Note: for index of full report see: http://jya.com/nrcindex.htm

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                              F

               A Brief Primer on Intelligence


   Intelligence gathering takes place for both tactical and
strategic purposes. Tactical intelligence is primarily the
domain of agencies within the military services. Tactical
intelligence provides advantages on the battlefield against
hostile military forces (or in support of counterterrorist
operations) through direct support to operational commanders
in areas such as reconnaissance, mapping, and early warning of
enemy force movements. Intelligence for strategic purposes
(national intelligence) serves foreign policy, national
security, and national economic objectives. National
intelligence focuses on foreign political and economic events
and trends; strategic military concerns such as plans,
doctrine, scientific and technical resources; weapons system
capabilities; and nuclear program development.(1)

   Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is one key source of
intelligence, important to both tactical and national
intelligence. Strictly speaking, SIGINT encompasses two
different forms of intelligence--communications intelligence
(COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). ELINT refers to
the capture and analysis of electromagnetic signals from
emitters such as radars; in general, these signals do not
carry information in the communications sense of the term. In
this report, and because it conforms to conventions that have
been established by the public debate to date, SIGINT is used
to refer to communications intelligence--the capture and
analysis of signals (from whatever source) that carry
communications information.

   It is difficult or impossible to identify a single source
that is more critical or important than all others because the
essence of intelligence is the synthesis of information from
all available sources ("all-source" synthesis). No single
source is necessarily critical, although any one might be in
any given instance, and it is a matter of judgment as to
whether a certain source should be accorded a higher priority
than another. Many important sources are open and public, but
others are secret or clandestine. Clandestine information
gathering, directed toward foreign and domestic military,
political, economic, criminal, and other sources to which
open, public access is denied, is a core element of national
intelligence activities.

   The community responsible for all-source synthesis is the
intelligence community, which consists of a number of civilian
and military agencies. The Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) is both the coordinator of this community and the
director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Under the
National Security Act of 1947, the CIA is the coordinating
agency for foreign intelligence analysis and dissemination.
The CIA produces finished (refined) intelligence for the
President and the National Security Council, and it is engaged
in many aspects of information collection. The Defense
Intelligence Agency and the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State also analyze and produce
finished intelligence, primarily for the Secretaries of
Defense and State, respectively. The National Security Agency
(NSA) is responsible for collecting signals intelligence --
monitoring, decrypting, and translating foreign communications
-- and for developing cryptographic and other techniques to
protect U.S. communications and computer security. Other parts
of the community include intelligence agencies of each of the
military services; the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO),
through which the Air Force and CIA jointly manage space-based
(satellite) data collection; the Central Imagery Office, for
processing photographic intelligence; and elements of the
Departments of Treasury and Energy, among others.

   Intelligence (and counterintelligence(2)) have foreign and
domestic components, including infiltration of human agents
into organizations operating abroad and in the United States
and electronic and photographic surveillance. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is responsible for conducting
these activities in the United States. By law, foreign
intelligence agencies such as the CIA and NSA are barred from
domestic surveillance. Transgressions in this area have
occurred, however, providing part of the rationale for
creation in the 1970s of the Senate and House Select
Committees on Intelligence. These committees provide
legislative oversight as well as budget authorization.

   Finally, it is important to note that intelligence is
pursued largely on a level-of-effort basis, rather than in
response to some set of specific needs that must be met at all
costs. Thus, its importance is more a judgment question than
one based on any analytical argument. This means, for example,
that it is very hard to exclude or include missions or
capabilities on the basis of a "must-have" list.

----------

NOTE: Some material in this appendix, including the
organizational makeup of the intelligence community and the
stages of the intelligence cycle, is adapted from the Central
Intelligence Agency, "Factbook on Intelligence," September
1995, available via the Internet at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/.

   (1)  As a result of operational successes in the Persian
Gulf War, however, increased demand by field commanders for
real-time access to national intelligence resources, such as
satellite reconnaissance, is blurring the boundary between
these areas. See, for example, Desmond Ball, *Signals
Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Era: Developments in the
Asia-Pacific Region*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore, 1993.

   (2)  Protecting secrets from disclosure to others is the
focus of counterintelligence, a closely related activity
involving many of the same processes as intelligence.

____________________________________________________________


                F.1 THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION

   The mission of national intelligence is defined by the
National Security Act and by relevant presidential directives,
of which the most recent is Executive Order 12333, signed by
President Reagan on December 4, 1981. Executive Order 12333
authorizes the DCI to develop and implement a National Foreign
Intelligence Program to provide "[t]imely and accurate
information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and
intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons and
their agents."(3) Its primary purpose is to provide the
President and designated officials, such as the National
Security Council, with decision support--information on which
to base decisions on foreign, defense, and economic policy and
the protection of U.S. national security interests.

   In the post-Cold War environment, the definition of
national security interests goes far beyond a focus on a
single rival such as the Soviet Union, and the United States
is now concerned with threats throughout the world.(4) Many of
these threats are lower in intensity, but in some ways more
complex and difficult to address, than those of the former
Soviet Union. They include not only conventional military
threats, but also issues such as the proliferation of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction;
terrorism; and political and economic instability, which often
leads to demands for U.S. or United Nations military or
humanitarian intervention.

   Counterterrorism efforts are on the rise. For example,
public reports indicate that SIGINT was responsible for
determining Libyan involvement in the terrorist bombing of Pan
Am flight 103 in 1988.(5) During the Persian Gulf War,
intercepted communications enabled identification and
forestallment of Iraqi terrorist teams.(6) Evidence from
wiretaps formed an important part of the case against Sheik
Omar Abdel Rahman in the case of an alleged conspiracy by
Islamic fundamentalists to blow up the United Nations, the
Hudson River tunnels, and the federal building in
Manhattan.(7)

   National security is also increasingly recognized as
including broader, nonmilitary areas. Monitoring and
countering the international drug trade is a relatively new
priority for the U.S. intelligence community. Economic
strength, industrial technology development, and environmental
protection contribute to national security, creating demand
among policy makers for collection and analysis of information
in areas traditionally unfamiliar to the intelligence
community.

   The net result is that the number and range of tasks being
assigned to the intelligence community are growing rapidly.
Intelligence efforts have expanded to include the support of
activities in the following areas:

   +    *Counterproliferation*. The United States has a policy
to discourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(nuclear, chemical, biological) and the capabilities of other
countries to acquire such weapons. (Ballistic missiles are
also subject to significant counter-proliferation efforts.)
Since the United States is not the only possible supplier of
components for these weapons, it must rely on the cooperation
of other possible supplier nations to discourage
proliferation. Thus, intelligence efforts are directed toward
identifying potential suppliers and purchasers, and the
information derived from these efforts is passed to policy
makers who can undertake appropriate actions in response.

   +    *Sanctions enforcement*. The United States is a
supporter of many sanctions around the world. For example, the
United Nations may decide to impose--and the United States
decide to support cconomic sanctions on a nation such that
only humanitarian supplies may enter it. Intelligence efforts
are needed to identify potential sources of leakages (e.g.,
sanctioned shipments masquerading as humanitarian supplies).

   +    *Economic and trade relations*. U.S. trade relations
with the rest of the world are increasingly important in a
globally interdependent economy. Two key dimensions of such
relations are the following:

        -- *Trade treaties*. U.S. negotiators meet with their
        foreign counterparts to secure treaty arrangements
        that are fair, are equitable, and advance U.S.
        interests. Public sources assert that intelligence
        efforts sometimes support the positions of U.S.
        negotiators.(8)

        -- *Trade practices*. U.S. companies often compete
        against foreign companies for international contracts.
        Although the U.S. intelligence community does not
        provide support to individual U.S. companies, it does
        play a role in identifying unfair trade practices
        (e.g., illegal activities undertaken by foreign
        governrnents on behalf of their constituents) and
        providing information to U.S. policy makers who might
        be responsible for remedial actions.

   One result of the expanding plate of activities is that the
parts of the national intelligence community that
traditionally focus on strategic issues are spending a larger
percentage of their time on activities that provide real-time
operational support. Whereas in the past the intelligence
community concentrated primarily on strategic intelligence
(largescale trends and the like) that was actionable by policy
makers on a scale of years, the community today must also
provide products that are actionable in the time scale of
hours, days, or weeks. Such time pressures obviously place
greater demands on the intelligence cycle, and in such an
environment, real-time information is at a premium.

----------

   (3)  Ronald Reagan, *United States Intelligence
Activities*, Executive Order 12333, The White House,
Washington, D.C., December 4, 1981. 

   (4)  S. Turner, "Intelligence for a New World Order,"
*Foreign Affairs*, Volume 70(4), 1991, pages 150-166. 

   (5)  "There Are Some Secrets the NSA Doesn't Want Kept,"
*Newsday*, August 21, 1989, page. 54. 

   (6)  Ball, *Signals Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Era:
Developments in the Asia-Pacific Region*, 1993. 

   (7)  See Joseph P. Fried, "Sheik's Tapped Calls Entered in
Terrorism Trial," *New York Times*, April 23, 1995, page 45.

   (8)  For example, public sources reported that the U.S.
intelligence community was active in supporting U.S.
negotiators on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See
Craig Whitney, "France Accuses 5 Americans of Spying; Asks
They Leave," *New York Times*, February 23, 1995, page A-l;
Tim Weiner, "C.l.A. Faces Issue of Economic Spying," *New York
Times*, February 23, 1995, page A-1.

____________________________________________________________


                 F.2 THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE


   Historically, the process of intelligence production has
been cyclical. Planning, which entails the prioritization of
information demands and the allocation of resources,
represents both the first and the last stage. Information is
collected from a variety of sources, processed into useful
form, analyzed, by drawing upon all available sources to
generate balanced conclusions, and disseminated to the
consumers of intelligence -- the President, national security
officials, and others in the executive and legislative
branches of government with a need for information to support
national security decisions. Dissemination of finished
intelligence products may stimulate demand for new requests
for intelligence information.


                       F.2.1 Planning

   National intelligence planning, management, prioritization,
and resource allocation are overseen by the DCI, as well as
the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The DCI chairs
the National Foreign Intelligence Board, which includes
officials of DoD, NSA, FBI, and other agencies and advises DCI
on both analytical and administrative issues. The National
Intelligence Council, comprised of senior intelligence experts
inside and outside the government, produces National
Intelligence Estimates, assesses the quality of analyses, and
identifies critical gaps requiring new collection priorities.
Among others with senior planning roles are the Executive
Director for Intelligence Community Affairs; the Executive
Director and Deputy Director of CIA and deputy directors of
its Intelligence, Operations, Administration, and Science and
Technology branches; and officials of other intelligence
agencies.

   In the context of the intelligence cycle, planning entails
the identification of collection priorities in response to
requests from intelligence consumers. An example of the
planning stage is the determination of how many surveillance
satellites the United States needs, the corresponding
allocation of financial resources made available by Congress,
and the continual process of selecting targets at which the
satellites' cameras and antennas should be aimed.

   Planning of collection efforts is an essential element of
the intelligence cycle because the United States does not have
unlimited intelligence collection assets. A central authority
is needed to weigh competing demands for collection and decide
which collection assets should be assigned to which tasks. Far
more requests for collection are submitted by various users
than are actually approved.


                      F.2.2 Collection

   Collection of foreign intelligence relies heavily on
technical means. The bulk of the intelligence budget is for
acquisition and operation of technical systems, most of which
are related to collection.(9) Technical collection assets
include various satellites; ground-based monitoring stations;
and airborne, ocean surface, and underwater platforms.

   Technical collection methods are categorized broadly as
image intelligence (IMINT; e.g., overhead photographs) and
SIGINT. IMINT is collected from aircraft, such as the U-2 and
the SR-7 1 Blackbird, and satellites.

   The NSA is the lead agency for SIGINT, the monitoring of
electronic signals. These include intercepted radio,
microwave, satellite, and telephone communications; telemetry,
such as data streams transmitted during ballistic missile
tests; and radar emissions. Some signals are intercepted
through the antenna arrays of ground stations around the
world, which monitor broadcast, satellite-linked, and other
radio communications. Space-based SIGINT collection comes from
a variety of satellites.

   Historically, technical collection means have been critical
in the verification of arms control agreements, through
monitoring of missile tests, radiation and seismic detection,
and direct observation of nuclear production facilities and
weapons sites.(10)

   Nontechnical intelligence collection can be open or covert.
Although there is substantial debate over the extent to which
the intelligence community (particularly the CIA) has made
effective use of open-source intelligence,(11) it is widely
recognized that a great deal of relevant information about
foreign political, economic, military, and other issues is
publicly available. Other potential open sources of material
for intelligence analysis include foreign broadcasts and
newspapers; academic, scientific, and trade journals; books;
scientific conference reports; diplomatic contacts (e.g.,
foreign attaches); and debriefings of U.S. scientists and
businesspeople who attend intemational meetings.(12)

   Clandestine nontechnical intelligence collection is the
concern of human intelligence, or HUMINT. Case officers,
usually operating under cover as U.S. officials in foreign
posts, are the backbone of this effort. Through their
political, economic, and social contacts, case officers
recruit local agents to provide information unavailable
through technical means. Placement of agents under nonofficial
"deep" cover may facilitate entry into particularly difficult
to penetrate organizations such as drug cartels; however, deep
cover involves potentially greater risk to the agent.(13)

----------

   (9)  H. Nelson, "The U.S. Intelligence Budget in the
1990s," International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, Volume 6(1), 1993, pages 195-203

   (10) J.A. Adarn, G. Zorpette, S.M. Meyer, and J. Horgan,
"Peacekeeping by Technical Means: Special Report/
Verification," *IEE Spectrum*, Volume 23(July), 1986, pages
42-80.

   (11) R.D. Steele, "A Critical Evaluation of U.S. National
Intelligence Capabilities," *International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Volume 6(2), 1993,
pages 173-193.

   (12) R. Godson (ed.), *Intelligence Requirements for the
1990s: Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence, and Covert
Action*, Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1989.

   (13) Godson, *Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s*.
1989.

____________________________________________________________


                      F.2.3 Processing

   The information collected by intelligence assets --
particularly, technical means -- must be converted to a usable
form before it can be analyzed. Encrypted communications have
to be decrypted for maximum utility (although full decryption
may not be necessary for traffic analysis, which itself
provides some useful information); language experts translate
SIGINT into English; IMINT is processed electronically to
assist in interpretation of imagery.


                       F.2.4 Analysis

   As noted earlier, all-source analysis is the basis of the
intelligence production effort. All-source analysis converts
collected information from multiple sources into finished
intelligence products that are useful to intelligence
consumers. At the simplest level, clearly, extensive editing
and prioritizing are necessary to reduce and simplify the
voluminous stream of collected data. The practice of analysis,
however, involves more than editing. In the traditional view
of the intelligence community, all-source analysis is both
science and art. It includes integration and evaluation of all
available data, finding patterns among fragmentary or
contradictory sources, and drawing inferences from incomplete
evidence. Whereas all-source analysis can add significant
value to raw information, it is subject to potential pitfalls
that can lead to major errors. These include, for example, a
lack of awareness of other cultures, leading to "mirror
imaging"--the assumption that foreign policy makers will
behave as Americans would. Overreliance on clandestine or
technical sources, simply because they are uniquely available
to intelligence analysts, is another risk.(14)

   Analysts, who are typically regional or subject matter
specialists, prepare a variety of products for intelligence
consumers. These include, among others, (1) current
intelligence on political and other events, (2) encyclopedic
intelligence -- compilations of data for future use, such as
maps or economic statistics; and (3) estimative intelligence
-- predictions of trends and events, with a focus on potential
threats to U.S. security. The traditional view of analysis,
developed in the CIA's early history and incorporated into its
training for many years, held that analysis should be
conducted at arm's length from intelligence consumers. This
distance would enable analysts to avoid being biased by
domestic political concerns.(15) More recently, a competing
view has emerged within the intelligence community that
analysts should actively seek to meet the specific needs of
policy makers, for example, by identifying opportunities for
proactive measures that advance U.S. policies.

----------

   (14) Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and 
the Cult of Intelligence*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1974.

   (15) Godson, *Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s*, 
1989.

____________________________________________________________


                     F.2.5 Dissemination

   The final step of the cycle is dissemination of the
finished product to consumers. Finished intelligence prepared
under the DCI's direction is handcarried daily to the
president and key national security advisers. Other selected
intelligence products, such as classified papers and encrypted
electronic documents, are distributed to national security
planners and policy makers on the basis of their need to know,
as determined, in most cases, by the intelligence community.
Broader, longer-range products prepared under the National
Intelligence Council's direction are disseminated as National
Intelligence Estimates. As these dissemination efforts lead to
new requirements for information, the intelligence cycle
begins again.

____________________________________________________________

[End Appendix F]



