
     unclassified form.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
