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20 July 1998
Source: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html

    [Congressional Record: July 17, 1998 (Senate)]
    [Page S8468-S8470]
    From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
    [DOCID:cr17jy98-138]

            NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE SENATE'S CHINA INVESTIGATIONS

      Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, as every Senator is aware, a number of
    Committees are investigating the national security impacts of two parts
    of the U.S. relationship with China: the launching of American
    commercial satellites on Chinese rockets, and the so-called ``China
    Plan'' to influence the American political process through campaign
    donations.
      Earlier this week the Majority Leader came to the floor to announce
    what he called ``major interim judgments'' of his task force
    coordinating this investigation. His remarks sparked a round of debate
    and speculation that may have clouded the real issues at hand, and I
    would like to take a moment to respond. [See ]
      These are unquestionably significant issues that merit serious,
    objective review. For me and for the Democratic Senators on our
    investigation task force, the objective is simple: national security.
      We want the national security to be enhanced; we want American lives
    and American interests protected.
      If the Senate's work on the satellite export issue reveals flaws in
    our export controls that endanger national security, we want those
    flaws corrected--now.
      If the facts warrant, we will gladly join with our Republican
    colleagues to that end. But there should be no place for politics, for
    partisan political maneuvering, when it comes to national security.
      We also want U.S. law to be enforced without fear or favor. If the
    law was violated in campaign financing for the 1996 election,
    Democratic Senators want the guilty held accountable. The best way to
    ensure this occurs is not to discuss classified information associated
    with these cases, and thereby avoid impeding or damaging the FBI's and
    the Justice Department's ability to investigate and build cases.
      In short, we care about this investigation because we care about
    national security.
      One of the most important guardians of national security is the
    Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This is a unique committee,
    Mr. President. It is not set up like others. It has a vice-chairman,
    not a ranking member. Its makeup gives the majority party just a one-
    vote advantage regardless of the composition of the Senate.
      We try to keep partisanship out of most things we do, but in the case
    of this Committee, Mr. President, we insist on it, because Americans
    are more safe when Congress can conduct oversight of intelligence
    functions in a manner that is not just bipartisan, but nonpartisan.
      It is for this reason that I agreed with the Majority Leader's
    decision to assign primary responsibility to the vital China
    investigation to the Intelligence Committee. And it is also for this
    reason that I am so gravely disappointed when its nonpartisan tradition
    is violated.
      That tradition makes the assertion earlier this week that ``interim
    judgments'' had been reached in the China matter particularly
    disturbing. The Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the
    senator from Nebraska, said they most assuredly had not, a fact
    subsequently confirmed by the Chairman.
      The Democratic priority is national security. National security is a
    complex and demanding topic in today's world. While several Senate
    committees consider the effect on Chinese ballistic missiles of
    launching American commercial satellites in China, this nation faces
    many other equally grave and immediate threats to our national
    security.
      For example, Russia, which is now in an economic and military
    tailspin, has thousands of nuclear warheads and many tons of fissile
    material from which warheads could be made at stake and perhaps in
    jeopardy.
      The temptation in Russia today to look the other way while such
    materials quietly migrate to rogue states must be acute. That's one way
    in which Russia's problems threaten the United States.
      Other threats appear in the headlines for a few days and then recede
    from public view, but they are still out there: the very unstable
    nuclear confrontation in South Asia, the development of weapons of mass
    destruction by Iran and other rogue states, the growing conflict in
    Kosovo, the growing tension between the Koreas, the still-tense Bosnia
    situation.
      We are also threatened today by non-nation state actors, the
    terrorist organizations who plot to kill or kidnap Americans overseas,
    and the crime cartels who use today's increasingly open international
    borders to bring narcotics and other criminal activity to our shores.
    Information warfare and the relationship between computers and our
    national infrastructure is another arena in which hostile nations,
    movements, or even individuals can threaten us.
      All these threats present greater challenges to the defense,
    intelligence, and law enforcement establishments than they encountered
    during the cold war.
      At the same time, the haystack is growing, the needles are as small
    as ever. We need to support and strengthen our capabilities in these
    areas. We need to be able to react quickly to changing threats and
    develop the brainpower to master environments ranging from now-obscure
    foreign cultures at one extreme, to global cyberspace at the other.
      The one thing we should not do is stand pat, as if winning the cold
    war gives us the right to relax.
      Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for the elements of
    government that defend against, deter, or counter the threats: the
    world's most capable military forces, informed by the world's leading
    intelligence services, as well as law enforcement entities which are
    second to none. It is our responsibility in Congress to fund these
    activities, to guide their continued improvement, and to oversee what
    they do.
      If these departments and agencies are essential to our national
    security--and they are--then our Congressional authorization,
    appropriation and oversight processes for these activities are also
    essential to national security.
      The need to address these issues underscores the importance of the
    Intelligence Committee's mandate. To approach these matters in a spirit
    of partisanship arguably puts the national security at risk.
      As for the China inquiry, to my knowledge, none of the four
    committees that have conducted hearings on the matter has reached any
    conclusions, interim or otherwise. Many documents already in the
    possession of Congress have not even been reviewed. Other documents
    have not yet been received from the administration, which is working
    hard to comply with the sweeping document requests they have gotten
    from Congress.
      So it is premature to reach even interim conclusions. To do so
    subverts the Congressional oversight process.
      I would prefer not to be here discussing ongoing investigations. But
    I think it is important to correct the record so that from this point
    on we can let the committees do their work.
      It has been suggested this week on the Senate floor that the Clinton
    administration's export controls for satellites are wholly inadequate.
    That statement should be considered in its historical context.
      The policy of exporting satellites for launch on Chinese rockets was
    initiated in 1988 under President Reagan and has continued under
    Presidents Bush and Clinton. President Bush authorized the export of 9
    satellites to China in three years. Each of these satellites could only
    be exported after President Bush determined that the transaction was in
    the U.S. national interest and that the Tianamen sanctions should be
    waived.
      President Clinton did make some changes in the licensing process for
    the export of commercial communications satellites.
      President Bush transferred licensing authority for over one-half of
    all commercial satellites from State to Commerce and recommended that
    serious consideration be given to moving the rest over to Commerce.
    President Clinton completed this transfer and issued

    [[Page S8469]]

    an executive order that greatly increased the role of the Defense
    Department in these decisions. In recent testimony before the Senate
    Armed Services Committee, a witness, otherwise critical of the Clinton
    administration, acknowledged that the United States has the strongest
    and best export controls in the world!
      Does this mean the system is perfect? Certainly not. No multi-agency
    process involving thousands of decisionmakers and difficult technical
    and political issues can be. In fact, as a result of some of the
    information disclosed in the early stages of the hearings, I believe
    some modification is probably in order. For example, the Departments of
    Defense and State should see the final text of all licenses.
      However, these are minor fixes in a system that, according to State,
    Commerce, Defense, and the intelligence community, is working well.
      Second, it has been asserted that sensitive technology related to
    satellite exports has been transferred to China. Under the Clinton
    administration, all requests to launch U.S. satellites aboard Chinese
    rockets go through an exhaustive and careful scrutiny. The Departments
    of Defense and State must approve all licenses and always place U.S.
    national security in the forefront of their decision process. Their
    primary role in this process is to specifically design procedures to
    ensure that China's access to U.S. technology is limited solely to what
    is needed to mate the U.S. satellite to the Chinese launcher.
      If these procedures are properly followed, the Chinese learn little,
    if anything, about our satellites or the technology they contain.
    Indeed, the Chinese gain no direct access to our satellites and only
    take ownership of the U.S. satellites they purchase from us after they
    are successfully placed in orbit.
      Third, it has been charged that China has received military benefit
    from U.S. satellite exports, and reference has been made to Chinese
    missiles pointed at U.S. nuclear cities. These very same missiles were
    developed years before President Reagan decided to allow U.S.
    satellites to be placed atop Chinese launchers.
      Furthermore, Intelligence Committee hearings have been held on this
    very issue. And I might say all of them were closed hearings, and
    public accounts of those hearings fail to substantiate this sensational
    charge. There is no public account, to my understanding, that
    substantiates the sensational charges made earlier by people on this
    floor.
      The final specific charge I will address today is the assertion that
    new evidence has come to light about a Chinese plan to influence our
    political process, and that this new evidence should lead the Attorney
    General to appoint an independent counsel. Unfortunately, the ``new''
    evidence cited is highly classified and cannot and should not be
    discussed publicly.
      Mr. President, publicly characterizing classified information under
    any circumstance is dangerous. Using it to make charges against which
    the accused are unable to defend themselves is even more so.
      Classification is a misunderstood, sometimes frustrating, thing. It
    is difficult to explain and understand why we keep some things secret.
    Well, the reason is simple. Americans, and our friends around the
    world, quite literally risk their lives to gather this information
    because we promise to protect them.
      When classified information is characterized, the sources who collect
    intelligence and the methods by which they do so are in danger.
    Furthermore, because the information involved was classified, those
    citing it are fully aware that the individuals involved cannot, under
    law, use that information to reply.
      I will resist the temptation to place on the Record my own
    characterization of this new classified information. Instead, I will
    simply make the point that we have heard Republican Members make
    equally ominous proclamations about the China-plot in the past only to
    see that these facts fail to substantiate their own allegations.
      Moreover, Attorney General Janet Reno has access to all relevant
    information, classified and unclassified. She has not been reluctant to
    call for a special prosecutor in the past, and I am confident that
    should the facts warrant, she will not hesitate to do so in this case.
      These observations cover my concerns about what has been voiced by
    critics of this administration's export policies. However, my greatest
    reservation is the result of what has not been stated. These critics
    repeatedly fail to mention that the last six Presidents--Democratic and
    Republican alike--have each concluded it is in our national interest to
    engage China, not isolate it.
      Specifically, every President since Ronald Reagan has agreed that our
    national security is enhanced as a result of allowing the Chinese to
    place U.S. satellites in orbit.
      Based on current information, I agree with this assessment. I believe
    it is in our national interest to dominate the world's commercial
    satellite market. This is a strategic industry vital to our defense. We
    simply cannot be the dominant power in today's high-tech world without
    this industry and others like it.
      This industry also produces tens of thousands of challenging, high-
    paying jobs for Americans. So when the Chinese choose an American
    satellite instead of a foreign satellite, that is good for our security
    as well as our economy. But the underlying point is that congressional
    committees are taking a fresh look at all these issues. Therefore, I
    will reserve final judgment pending their findings.
      The China investigations now underway could have significant,
    positive benefit for national security. That is my goal and the goal of
    the Democratic task force. We look forward to working with Senator Lott
    and Republican members of his task force to get an outcome that makes
    America safer.
      I applaud many members of our task force and the work done by members
    of the committee. The next speaker, Mr. President, deserves special
    commendation. He is not only a member of the Intelligence Committee,
    but he is our ranking member on the Armed Services Committee. I do not
    know of anyone who has put more time and effort into sifting through
    these facts and attempting as best as he can, in as objective a manner
    as he can, what the facts are. He has done so in a fashion that is
    commensurate with his reputation. I commend him again for his studious
    and thoughtful analysis and the work that he has provided not only to
    our task force but to the committee.
      I yield the floor.
      Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
      The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
      Mr. LEVIN. First, let me thank the Democratic leader for those kind
    comments.
      It is my intention just to briefly amplify what the Democratic leader
    said here this afternoon. And I am greatly appreciative for the
    tremendous support that he has given to an effort to achieve a
    bipartisan approach to an issue which should be approached in a
    bipartisan manner. There is no justification for partisanizing this
    issue. It will weaken our security if we do so. And the Democratic
    leader's effort to insist that we approach this issue in a bipartisan
    way, I hope, will produce some results.
      Mr. President, the statement that was released last Tuesday by the
    majority leader was a highly partisan approach to the multiple hearings
    which we have had in the Senate relative to the export of satellites to
    China.
      I happen to sit on three of the four Senate committees that have held
    these hearings, so I speak from personal experience when I say that the
    majority leader's statement omitted some of the most important
    testimony that those committees received.
      His statement also conveyed the false impression that the statement
    was a bipartisan product, when to the best of my knowledge not a single
    Democrat was consulted or even knew that the statement was being
    prepared.
      The majority leader's statements claim that he was being careful not
    to rush to judgment, but then he offered such unequivocal conclusions
    as:

           The Clinton Administration's export controls for satellites
         are wholly inadequate, [and that] they have not protected
         sensitive U.S. technology, [and that] national security
         concerns are regularly downplayed and even ignored, [and
         that] sensitive technology related to satellite exports has
         been transferred to China, [and that] China has received
         military benefit from U.S. satellite exports.

    [[Page S8470]]

      To my knowledge, Mr. President, not one of the Senate committees
    investigating these issues has reached those conclusions. The evidence
    that the majority leader offered to support his conclusions ignored
    some of the most important testimony that we received, obviously,
    because it contradicted their conclusions offered.
      For example, the majority leader's statement ignored testimony by
    senior Department of Defense and State officials on June 18 and 25 and
    on July 8 that the 1996 Clinton Executive order ``strengthened'' the
    Department of Defense's role in Commerce export licenses, rather than
    weakening it, and also ignored the fact that those Department of
    Defense and State Department officials believed ``it would be a bad
    thing'' to return to State licensing of commercial satellites.
      In a June 18 hearing before the Senate Governmental Affairs
    Subcommittee on International Security on which I sit, when responding
    to a question on whether commercial satellite export licensing should
    be returned to the State Department, Department of Defense, Principal
    Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Jan Lodal testified that ``I think it
    would be a bad thing to do.'' And Assistant Under Secretary of State
    for International Security John Holum, testified, ``I agree. . . . I
    would recommend against that.''
      Mr. President, the statement of the majority leader last Tuesday also
    ignored the Department of Defense and State Department letters which
    were included in the June 18 Governmental Affairs Committee
    subcommittee hearing record and which stated that each agency has an
    adequate opportunity to revise and support the issuance of all
    satellite export licenses actually issued by Commerce since 1990.
      The majority leader's statement ignored testimony on June 18 by
    senior State and DOD officials, stating that they are unaware of any
    transfer of sensitive U.S. satellite technology to China that has
    harmed U.S. national security.
      Mr. Holum testified, ``[W]e do not believe that any launch of a
    commercial satellite under this policy since 1988 has resulted in a
    transfer of significant technology or assistance to Chinese either
    space-launch vehicle capabilities or missile capabilities.''
      Mr. Lodal testified, ``I agree. We're not aware of any situation in
    which such transfer harmed U.S. security.'' Yet the majority leader's
    statement ignores that kind of testimony.
      Now, the majority leader's statement cited testimony critical of U.S.
    export control from a June 25 hearing before the Governmental Affairs
    Committee by an individual that the majority leader described as a
    ``senior official of the Defense Trade and Security Administration,''
    without mentioning testimony the following week before the Senate Armed
    Services Committee revealing that this individual, Dr. Peter Leitner,
    had been demoted by the Bush administration from a senior policy
    position to a lower-level licensing officer within that office. The
    statement of the majority leader also omitted testimony on June 25 and
    on July 9 by some of Dr. Leitner's current and former superiors at the
    Department of Defense contradicting Mr. Leitner's facts and assertions.
      The majority leader's statement cites testimony by the GAO before the
    Senate Intelligence Committee on June 10, but omitted testimony from
    the same hearing indicating that the General Accounting Office has not
    reached a conclusion on whether current export controls are adequate to
    protect national security, and he omitted to say that the Intelligence
    Committee had requested the General Accounting Office to conclude that
    analysis. Now, the relevant testimony came from Katherine Schinasi, the
    Associate Director of the International Affairs Division at the General
    Accounting Office. Responding to a question about Department of
    Defense's ability to effectively advocate national security interests
    in the current export control process, she testified on behalf of the
    General Accounting Office that, ``We have not looked at how that
    process has operated.''
      The majority leader's statement indicates that moving satellites from
    the State Department to the Commerce Department eliminated the
    requirement that Congress receive notice of individual export licenses.
    The statement failed to mention the legal requirement that the
    President must notify Congress of all national security waivers
    authorizing commercial satellite exports to China, whether the export
    license is issued by State or by Commerce. The majority leader's
    statement also failed to note that Congress has, in fact, received
    timely notice of every waiver granted to export a satellite to China;
    and that Congress has received timely notice of the decisions in 1992
    and 1996 to transfer satellites from the State Department to the
    Commerce Department. It fails to acknowledge that despite receiving all
    those notices, Congress took no action to express disagreement with the
    decisions made.
      The majority leader's statement also omitted mention of the National
    Security Council letter included in the July 9 Senate Armed Services
    Committee hearing record, stating that the National Security Council
    conducts the same waiver review process for commercial satellite
    exports to China, whether the export license is issued by the State
    Department or by the Commerce Department.
      The majority leader's report omitted testimony on June 18 and July 8
    before the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on international security,
    by senior Defense and State Department officials that, after the 3
    unmonitored satellite launches took place in China, a policy decision
    was made in 1996 and remains in effect today, requiring the Defense
    Department to monitor all satellite launches, whether or not a
    satellite contains sensitive technology.
      Mr. Lodal, speaking for the Defense Department, testified on June 18
    that

           Communication [satellite] licenses include strong
         safeguards, including DOD monitoring . . . DOD currently
         reviews all communication satellite licenses to ensure that
         the proposed export would be consistent with U.S. national
         security interests . . . [A]fter the implementation of the
         1992 Bush administration decision to transfer to Commerce
         purely commercial satellites, and before the 1996 revision,
         there were three launches that were not monitored . . . We're
         not aware of any transfer of technology from these
         unmonitered launches that contributed to China's missile and
         military satellite capabilities.

      He continued, speaking for the Defense Department:

           Nevertheless, DOD did conclude that full monitoring would
         be a strong safeguard at relatively low cost to the
         companies, and that it should be applied to all license
         cases, even those that did not require Department of State
         licenses. And this was agreed by all agencies and
         incorporated as a requirement in 1996, when jurisdiction was
         transferred to Commerce for all commercial communications
         satellites. . . .''

      The majority leader's statement identified the major ``military
    benefit'' of China launches of U.S.-made commercial satellites to be
    the access gained by the Chinese military to an improved commercial
    telephone system, without acknowledging that that same so-called
    military benefit would have accrued if China had instead launched
    European-made commercial satellites.
      The majority leader's statement ignored testimony from Clinton
    administration critics on July 9 before the Senate Armed Services
    Committee that the United States export control system is still the
    ``best'' and most restrictive in the world.
      Now, the majority leader has the right to say whatever he wishes on
    the subject of satellite exports to China. But he is wrong to suggest,
    as his statement did, that his conclusions were bipartisan, or that
    they were reached by the Senate committees examining this issue. His
    statement struck a major blow to whatever hopes there were that the
    Senate committees would proceed in this matter in a bipartisan way,
    with emphasis on the facts rather than on partisan politics.
      Mr. President, I hope that a bipartisan approach can still be
    salvaged. But I think it is fair to say that that goal, that effort
    which is so important to the national security of this Nation, was
    given a set-back by the highly partisan comments of the majority leader
    on this floor last Tuesday.
      Mr. President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
      Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
      The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.

                              ____________________