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14 March 1998

    Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html

    -------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [Congressional Record: March 13, 1998 (Senate)]
    [Page S1920-S1922]
    From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
    [DOCID:cr13mr98-18]

                         CHINA'S PROLIFERATION ACTIVITY

      Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise today to address a rather
    disturbing article that appeared not only in the Washington Times but
    also in the Washington Post, a similar article. The headline in the
    Times says: ``China in New Nuclear Sales Effort.'' The headline in the
    Post: ``U.S. Action Stymied China Sale to Iran.''
      These articles represent a concern of mine, because they detail
    China's continuing nuclear proliferation, not just nuclear
    proliferation, but proliferation to the nation of Iran.
      According to these articles, U.S. intelligence discovered secret
    China-Iran negotiations concerning Chinese transfer of hundreds of tons
    of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride. Anhydrous hydrogen fluoride is a
    material used in enriching uranium to weapons grade uranium.
      This transfer was scheduled to go to Iran's Isfahan Nuclear Research
    Center. The Isfahan Center is the principal site of Iran's efforts to
    manufacture the explosive core of an atomic device, according to the
    articles.
      So what we have here, both in the Washington Post and in the
    Washington Times, is the chronicling of China's effort to send these
    kinds of components and processes to Iran in order for Iran, a rogue
    nation, to enhance its capacity to be involved with atomic weapons of
    mass destruction.
      This revelation of new Chinese efforts to aid Iran's nuclear weapons
    program is deeply troubling, and it follows solemn commitments from
    Chinese leaders just last October that China would cut off nuclear
    assistance to Iran.
      What is more troubling to me, however, is the fact that the Clinton
    administration has overlooked more than a decade of similar promises
    that have been broken just as quickly and routinely as last October's
    promise has now been revealed to have been broken on the face of the
    front pages of this city's newspapers.
      This continued course by this administration to simply take at face
    value assurances consistent with other assurances and, unfortunately,
    consistent with the disregard for those assurances in terms of policy,
    causes us to question whether or not we should have been racing into
    these agreements, and particularly according to China the special
    standing which we have provided to China based on the events of last
    October.
      It is pretty clear to me that, in spite of the fact that China
    assured us last October that they were going to be adopting a different
    posture in regard to nuclear proliferation, their policy and their
    practice was not altered. Their policy and practice of providing this
    kind of proliferation to rogue nations remains in place.
      It is, unfortunately, not new that the Chinese have broken
    agreements. I will submit for the Record a list of events and times in
    which the Chinese have said one thing and done another in regard to
    nuclear proliferation--starting in 1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987,
    1989, 1990, 1991, another incident in 1991, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997.
      Now, this list, which has been assembled by the Nuclear Control
    Institute, merely chronicles the habit, the practice, and the policy of
    China in saying one thing and doing another.
      A number of us were stunned last year when the administration said it
    wanted to elevate the standing of China as it related to nuclear
    technology. We were stunned because we were aware of this list. We were
    stunned, thinking that if in the summer of 1997 our own CIA labels
    China as the world's worst proliferater of weapons of mass destruction,
    why would we

    [[Page S1921]]

    90 days later want to constitute them as a nuclear cooperator and enter
    into a nuclear agreement with them that would entitle them to higher
    levels of information, higher degrees of cooperation with the United
    States?
      I will submit this list for the Record. I will not belabor the Senate
    with all of the documentation here, but I would like the list to be
    included in the Record and the documentation be available to the Senate
    and to the American people. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed
    in the Record.
      There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
    the Record, as follows:

    CHINA'S NON-PROLIFERATION WORDS VS. CHINA'S NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION DEEDS*
                      [From the Nuclear Control Institute]

         Date and what China said--                What China did--
    1981--``Like many other peace-       In 1981, China supplies South
     loving countries, China does not     Africa (at that time not a member
     advocate or encourage nuclear        of the NPT and pursuing a nuclear
     proliferation, and we are            weapons program) with 60 tons of
     emphatically opposed to any          unsafeguarded enriched uranium.
     production of nuclear weapons by     This enriched uranium may have
     racists and expansionists such as    enabled South Africa to triple
     South Africa and Israel.''--Yu       weapons-grade uranium output at
     Peiwen, head of Chinese delegation   the Valindaba facility.\1\ In
     to Conference on Disarmament in      1981, other unsafeguarded Chinese
     Geneva, Xinhua, 8/4/81.              exports include highly enriched
                                          uranium, uranium hexaflouride, and
                                          heavy water to Argentina, and
                                          heavy water to India. Both nations
                                          are non-NPT states with nuclear
                                          weapons programs at the time.\2\
    1983--``China does not encourage or  In 1983, China contracts with
     support nuclear proliferation.''--   Algeria, then a non-NPT state, to
     Vice Premier Li Peng, Xinhua, 10/    construct a large, unsafeguarded
     18/83.                               plutonium-production reactor.
                                          Construction of the reactor
                                          complex began after November 1984--
                                          well after China's April 1984
                                          pledge to subject all future
                                          nuclear exports to IAEA
                                          safeguards, and while China is
                                          negotiating a nuclear cooperation
                                          agreement with the United
                                          States.\3\ China also supplies
                                          Algeria with large hot cells,
                                          which can be used to handle highly
                                          radioactive spent fuel to separate
                                          plutonium.\4\
    1984--``We are critical of the       U.S. officials reveal that, in the
     discriminatory treaty on the         early 1980s, China provided
     nonproliferation of nuclear          Pakistan with the design for a
     weapons, but we do not advocate or   nuclear weapon, and probably
     encourage nuclear proliferation.     enough highly enriched uranium
     We do not engage in nuclear          (HEU) for one to two bombs.\5\
     proliferation ourselves, nor do we
     help other countries develop
     nuclear weapons.''--Premier Zhao
     Ziyang, White House state dinner
     on 1/10/84, Xinhua, 1/11/84 (Note:
     A U.S. official later said that
     ``These were solemn assurances
     with in fact the force of law,''
     AP, 6/15/84).
    1985-86--``China has no intention,   In addition to covering up its
     either at the present or in the      export of the unsafeguarded
     future, to help non-nuclear          reactor to Algeria, China secretly
     countries develop nuclear            sells Pakistan tritium, an element
     weapons.''--Li Peng, Chinese Vice    used in the trigger of hydrogen
     Premier, Xinhua, January 18, 1985.   bombs as well as to boost the
      ``The Chinese made it clear to us   yield of fission weapons.\6\
       that when they say they will not
       assist other countries to
       develop nuclear weapons, this
       also applies to all nuclear
       explosives . . . We are
       satisfied that the
       [nonproliferation] policies they
       have adopted are consistent with
       our own basic views.''--
       Ambassador Richard Kennedy,
       Department of State,
       Congressional testimony, 10/9/85.
      ``Discussions with China that
       have taken place since the
       initialling of the proposed
       [nuclear] Agreement have
       contributed significantly to a
       shared understanding with China
       on what it means not to assist
       other countries to acquire
       nuclear explosives, and in
       facilitating China's steps to
       put all these new policies into
       place. Thus, ACDA believes that
       the statements of policy by
       senior Chinese officials, as
       clarified by these discussions,
       represent a clear commitment not
       to assist a non-nuclear-weapon
       state in the acquisition of
       nuclear explosives.''--ACDA,
       ``Nuclear Proliferation
       Assessment Statement,''
       submitted to Congress on 7/24/85
       with the U.S./China Agreement
       for Cooperation, 7/19/85.
      ``China is not a party to the
       NPT, but its stance on the
       question is clear-cut and above-
       board . . . it stands for
       nuclear disarmament and
       disapproves of nuclear
       proliferation . . . In recent
       years, the Chinese Government
       has more and more, time and
       again reiterated that China
       neither advocates nor encourages
       nuclear proliferation, and its
       cooperation with other countries
       in the nuclear field is only for
       peaceful purposes''.--Ambassador
       Ho Qian Jiadong, speech given at
       the Conference on Disarmament in
       Geneva, 6/27/85 (quoted by Amb.
       Richard Kennedy in congressional
       testimony, 7/31/85).
    1987-89--``China does not advocate   In 1989, China agrees to build a
     or encourage nuclear                 light-water reactor for Pakistan,
     proliferation, nor does it help      begins assisting Iran's
     other countries develop nuclear      development of indigenous
     weapons.''--Vice Foreign Minister    manufacturing capability for
     Qian Qichen, Beijing Review, 3/30/   medium-range ballistic missiles,
     87.                                  and assists Iraq in the
      ``As everyone knows, China does     manufacture of samarium-cobalt
       not advocate nor encourage         ring magnets for uranium-
       nuclear proliferation. China       enrichment centrifuges.\7\
       does not engage in developing or
       assisting other countries to
       develop nuclear weapons.''--
       Foreign Ministry spokesman,
       Beijing radio, 5/4/89.
    1990--``. . . the Chinese            In September 1990, after Iraq's
     government has consistently          invasion of Kuwait and the
     supported and participated in the    imposition of an international
     international community's efforts    trade embargo, China provides Iraq
     for preventing the proliferation     with lithium hydride, a chemical
     of nuclear weapons.''--Ambassador    compound useful in both boosted-
     Hou Zhitong, Xinhua, 4/1/91.         fission and thermonuclear
                                          (hydrogen) bombs, as well as in
                                          ballistic missile fuel.\8\
    1991--``The report claiming that     Sometime around 1991, China
     China provides medium-range          provides ballistic missile
     missiles for Pakistan is             technology to Syria, including the
     absolutely groundless. China does    nuclear-capable M-9 missile. In
     not stand for, encourage, or         1993, a Chinese corporation
     engage itself in nuclear             exports ammonium perchlorate, a
     proliferation and does not aid       missile fuel precursor, to the
     other countries in developing        Iraqi government via a Jordanian
     nuclear weapons.''--Foreign          purchasing agent.\9\ In August
     ministry spokesman Wu Janmin,        1993, the United States imposes
     Zhongguo Ximwen She, 4/25/91.        sanctions on China for exporting
                                          nuclear-capable M-11 ballistic
                                          missiles to Pakistan.
    1991--``China has struck no nuclear  In 1991, China supplies Iran with a
     deals with Iran . . . This           research reactor capable of
     inference is preposterous.''         producing plutonium \10\ and a
     Chinese embassy official Chen        calutron, a technology that can be
     Guoqing, rebutting a claim that      used to enrich uranium to weapons-
     China had sold nuclear technology    grade.\11\ (Calutrons enriched the
     to Iran, letter to Washington        uranium in the ``Little Boy'' bomb
     Post, 7/2/91.                        that destroyed Hiroshima, and were
                                          at the center of Saddam Hussein's
                                          effort to develop an Iraqi nuclear
                                          bomb.)
    1994--``China does not engage in     China supplies a complete nuclear
     proliferation of weapons of mass     fusion research reactor facility
     destruction . . .''--Foreign         to Iran, and provides technical
     Minister Qian Qichen, AP newswire,   assistance in making it
     10/4/94.                             operational.\12\ China, with
                                          apparent U.S. acquiescence, agrees
                                          to replace France as supplier of
                                          low-enriched uranium fuel for
                                          India's U.S.-supplied Tarapur
                                          reactors. The U.S. cut off supply
                                          of LEU soon after India's nuclear
                                          explosion of 1974. This LEU supply
                                          makes it easier for India to
                                          concentrate other nuclear assets
                                          on its weapons program.\13\
    1995--``China has never transferred  In 1995, China exports 5,000 ring
     or sold any nuclear technology or    magnets to Pakistan. Such magnets
     equipment to Pakistan . . . We       are integral components of high-
     therefore hope the U.S. Government   speed gas centrifuges of the type
     will not base its policy-making on   used by Pakistan to enrich uranium
     hearsay.''--Foreign Ministry         to weapons-grade.\14\
     Deputy Secretary Shen Guofang,
     Hong Kong, AFP, 3/26/96 (after
     discovery of the ring magnet sale
     to Pakistan).
    1996--``. . . We have absolutely     In July 1997, a CIA report
     binding assurances from the          concludes that, in the second half
     Chinese, which we consider a         of 1996, ``China was the single
     commitment on their part not to      most important supplier of
     export ring magnets or any other     equipment and technology for
     technologies to unsafeguarded        weapons of mass destruction''
     facilities . . . The negotiating     worldwide.\15\ The report also
     record is made up primarily of       states that, for the period July
     conversations, which were detailed   to December 1996--i.e. after
     and recorded, between U.S. and       China's May 11, 1996 pledge to the
     Chinese officials.''--Under          United States not to provide
     Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff,    assistance to unsafeguarded
     congressional testimony, 5/16/96.    nuclear facilities--China was
      ``China's position on nuclear       Pakistan's ``primary source of
       proliferation is very clear . .    nuclear-related equipment and
       . It does not advocate,            technology . . .'' \16\
       encourage, or engage in nuclear
       proliferation, nor does it
       assist other countries in
       developing nuclear weapons. It
       always undertakes its
       international legal obligations
       of preventing nuclear
       proliferation . . . China has
       always been cautious and
       responsible in handling its
       nuclear exports and exports of
       materials and facilities that
       might lead to nuclear
       proliferation.''--Statement by
       Foreign Ministry spokesman Cui
       Tiankai, Beijing, Xinhua, 9/15/
       97.
    1997--``The question of assurance    According to a CIA report, China is
     does not exist. China and Iran       ``a key supplier'' of nuclear
     currently do not have any nuclear    technology to Iran, exporting over
     cooperation . . . We do not sell     $60 million worth annually.
     nuclear weapons to any country or    Fourteen Chinese nuclear experts
     transfer related technology. This    are reportedly working at Iranian
     is our long-standing position,       nuclear facilities.\17\
     this policy is targeted at all
     countries.'' Foreign Ministry
     spokesman Shen Guofang, Los
     Angeles, 11/2/97, Reuters, 11/3/97.
      ``I wish to emphasize once again
       China has never transferred
       nuclear weapons or relevant
       technology to other countries,
       including Iran . . . China has
       never done it in the past, we do
       not do it now, nor will we do it
       in the future.''--Foreign
       Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang,
       Kyodo, 10/21/97.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    END NOTES

    * China's non-proliferation statements are documented in Rep. Benjamin
      Gilman, ``China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Promises: 1981-1997,''
      Congressional Record, November 5, 1997, p. H10073. China's
      proliferation deeds are documented in Steven Dolley, ``China's Record
      of Proliferation Misbehavior,'' Nuclear Control Institute, September
      29, 1997.
    \1\ Leonard Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, 1990, p. 274; Michael Brenner,
      ``People's Republic of China,'' in International Nuclear Trade and
      Nonproliferation, Ed. William Potter, 1990, p. 253.
    \2\ Judith Miller, ``U.S. is Holding Up Peking Atom Talks,'' New York
      Times, September 19, 1982; Brenner, ibid,; Gary Milhollin and Gerard
      White, ``A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar,'' Washington
      Post, May 12, 1991, p. C4.
    \3\ Vipin Gupta, ``Algeria's Nuclear Ambitions,'' International Defense
      Review, #4, 1992, pp. 329-330.
    \4\ Mark Hibbs, ``Move to Block China Certification Doesn't Concern
      Administration,'' Nucleonics Week, August 7, 1997, p. 11.
    \5\ Leslie Gelb, ``Pakistan Link Perils U.S.-China Nuclear Pact,'' New
      York Times, June 22, 1984, p. A1; Leonard Spector et al., Tracking
      Nuclear Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
      1995, p. 49.
    \6\ Milhollin and White, ``A New China Syndrome,'' op cit., p. C4.
    \7\ ``Iraq and the Bomb,'' MidEast Markets, December 11, 1989, p. 130.
    \8\ Tim Kelsey, ``Chinese Arms Dealers Flaunt U.N. Embargo--China Ships
      Vital Nuclear Cargo to Iraq,'' London Sunday Independent, September
      30, 1990, reprinted in Congressional Record, October 18, 1990, p.
      H10531.
    \9\ Export Control News, December 30, 1994, p. 14.
    \10\ Kenneth Timmerman, ``Tehran's A-Bomb Program Shows Startling
      Progress,'' Washington Times, May 8, 1995. According to Timmerman,
      China and Iran did not report the 1991 purchase of this reactor to the
      IAEA.
    \11\ Marie Colvin, ``Secret Iranian Plans for a Nuclear Bomb,'' Sunday
      Times (London), July 28, 1991; Russell Watson, ``Merchants of Death,''
      Newsweek, November 18, 1991, p. 38.
    \12\ Gary Milhollin, Wisconsin Project, Testimony before the Senate
      Select Committee on Intelligence, September 18, 1997, p. 8.
    \13\ Mark Hibbs, ``Reported VVER-1000 Sale to India Raises NSG Concern
      on Safeguards,'' Nucleonics Week, January 12, 1995, p. 1.
    \14\ Tim Weiner, ``Atom Arms Parts Sold to Pakistan by China, U.S.
      Says,'' New York Times, February 8, 1996, p. A1.
    \15\ U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Nonproliferation Center, ``The
      Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
      Advanced Conventional Munitions,'' 1997, p. 5. See also Mark Hibbs,
      ``DOD, ACDA Want China Accord Link to Other Weapons Export Limits,''
      Nucleonics Week, August 21, 1997, p. 2; Tim Weiner, ``China is Top
      Supplier to Nations Seeking Powerful, Banned Arms,'' New York Times,
      July 3, 1997, p. A10.
    \16\ CIA report, ``The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of
      Mass Destruction,'' op cit., p. 5.
    \17\ CIA report, ibid.; Con Coughlin, ``U.S. Sounds Alarm Over Iran
      Nuclear Threat,'' Sunday Telegraph (London), February 23, 1997, p. 24.

    [[Page S1922]]

      Mr. ASHCROFT. Now, this most recent set of incidents, of course,
    revealed in the Washington Times today, and in the Washington Post as
    well, and I am sure in other newspapers across the country, was the
    subject of a special briefing to Members of the U.S. Senate very
    recently. I was not a part of that briefing and I do not know what was
    said at the special briefing, but the information that I am including
    is information from these news sources. I want to make it clear that I
    would not be breaching any special information provided to the Senate.
    I was not a party to it. But the information is well known.
      What is perhaps in some measure troubling is that the administration
    sought to portray this episode with China as a success. They say,
    ``Look what we stopped. Look what we were able to do.'' They say that
    China responded more swiftly to our complaints this time, that when we
    caught them red-handed in the process of breaking their word, they were
    more ready to admit they were breaking their word. To hear
    administration officials talk, the swiftness of China's response to the
    exposure of their proliferation activity is grounds for disregarding
    that the administration was hoodwinked by the Chinese all along.
      Well, the inventory since 1981 is sort of the litany, if you will, of
    the insistent and nagging record of proliferation violation after
    proliferation violation after proliferation violation upon
    proliferation violation. These things provided a basis for saying to
    the administration, we should not trust the Chinese, at least without
    some record, without some record that proliferation will stop, and yet
    within days after our CIA labeled the Chinese as the world's worst
    proliferaters, we in this administration seemed ready to believe their
    next assurance. And, of course, these newspapers indicate that our
    belief should have been in their practice and policy of the past, which
    has been a policy of betrayal and a policy of disregard, not a policy
    of compliance with agreements relating to nonproliferation of nuclear
    weapons.
      Who knows what other nuclear assistance projects China has in store
    with Iran or other rogue regimes. Who knows how many such projects we
    have not detected, have not called their hand on, have not asked them
    to stop because we did not know about them. We happen to intercept
    information here.
      Given China's past proliferation record, and given that the 1997 CIA
    report that called China--and I quote--``the most significant supplier
    of weapons of mass destruction-related goods and technology to foreign
    countries''--that was a quote; the CIA labeled them that less than a
    year ago--it is pretty clear that people of good sense would say, maybe
    we ought to ask that they be compliant, maybe we ought to ask that they
    observe their agreements for at least a short interval before we endow
    them with our full trust and confidence.
      I opposed President Clinton's decision to begin nuclear cooperation
    with China based on the CIA report, based on this heritage of denying
    and breaking these agreements. And now the newspapers of this morning,
    from both the right and the left, if you will, have said that China was
    in the process of breaking these agreements currently after China has
    given its word.
      In order for United States-China nuclear cooperation to proceed, the
    President certified to Congress that China--and this is what he
    certified--``is not assisting and will not assist any nonnuclear-weapon
    state, either directly or indirectly, in acquiring nuclear explosive
    devices or the material and components for such devices.''
      The President's haste to make this certification seriously undermined
    U.S. counterproliferation credibility, credibility that would be
    desperately needed just a few weeks later in a confrontation with
    Saddam Hussein over the same issue of the threat of weapons of mass
    destruction--not a unique issue.
      Mr. President, the startling inconsistencies in this administration's
    policy regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
    these inconsistencies are putting the national security of our country
    at risk. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright talks about NATO's new
    central mission as combating the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction. The United States almost went to war last month in the
    Persian Gulf over the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
      We still face the prospect of having to use military force to address
    the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. And
    yet, in spite of all this, the administration's rhetoric on
    counterproliferation--in spite of the continuing object lesson of
    Saddam Hussein and the threat posed by his terrorist government--the
    Clinton administration has entered into a nuclear cooperation agreement
    with China, the world's worst proliferater of weapons of mass
    destruction. And we know, as of this week, that China is repudiating
    the basis of those agreements.
      Just as Saddam Hussein has outmaneuvered this administration to keep
    his weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, China has outmaneuvered this
    administration to continue to proliferate weapons of mass destruction
    to Iran. Not only is Beijing continuing to pursue nuclear assistance to
    Iran, but, according to the CIA, China is a major supplier to Iran of
    chemical weapons and missiles technology as well.
      I call on the President to put a halt to nuclear cooperation with
    China. The President, in my opinion, has pursued a policy of blind
    engagement with the Chinese. It is a policy which disregards the facts,
    the litany of breaches on the part of the Chinese. It disregards the
    facts of continuing breaches of their agreements by the Chinese who
    continue to proliferate weapons of mass destruction. In light of the
    reports on China's continuation of proliferation activity, the proposed
    United States-China summit meeting in June should be reconsidered.
      Mr. President, the decision to begin nuclear cooperation with China
    was a political one. It was driven by the administration's desire to
    have a ``meaningful'' meeting, an event strategy. Well, ``meaningful''
    events cannot replace substantive foreign policy. We cannot say in one
    part of the world to Saddam Hussein, ``Well, we'll go to war with you
    over weapons of mass destruction,'' while we are winking at someone
    else, saying, ``Well, it's OK if you continue to break your word and
    proliferate weapons of mass destruction'' to equally dangerous rogue
    regimes. It undermines America's credibility in combating the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is not worth the
    photo-op that we get from the Chinese by having a summit if we have to
    destroy our policy and threaten the security of this globe to do it.
      I believe that it is time for us to have a policy, a policy that is
    unmistakable and clear and a policy that is respected, that weapons of
    mass destruction are not to be tolerated and that the United States
    will not extend privileges of nuclear cooperation to those who would
    take nuclear resources and make them available to rogue nations as
    weapons of mass destruction.
      The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes has expired.
      Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I yield the floor and thank the Chair.
      Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.
      The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.

                              ____________________