21 June 1997
See related documents: http://jya.com/whpfiles.htm

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4 March 1997
Source: William H. Payne
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Thursday October 24, 1996 11:11

CERTIFIED - RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Lieutenant General Kenneth A Minihan, USAF
Director, National Security Agency
National Security Agency
9800 Savage Road
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

Dear General Minihan:

Purposes of this letter are:

     1    appeal two Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) denials,
     2    discuss NSA classification abuse,
     3    offer settlement.

Purpose 1.  June 10 NSA administrator Bruce Bottomly was served the FOIA,

     	In about '91 both you and NSA employee Donald Simard met with me
	in the conference room of building 855, the seismic verification 
	building, at Sandia National Laboratories.

     	I brought to the meeting the US/USSR comprehensive test ban
	Treaty seismic data authenticator.

     	Both you and Simard railed against me to stop helping Sandia   
	with its crypto projects.  You both told me that this was NSA's job, 
	not Sandia's.

	You were a graduate student in the late '60s or early '70s at 
	Washington State University (WSU) in computer science.

     	You were on leave from the National Security Agency (NSA).

     	I was a computer science professor at WSU at that time.

     	You told me at the meeting that you nearly told me at that early 
	time to discontinue my work on pseudorandom numbers.  The reason 
	was that this area of work was the providence of the NSA.

     	In the evening you, I, John Sobolewski went for dinner at El Pinto 
	in Albuquerque.  

	Sobolewski directed your master's thesis work at WSU.  Sobolewski 
	was one of my Ph.D. students.

     	Looking back over the years, I feel that there is evidence that 
	NSA attempts to illegitimately control academic research relating 
	to pseudorandom numbers and machine combinatorics.

     	My National Science Foundation grant NSF DCR75-08822 for building 
	pseudorandom number and machine combinatoric subprogram libraries 
	was funded.  Then funding ceased.

     	I learned in the early '90s from Bamford's book the Puzzle Place, 
	page 361, that Bruce Barns, monitor of my grant, was to discontinue
	funding in research areas NSA felt was its.

        My concern about a possible improper role of NSA exerts in 
        influencing the lives and careers of American citizens, prompts 
        me to inquire.

     	As you know, "The opportunities for an individual to secure
     	employment, insurance, and credit, and his right to due process, and
	other legal protections are endangered by the  misuse of certain 
	information systems."  Congress regulates the collection, maintenance 
	and dissemination of information  agencies.

     	The Privacy Act establishes rules governing the use and
     	disclosure of personal information.  The Act specifies that
     	information collected for one purpose may not be used for another
 	purpose without notice to or the consent of the subject of the record.

     	The Act also requires that each agency keep a record of disclosures 
	of personal information.

     	This is a request under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 USC 552a.

     	I request copies of,

     	1    All documents containing the name of William H. Payne, 
	     Bill Payne, etc. between the dates of January 1, 1970 to 
	     June 10,1996.

     	The Privacy Act provides legal remedies that permit an individual to 
	seek enforcement of the rights granted under the Privacy Act.  
	
	Employees who fail to comply with the  Act's provisions may be 
	subject to criminal penalties.

     	Please consider that this request is also made under the  Freedom of 
	Information Act (FOIA), 5 USC 552b.  Please  provide any additional 
	information that may be available  under the FOIA.

	I am requesting this information for factual information on a book I 
	am writing on lack of ability and expertise, mismanagement, fraud, 
	waste, abuse, corruption, violations  of law, classification abuse, 
	clearance abuse, abuse of  national security interests, and cover-up 
	of wrongdoing.

     	And killing Iranians and Libyans.

     	I have been unable to find NSA's mandatory published  classification 
	guidelines.

	So, under 5 USC 522b I request access to, 

     	2    NSA's required published classification guidelines.

     	Simard was a one-year visitor at Sandia from NSA visiting  Sandia 
	employee James Gosler.

    	Simard was an NSA Forth programming language expert.  Simard      
	also told me that you were involved with the Forth  programming 
	language.

	I arranged a Forth language course for the employees of  Gosler's 
	division.

     	Simard even taught part of the class.  Gosler's employees  told me 
	what they and Simard were doing for NSA/Sandia.  

     	Virusing computer software and hardware.

     	Then Gosler attempted to conscript me into NSA's infowar.

     	The Baltimore Sun published a sixteen page six-part series between
	December 3-15,

                                No Such Agency
                   AMERICA'S FORTRESS OF SPIES
                     by Scott Shane and Tom Bowman

                                    Part Four

                        RIGGING THE GAME

     	 o    Spy sting:  Few at the Swiss factory knew the
          mysterious visitors were pulling off a stunning
          intelligence coup - perhaps the most audacious in the
          National Security Agency's long war on foreign codes.

   	tells of the case of Swiss Crypto AG, Hans Buehler and the spiked 
	crypto units.

     	Shane and Bowman write in Part Four of their series,

     	Engineers 'turning white'

     	IF CRYPTO AG WAS OFFERED a deal by NSA in return for
     	rigging its products, it would not be alone.  The approach
     	to American firms usually come during discussions with NSA's
     	export licensing office.
       	"It is not unheard of for NSA to offer preferential export
     	treatment to a company if it built a back door into its
     	equipment," says one person with experience in the field.
     	"I've seen it.  I have been in the room."
       	NSA's pitch varies.  "Generally with high-level executive
     	it's an appeal to patriotism - how important it is for us to
     	listen to the world," this source says.  "With the midlevel
	commercial types, it's 'Do this and we'll give you
     	preferential export treatment.'  To the real technical
     	people, it's 'why don't you do this?'  And you don't realize
     	what's being suggested until you see the engineers are
     	turning white."
       	  In addition to the carrot of export approval, NSA also can
     	brandish a stick, this source says.  "There's the threat"
     	You'll never get another export approval if you don't start
     	to play ball."

     	Journalist Loring Wirbel in the January 22, 1996 issue of Electronic 
	Engineering Times wrote,

     	"Next in my in-basket was a set of reprints from the
     	Baltimore Sun from the paper's NSA series, which ran in
     	early December.  The series reveals the setup by the NSA and
     	CIA of a new covert collection agency, the Special
     	Collection Service, and details the case of Hans Buehler, an
     	employee of Crypto A.G. who was thrown into an Iranian
     	Prison after getting snared in Crypto/NSA string against
     	that country."

     	Buehler phoned me from Zurich on December 31, '94.  And we
	began to put the story together.

     	The story appears to be developing into The most audacious spy story, 
	in terms of killing human beings, in the history  of "intelligence."

     	Germany only lost as killed about 28,000 and 5,000 captured out of a
	force of about 39,000 WWII U boat personnel,  reports Hoyt.

     	Some of these deaths were directly attributable to deciphering enigma 
	messages, Kahn reports.

     	The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict by Dilip Hiro states
	on the cover text,

     		"How was Iraq - at a 3 to 1 disadvantage in population -
		able to sustain an eight year war and arm one-tenth of its 
		entire population?" ...

     		"It had been a bloody and expensive conflict.  Conservative  
		Western estimate put the total number of war dead at 367,000 
		- Iran accounting for 262,00 and Iraq 105,000.  With more      
		than 70,000 injured, the total casualties were put at over 
		one million.  The official figures, given a month later by
		Iran's minister of Islamic guidance in a radio interview, 
		put the Iranian dead at 123,220 combatants, and another
		60,711 missing in action.  In addition 11,000 civilians had 
		lost their lives.  Tehran's total of nearly 200,000 troops and 
		civilians killed was in stark contrast to Bagdad's estimate of 
		800,000 Iranian dead."  page 250. 

	It appears that NSA/US government was giving Iranian tactical war 
	messages to Iraq during the Iran/Iraq war.  

	And then there is the unfortunate case of former Iranian opposition 
	leader Baktiar's death by stabbing in France.   

	NSA apparently knew in advance of the plot.  But did not disclose this 
	information to French authorities until after Baktiar was killed.

	Therefore, under 5 USC 522b I request access to, 
 
		3    all NSA intercepted Iranian messages and translations 
	     	     between January 1, 1980 and June 10, 1996,

     		4    all NSA intercepted Libyan messages and translations 
             	     between January 1, 1980 and June 10, 1996.

	5 USC 552(b) permits withholding only properly classified      
	documents from a Freedom on Information Act (FOIA) request.

	Therefore, I ask NSA to perform the mandatory  declassification 
	review ordered by EO 12356 if NSA feels that any of the documents 
	are properly classified under its required published classification 
	guidelines which I cannot find.


	If there are any fees for searching for, or copying, the records I 
	have requested, please inform me before you fill the request.

     	As you know, the Act permits you to reduce or waive the fees  
	when the release of the information is considered as   "primarily 
	benefiting the public."  I believe that this requests fits that 
	category and I therefore ask that you waive any fees.

     	If all or any part of this request is denied, please cite the 
	specific exemption(s) which you think justifies your refusal to 
	release the information and inform me of your agency's administrative 
	appeal procedures available to me  under the law.

     	I would appreciate your handling this request as quickly as
     	possible, and I look forward to hearing from you within 10
     	working days, as the law stipulates for the FOIA..

     	I ask that acknowledgment of my Privacy Act request be made
     	within 10 working days.  And the records be provided within 30 days.  
	Otherwise, I will consider my request denied.  ...

Second FOIA was issued to NSA crypto-mathematician Brian Snow, R 
division, on June 10.

Text of the FOIA reads,

	Dear Brian:

     	Let me refresh your memory.

     	I was project leader of the Missile Secure Cryptographic Unit (MSCU)  
	Sandia labs from about '82 until late '86.

     	You designed the crypto algorithm for the MSCU, and I having 
	access to it, analyzed it in preparation for its  implementation on a 
	8085 microprocessor and 8051 microcontroller.

     	The MSCU project was funded by NSA.

     	On one trip to NSA, FANX building, you gave a talk on reliability of
	NSA's hardware KG crypto units.  

     	You showed us schematics and devices of many KG units and told us 
	about field failure reasons.

     	You concluded by stating that dual redundant implementation   had 
	stopped NSA's field failure problems - in the sense that "red" data 
	was never inadvertently released.

     	My impression of NSA's crypto algorithm technology, from the  
    	MSCU and the schematics you showed us, was that it was quite 
     	ordinary shift register and machine combinatoric technology.   
	But simple and reliable.  And slow.

     	I went on to design and build the data authenticator of the 
	US/USSR CTBT.

     	I wrote SAND91-2201 technical report which as critical of NSA 	
	"deficient" crypto work.

     	The seismic algorithm was designed by NSA employee Ronald      	
	Benincasa.

     	Benincasa later released a modification that compensated for  
	the adverse algorithm procedure that any communication error  
	caused a data authentication failure.

     	In a DRAFT memorandum addressed to NSA deputy director James 
	Hern on June 21, 1989 I specifically enumerated 7 serious NSA 	
	generic crypto algorithm deficiencies.

     	In one response to my June 21 letter NSA crypto employees  Mark 
	Unkenholtz and Scott Judy released a new algorithm code named 
	GRANITE which attempted to correct for some of the deficiencies I 
	pointed out.

     	In fact, NSA senior employee Bob Delan even talked to me in
      	person about my concerns with NSA's deficient algorithms.

     	I recently read,

		Crypto pan report may sink Clipper chip

		By George Leopold

		EE Times, June 3, 1996

		In a move that could sound the death knell for the 
		controversial Clipper chip, a long-awaited report
		to Congress last week endorsed widespread commercial use
		of encryption technology and rejected key facets of the 
		Clinton administration's key-escrow scheme. ...

     	NSA's crypto advice is embarrassing the Clinton administration.  

     	And NSA may even be giving the government bad advice on other 
     	crypto-related matters.

     	NSA has apparently created the impression that it possesses some 
	secret knowledge and techniques in crypto matters which those, 	
	uncleared, are not able to see.

     	But I was cleared and understood what NSA was doing both theoretically 
	and practically.

     	I found no evidence that NSA possesses any special crypto skills, and
	apparently hides its deficiencies behind the veil of classification 
	abuse.  

     	To the contrary, I discovered generic deficient crypto work. 

     	We brought this to the attention of NSA.  Sandia even offered to help
	NSA fix its deficient crypto work.  And NSA attempted to correct its
	deficient crypto work.

     	Therefore, under 5 USC 522b I request access all technical
      	documentation on, 

     	1    Benincasa's original NSS/USO algorithm,

     	2    Benincasa's revision of 1,

     	3    The Unkenholtz - Judy GRANITE algorithm,

     	4    Your MSCU algorithm,

     	5    the clipper algorithm,

     	6    the STU III algorithms.       

     	I feel that published analyses of the above 6 algorithms will show 
	the Clinton administration, congress, and the  public that NSA 
	possess no superior knowledge of crypto matters. 

     	But, in fact, suffers at least the same problems as everyone else in 
	implementing field-reliable crypto equipment.

     	I am requesting this information for factual information on a book I 
	am writing on lack of ability and expertise, mismanagement, fraud, 
	waste, abuse, corruption, violations of law, classification abuse,
 	clearance abuse, abuse of  national security interests, and cover-up 
	of wrongdoing.

     	And killing Iranians and Libyans.

     	5 USC 552(b) permits withholding only properly classified documents 
	from a Freedom on Information Act (FOIA) request.

     	Therefore, I ask NSA to perform the mandatory  declassification 
	review ordered by EO 12356 if NSA feels that any of the documents
	are properly classified under the required published NSA 
	classification guidelines which I cannot find.

     	If there are any fees for searching for, or copying, the records I 
	have requested, please inform me before you fill the request.

     	As you know, the Act permits you to reduce or waive the fees 
     	when the release of the information is considered as  "primarily 
	benefiting the public."  I believe that this requests fits that 
	category and I therefore ask that you waive any fees.

	If all or any part of this request is denied, please cite the specific 
	exemption(s) which you think justifies your  refusal to release the 
	information and inform me of your  agency's administrative appeal 
	procedures available to me under the law.

     	I would appreciate your handling this request as quickly as
     	possible, and I look forward to hearing from you within 10
     	working days, as the law stipulates for the FOIA..

     	I enjoyed your practical talk and made mental notes.  

     	I sat directly across the table from you at lunch in the FANX 
	cafeteria after your talk.

Green return receipt requested postcards from NSA did not return.

September 8 NM Eldorado postal substation issued two yellow follow-up 
postcards.

September 17 clerk RAW acknowledged that NSA received the two FOIAs on  
June 13.

I never received any response from NSA to theses two FOIAs.  

Under the law NSA is required to respond within 10 days.  

NSA never requested an extension of time as required by law.  No reasons 
for extension of time, required by law, were given.  

Congress does not condone failure to meet time limits without reason.

Therefore, I assume, as specified by law, my requests were denied.

NSA never gave any reasons, as required by law, for NSA's denial.  

NSA did not furnish, as required by law, my right of appeal notification.

FOIA request denial appeals, according to law, can be made to head of the 
agency.  You, General Minihan.

I appeal these two denials.

Further, if you grant my appeal, then I ask that NSA provide the material in 
ascii text diskette files.  Or post the information on Internet.

Purpose 2:  Classification abuse

In 1991 I authored the Sandia National Laboratories technical report,

	SAND91-2201	Data Authentication for the Deployable 
                        Seismic Verification System

NSA furnished Sandia the data authentication algorithm. 

Page 14 of SAND91-2201 presents NSA's algorithm.



     				Data Bits
			    	      | 				
			   	     \ /
			    	      |	
                  16 Bit              |	
           -->    V Register  ------> +
           ^		    |         | 	
           |________________|	      |
		                      |
	          63 Bits	      |		  14 Bits
          -->     F Register  ------> + --------> R Register
          ^        |_+_|	      ^		  |___+___|
          |__________|		      |_______________|


     	Figure 6.  Diagram of the data authenticator algorithm   
	structure.  The algorithm is bit-oriented.  Each data bit is
	exclusively OR-ed with the low-order bit of a 16-bit V  register.  
	This output is exclusively OR-ed with the low- order bit of a 63-bit 
	linear feedback shift register.  This is called the F register.  This 
	output is exclusively OR-ed  with a boolean function, 14-bit R 
	register.  The high-order 10 bits of the R register are the 
	authentication checksums.  The V and R registers contain the 79-bit 
	key.

     	The NSA  R Register feedback function is classified.  For each data 
	bit processed, both the F and R registers are stepped multiple times.  
	The number of steps is classified.  All remaining parts of the 
	algorithm are unclassified. ...

Sandia ordered me to build unclassified hardware.  Therefore, the classified 
step value is stored in hardware latch U20, HC '374 seen in the schematic on 
pages 55-56.

An unclassified number [between the limits of 0 and 255] was stored in the 
latch.  

Page 166 show code for storing the unclassified value of 29.

     : >STEP 29 STEP C! ;

The conclusion of my SAND report was that DOE wasted millions of dollars of 
the taxpayers money on deficient NSA algorithm work over about a 20 year 
period.

This is documented in my SAND report.


                           APPENDIX T
               Benincasa's Algorithm Deficiencies

               This draft memorandum was circulated at 
               NSA.  No final copy was required.  Sandia
               Labs received one new algorithm.

	       OFFICIAL USE ONLY     	181

	
[ ] is used to indicate penciled changes in the typed text.  

Appendix T reads,

                              		DRAFT

     	June 21, 1989

     	Dr James J. Hearn
     	Deputy Director of Information Security
     	National Security Agency
     	Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000

	Dear Dr. Hearn:

     	The National Security Agency provided an approved data authentication 
	algorithm for the SALT II seismic verification program in the middle 
	1970's.  It is called the National Seismic Station - unmanned [U]  
	Seismic Observatory data authentication algorithm and [ .It] is 
	authored by Ronald Benincasa.

     	The algorithm is currently being used for the Deployable Seismic
	Verification System. Data rates increased so the  NSS-USO algorithm
	implementation technology is upgraded.  The algorithm continues to 
	serve well [well is crossed out] for this  particular program.

     	We considered using this approved algorithm for other treaty 
     	verification programs but is has several major [major is crossed out]
	deficiencies which make it awkward to apply.

     	These deficiencies are: [include is penciled above 'are']

     	1.	The algorithm is bit oriented as opposed to bye, 16 bit
		word, 32 bit double word or 64 bit quad word oriented.

     	2.	The algorithm required stepping two of its internal
		registers at a rate many times the data rate.  This 
		limits the maximum rate at which data can be authenticated.

     	3.	The algorithm, because of deficiency 2, is only suitable for 
		implementation in hardware.

     	4.	The hardware implementation requires too much hardware
         	using low technology chips releasable to treaty participants. 
		The device is too big and expensive.

     	5.	The original algorithm specification was amended by NSA
		to handle resynchronization in event of data transmission 
		errors.  
        
		It requires additional information to be added to a data 
		frame to preserve adequate security.

					DRAFT
     
     	182				OFFICIAL USE ONLY

					DRAFT

     	6.	The algorithm is currently classified SECRET although its 
		declassification to a level so its details can be given to the 
        	Soviet Union has been promised.

     	7.	We expect to have data authentication applications with 
		bilateral and multilateral treaties.
     
     	We feel it is [is is crossed out] advisable to use different 
	algorithms for different treaties.

     	We need a number of unclassified data authentication algorithms which 
     	apply to different data widths and speeds.  The algorithms should
 	permit inexpensive implementation in small packages.

     	I ask that NSA assist us by providing us these algorithms.

	Sincerely,

     	TBD by DOE

					DRAFT

     	To: Mark and Ed, R
     	From Bill 	FAX 505-846-6652 phone 505 -292 [292 is crossed 
			out. 884 penciled above] -6847

     	Tom read and approved this.  We wait for you comments.  When 
	we all agree we'll forward this to Doug at DOE.

     	cc Amy Johnston  [ in pencil]

                   OFFICIAL USE ONLY				183

Abuse of classification by NSA is also a subject of an on-going lawsuit.

     	The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) has filed a
	federal court brief challenging the "national security"  
	classification of information concerning the "Clipper Chip"  
	encryption system and the underlying SKIPJACK algorithm.   The 
	brief was filed in opposition to the National Security Agency's 
	attempt to withhold the data from disclosure under the Freedom of 
	Information Act.

     	Urging disclosure of the disputed information, EPIC argues  that:

     	1) Clipper's technical details have been withheld for "law 
     	enforcement" reasons, not "national security" reasons.  As such, 
	the information is not properly classified;

     	2) The security of the Clipper encryption system does not require the 
	secrecy of the SKIPJACK algorithm or other technical details;

     	3) Disclosure of the withheld information will not (as NSA claims)
	constitute a violation of U.S. export control laws;  and

     	4) The withheld information was part of the government's  decision-
	making process that culminated in the adoption of  FIPS 185, the 
	"Escrowed Encryption Standard."

     	The brief was filed in a FOIA case initiated on behalf of EPIC's 
	co-sponsoring organization, Computer Professionals for Social 	
	Responsibility, in May 1993.  NSA was granted a delay of more than
	two years in order to process relevant  documents.  The agency 	
	recently moved for summary judgment  in the case, arguing (among
	other things) that the disputed information is properly classified.

Executive Order 12356 states:

     	Documents may not be classified in order "to conceal violations of
 	law,  inefficiency, or administrative error, to prevent embarrassment 
	to a person, organization or agency, to restrain competition, or to
	prevent or delay release of information that does not require 	
	protection in the  interest of national security.

General Minihan, classification of the ruinous large STEP value violates 
Executive Order 12356 in that NSA's generic deficient crypto work has caused 
embarrassment to NSA.

So NSA abused classification.  And I subtly pointed this out in my SAND report.

EPIC has challenged NSA in court on classification abuse.

The improperly-classified STEP value NSA supplied is 31.

But this is clearly a abuse of classification.

And this, General Minihan, leads to purpose 3 of this letter.

Settlement.

Not only did NSA have my NSF grant continuation denied in 1975.

I was fired from Sandia National Laboratories in 1992.  But I did nothing 
wrong.  I violated no rules.

I advocated DOE's interests.

I did refuse to do NSA "spiking" work.  And would not sign my civil rights 
away to do this work! 

The document,

                    WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN
                  SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES
                              AND
                  THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

      	CONCERNING RESEARCH IN CRYPTOGRAPHY AT SANDIA 	
	NATIONAL LABORATORY

     	Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the National Security  
	Agency (NSA) have established a working relationship which has
 	gown substantially over the last decade.  Currently,  there exist 
	several joint project areas of mutual interest.

     	Different policies and administrative procedure exist at SNL and NSA
 	which govern the handling of sensitive and classified material, and 
	the documentation and dissemination of such work.  It is the purpose 
	of the Agreement to specify  the general guidelines under which work 
	will be administered  in the area of cryptography research at SNL.

	First, SNL, in its role as systems integrator, requires and
      	indigenous cryptographic capability to support its Department of
 	Energy mission in the design and development of safe and secure
 	nuclear weapons and in treaty verification.  SNL and NSA agree to a
	cooperative effort to support SNL's needs in a manner consistent with 
	the role of such work to national security.

     	Second, NSA, in its role as the U.S. Government approval authority for 
	cryptographic systems developed for and used in national security 
	applications, recognizes its responsibility to provide support and 
	guidance to SNL's activities in applying cryptography.

     	Third, SNL will regard cryptographic research work as classified
 	when it is initiated or created, i.e., will  protect such work as 
	"created classified", and will consult  with NSA prior to handling 
	such work as unclassified.  Periodic technical and managerial 
	discussions between SNL and NSA will be held to increase the 
	awareness of the security concerns of both organizations and to 
	develop and maintain an SNL cryptographic classification guide which  
	will protect the national security interests of both organizations.

     	This working agreement shall be effective on the date of the last
 	signature and will be reviewed annually by SNL and NSA.   It will be
	valid until terminated by mutual agreement.

	AGREED:

     	ALBERT NARATH           RADM  JAMES  MCFARLAND (USN)
     	President		Plans and Policy
     	TITLE			TITLE
     	SANDIA NATIONAL 
	LABORATORIES	        NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
     	June 10, 1991		22 July 1991
     	DATE			DATE

paves the way for abuse of classification.  For criticisms of NSA deficient 
crypto work would be automatically classified SECRET to prevent embarrassment 
to NSA.  

Also I refused to do illegal FBI electronic lock breaking work.

Clearly, both DOE and NSA need to get on to important post-Cold War tasks.

I quote from a report of the National Academy of Public Administration,

     	On November 6, 1993, DOE Secretary Hazel R. O'Leary delivered the 
     	keynote speech at "The Second Annual Protecting Integrity & Ethics 
     	Conference," sponsored by Public Employees for Environmental 
     	Responsibility (PEER). Although the conference addressed issues 
     	affecting federal employees in general, a special segment was 
	dedicated to the issue of whistleblowing in DOE. In her speech the
 	Secretary committed herself to "zero tolerance for reprisal" and to
	celebrating  whistleblowing. The Secretary also asserted that "we 
	can't look forward until we look back and correct what's happened in 
	the past." These statements were widely quoted in the press coverage 
	of the conference. 

Heart of America paid my way to hear O'Leary.

So, General Minihan, perhaps you too might be well-advised to correct what 
has happened in the past so that NSA can look forward too?

July 16 I forwarded criminal complaint affidavits to DC chief judge Harry 
Edwards naming Gosler and others involved in "spiking" hi tech terrorism for 
violating my civil rights.

July 17 TWA 800 crashed.

While the events in the above two paragraphs were mere coincidence, this rare 
event raises a serious problem for NSA and others, like Sandia Labs, involved 
in hi tech terrorism.

Financial liability.

Reasonable assumption must be that ANY unfortunate event is possibly an 
understandable and justifiable anti-terrorism attack for NSA's and other's hi 
tech terrorism activities.  

Like the US retailiatory attack on Libya for the La Belle disco bombing the 
Reagan administration attributed to Libya.  

Or a frame-up of those who are justified to commit anti-terrorism retaliatory 
strikes.  By their enemies, of course.

There is figure for settlement.

July 3, 1988 Iran Air A300 Airbus was shot down by the USS Vincennes over the 
Persian Gulf.  273 were killed.

The Clinton administration apparently settled with the families of the Iranian 
victims for $300,000 wergild.

US victims families' will likely want more.

Now, General Minihan, perhaps NSA might considering escrowing at least this 
amount for each victim of ANY unfortunate incident, either past, or in the 
future?  

And, of course, there is the wergild for those Iranians killed by Iraq as a 
result of the tactical messages given to Iraq during the Iran/Iraq war.

But we will not know the magnitude of the damages until NSA complies with my 
FOIA to Bottomly.

But, my primary purpose is to settle with NSA.

Here is my proposal:

	1    	$200,000 lost wages and benefits for my NSF grant 	
		non- continuation.

     	2    	$2,000,000 for the years 1997-2003 for my salary, 
		benefits, and  money to complete the work proposed 
		in my NSF grant renewal and new work - related to 
		pseudorandom number generation and machine 
         	combinatorics, of course.  

The law allows you 20 working days to respond to the appeal.  

You can ask for an additional 10 day extension for a valid reason.  

I ask that you respond to my settlement offer within this time too.

Sincerely,



William H. Payne                   
13015 Calle de Sandias NE          
Albuquerque, NM 87111              

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