4 February 1998
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html

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[Congressional Record: February 2, 1998 (Senate)]
[Page S255-S257]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr02fe98-28]


SECRETARY JAMES R. SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENT BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE
  ON ARMED SERVICES ON THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
                             DEFENSE PANEL

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would like to take a few moments to
address the comments made by James R. Schlesinger, the former Secretary
of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, in his appearance last week before the Committee
on Armed Services. The purpose of the hearing was to review the
Quadrennial Defense Review of the Department of Defense, and the report
of the National Defense Panel, in order to determine what measures are
necessary to ensure our national security establishment is able to meet
the threats of today and tomorrow.
  The testimony provided by Secretary Schlesinger was very sobering in
that he provided the Committee with a clear picture of the crisis we
are facing due to the imbalance between our foreign policy commitments
and the diminished capabilities of our Armed Forces. In his own words,
``By early in the next century, at the latest, we shall be obligated to
spend far greater sums on procurement. Alternatively, we can watch the
force structure itself age and erode--until it will no longer be
capable of sustaining the ambitious foreign policy that we have
embraced.''
  Mr. President, it is unfortunate that the entire Senate was not able
to attend last week's hearing and discuss the problems outlined by
Secretary Schlesinger. I believe it is important, especially at a time
when the U.S. military may once again be called upon

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to protect our interests in the Persian Gulf, for all of the members to
fully understand the extent to which our military capability has
diminished in recent years, and the impact this will have upon our
ability to pursue an aggressive foreign policy.
  Therefore, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement
provided by Secretary Schlesinger to the Committee on Armed Services be
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

  Statement of James Schlesinger Before the Armed Services Committee,
   United States Senate, on the Report of the National Defense Panel
                            January 29, 1998

       Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: You have requested
     that I comment on the Report of the National Defense Panel
     and, in particular, to develop further the discussion of
     alternative strategies and alternative force structures. At
     the outset, let me say that the Panel has done a commendable
     job. Overall, its diagnosis of the emerging international
     scene is excellent, its stress on the need for the
     transformation of defense is correct. Many of its specific
     recommendations are admirable. While I shall later comment to
     some extent on alternative strategies, at the moment I simply
     wish to state that the reticence of the Panel in the area of
     alternative strategies and force structures is
     understandable.
       For reasons I shall spell out, I sympathize with the Panel
     on this point, for it was facing a formidable task. Quite
     simply you can't get there, that desired point in the 21st
     Century, from here--given the apparent fiscal limits. The
     United States has a very ambitious foreign policy. It has
     accepted the role of the world's principal stabilizing power,
     the one universal power. Yet, there is no way that it can
     sustain over time the force structure that the QDR calls
     for--on three percent of the gross Domestic Product. That is
     not a matter of analysis; that is simple arithmetic. To
     fulfill our present commitments and to modernize the QDR
     force for the more challenging years of the next century
     would require four percent-plus of the GDP. That does not
     appear a surprising sum for a nation that aspires to be the
     sole universal power. Our present level of expenditure,
     relative to GDP, is less than it was before Pearl Harbor.
       In this decade, we have been cushioned by allowing the
     principal equipments, inherited from the Cold War years, to
     age. Obviously such action is tolerable only in the short
     run. We now spend some forty billion dollars a year on
     procurement. Yet, the depreciation on our equipment--at
     replacement costs--runs over a hundred billion dollars per
     year. In brief, we have been enjoying an extended Procurement
     Holiday. By early in the next century, at the latest, we
     shall be obliged to spend far greater sums on procurement.
     Alternatively, we can watch the force structure itself age
     and erode--until it will no longer be capable of sustaining
     the ambitious foreign policy that we have embraced.
       In the period around 2010, the Department of Defense
     believes that a new peer-competitor of the United States
     might emerge. It would be a time, according to present
     assertions, that we now intend to expand NATO to include
     portions of the former Soviet Union. It would be a time that
     expenditures on entitlements programs would be escalating as
     the baby-boom generation retires, and the budget is projected
     to go into deficit. Yet, at that very time the effects of the
     aging of major items of equipment and the erosion of our
     military capabilities would become clear. Unless we alter our
     present course, under those circumstances we would have no
     prudent choice but to retrench on our foreign policy
     objectives and commitments.
       Can we not shrink the present force structure--and thereby
     provide more funds for modernization? In principal, we should
     be able to do so, but in practice we would encounter vast
     difficulties. The operations tempo of the Armed Forces is at
     this time at an all time peak in peacetime. Force deployments
     in the post-Cold War years have been far more frequent, of
     substantially larger size, and of longer duration than in the
     1980's. To be sure, the optempo of the Services could be
     trimmed. We should certainly review the training regime of
     the Services, which has not changed since the end of the Cold
     War. With Goldwater-Nichols, the regional CINC's have piled
     on additional requirements. We do need an overall review to
     see whether so high an optempo is desirable. But, we
     should recognize, given our present foreign policy
     commitments, we can only trim rather than substantially
     reduce the optempo. So long as that is the case, any
     hankering substantially to reduce the force structure
     remains unachievable.
       Quite rightly, the National Defense Panel points to the
     growing strategic uncertainties of the early part of the 21st
     Century, the possible emergence of a peer-competitor, the
     serious arrears in funding the re-equipping of the forces,
     the emerging (re-emerging) issue of homeland defense, the
     need for space control, the need to incorporate the benefits
     of the revolution in military affairs, in short, the need to
     transform defense. It questions whether the two major-
     regional-conflicts measuring rod is realistic--or is just ``a
     means of justifying current forces.'' It points to the
     generally low-risk international environment of today. Quite
     rightly, the Panel states that the ``priority must go to the
     future.'' It argues that the pursuit of the two MRC strategy
     consumes resources that could reduce the risk to our long-
     term security. given the budgetary limits, the Panel suggests
     that we surrender the two-MRC standard. There are risks and
     certain strategic questions that arise following such a path.
     Yet, given the constraints, it is a plausible suggestion.
     Nonetheless, at this time, the optempo of the Armed Forces
     precludes a reduction of the force structure sufficiently
     large to generate the funds for re-capitalizing the forces.
       The Panel recommends other means of generating funds within
     the present budget. It correctly urges a further attack on
     our excessive infrastructure--and urges the outsourcing of
     some 600,000 positions in the DOD, including the
     civilianizing of certain active military positions. I applaud
     the further closing of bases and I am receptive to pushing
     outsourcing as far as feasible. I note, however, that there
     are still some 20 major domestic bases to be closed still
     left from the BRAC of 1993. I note that most of the
     reductions in civilian personnel under the quadrennial review
     is based upon a base-closing exercise which the Congress has
     already rejected. I note that base closings to this point
     have generated less than $6 Billion in savings. Thus,
     admirable as a further assault on our infrastructure may be,
     it will not generate substantial additional savings to re-
     capitalize the Forces.
       Yet, the suggestion that we move more vigorously to
     outsourcing is certainly correct. In the view of the doubts
     and resistance that inevitably will occur, it will be many
     years before the resources become available. Given the legal,
     administrative, and political constraints, less is likely to
     be obtained by these measures in the necessary time-frame
     than both the Panel and I would wish.
       All in all, the transformation of defense is a meritorious,
     if not an essential, objective. Yet, it is a far more
     difficult task, given the resources available, than we are
     ready to acknowledge. We are not dealing with a system at
     rest, a garrison military like the pre-World War II German
     Wehrmacht. The U.S. military now is always on the go, moving
     around the world and conducting operations in dozens of
     countries. To transform a force so active is a far more
     arduous task. While we should embrace the objective, we
     should also recognize the difficulties that stand in our
     path.
       Mr. Chairman, let me now turn away from household tasks to
     an examination of what the Panel describes as the ``cusp of a
     military revolution.'' The opportunity for such a revolution
     has been created by the immense technical advances in
     computers, microelectronics, telecommunications, sensors, and
     precision guided munitions. These new military technologies
     were first unveiled in the Gulf War. Admittedly, the
     conditions were ideal for exploitation of these new
     technologies. It permitted our senior officers to have
     dominant battlefield awareness, while Iraq's unfortunate
     generals had limited ability to communicate and were largely
     unaware of what was transpiring on the battlefield. However,
     one element must be kept in mind: our showcasing of these
     military technologies means that we will never again have the
     element of surprise, nor will we again be able so easily to
     exploit the advantages that these technologies offer. We
     shall have to labor hard, as others acquire these
     technologies, both to stay ahead and to exploit fully the
     opportunities offered by them. When I say that we must work
     hard, I mean that we must not be lulled into complacency by
     such phrases as ``full spectrum dominance.'' There is no
     guarantee of permanent American military dominance. Others
     will be learning the capabilities of information warfare
     and weapons of mass destruction. Thus ``eternal
     vigilance'' remains essential.
       That leads me--all too briefly--into alternative strategies
     and alternative force structures. You will understand, of
     course, Mr. Chairman that I can only throw out a few brief
     observations. A complete review would require far more time.
     But it is essential that, as conditions change we continue to
     seek alternative means to achieve military or national
     goals--and to choose those means that achieve our goals most
     effectively. I have dwelt upon the Gulf War as a watershed
     event. The military establishments of many nations are busily
     seeking to discern the lessons of the Gulf War.
       In this light I find it curious that the United States,
     which developed, exploited, and revealed these new military
     technologies in the Gulf War, has failed fully to grasp at
     least one of the principal lessons from that war. The lesson
     I refer to, that has not been fully absorbed, is the immense
     success of the air offensive prior to and during the hundred
     hour ground war. The six weeks of coordinated air attacks
     prior to the launching of the counter offensive on the ground
     significantly crippled the combat power of the Iraq forces--
     and continued to do that during the four days of the ground
     war. Nonetheless, to date the U.S. military establishment has
     failed to absorb the lessons of the immense success of the
     air war into either doctrine or war plans. In touching on so
     many issues, the Panel failed to note the centrality of this
     issue of strategy. And the Air Force itself has been remiss.
     For so many years it treated ``strategic'' and ``nuclear'' as
     synonymous that it failed to analyze and articulate the
     strategic role that Tac Air can play.
       Despite all our talk of jointness, the Services still have
     yet to formulate a sufficiently shared vision of our military
     future. Air

[[Page S257]]

     power is not just an ancillary to the ground
     counteroffensive. If we have air superiority, it too can
     attrit enemy ground forces. And it can do so at a far lower
     cost in American blood. All this potentially has major
     implications for budgets and force structure. It is ironical
     that those who comment upon--and sometimes complain--that
     sixty percent of the procurement budget goes to Tac Air, have
     not fully grasped the potential advantages that that confers.
     It raises a question, for instance, whether the allocation
     between platforms and munitions is the right one. Given the
     military significance of precision-guided munitions, one
     wonders whether it is wise to allow our inventories to be as
     low as they are. (The Committee may wish to check what kind
     of a dent the air war against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 or
     (what may be) the forthcoming military operations against
     Iraq put into our inventory of precision guided weapons.) It
     is a regrettable fact that, if inventories are constrained
     and are expected to be limited, that in itself may alter
     military plans--in a way that makes them less effective. The
     size of inventories is also a choice.
       An issue of at least equal importance that we have not yet
     thought through is what dependence on these newly-available
     military technologies may do to our vulnerability. Not only
     is the United States more dependent upon these technologies
     than any other nation, its extraordinary military leverage
     now comes from these technologies. That makes us more
     vulnerable to all of those stratagems that fall under the
     rubric of information warfare.
       That underscores at least two things. First, it is
     essential for the United States to continue to forge ahead of
     other nations, not only in the exploitation of information
     warfare, but in defensive measures. Other nations are now
     industriously studying how to exploit information warfare.
     The secret is now out.
       Second, we must continuously examine whether or not we are
     becoming overly dependent on these new technologies in a way
     that might create a critical vulnerability. If these
     technologies are essential as force multipliers,
     neutralization by others of our exploitation of these
     technologies would place us at an immediate disadvantage. We
     must, therefore, examine to what extent we should hedge
     against such a vulnerability. Such hedging could be costly.
     To hedge against the neutralization of force multipliers, one
     can maintain larger forces. But if one were totally to hedge,
     one would forfeit the cost benefits (though not the benefits
     in effectiveness) embodied in the revolution in military
     affairs.
       I close by reminding the Members of the Committee of the
     longer-term problems of sustaining our military advantages
     and thereby sustaining our ambitious foreign policy. The
     Department of State has recently stated (in response to
     Russian complaints about our indifference to their sphere of
     influence in the ``Near Abroad'') that the Department of
     State states that the United States does not acknowledge the
     legitimacy of spheres of influence. That presumably applies
     only to other countries, since the United States, as the
     single universal power, regards all the outside world as its
     sphere of influence. Yet, if we are unable to sustain our
     military forces and sustain our military advantages into the
     21st Century, despite the ambitions of our foreign policy, we
     would be obliged to retreat.
       Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the Members of the Committee
     for your attention. I would be pleased to answer any
     questions that you may have.

                          ____________________
